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ABSTRACT

For long, coastal management focused on the sustainable utilization of coastal resources
and avoidance and management of conflict, as well as the promotion of
complementarities between users. However, with rising sea levels and other climate
change impacts, coastal management has become increasingly complex. This thesis
investigates the legal instruments underpinning the management of coastal zones,
exploring the concept of sustainable coastal development (SCD) and the relevance of the
integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) process. Specifically, the discourse analyzes
how law and legal regimes play a backbone role in strengthening and supporting ICZM
implementation by facilitating the linkage between ICZM and coastal climate change
adaptation (CCCA) to contribute to SCD.
Countless reports and studies testify that several of the world’s coastal regions have
already and will continue to be detrimentally impacted by sea level rise (SLR) and
climate change. One of the major theaters where these impacts will be most acute is
South Asia, where vast populations are crowded into low-lying coastal areas. Most of the
residents in these zones are economically constrained and have poor adaptive capacities,
leaving them particularly vulnerable to climate change and SLR. Accordingly,
operationalizing ICZM and linking it with CCCA is vital to these coastal communities, as
is enacting and reengineering their coastal laws to affect the linkage. However, given the
magnitude of the problem and the inability of most of the South Asian coastal countries
to be able to respond singularly to the challenges there is an urgent need for greater
regional co-operation. Drawing on the experiences of other coastal countries and regions,
certain core principles that can inform coastal law-making for South Asia are identified.
The idea is that these principles when set in a regional level instrument (in the instant
case, the South Asian Seas Action Plan), will not only go a long way to strengthen
regional cooperation, but also, and more importantly, will help coastal countries develop
their respective coastal laws by effectuating the linkage between ICZM and CCCA
implementation. This reform agenda has significant potential to facilitate the move
towards SCD.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION
The sea, which had been beating against the shores, suddenly
broke the boundary that was imposed on it by nature [and]
rushed into the city. It coursed through the streets of the
beautiful city, [covering] up everything . . . Even as they were
all looking, Arjuna saw the beautiful buildings becoming
submerged one by one. Arjuna took a last look at the mansion
of Krishna. It was soon covered by the sea. In a matter of a few
moments it was all over. The sea had now become as placid as
a lake. There was no trace of the beautiful city, which had been
the favourite haunt of all the Pandavas. Dwaraka was just a
name; just a memory.1
-The Mahabharata
This poignant passage from an ancient Hindu text is one of the earliest accounts of an
entire city in the Indian subcontinent – the Dwaraka of Lord Krishna – being inundated
by rising seas.2 Similar tales abound in other civilizations, including the biblical deluge3
and the epic of Gilgamesh.4 Akin to this swallowing of the Dwaraka by the sea,
cataclysmic floods, tsunamis and earthquakes have destroyed cities and towns throughout
recorded and pre-recorded history. Examples include the fabled continent of Atlantis,5
parts of Cleopatra’s royal quarters off coastal Alexandria, 6 the seven pagodas at
1
2

3

4
5
6

Bhaktivejanyana Swami, Ithihaasa: The Mystery of His Story is My Story of History (Bloomington:
AuthorHouse, 2013) at 148.
TS Subramanian, "Significant finds at Dwaraka", The Hindu [of India] (23 February 2007) online:
The Hindu <http://www.thehindu.com/>. The Matsyapurana mentions the story of King Manu who
was saved by Lord Vishnu in his Matsya Avatar, (fish incarnation) from the Mahapralaya (the
deluge). Matsya Mahapurana: An Exhaustive Introduction, 1st ed, KL Joshi, ed, translated by Board
of Scholars, Parimal Sanskrit Series, No 93 (New Delhi: Parimal Publishers, 2007) at 15-40, ver
2.10.
See The King James Version of the Holy Bible, Genesis, ver 6:5-8:21. In the Book of Genesis, God
resolves to send a devastating flood to destroy mankind due to its wicked ways. He commands
Noah, the only righteous person on Earth, to build a wooden ark and fill it with males and females of
all living creatures. When Noah finished the task and boarded the ark with his family, the heavens
opened and it rained for 40 days and nights, after which floodwaters overran the earth, destroying all
life except for that on the ark. Once the floodwaters receded, Noah and his brood, both human and
non-human, left the ark to repopulate the world. Ibid.
The Epic of Gilgamesh (Assyrian International News Agency, Books Online, [nd]) chap 5 at 20,
online: AINA, Books, The Epic of Gilgamesh <http://www.aina.org/>.
“Has the real lost city of Atlantis finally been found ... buried under mud flats in Spain?”,
MailOnline (15 March 2011) online: MailOnline <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/index.html>.
“Sunken treasure - divers recover the stunning artefacts of Cleopatra’s palace”, Mail Online (26
May 2010) online: MailOnline <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/index.html>.
1

Mahabalipuram,7 and the port cities of Muziris,8 Pavlopetri,9 Dunwich10 and Port
Royal.11 A variety of reasons have been offered for the destruction of these places,
ranging from the wickedness of the inhabitants, to retribution spells and curses. These
losses have been largely localised and sporadic, having taken place at different times in
human history.
Today, with global warming and sea level rise (SLR), we have an impending
disaster looming over our heads like the proverbial sword of Damocles. A growing body
of scientific evidence confirms that the earth’s climate is rapidly changing. 12 In fact,
climate change, and in particular its impacts on coastal regions, is fast becoming the
biggest challenge ever to confront mankind.13
In recent history, the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, which was one of the worst
natural disasters ever to strike the area, brought the coastal communities of South Asia
face-to-face with the destructive power of the sea. On 26 December 2004, a massive
underwater earthquake measuring 9.3 on the Richter scale, with its epicenter off the
western coast of northern Sumatra, triggered a tsunami. Within hours, the wave was
cutting a deadly path across two continents, killing nearly 300,000 people.14 The worst
affected countries were Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, the Maldives and Thailand. Entire
coastal communities were wiped out, and in certain places the waves reached three

7
8
9
10
11
12

13

14

TS Subramanian, “The secret of the Seven Pagodas”, Frontline [of India] 22:10 (20 May 2005)
online: Frontline, Archive Search <http://www.frontline.in/>.
Pankaja Srinivasan, “In search of Muziris”, The Hindu [of India] (8 August 2012) online: The
Hindu <http://www.thehindu.com>.
See generally The Pavlopetri Underwater Archaeology Project, online: UK Campus
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/pavlopetri/index.aspx>.
“Underwater city could be revealed”, BBC News (14 January 2008) online: BBC News
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/>.
The Underwater City of Port Royal: Description, online: UNESCO <http://whc.unesco.org/en/ten
tativelists/5430/>.
The IPCC concludes that “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal.” Core Writing Team,
Rajendra K Pachauri & Andy Reisinger, eds, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (Geneva:
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008) at 30.
“We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time”. See UNFCCC,
Draft decision -/CP.15: Proposal by the President: Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (18
December 2009) ¶1.
The Indian Ocean tsunami is one of the worst natural disasters in recorded human history. See
generally Hope Lewis, “Human Rights and Natural Disaster The Indian Ocean Tsunami” (2006) 33
Hum Rts 12 (HeinOnline). The killer waves wrecked the coastlines of several countries spread over
a vast geographical area in the Indian Ocean that stretched out from the Indonesia in far South East
Asia, spread over large parts of coastal South Asia, right up to Somalia in the African continent.
2

kilometers inland.15 Over 1.7 million were displaced, and economic losses exceeded
USD10 billion.16 In South Asia, the tsunami primarily hit Sri Lanka, India and the
Maldives. Sri Lanka suffered damage to nearly two-thirds of its coastline, lost 35,322
lives, and was left with 853,025 displaced persons.17 The total loss in assets was about
USD1 billion or nearly five per cent of its GDP.18 In India, the southeastern coastline
bore the brunt of the damage, which left nearly 12,500 dead and 647,600 displaced. 19 In
the Maldives, the main damage was to water sources and infrastructure, setting the
struggling developing country back by several decades.
Even though the Indian Ocean tsunami is not per se related to climate change and
SLR, the consequent response by the affected countries in the South Asian region is a
stark and vivid example of how unorganised nations in this region are in dealing with the
impacts of mass disasters in coastal areas, in this case climate change and SLR. Even
after the enactment of new responsive mechanisms, it is doubtful whether these countries
are still able to respond to emerging challenges. 20 In fact a few years later, in 2007, Super
Cyclone Sidr swept across the southwest coast of Bangladesh, leaving 3,406 people dead
and close to nine million people affected.21 The cyclone first struck the Sunderban
mangrove forests, a fortunate happenstance, which considerably reduced the storm’s
intensity before it reached the populated areas.22 A year later, Cyclone Nargis hit
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16

17

18

19
20
21
22

Prema-chandra Athukorala, “Disaster, Generosity and Recovery: Indian Ocean Tsunami”, Working
Paper No 2012/04 (Canberra: Working Papers in Trade and Development, Australian National
University, 2012) at 5.
John Telford, John Cosgrave & Rachel Houghton, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Joint Evaluation
of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report (London: Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition, 2006) at 16-17.
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Legal Issues from the
International Response to the Tsunami in Sri Lanka: An International Disaster Response Laws,
Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme Case Study (2006) at 4.
Shamalie Gunawardana, “Legal and Governance Issues of the Tsunami Disaster – The Sri Lankan
Experience” in C Raj Kumar & DK Srivastava, eds, Tsunami and Disaster Management: Law and
Governance (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2006) 227 at 228.
Tiding over Tsunami - Part 1 (Tamil Nadu: India, 2005) at 14.
See UNISDR, Press Release, UNISDR 2009/24, “Five years after the Indian Ocean Tsunami – are
we better prepared and more resilient to disasters?” (24 December 2009).
Bangladesh, Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh Damage, Loss, and Needs Assessment for Disaster
Recovery and Reconstruction (Bangladesh: Economic Relations Division, 2008) at 4.
Ibid at 5.
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Irrawaddy Delta and southern Yangon in Myanmar, leaving 140,000 people dead and 2.4
million severely affected.23
The increasing frequency and ferocity of disasters and extreme weather events,
points to something out of the order in the natural regulation of the earth’s climate.24 All
these events have brought the issue of climate change out of science journals and movies
and into the realm of public consciousness and debate.25
There is now overwhelming and demonstrable scientific evidence that supports the
conclusion that the earth is warming at alarming and unprecedented levels. As the Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5) notes “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal … The
atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea
level has risen …”26 These phenomena cannot be accounted for by natural climate
variability alone and human activity, particularly the burning of fossil fuels and
deforestation processes, appears to be the main contributing factor. The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change 199227 (UNFCCC) also recognises human
contribution in this phenomenon, defining climate change as

23
24

25

26

27

“FACTBOX-Key facts about Cyclone Nargis, Reuters” (30 April 2009) online: REUTERS
<http://www.reuters.com/>.
Hurricane Katrina, a category five hurricane that all but destroyed New Orleans, became the
costliest natural disaster to strike the United States. See Casey P Kaplan, “The Act of God Defense:
Why Hurricane Katrina & Noah’s Flood Don’t Qualify” (2007) 26 Rev Litig 155 at 156 (QL); see
also Staff Reporter, “Climate change-triggered high sea level led to more damage in Japan:
Pachauri”, The Hindu [of India] (23 March 2011) online: The Hindu <http://www.hindu.com>.
Kevin Costner’s 1995 film Waterworld is a futuristic vision of the polar ice caps having completely
melted and “the earth lying beneath the watery grave”. The survivors managed to adapt to the new
water world, living in rusty vessels while searching for a mythical place called “dry land.”
Waterworld, 1995, DVD: (New York: Universal Pictures, 1995). The Day After Tomorrow (2004) is
a film in a similar vein that gave audiences a chilling visualization of the possible catastrophic
consequences of global warming. The Day After Tomorrow, 2004, DVD: (Santa Monica: California,
Lions Gate Films, 2004). While climatologists were pleased to see Hollywood dealing with such a
critical issue, these movies were criticised for their inaccurate description of the science of climate
change and for their melodramatic scenes. This cleared the path for documentaries such as An
Inconvenient Truth, acclaimed for its articulation of the science of climate change by former United
States Vice-President Al Gore. An Inconvenient Truth, 2006, DVD: (LA: California, Paramount
Pictures, 2006). The documentary highlighted the environmental impacts of climate change and the
disastrous consequences of non-action. It also explored what can be done to protect the planet for
present and future generations.
“Summary for Policymakers” in Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis,
at SPM-3, online: IPCC <http://www.climatechange2013.org/>.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York on 9 May 1992) [UNFCCC].
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a change of climate which is attributed directly or
indirectly to human activity that alters the
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in
addition to natural climate variability observed over
comparable time periods.28
This study examines the effects of SLR and climate change on coastal areas, ecosystems
and communities, analysing the central role that law can play in supporting integrated
coastal zone management (ICZM) and in drawing linkages with coastal climate change
adaptation (CCCA). It will examine how laws can respond to the multi-dimensional
problems confronting degraded coastlines and to climate change-related impacts, thereby
moving us towards sustainable coastal development (SCD).29 And in this regard, this
study uses a South Asian coastal context to demonstrate the importance of law in
supporting ICZM.Coastal South Asia is made up of five countries: India (which has the
largest coastline in South Asia), Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. While
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are situated on the Asian mainland and almost encircle
the northern portion of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, the Sea and the Bay are
separated by the downward-protruding, triangular-shaped Deccan plateau, which
establishes India’s coastline.30 The Maldives and Sri Lanka are island nations in the
28
29

30

Ibid, art 1.2.
See generally Biliana Cicin-Sain, “Sustainable Development and Integrated Coastal Management”
(1993) 21 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 11. For a detailed discussion on the importance of ICZM and the
role played by law in supporting ICZM, see also chs 3 & 4.
It can be argued that the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea are semi-enclosed seas. Article 122 of
the LOSC defines “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” to mean “a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two
or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or
primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.” See
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, 21 ILM 1261
(entered into force 1994). A perusal of the terms reveals that the article contemplates two elements.
The first focuses on the geographical nature of the ocean space, while the second is on the
jurisdictional element. The use of the term “or” points out that these elements are mutually
exclusive, independent of each other. From the article, it is clear that the connection between the
gulf, basin or sea with another sea or ocean has to be through a narrow outlet, which is not so in the
case of both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Thus, it can be argued that this Sea and the Bay
are not semi-enclosed seas. Lewis M Alexander, “Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of
Semi-enclosed Seas” (1974) 2 Ocean Devel & Int’l L 151 at 157. However, the second element
conceives of the area as “consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive
economic zones of two or more coastal States.” In the case of the Bay of Bengal, the territorial seas
and exclusive economic zones of both India (on the eastern side of India), Bangladesh and Myanmar
are either entirely or primarily within the Bay of Bengal. Similar is the case of the Arabian Sea,
where Pakistan, India (western portion) and the sultanate of Oman have their territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones in the Arabian Sea. Accordingly, it can be argued that both the Arabian
Sea and the Bay of Bengal are semi-enclosed seas. Such a classification is pertinent as it requires
states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea to co-operate with each other in the exercise of
5

Indian Ocean and are situated close to the Indian mainland.

Figure 1 Coastal South Asia31

31

their rights and in the performance of their duties under the LOSC, article 123 calls upon states
bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea to co-operate with each other on matters like protection
and preservation of the marine environment, scientific research, and the management, conservation,
exploration and exploitation of living resources. Satya N Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne, eds, United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary vol 3 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1995) at 343-68.
Created by Jennifer Strang, GIS Analyst, Dalhousie University, with inputs from the author.
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This introduction has two sections. The first explains the nature and scope of this study
while the second outlines the research questions and also sets out the road map.
1.2 NATURE AND SCOPE

Coasts represent transitional zones where the land meets the sea and where the landward
side is, in large part, determined by the influence exerted by the ocean and vice versa.32
Due to this land-sea interface, and the moon’s gravitational pull, which leads to
oscillation of coastal oceanic waters (the tides), the coastal zone represents a complex and
dynamic ecosystem. It encompasses some of the world’s most unique biodiversity and
economic resources, and includes estuaries, wetlands, mangroves, salt marshes, lagoons,
deltas, coral reefs, aquifers and sea grass beds.33 The largest human populations are also
found in costal regions,34 as is a wide range of economic activities, most of which cannot

32

33

34

International Law Association, Sofia Conference (2012): Baselines Under the International Law of
the Sea at 5, online: International Law Association <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index
.cfm/cid/1028> [ILA, Sofia Conference].
Charles T O’Reilly, Donald L Forbes & George S Parkes, “Defining and Adapting to Coastal
Hazards in Atlantic Canada: Facing the Challenge of Rising Sea Levels, Storm Surges, and
Shoreline Erosion in a Changing Climate” in Aldo Chircop & Moira McConnell, eds, Ocean
Yearbook, 19 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005) 189 at 189.
UNEP, Global Environment Outlook GEO4 Environment for Development (UNEP, 2007) at 128
(noting that over 60 per cent of the global population lives within 100 kilometres of the coastline).
In China, nearly 100 million people moved from inland to the coastal areas in the last 20 years. See
Richard J Nicholls & Poh Poh Wong, “Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas” in ML Parry et al,
eds, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group
II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 315 at 345. It is estimated that, even though coastal zones cover
only 15 to 20 per cent of the earth’s total land surface, more than 50 per cent of the world’s
population lives within 100 kilometers of the shoreline, a figure that is slated to rise to 75 per cent
by 2020. Luitzen Bijlsma et al, eds, Preparing to Meet the Coastal Challenges of the 21st Century:
Conference Report World Coast Conference 1993 (The Netherlands: Ministry of Public Works and
Water Management, April 1994) at 13. It is estimated that at the global level more than half the
world's population lives within 60 kilometers of the shoreline, and this could rise to three quarters
by 2020. Nicholas A Robinson, ed, Agenda 21 & The UNCED Proceedings, vol 4, 3rd series,
International Protection of the Environment (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1993) at 307, ch
17, ¶17.3; GESAMP (IMO/FAO/UNESCO-IOC/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP Joint Group of
Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection) & Advisory Committee on
Protection of the Sea, A Sea of Troubles, Rep Stud GESAMP No 70 (2001) at 19. Nearly three
billion humans, more than half of the world’s population live within 60 kilometers of the shoreline.
Robert F Blomquist, “Virtual Borders? Some Legal-Geo-Philosophical Musings on Three Globally
Significant Fragile Ecosystems under United Nations Agenda 21” (1997) 45 Clev St L Rev 23 at 28
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be replicated elsewhere.35 Indeed, coastal areas and resources play a critical role in the
economies of virtually all nations that border the sea.36
People continue to gravitate from inland areas to coastal regions in search of
improved living standards and economic opportunities,37 and many rural coastal areas
being urbanized and small cities and towns are transforming into mega-coastal cities.38 In
fact, coastal urbanisation has become one of the most critical issues facing the planet.
Due to this massive human presence, there is a proliferation of construction and built-up

35

36
37

38

(QL). The estimates vary because there is no uniform criterion to determine in exact terms the
'coastal zone'.
Coastal and ocean activities contribute more than one trillion dollars to America’s GDP. US,
Department of State, U.S. Climate Action Report 2010 (Washington: Global Publishing Services,
2010) at 90. Washington Ochola, “The Future Today” in UNEP, Africa Environment Outlook 2: Our
Environment, Our Wealth (Nairobi: UNEP, 2006) 412 at 471. For instance, it is estimated that
around 20 million people or 22.6 per cent of the total population of Nigeria, live in the coastal zone.
In Senegal, around 4.5 million people or 66.6 per cent of the total population live in the coastal zone
around Dakar, where approximately 90 per cent of industry is located. Similarly, in Benin, Côte
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo, most economic activities, take place in the coastal
zone. Ibid.
J Dronkers et al, eds, Report of the Coastal Management Subgroup: Strategies for Adaption to Sea
Level Rise (Geneva: IPCC, Response Strategies Working Group, 1990) at 1.
Even though the Metropolitan area of Buenos Aires has only 0.1 per cent of the land mass of the
country, it accommodates 31.6 per cent of the total population and the mean density is 2,995 per
square kilometer. Within this narrow territory, 45 per cent of the manufacturing industries, 38 per
cent of commercial establishments, 39 per cent of the financial institutions are located and it
contributes nearly 40 per cent of the Gross national product. See generally José R Dadon & Silvia D
Matteucci, “Coastal Zone Management in Buenos Aires, Argentina” in Aldo Chircop, Scott CoffenSmout & Moira McConnell, eds, Ocean Yearbook, vol 23 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2009) 361. Istanbul, the largest coastal city in Turkey, had a growing population of about 11 million
in 2000. The population density was 2,107 people per square kilometer. Also, Istanbul contributes
21 per cent of the GDP. See Turkey, Ministry of Environment & Forestry, First National
Communication of Turkey on Climate Change Under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Ankara: Ministry of Environment & Forestry, 2007) at 167.
Chua Thia-Eng, The Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management: Practical Applications in the
Sustainable Coastal Development in East Asia (Quezon City: GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional
Programme for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 2006)
at 20 [Thia-Eng, Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management]. Rapid urbanization will lead to
more coastal cities becoming mega-cities containing 10 million or more people. Already, 13 of the
world’s 20 megacities are coastal and nearly 700 million people live in low lying coastal areas that
is less than 10 meters above sea level. In West Africa, the 500 kilometers of coastline between
Accra (Ghana) and the Niger delta (Nigeria) will become a continuous urban megalopolis that will
house more than 50 million inhabitants by 2020. IOC/UNESCO et al, A Blueprint for Ocean and
Coastal Sustainability (Paris: IOC/UNESCO, 2011) at 9; see also UN Habitat, State of the World’s
Cities 2008/2009: Harmonious Cities (Sterling: Earthscan, 2008) at xv (at the global level, nearly 60
per cent of the world’s population which live in low-elevation coastal zones are urban). The
Brundtland Report points out that “the future will be predominantly urban and the most immediate
environmental concerns of most people will be urban ones.” World Commission on Environment &
Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) at 255. More than 60
per cent of the global population lives within 100 kilometers of the coastline, and 21 of the world’s
33 mega-cities are located in the coastal zones of developing countries. UNEP, Global Environment
Outlook GEO4 Environment for Development (UNEP, 2007) at 346.
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area along the water’s edge. Industries, power plants and transportation corridors are
entrenched on the coastal fringes, spewing dangerous chemicals and heavy metals, and
facilitating the introduction of invasive species into coastal waters.39 The increasing
urbanization of coastal areas and the subsequent demand for more amenities engenders a
series of environmental and natural resource management problems, such as squatter
settlements, overcrowded makeshift housing,40 lack of potable water,41 improper
sanitation facilities,42 unscientific garbage disposal, untreated sewage,43 and diseases.44 In
39

40

41

42

43

44

See generally Tony George Puthucherril, “Ballast Waters and Aquatic Invasive Species: A Model
for India” (2008) 19 Colo J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y 381. The increasing volumes of trade and shipping
and the ever-increasing connectivity of ports and harbors spread invasive species. IUCN,
“Intentional introductions” Marine Menace: Alien Invasive Species in the Marine Environment
(Switzerland: IUCN, 2009) at 11. Fish in the Persian Gulf contain as much as 3.9 parts per million
(dry weight) of methyl mercury while dolphins in the Mediterranean have more than 2,200 parts per
million of mercury and 770 of selenium. These levels are 1,500 times higher than what is safe for
human consumption. Oceana, Oceans in Danger (June 2004) online: Oceana <http://oceana.org/en>.
Coastal Mumbai is the seventh largest city in the world with the fifth fastest rate of population
growth. However, over half its population, live in abject poverty, crammed into over-crowded slums
and hutments located in unhealthy marginal environments. Greg O’Hare, Dina Abbott & Michael
Barke, “A Review of Slum Housing Policies in Mumbai” (1998) 15:4 Cities 269–83
(ScienceDirect).
In Cyprus and in the Gaza Strip, groundwater quality has been affected by increasing salinity levels
as a result of saltwater intrusion into coastal aquifers. In the coastal cities of Chennai in India,
Shanghai, and Tianjin in China, excessive groundwater abstraction is resulting in falling water
tables, water quality degradation and land subsidence. World Water Assessment Programme,
Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk, vol 1, The United Nations World Water Development
Report 4 (Paris: UNESCO, 2012) at 66, 94.
For instance, in Buenos Aires, even though the Autonomous City provides all the residents with
drinking water and sewerage service, the reality is that only 37 per cent have drinking water and 20
per cent have sewer services in the peripheral counties. Dadon & Matteucci, supra note 37 at 371.
The number one factor contributing to the pollution of major river systems and the Manila Bay in
Philippines are shanties and other unauthorized structures that do not have septic tanks.
Metropolitan Manila v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, represented and joined by Divina v
Ilas, (2008), GR Nos 171947-48 (Phil SC), online: Supreme Court of the Philippines, Jurisprudence,
December 18, 2008, GR No 171947-48 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/#> [Metropolitan Manila].
Nearly 60 per cent of the waste water discharged into the Caspian Sea is untreated, in Latin America
and the Caribbean it is close to 80 per cent, and in large parts of Africa and the Indo-Pacific, the
proportion is as high as 80–90 per cent. USD56 billion is needed annually to address this enormous
waste water problem. C Nellemann, S Hain & J Alder, eds, In Dead Water: Merging of Climate
Change with Pollution, Over-harvest, and Infestations in the World’s Fishing Grounds (Arendal:
UNEP GRID-Arendal, 2008) 42. See generally UNEP, Marine Litter: A Global Challenge (UNEP:
Nairobi, 2009); see also Mary Schumacher & Porter Hoagland, “The Protocol Concerning Pollution
from Land-Based Sources and Activities in the Wider Caribbean Region: A Breakthrough for the
Caribbean, But How Closely Should Others Follow Their Lead?" in Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Aldo
Chircop & Moria McConnell, eds, Ocean Yearbook, vol 16 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2002) 496 at 504-5 (explaining the impacts of coastal sewage discharge).
People living in small island developing states, coastal and polar regions are particularly vulnerable.
World Health Organization, Protecting Health from Climate Change: World Health Day 2008
(Geneva: WHO Press, 2008) at 14. SLR and higher temperatures will lead to the resurgence of
malaria and new mosquito-borne diseases like dengue fever. Robin Kundis Craig, “A Public Health
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addition to these problems, the resilience of coastal ecosystems habitat is further
reduced45 by uncontrolled felling of mangroves,46 extraction of beach sand,47 filling,
draining and conversion of wetlands for agriculture, aquaculture and infrastructural
projects,48 coral mining,49 and upstream diversion of waters (which impairs freshwater
flows into estuaries and diminishes the quantity of river-borne sediments into coastal
deltas).50 The growing number of dead zones near coastal waters, eutrophication and
algal blooms are symptomatic of the ills that currently plague coastal zones.51
It also goes without saying that coastal ecological systems provide a myriad of
services to human societies, more importantly, free ecological services like storm surge
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Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Points for Climate Change Adaptation” (2010) 15 Widener
L Rev 521 at 531(QL).
Estuaries are the hardest hit among the various habitats. Tom Garrison, Oceanography: An
Invitation to Marine Science, 4th ed (California: Brooks/Cole Thomson Learning, 2002) at 479.
India lost half of its mangrove forests between 1963 and 1977. Ibid at 480; see also US Commission
on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century: Final Report (Washington, DC, 2004) at
170 (since the arrival of the early settlers, US has lost nearly 110 million acres of its wetlands).
Africa has lost about 500,000 hectares of mangroves over the last 25 years, the primary causes being
conversion of land for rice production and coastal infrastructure, and to a lesser extent cutting of
wood for poles and for fuel wood. See FAO, The World’s Mangroves 1980-2005, FAO Forestry
Paper 153 (Rome: FAO, 2007) at 18.
LK Sekhar & SK Jayadev, “Karimanal (Mineral Beach-Sand) Mining in the Alappuzha Coast of
Kerala – A People’s Perspective” (Paper delivered at the Third International Conference on
Environment and Health organised by the Department of Geography, University of Madras and
Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, India (15 December 2003) [unpublished].
Nearly two-thirds of all European wetlands have been lost since 1900, and that in Indonesia more
than 90 per cent of Java and Bali’s historical wetlands was lost or was converted for agriculture or
aquaculture. Royal C Gardner, “Rehabilitating Nature: A Comparative Review of Legal
Mechanisms That Encourage Wetland Restoration Efforts” (2003) 52 Cath U L Rev 573 at 574.
Among different local pressures, overfishing including destructive fishing is the most pervasive
immediate threat, affecting more than 55 per cent of the world’s reefs. This is followed by coastal
development and watershed-based pollution, each threatening about 25 per cent of reefs. Marinebased pollution and damage from ships threaten 10 per cent of reefs. Lauretta Bruke et al, Reefs at
Risk Revisited (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2011) at 3; see also Coral Reef Mining,
Harvesting and Trade: Undermining the Future Value of Coral Reefs?, online: Coral Reef Alliance
<http://www.coral.org/files/pdf/breifs/coralmining.pdf>.
As a result of construction of the Aswan High Dam and other dams on the Nile, the amount of
sediment reaching the delta has reduced significantly. The delta coastline is eroding by up to 5-8
meters per year, and in certain places this exceeds 240 meters per year. Again, dams have reduced
the quantity of sediment transported by the Rhone River to the Mediterranean from 12 million tons
to four to five million tons presently leading to erosion rates of up to five meters per year for the
beaches. Commission on Dams, Dams and Development A New Framework for Decision-Making
(London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2000) at 81. Damming and withdrawal causes salinization of
estuarine land. In Bangladesh, the livelihoods and nutrition requirements of up to 30 million people
have been affected because of stream-flow modifications. Reduced sediment discharge to coastal
areas is increasing the vulnerability of low-lying coastal communities to inundation. UNEP, Global
Environment Outlook: Geo4 Environment for Development (Malta: UNEP, 2007) at 130.
The number of dead zones increased from 149 in 2003 to over 200 in 2006. Nellemann, Hain &
Alder, eds, supra note 43 at 9.
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protection, filtration of effluents, etc. Too often, without realising the importance of these
services, these are destroyed and subsequently the functions that these ecosystems
provide are sought to be replicated through expensive technological interventions. And
these technological interventions do not always provide the functions with the same
efficiency as those provided by natural systems which were in harmony with the
surrounding ecology.
In addition to the above-listed problems, over-fishing is depleting fishery stocks in
many coastal waters.52 This is having a profoundly negative effect on the economies of
several traditional coastal communities, particularly in developing countries as they are
heavily dependent on artisanal fishing, subsistence farming, traditional aquaculture, and
gathering produce from coastal forests.53 Due in large part to globalization and the
implementation of neo-liberal market-based development policies in certain coastal
regions, coastal communities are increasingly being boxed into small parcels as their
lands and common property resources are appropriated for developmental projects and
for special economic zones.54 Poverty aggravates the problem of coastal resources
depletion as these impoverished communities rely increasingly on deleterious methods
for resource extraction, like cyanide and dynamite fishing, 55 destructive fishing gear,56
52

53

54

55

56

In 2008, nearly 45 million people were directly engaged in capture fisheries or aquaculture and that
at least 12 per cent were women. This number represents a 167 per cent increase compared to the
16.7 million people engaged in 1980. Although, capture fisheries continue to provide the maximum
number of jobs, its share of employment has stagnated or decreased as a result of the decline in fish
stocks caused by overfishing and habitat destruction. UNGA, Oceans and the Law of the Sea:
Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum, 66th Sess, A/66/70/Add.2 (2011) at 33.
See generally J Campbell, E Whittingham & P Townsley, “Responding to Coastal Poverty: Should
we be Doing Things Differently or Doing Different Things?” in Chu Thai Hoanh et al eds,
Environment and Livelihoods in Tropical Coastal Zones: Managing Agriculture–Fishery–
Aquaculture Conflicts (Oxon: CAB International, 2006) 274 (providing overview of the impact of
poverty on coastal communities and utilizes the sustainable livelihoods approach to reduce coastal
poverty).
Nowhere is the phenomenon more at play than in the Indian coastline. See Sandip Roy, “SEZs: The
war on India’s coast” Firstpost (28 November 2011) online: Firstpost <http://www.firstpost.com/>.
In the guise of establishing special economic zones, coastal lands are being appropriated by large
business houses often with state connivance. Ibid; see also Anupam Chakravartty, Gujarat High
Court halts work at Mundra SEZ”, Down to Earth (9 May 2012) online: Down to Earth
<http://www.downtoearth.org.in/>.
Sue Wells, “Dynamite Fishing in Northern Tanzania – Pervasive, Problematic and yet Preventable”
(2009) 58 Mar Pollution Bull 20 (ScienceDirect) (despite a ban since 1970s in Tanzania, this
practice still continues).
FAO & UNEP, Report of the FAO/UNEP Expert Meeting on Impacts of Destructive Fishing
Practices, Unsustainable Fishing, and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing on
Marine Biodiversity and Habitats, Rome, 23–25 September 2009, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture
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and clearing mangrove forests for wood.57 In turn, these practices further deplete the
resource base58 and often lead to conflicts between stakeholders. With coastal populations
expected to double or even triple in the coming decades, development and claims to
resources are expected to intensify, placing unprecedented pressures on coastal areas and
resources.59
In short, coastal and marine ecosystems are in a precarious state and the coastline is
under siege by a multitude of threats.60 Nevertheless, all of these challenges pale in
comparison to accelerated SLR and other climate change impacts. Given the overall
degraded state of the coastlines, even slight climatic disruptions, such as increased
frequency and intensity of storms, will magnify the rate of degradation and produce farreaching and catastrophic consequences.61 While these stressors and climate change
impacts are by themselves capable of inflicting heavy damage on coastlines, their
convergence exponentially worsens the situation, leading to extreme reduction in coastal
estate, destruction of ecosystems, and a tearing of the social fabric.
These general observations about the state of coastal zones in most parts of the
world also apply to coastal South Asia, where population growth and waterfront
expansion have led to increased coastal urbanisation and its attendant problems including
marine and coastal pollution.62 The coastal countries in the South Asian region are
endowed with unique natural resources. This diversity in coastal and marine biodiversity
places a concomitantly heavy responsibility on these countries for effective management
of their resources. However, amidst the growing clamour for greater economic growth

57

58
59
60

61
62

Report No 932, FIRF/R932 (En) (Rome: FAO, 2010) at 7.
James Tobey & Elin Torell, “Coastal Poverty and MPA Management in Mainland Tanzania and
Zanzibar” (2006) 49 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 834 (ScienceDirect) (emphasizing that poverty makes it
more difficult to realize conservation goals).
Campbell, Whittingham & Townsley, supra note 53.
See generally Liz Creel, “Ripple Effects: Population and Coastal Regions” in Making the Link
(Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, September 2003).
Tricia A Sherick, “A Comparison of the Coastal Zone Management Policies of the Atlantic and
Pacific Coastal Regions Versus Programs Implemented in Selected Great Lakes States: The Case for
Greater Application of the Public Trust Doctrine in Great Lakes States Coastal Management
Policy”, Comment, (1997) 28:2 U Tol L Rev 459 at 459 (HeinOnline).
See generally Nellemann, Hain & Alder, eds, supra note 43.
Heavily populated South Asian coastal cities play a central role in supporting national economies.
As has been observed, the “[c]oastal cities in South Asia are at the frontline of . . . climatic
changes.” Moika Barthwal-Dutta, Understanding Security Practices in South Asia: Securitization
Theory and the Role of Non-State Actors, Asian Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2012) at
123.
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and eradication of poverty, responsible and sustainable management is all but forgotten.63
As a result, intense economic development and continuing unrestrained population
growth have engendered several environmental problems and predicaments that now
besiege this region. As well, the vast majority of coastal communities, particularly those
in South Asia, are situated in low-lying areas such as flood plains and the banks of
estuarine environments. Hence, the exposure to extreme weather events and coastal
hazards will be devastating.64 In many ways, coastal development in South Asia is a
classic example of the age-old human vs nature conflict.
Against this backdrop, the observations by the Coastal Zone Management
Subgroup of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, made in 1991 in a more
general context, are relevant for coastal South Asia, despite 20 years of half-hearted
action by the concerned states.
In many parts of the world, the natural systems that provide
protection against the sea are being degraded by
development activities through mining for sand and coral,
cutting mangroves, damming and confining the flow of
rivers, and filling wetlands. Every year that countries
postpone addressing these issues, they continue to increase
their vulnerability to climate change and associated sea level
rise … Thus, even though the effects of accelerating sea
level rise are still decades away, NOW is the time to take
action.65
Without a doubt, there is an urgent need to find practical means to resolve conflicting
uses and interests in the coastal zones. And in this search for a plausible solution,
integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) emerges as the central tool that can be
utilised for managing coastal areas and resources while stimulating and sustaining
economic development.66 In fact with an increasing understanding and recognition of the
economic and environmental contributions that coastal regions make to overall national
63
64

65
66

For more details on the dilemma (economic growth v environmental protection) faced by coastal
countries, see Ch 3.
Approximately 360 million urban residents live in coastal areas less than 10 meters above sea level
and are vulnerable to flooding and storm surges. Fifteen of the world’s 20 megacities are at risk
from rising sea levels and coastal surges. The World Bank, Cities and Climate Change: An Urgent
Agenda, 10 Urban Development Series Knowledge Papers (Washington DC: The World Bank,
2010) at 8.
Bijlsma et al, eds, supra note 34 at 9.
For a more detailed explanation on the utility of ICZM to attain sustainable coastal development, see
Ch 6.
13

development, the coastal countries of South Asia (as elsewhere) with diverse geographic,
economic and political environments are devoting resources (however, there is a
mismatch between the scale of problems that confronts the coastal areas and the
management, legal and policy tools that are being developed and the resources as
plausible solutions to these issues) to develop planning and management initiatives for
coastal and marine areas via ICZM.67 Before going into further detail, the concept of
ICZM must first be understood.68
ICZM is a primary management and planning response that aims to prevent
degradation of coastal areas by addressing coastal issues in an integrated manner. It seeks
to accomplish this by integrating actions and actors on a wide range of fronts thereby
minimizing conflicts and maximising the benefits that can be secured through this
nuanced approach to coastal management. In fact, ICZM seeks to overcome
fragmentation hitherto inherent in sectoral approaches to coastal governance as well as
the jurisdictional overlap between different tiers of government and multiple management
systems.69 Rather than displacing sectoral management, the emphasis here is to draw
appropriate linkages between the various sectoral efforts to produce a more holistic
response for coastal zone management (CZM). It also seeks to transform top-down
bureaucratic models of coastal governance into actions that are more bottom-up,
participatory, equitable, inclusive, transparent and accountable.70 In doing so, it aims to
reduce the vulnerability of coastal areas to natural hazards, climate change and SLR and
it seeks to sustain essential ecological processes, life support systems and biological
diversity.71 In sum, it is an operational tool that seeks to achieve sustainable coastal
development (SCD).72
67
68
69
70
71

72

For a more detailed explanation of the problems faced by coastal South Asia, see Chs 2 & 3.
For further analysis of this concept, see Ch 6.
See ibid.
Ibid.
Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W Knecht, Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: Concepts and
Practices (Washington DC: Island Press, 1998) at 39 [Cicin-Sain & Knecht, Integrated Coastal].
The ultimate goal of integrated coastal management (ICM) is to improve the quality of life of
coastal inhabitants through achieving sustainable development objectives. Chua Thia-Eng, Danilo
Bonga & Nancy Bermas-Atrigenio, “Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management: PEMSEA’s
Experience” (2006) 34 Coastal Mgmt 303 at 303. ICZM is increasingly being “recognised and
promoted as the most appropriate process” to deal with the divergent stressors and the far-reaching
impacts of climate change and SLR. Nicholls & Wong, supra note 34 at 340.
Cicin-Sain & Knecht, Integrated Coastal, ibid at 40. For more details on ICZM, see also Ch 6.
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Presently, ICZM has wide recognition as an important adaptive methodology that
can be utilised to deal with some of the challenges posed by SLR and other climate
change impacts on coastal zones.73 In the context of Asia’s low-lying highly populated
coastal areas, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in the Fourth
Assessment Report, specifically points out:
ICZM provides an effective coastal protection
strategy to maximise the benefits provided by the
coastal zone and to minimise the conflicts and
harmful effects of activities on social, cultural and
environmental resources to promote sustainable
management of coastal zones … The ICZM concept is
being embraced as a central organising concept in the
management of fisheries, coral reefs, pollution,
megacities and individual coastal systems in China,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Vietnam and Kuwait. It has been successfully
applied for prevention and control of marine pollution
in Batangas Bay of the Philippines and Xiamen of
China over the past few years … The ICZM concept
and principle could potentially promote sustainable
coastal area protection and management in other
countries of Asia.74
Before proceeding further, a note on terminology would be helpful. While a wide array of
terms is used to describe this practice,75 the most popular ones are ‘integrated coastal
zone management,’ ‘integrated coastal and ocean management’ (ICOM), 76 and

73
74

75

76

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York 9 May 1992) [UNFCCC] art 4(1)(e).
Rex Victor Cruz et al, “Asia” in ML Parry et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 469 at
491.
These range from terms like ‘coastal zone management’, ‘coastal area management’, ‘shore
management’’, ‘coastal resources management’, ‘sea-use planning’, ‘coastal management’, ‘crosssectoral integrated coastal area planning’, ‘community-based coastal resource management’, ‘coastal
resource management’, ‘coastal resources co-management’, ‘integrated coastal zone management’,
‘coastal area management’, and ‘coastal planning’.
Integrated coastal and ocean management [ICOM] has wider geographical connotations, as it places
greater emphasis on the ocean side of the land-sea interface. However, in practice, both approaches
overlap and are extensions of the same process of integration rather than alternatives. See generally
Aldo Chircop & Ryan O’Leary, “Legal Frameworks for Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management
in Canada and the European Union: Some Insights from Comparative Analysis” (2012) 13:3 Vt J
Envtl L 425 (HeinOnline).
15

‘integrated coastal management’ (ICM).77 The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
introduces another variant term namely, ‘integrated marine and coastal area management
(IMCAM).78 Although all these concepts are similar in objective, dissimilarity can arise
in terms of approach and application.79 For the purposes of this study, the term ICZM
will be utilised throughout, primarily because ‘coastal zone’ implies a high degree of
definiteness with regard its spatial extent that is the subject of integrated management,80
and, secondly, the emphasis on the term ‘integrated’ in ICZM distinguishes it from
regular coastal zone management efforts.
ICZM has been on the international agenda for nearly four decades, and the number
of national projects and programmes has increased substantially.81 However, at the
international level, ICZM remains entrenched in a series of soft law instruments and
documents.82 ICZM has also been introduced into South Asia; however the efforts here
have remained largely sub-optimal.83 Most coastal nations in this region and particularly,
those in other parts of the developing world lack the capacity to translate many of these
postulates into action.84 Another major reason for the lack of success is that ICZM in
77

78

79
80

81

82

83

84

Evelyne Meltzer, ed, International Review of Integrated Coastal Zone Management: Potential
Application to the East and West Coasts of Canada, Oceans Conservation Report Series (Ottawa:
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1998) at 8.
See AIDEnvironment, National Institute for Coastal and Marine Management/Rijksinstituut voor
Kust en Zee (RIKZ), Coastal Zone Management Centre, Integrated Marine and Coastal Area
Management (IMCAM) Approaches for Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD
Technical Series No 14 (Montreal: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004) at 3.
Cicin-Sain & Knecht, Integrated Coastal, supra note 71 at 11.
As well, it must be mentioned that at a five-day workshop organised in Charleston, USA, in 1989,
which brought together 28 participants from 13 different nations to review the progress of ICZM,
one of the major issues deliberated related to the appropriate term to describe this practice. After
much consideration, it was decided that the best term was Integrated Coastal Zone Management, or
ICZM. Jens Sorensen, “The International Proliferation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Efforts” (1993) 21 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 45 at 48-49.
Jens Sorensen, “National and International Efforts at Integrated Coastal Management: Definitions,
Achievements, and Lessons” (1997) 25:1 Coastal Mgmt 3 at 13 (tracing the history of the concept);
see also Cicin-Sain & Knecht, Integrated Coastal, supra note 71 at 305-432 (describing ICZM
practices in 22 selected nations).
See generally Biliana Cicin-Sain, “Earth Summit Implementation: Progress Since Rio” (1996) 20:2
Mar Pol’y 123 (ScienceDirect) [Cicin-Sain, “Earth Summit”]. For further discussion of this aspect,
see also Ch 7, Part 7.2.
See generally Tony George Puthucherril, “Adapting to Climate Change and Accelerated Sea-Level
Rise through Integrated Coastal Zone Management Laws: A Study of the South Asian Experience”
in Aldo Chircop, Scott Coffen-Smout & Moira McConnell, eds, Ocean Yearbook, vol 26 (Leiden:
The Netherlands, 2012) 533 at 573 [Puthucherril, “Adapting to Climate Change”].
An ICM program must walk before it can run, and that here the general limiting factor is the absence
of institutional capacity. T-E Chua, “Introduction to the Special Issue on Lessons Learned in
Integrated Coastal Management” (1997) 37:2 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 153 at 164. There is a need for
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South Asia has been presented primarily as pilot projects sponsored by international
funding agencies.85 These pilots often have a very narrow mandate, are operational for
short periods of time, and generally do not consider broader sustainability issues.86
As well, the legal moorings of ICZM are rarely addressed and there is generally a
disconnect between the law and the implementation of the ICZM programme, which in
the long run hampers its effectiveness. The legal reality is that ICZM involves the

85

86

capacity building in two areas, namely, to re-orient existing coastal managers to a more holistic
perspective of understanding the interrelationships between human use activities in coastal areas and
their ecological impacts and to train and educate a cadre of coastal professionals in a
multidisciplinary manner. Biliana Cicin-Sain et al, “Education and Training in Integrated Coastal
Management: Lessons from the International Arena” (2000) 43 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 291 at 293-94
(ScienceDirect).
For instance, India began managing its coastlines and resources since 1991. However, it was only
recently that India began to move towards ICZM, which is being implemented via pilot projects
sponsored by the World Bank. For more details, see The World Bank, Projects & Operations,
online: The World Bank, Projects & Operations, Find a Project, Keyword “Integrated Coastal”
<http://www.worldbank.org/> [World Bank, Projects & Operations]. Way back in 1997 it was
observed “[i]f integrated coastal management is to have a significant global impact on the condition
of coastal ecosystems we must quickly scale up endeavors that are now largely conceived and
implemented as a scattering of pilot projects”. Stephen Olsen, James Tobey & Meg Kerr, “A
Common Framework for Learning from ICM Experience” (1997) 37:2 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 155 at
156 (ScienceDirect). Unfortunately, ICZM is still being implemented primarily via projects at least
in coastal South Asia. For more details, see Puthucherril, “Adapting to Climate Change”, supra note
83.
Puthucherril, “Adapting to Climate Change”, ibid; World Bank, Projects & Operations, ibid. For
more details on the non-legislative approach to ICZM implementation as seen in Bangladesh, see
also Ch 3, Part 3.2.3. India is relying on a World Bank Project to implement ICZM. For more details
see India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Press Brief, “India, World Bank sign two loan
agreements for Coastal Zone Management and Remediation of Polluted Sites” (22 July 2010)
online: Ministry of Environment & Forests <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/W
orld-Bank-Loans-Press-Brief.pdf>.
The situation in other regions is also more or less similar. Despite the availability of priming funds
from the European Commission, the emphasis in Europe is on “pilot” and “demonstration” methods,
(project-based approach to ICZM) which can hamper realization of long-term objectives. See
generally Brian Shipman & Tim Stojanovic, “Facts, Fictions, and Failures of Integrated Coastal
Zone Management in Europe” (2007) 35 Coastal Mgmt 375. For more details on the Coastal
Resource Management Project in the Philippines, see Catherine A Courtney & Alan T White,
“Integrated Coastal Management in the Philippines: Testing New Paradigms” (2000) 28 Coastal
Mgmt 39. The object of the World Bank sponsored ICZM project in Morocco is to “pilot the
application” of ICZM in the project area by building capacity of government institutions and local
communities for ICZM, improve coastal resource management and livelihoods by taking recourse to
a co-management approach and finally monitoring and evaluation. See generally World Bank,
Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant from the Global Environment Facility in the
Amount of US$ 5.18 Million to the Kingdom of Morocco for an Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Project, Report No 66413-MA (Sustainable Development Department: Middle East
and North Africa Region, June 13 2012). As can be seen, this project applies only to the project area
and much will depend upon the country to take it forward even after funding stops.
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application of laws and legal institutions at several levels.87 These aspects will need to be
addressed in the designing and implementation of an ICZM programme.88 Indeed, despite
an identified need for clear ICZM laws across South Asia, only a few pieces of legislation
deal with coastal management, let alone address climate change. As will be seen in
greater detail in the subsequent chapters, most of the current laws do not require the
decision-maker to consider the potential impacts of climate change on proposed
developments in vulnerable coastal areas. And therefore, planning activities continue to
be organised in a sectoral way with hardly any scope for linkages.89 This fragmented
approach contributes to the inefficient use of resources and conflicting claims among
various stakeholders, ultimately culminating in missed opportunities and unsustainable
development. Moreover, archaic laws and practices negatively affect the resilience and
productivity of coastal ecosystems, rendering them vulnerable to threats posed by SLR.
And, this leads us to another important dimension of this inquiry, namely, the need
for regional cooperation. It was to protect and manage the shared marine waters and
associated coastal ecosystems that a regional seas programme was established along with
an action plan for the South Asian region in 1995. ICZM has been identified as one of the
87

88

89

See generally Cormac Cullinan, Integrated Coastal Management Law: Establishing and
Strengthening National Legal Frameworks for Integrated Coastal Management, FAO Legislative
Study, No 93 (Rome: FAO, 2006).
In the context of overlapping jurisdiction between different agencies, the importance of a
legislative basis for ICZM operation is highlighted. The authors point out
[t]here are overlapping jurisdictions/functions among sectoral
agencies over coastal areas and resources, which make the
adoption of an integrated coastal resource management
framework problematic. Furthermore, agencies are
sometimes confused about their role in coastal resource
management, which can in effect reduce their commitment to
ICZM activities. In fact, several agency representatives who
were interviewed concurred that this is a primary factor that
has thwarted ICZM efforts. Many cite the need for
developing appropriate legislation to clarify jurisdictional and
functional powers, as the first step towards any real solution.
A legal framework is vital for legitimising policy objectives
and establishing a structure for implementing policy
initiatives related to ICZM. Yet, in Guyana, related
legislation is either not there to support the ICZM agenda, or
obsolete.
Robin McCall & Talia Choy, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Guyana:
Development Barriers, Opportunities and Recommendations" in Erlend Moksness, Einar Dahl &
Josianne Støttrup, eds, Integrated Coastal Zone Management (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 219
at 229-31.
For an overview see, Puthucherril, “Adapting to Climate Change”, supra note 83.
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key areas of focus under this action plan. Recently, a coastal management centre under
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) that aims at capacity
building for coastal zone management has been established.90 Despite these efforts,
regional co-operation exists only on paper and regional regime building in this direction
is still in its infancy.
South Asia is in fact one of the “least integrated” regions in the world, and there are
several barriers that impede co-operation.91 Regional cooperation can be an influential
platform that can enrich countries by providing greater opportunities to devise solutions
for common problems that affect a region.92 Cooperation can also shorten the gap
between leading and lagging nations in terms of capacity and resources by promoting the
build-up of epistemic communities, reduce vulnerabilities, and help the poor improve
their economic capacities.93
In sum, the gaps in the normative framework for coastal management at the
national level in these countries, the lack of an all-encompassing international treaty on
ICZM that sets out the specific rules of the practice, the strong possibility that the
harmful consequences of climate change and SLR cannot be managed solely by
individual countries by confining them to national borders (there can be spill-overs), the
cross-border environmental impacts of developmental decisions of one country (which
can influence the coastal environments of other nations situated hundreds of miles away)
– all of these factors underscore the need for an overarching regional instrument rooted in
90
91

92

93

SAARC, Area of Cooperation: Environment, online: SAARC <http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofc
ooperation/cat-detail.php?cat_id=54>.
Sadiq Ahmed & Ejaz Ghani, “South Asia’s Growth and Regional Integration: An Overview” in
Sadiq Ahmed & Ejaz Ghani, eds, South Asia: Growth and Regional Integration (Washington DC:
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World, 2007) 3 at 4.
For a more detailed analysis on the nature of regional cooperation in South Asia, see generally
Ashok K Behuria, ed, South Asia: The Quest For Regional Cooperation (New Delhi: Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, 2009).
See generally Aldo Chircop, David VanderZwaag & Peter Mushkat, “The Gulf of Maine Agreement
and Action Plan: A Novel but Nascent Approach to Transboundary Marine Environmental
Protection” (1995) 19:4 Mar Pol'y 317 (ScienceDirect); see also Lawrence P Hildebrand & Aldo
Chircop, “A Gulf United: Canada-U.S. Transboundary Marine Ecosystem-based Governance in the
Gulf of Maine” (2010) 15 Ocean & Coastal LJ 339 (QL). In 1989, the States of Maine,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire in the United States and the Canadian Provinces of New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia adopted the Agreement on Conservation of the Marine Environment of
the Gulf of Maine Between the Governments of the Bordering States and Provinces. This gave birth
to an informal system for regional cooperation, namely the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine
Environment. The participants in this regime have cooperated effectively on the basis of “an
informal framework consisting of soft principles” to produce tangible results. Ibid.
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the peculiar coastal problems and economic, social and political milieu of South Asia.
The idea is that this regional instrument will be able to offer normative guidance and
support to national governments to effectively address complex coastal zone
management, SLR, and other climate change related issues and will act as the the first
step towards a more comprehensive regime on ICZM and CCCA in South Asia.

1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE ROAD MAP
This study explains the role of law in promoting the implementation of ICZM in South
Asia by providing a framework and tools for achieving the specific objective of
harmonising conservation with development, and supporting CCCA. Since ICZM is
highly contextual, by drawing upon experiences from elsewhere (both national and
regional), it identifies certain principles that can inform a regional regime at the South
Asian level as a possible key step, which can help galvanise efforts at the national level
and also contribute to the development of regional regime on the subject. In short, this
study is based on the following two primary research questions:
1) Do laws and legislative frameworks play any role in promoting and facilitating the
implementation of ICZM and CCCA, thereby contributing to SCD? And, if yes, what is
that role, specifically in the South Asian context?
2) What principles can inform the development of a regional legal framework for ICZM
implementation in South Asia? And can a regional framework help in strengthening
ICZM implementation and promote CCCA for SCD at the national level in South Asia?
In addition, this study will also examine the following secondary research questions,
namely:
1) What is the meaning of SCD and how does ICZM facilitate its attainment?
2) What is the importance of CCCA and how it can be implemented via an ICZM process
to facilitate the attainment of SCD?
In short, this thesis describes the paramount importance of law and legal frameworks in
steering the ICZM process. The objective is to introduce a new narrative to coastal zone
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management in South Asia taking into account contemporary problems by highlighting
the importance of law and legal frameworks in implementing ICZM and promoting
CCCA. And this is to be accomplished through a regional-level legal framework, which
will act as a catalyst in developing national level legislations on ICZM.

1.3.1 The Thesis Structure
Apart from this introduction, the above-identified research questions are addressed over
the next four parts. Part I sets out the problématique of this thesis and its context (the
uniqueness of coastal South Asia) in detail. Part II provides the theoretical foundation of
this thesis, in terms of expounding the concept of sustainable coastal development and
explaining the role of ICZM in balancing and securing the seemingly conflicting interests
of coastal environment protection, coastal development and CCCA to further SCD. Part
III analyses the role of law in facilitating an ICZM process and in securing the linkage
between ICZM and CCCA. Part IV articulates the importance of a regional regime on
ICZM for South Asia and it sets out the elements, which a regional level instrument on
ICZM should contain.

1.3.2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology
This study is grounded in the inter-disciplinary concept of sustainable development in
relation to coastal areas, resources, and coastal communities. To have a deeper
understanding of how sustanible develoment will be utilised, it is imperative that the
doctrinal foundations of sustanible develoment be examined. Ever since the Brundtland
Commission Report,94 this concept has gained prominence and international recognition,
and has found its way into a large array of international environmental law treaties,
national legislations and jurisprudence. Nevertheless, and despite a simple and concise
formulation, it remains an elusive concept difficult to put into practice. What is
sustainable in a particular context, depending upon available scientific knowledge in a
given situation and at a particular point in time, may not be so subsequently. Even though
94

See generally World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987).
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more than two decades have passed since “Our Common Future”, the issues that continue
to plague the planet remain basically remains the same – proliferation of reckless
development practices, degradation of environmental and natural resources, widespread
pollution, and dehumanising poverty. In addition, and as highlighted earlier, we are now
confronted with one of the all-time greatest environmental challenge – greenhouse gas
emissions and global warming, which in turn leads to biodiversity losses, land
degradation, water scarcity, and SLR. This raises the key question that guides this study,
namely, as to what is sustainable development and what does it imply in a coastal zone
management context? Ultimately, this thesis argues that utilising ICZM as the pathway to
SCD makes eminently good sense.
Coastal management is all about influencing human behaviour in relation to the
coasts, and this brings into focus the governance dimension of the practice. One of the
most potent instruments to regulate human behaviour is the instrumentality of law.
Indeed, to demonstrate why law is needed to regulate human activities in the coastal
zone, reliance will be placed on common property resource theories to justify the need for
a legal framework for coastal management.
A significant portion of this thesis is also carried out on the basis of a theoretical
framework provided by the regime theory. The essence of the regime theory is to offer a
rationale to help explain how disaggregated interests of different states can converge to
further common objectives, and how they evolve. In particular, the regime theory is
utilised to explain the different forces at work in the South Asian region to illuminate
how regional regime development on ICZM can be achieved there.
Regarding methodology, and as explained earlier, this thesis examines the role of
law in supporting ICZM-based responses to the complexities posed by SLR and climate
change in relation to coastal zone management. While its scope does not extend to laying
down a detailed code on coastal law to support ICZM and provide for CCCA, the
emphasis is on articulating essential principles that comport to the identified twin
objectives, such as balancing development with conservation and ensuring CCCA, taking
into account the peculiarities of the South Asian region. ICZM is not nation-specific and,
as pointed out earlier, there are no off-the-shelf models that can be applied across the
spectrum. The manner in which ICZM is implemented in each country varies
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considerably, and each ICZM programme displays characteristics that are unique to the
nation for which it is developed. In other words, there is variety in approach in
implementing ICZM and countries can draw lessons from the experiences of others while
tailoring such programmes to suit their own needs.
Since the canvas for this thesis is the South Asian region, and since ICZM law has
not evolved sufficiently into a core practice, this study is based in comparative law
analysis, examining and comparing the coastal law situation in other countries and
relevant regional mechanisms. Creative innovations with respect to coastal laws and
ICZM programmes of different countries are compared to identify core irreducible
principles of an ICZM law and process that should inform the regional regime on coastal
management for South Asia. In addition, reliance will be placed on policy and advocacy
methods. At the intersection of science, natural resources law and management, this study
will employ an interdisciplinary analysis.

1.3.3 Limitations
Like any other study, this thesis can accomplish only so much. The first major caveat is
that this analysis is restricted only to examining ICZM models that are predicated on
legislation. In drawing the conclusion that implementing ICZM through the legislative
route is a much superior and stable option (as it is based on a principled approach to
coastal management, helps reduce conflicts and streamlines human behavior in relation to
coastal management and coastal resources utilisation), the analysis will not draw
comparisons with ICZM programmes that are being implemented even in the absence of a
dedicated coastal statute (However, reference will be made to the non-legisaltive model
on ICZM implementation in Bangladesh and the Maldives where necessary). Secondly, in
identifying the essential features of a coastal law, it provides only an overview of the
statutory frameworks for coastal management in a few coastal countries and some of the
regional instruments in this regard. Another drawback that a research project of this
nature will encounter is the lack of primary research materials and information from the
coastal countries in the South Asian region. Even though reasons can be many and varied,
the most important is the absence of laws and policies and exclusive institutional
mechanisms to carry out tasks that coastal and marine management demands. To
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overcome this limitation vis-à-vis a particular issue, primary focus will be placed on those
countries that have specifically addressed the concern. And here reliance will be placed
on India’s experience. This accent on India is justified as India has utilised the legislative
route to address several of the issues affecting the coastal zone and it is this country that
has the longest coastline among the South Asian coastal countries. The third limitation is
the peculiar circumstances of the context i.e., South Asia. Regional regimes have failed to
take off and establish in several other critical areas. However, the coastal problems in
South Asia are so complex that, left to their own devices, these countries may be unable
to resolve them sustainably. Moreover, climate change, SLR and their impact on the
coastal zones do not respect national borders. The transboundary implications of these
issues affect the area as a whole, and therefore a regional instrument to place national
coastal administrations on the right track would prove highly beneficial. However, as
things stand, coastal South Asia may not be ready for a hard law instrument that creates
binding obligations on state parties, as accomplishing this may derail the nascent regime.
It is this realisation that prompts this study to recommend only a set of broad principles
that can inform coastal law-making in these countries. This will enable state parties to be
involved in the process without binding themselves to yet another set of legal obligations
that could compromise the ability of their domestic legislatures to adapt to evolving
national interests.
In sum, this study is premised on the proposition that given the predictions relating
to large-scale climate change impacts on the coastal zones in South Asia, it is necessary
for these countries to adopt a proactive approach in managing their coastal zones. And
this can be accomplished by enacting appropriate laws to facilitate ICZM
implementation, CCCA, and SCD. Laws that articulate clearly defined responsibilities
will greatly assist decision-makers by providing guidance on how to develop, draft and
implement ICZM plans.
While this study underscores the importance and centrality of law in supporting
ICZM and in effectuating CCCA, merely enacting a law will not per se achieve
successful ICZM. The study does not forward any grand illusions that a law on ICZM is
the silver bullet solution to all problems that confront our degraded coastlines and that
CCCA can be achieved and the journey towards SCD can be secured. Law is simply one
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of the many tools that a prudent coastal manager can rely on for efficient coastal
management. Other factors are also important, like adequate financial support, political
commitment to the programme, effective enforcement, monitoring and feedback,
adaptive management, use of good science, and decentralisation of power to lower tiers
of government. Nonetheless, the strength of the legal spine will in large measure
determine the success or failure of an ICZM programme. By advocating a regional
approach on ICZM implementation for coastal South Asia, this thesis pushes ICZM from
its present “backwater status”95 to the centre stage of national environmental planning
and management in the region.

95

Shipman & Stojanovic, supra note 86 at 380.
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PART I
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLÉMATIQUE IN THE CONTEXT
The purpose of this part is to explain and set out the problématique against the context of
coastal South Asia practically providing the background for the succeeding discussion. In
doing so, this part is arranged as two chapters. Chapter two introduces and provides a
synoptic overview of interacting SLR and climate change impacts and issues relating to
coastal areas (in terms of vanishing land territory and maritime estates), coastal
ecosystems (impacts on coastal aquifers, coral reefs and wetlands), and coastal
communities (the issue of internal displacement and those people who have to cross
international borders due to SLR and climate change-related impacts), and the extant
international and national laws (as available in some of the coastal countries of South
Asia) in responding to these issues. The argument posited is that there is disconnect
between applicable law and new realities, and in responding to these challenges new legal
rules will have to be crafted to dispel vagueness. This may be a long-drawn out process
and in the short-term this brings to the fore the need for other practical measures to deal
with these situations, which militates in favour of effective ICZM as one possible strategy
that can help increase coastal resilience and adaptive capacities. Chapter three sets out the
management and legal frameworks that support ICZM implementation in coastal South
Asia. It is an overview of current coastal management efforts in the South Asian coastal
countries. It provides the necessary context by identifying gaps in the present national
level approaches to ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation and articulates the need
for a regional regime on ICZM for South Asia. In explaining the problématique, the
chapter essentially points out that there is growing visible evidence that the coastal
ecosystems in South Asia are under considerable stress and strain since the
developmental trajectories for the coastal environment are so perverse they may
overwhelm these fragile coastal ecosystems. Accordingly, the chapter sets out a case for
developing a new approach to the management of coastal areas, ecosystems, resources
and communities in South Asia, grounded in the concept of ICZM. In particular, it is
pointed out that there is a need to strengthen the legal framework to facilitate ICZM
implementation. However, given the lack/divergence of capacities at the respective
national levels in South Asia and the common nature of problems confronting its coastal
regions, one possible way to do so is to strengthen the regional framework, which is the
fundamental focus of this thesis.

26

CHAPTER 2

RISING SEAS, RECEDING COASTLINES, VULNERABLE
COASTAL COMMUNITIES AND ECOSYSTEMS:
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE AND NEED FOR
INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT

2.1 INTRODUCTION
Basic science informs us that it is the “heat trapping”1 feature of naturally occurring
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere such as water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and ozone,2 that keeps the earth’s surface warm
thereby playing an integral role in sustaining life. 3 And in ensuring the same, practically,
the GHGs act as “a sleeping bag or down comforter.”4 However, the “earth’s heat
budget”5 is presently undergoing sweeping changes. Anthropogenic activities (mainly
combustion of fossil fuels and coal-fired power plants) are adding large quantities of
GHGs to that which occurs naturally in the atmosphere. GHGs are now at far greater
concentrations than at any time in the past 160,000 years,6 with CO2, the principal gas
that contributes to the enhanced GHG effect, being about 40 per cent higher than in preindustrial times.7 As well, modern industrial processes have also introduced a series of
1

2
3
4
5
6
7

Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (7 December
2005) at 28, online: INUIT, Media & Reports, Press Releases, Press Releases-2005
<http://inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?Lang=En&ID=1> [Inuit Petition].
“Historical Overview of Climate Change Science” in Susan Solomon et al, eds, Climate Change
2007: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 93 at 97.
Christina K Harper, “Climate Change and Tax Policy” (2007) 30:2 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 411 at
412 (HeinOnline).
RT Pierrehumbert, “Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion” (2006) 6:2 Chicago J Int’l L
573 at 575 (QL) [Pierrehumbert, “Climate Change”].
See Inuit Petition, supra note 1 at 28.
Before the industrial era, one would have to sift through a million molecules of air to find 280
molecules of carbon dioxide. Pierrehumbert, “Climate Change”, supra note 4 at 574.
Since the dawn of the industrial era in the mid-eighteenth century, when petroleum hydrocarbons
first began to fuel the global economy, CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere have risen several
times over. As at 2011, the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) have all increased since 1750 by about 40 per cent, 150
per cent, and 20 per cent, respectively due to human activity. “Summary for Policymakers” in
Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, online: IPCC
<http://www.climatechange2 013.org/> [“Summary for Policymakers” in Physical Science, 2013];
see also “Summary for Policymakers” in Susan Solomon et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: The
Physical Science Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 1 at 2 [“Summary for
Policymakers” in Physical Science, 2007]. As at December 2012, CO2 concentrations stand at
394.39 parts per million (measured at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii, USA) Earth's CO2
Home Page, online: CO2 Now <http://co2no w.org/>. Methane (CH4) is higher by more than 100
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new and extremely powerful GHGs into the atmosphere (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons,
hydrofluorocarbons,

hydrochlorofluorocarbons,

perfluorocarbons,

and

sulfur

hexafluoride), compounding the problem.8 All these factors have increased warming and
have lead to the “enhanced green house effect,”9 producing far-reaching and
unpredictable climatic changes affecting the integrity of a wide array of ecosystems.
Climate change is altering hydrological, coastal, marine, forest, and agricultural regimes,
and is replacing them with “new assemblies.”10
In addition to this introduction, this chapter is divided into five sections, arranged
as follows. The first offers a generalized overview of the problem of sea level rise (SLR).
The second, third and fourth sections analyses the impact of SLR on coastal areas and
maritime territories; on coastal communities; and finally, on coastal resources, namely,
groundwater, coral reefs and mangroves. All through, the intention is to provide an
overview of the far-reaching impacts of SLR on these identified elements and to set out
applicable international and national laws (relevant laws from the South Asian coastal
countries), identifying their weak points. On the basis of these discussions, the chapter
concludes by emphasising the importance of integrated coastal zone management
(ICZM).

2.2 “THE RISING SEAS”
As is known, oceans cover almost 70 per cent of the earth’s surface and have a heat
capacity that is nearly 1,000 times more than that of the atmosphere.11 Due to this feature,

8
9

10
11

per cent, and nitrous oxide (N2O) by more than 15 per cent. Ibid at 3. Between 1970 and 2004, there
has been a 70 per cent increase in global GHG build-up, while the CO2 emission during this period
grew by about 80 per cent. “Summary for Policymakers” in Core Writing Team, Rajendra K
Pachauri & Andy Reisinger, eds, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (Geneva:
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008) 1 at 5 [“Summary for Policymakers” in Climate
Change 2007].
See Inuit Petition, supra note 1 at 28
“Climate Change 101: Science and Impacts” in Climate Change 101: Understanding and
Responding to Global Climate Change (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, January 2001
update) 1 at 2.
JB Ruhl, “Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog
Future” (2008) 88:1 BUL Rev 1 at 11 (HeinOnline).
Nathaniel L Bindoff & Jürgen Willebrand, “Observations: Oceanic Climate Change and Sea Level”
in Susan Solomon et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 385 at 389.
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ocean circulation patterns play a fundamental role in stabilizing climate and moderating
global biogeochemical cycles.12 Oceans also perform a series of other life-sustaining
functions, the least of which is the support to sustain the livelihood of coastal
communities and therefore any physical, biological and biogeochemical changes in the
oceans arising from global warming can have far-reaching catastrophic impacts with
potential to impair the stability of the entire climate system. 13 And the primary impact of
these changes in the oceans will resonate on the land that borders these waters (the dry
side of the coastal zone).
A key manifestation of these climate change impacts on coastal zones of most
countries, including those in South Asia, is through the phenomenon of SLR, which has
already begun to claim low-lying lands in most of the coastal countries of this region and
has triggered sporadic internal migrations of coastal populations and, in certain cases,
even external.14 Two contributory factors that accelerate global SLR are thermal
expansion of the oceans (or the “steric effect”) and loss of glacial ice due to increased
melting. With increased dumping of GHGs into the atmosphere, atmospheric and oceanic
temperatures are rising, leading to thermal expansion of the waters.15 Increased
temperatures will also produce more glacial melting as well as rapid shrinkage of polar
ice sheets.16 In fact, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5) points out with high confidence that since the early 1970s,
glacier mass loss and ocean thermal expansion together accounts for nearly 75 per cent of
the observed global mean SLR.17 Further factors causing SLR include increased
12
13
14
15

16
17

Ibid.
For further details see generally ibid.
See also Robin Kundis Craig, “A Public Health Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Points for
Climate Change Adaptation” (2010) 15:2 Widener L Rev 521 at 522 (HeinOnline).
AR5 points out that the last three decades has been successively warmer than any preceding decade
since 1850. The report expresses medium confidence that in the Northern Hemisphere, the period
between 1983–2012 was likely the warmest 30-year period in the last 1400 years. The report express
high confidence that the over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been
losing mass, glaciers almost everywhere are shrinking, and Arctic sea ice and Northern Hemisphere
spring snow cover have decreased in extent. “Summary for Policymakers” in Physical Science,
2013, supra note 7.
Already the polar ice sheets are melting at alarming levels. See Arctic Sea Ice Shrinks to New Low in
Satellite Era (26 August 2012), online: NASA <http://www.nasa.gov/index.html>.
From 1955 to 1995, ocean thermal expansion is estimated to have contributed about 0.4 millimeters
per year to SLR; from 1993 to 2003, it was significantly larger, at about 1.6 millimeters per year for
the upper 750 meters of the ocean alone. Scientists also estimate that the melting of glaciers and ice
caps (excluding the glaciers covering Greenland and Antarctica) contributed to SLR by about 0.3
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groundwater mining, impoundment in reservoirs, increased runoff from urbanisation,
permafrost thawing, tectonic movements, and deforestation.18
The IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) expresses high confidence that
there is a significant rise in the global mean sea level.19 From 1961 to 2003, the average
rate of SLR was 1.8 ± 0.5 mm yr–1.20 Depending on the emission trajectory, the IPCC in
the Fourth Assessment Report, affirms that by 2100, global warming will cause sea levels
to rise by 18 to 59 centimeters.21 These calculations are based on six scenarios, excluding
“future rapid dynamical changes in ice flow.”22 These are at best conservative
estimates,23 as they omit the fresh water input from glacial and ice cover melting into the
oceans.24 For instance, it is estimated that the West Antarctic ice sheet, which lies below
sea level, contains enough ice to raise the water by six meters.25 Another important aspect
to be noted is that due to geological processes in relation to the earth’s crust and its
mantle, the relative position of land and sea, changes in currents, upwelling, tidal range
and other oceanic processes, there cannot be any spatial uniformity rate in SLR.26
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19
20
21
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23
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millimeters per year from 1961 to 1990, increasing to about 0.8 millimeters per year from 2001 to
2004. See Christian Nellemann, Stefan Hain & Jackie Alder, eds, In Dead Water – Merging of
Climate Change with Pollution, Over-Harvest, and Infestations in the World’s Fishing Grounds
(Norway: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2008) at 32.
JA Church et al, “Changes in Sea Level” in JT Houghton et al, eds, Climate Change 2001: The
Scientific Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 639 at 658. Most of the water that
is mined from the ground ultimately reaches the ocean through the atmosphere or runoff. As far as
lakes are concerned, there has been considerable reduction of their size due to increased irrigation
and water use. For instance, the reduced volumes of the Caspian and Aral seas contribute 0.03 and
0.18 millimeters/year to SLR. Urbanization leads to reduced infiltration and increased surface
runoff, which may also contribute to SLR. Ibid at 657.
Bindoff & Willebrand, supra note 11 at 387.
Ibid.
Core Writing Team, Pachauri & Reisinger, eds, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis
Report
(Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008) at 45.
Ibid.
Satellite measurements show that the sea level has been rising an average of 3.4 millimeters per year
since 1993, which is 80 per cent faster than the estimates under the IPCC Third Assessment Report.
As well, if ice-sheet mass loss is accounted, the anticipated sea-level rise until 2100 is likely to be at
least twice that presented by IPCC AR4, with an upper limit of approximately two meters. The
Copenhagen Diagnosis: Updating the World on the Latest Climate Science (Sydney: UNSW
Climate Change Research Centre, 2009) at 39.
Core Writing Team, Pachauri & Reisinger, eds, supra note 21 at 44.
Church et al, supra note 18 at 641.
Bindoff & Willebrand, supra note 11 at 411. Even within the same country, not all areas will
experience the same rate of SLR. For instance, in significant areas of Canada’s Arctic coasts,
geological processes are causing the sea level to fall, while the sea level is rising on the Atlantic and
Beaufort Sea coasts. Donald S Lemmen & Fiona J Warren, eds, Climate Change Impacts and
Adaptation: A Canadian Perspective (Ottawa: Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Directorate,
2004) at 115; see also Nick Bryant, “Low-lying Pacific islands ‘growing not sinking’" BBC News (3
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Consequently, in some places, the sea may rise at rates several times over the global
average (like in the western Pacific and the eastern Indian Ocean), and in certain other
regions, the sea level may fall going against the general trend (eastern Pacific and
western Indian Ocean).27
The findings in AR5, which represents the most comprehensive and current science
on the subject reinforces the observations in AR4 and other previous reports that the sea
is rising. AR5 expresses high confidence that the rate of SLR since the mid-nineteenth
century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia. In fact, the
ascendancy in the global mean sea level during 1901-2010 stands at 0.19 meters.28 As far
as determination of future rise is concerned, the report relies on a set of four new
pathways termed as representative concentration pathways (RCP) and it expresses
medium confidence that the global mean SLR for 2081-2100 (relative to 1986–2005) will
likely be in the following ranges - for RCP2.6, it is expected to be between 0.26 to 0.55
meters, for RCP4.5 between 0.32 to 0.63 meters, for RCP6.0, between 0.33 to 0.63
meters, and for RCP8.5 between 0.45 to 0.82 meters.29 And in these projections, thermal
expansion will account for 30 to 55 per cent of the mean SLR; while glacier melt will
contribute 15 to 35 per cent.30 In short, the report categorically asserts that the “[g]lobal
mean sea level will continue to rise during the 21st century.”31
The harms associated with SLR are serious and well recognized. Generally, SLR
will lead to inundation of wetlands and lowlands; erode shorelines; increase salinity in
estuaries and aquifers; alter tidal ranges in rivers and bays; change the locations and
patters where rivers deposit sediments; increase wave heights; lead to storm surges, and,
reduces the amount of light that reaches the bottom oceans. 32 In the succeeding
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June 2010), online: BBC News <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10222679> (referring to a study which
points out that many low-lying Pacific islands were growing and not sinking, but whether all of
these will be inhabitable is not clear).
Bindoff & Willebrand, ibid.
“Summary for Policymakers” in Physical Science, 2013, supra note 7, SPM-6.
Ibid at SPM-18.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See generally Richard J Nicholls & Poh Poh Wong, “Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas” in ML
Parry et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 315. For more details, see James G Titus,
“Greenhouse Effect, Sea Level Rise, and Land Use” (1990) 7:2 Land Use Pol'y 138 (ScienceDirect).
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discussion, the hazards posed by the SLR are described in more detail.
Perhaps, the most visible impact of SLR is that of inundation and flooding. A rise
in sea level is expected to inundate hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of lowlying areas, leading to the mass destruction of property and infrastructure, destabilising
coastal life.33 Inundation can be permanent in which case areas remain completely
submerged underwater or may remain underwater for a significant portion of the day,
while, episodically flooded areas are at risk only from extreme weather events.34 SLR can
also pose serious health consequences. It has been observed:
Sea-level rise will create new reservoirs of warm,
brackish, stagnant water, perfect for breeding mosquitoes
that can transmit malaria, dengue fever and a host of
other tropical mosquito-borne diseases, while the
warming sea itself will harbor increasing concentrations
of opportunistic viruses and bacteria such as cholera and
Vibrio vulnificus ...35
As oceanic waters become warmer,36 they lose their ability to hold dissolved oxygen
essential for sustaining sea life.37 Algal blooms thrive in oxygen-depleted areas and may
33
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It has been estimated that Uruguay, Egypt, the Netherlands, Bangladesh and the Majuro Atoll in the
Marshall Islands, will lose 0.05 per cent, one per cent, six per cent, 17.5 per cent, and 80 per cent,
respectively of their land territory to the rising seas in the event of a one meter rise. “Summary for
Policymakers: Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate
Change” in Robert T Watson, Marufu C Zinyowera & Richard H Moss, eds, Climate Change 1995:
Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scientific-Technical Analyses,
Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 1 at 11. It is expected that
nearly 30 per cent of coastal infrastructure in Africa is at risk of partial or total inundation and the
forceful impact of SLR will be felt in urban areas and ports, like Cape Town, Maputo, and Dar EsSalaam. UNFCCC, Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing
Countries (UNFCCC, 2007) at 20, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publi
cations/impacts.pdf>. While a one-meter rise will inundate much of Alexandria, a SLR of 50
centimetres in Tanzania, will inundate over 2,000 square kilometres of land, and the financial loss is
pegged at USD51 million. Russell Arthurton & Kwame Korateng, “Coastal and Marine
Environments” in UNEP, Africa Environment Outlook 2: Our Environment, Our Wealth (Nairobi:
UNEP, 2006) 155 at 176.
US, New York State Sea Level Rise Task Force, Report to the Legislature (2010) at 19, online:
Dep't of Environmental Conservation <http://www.dec.ny.gov/>.
Craig, supra note 14 at 540.
During the period from 1961 to 2003, the global ocean temperature went up by 0.10 degree Celsius
from the surface to a depth of 700 meters. Bindoff & Willebrand, supra note 11 at 387. Large parts
of the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Southern Ocean have warmed. Ibid at 391. The AR5
points out that it is virtually certain that the upper ocean (0-700 meters) has warmed from 1971 to
2010. On a global scale, the ocean warming is largest near the surface. In fact, the upper 75 meters
has warmed by 0.11 (0.09 to 0.13) °C per decade over the period between1971–2010. “Summary for
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develop into harmful levels.38 Sea surface temperature increases will affect fish
distributions as sea creatures migrate towards cooler and deeper waters. 39 As well, it can
result in lesser fish yield, impact species distribution and lead to increased variability in
catches. While the link between global warming and stronger hurricanes has yet to be
clearly established, it is believed that rising sea surface temperatures will brew more
intense tropical cyclones. As the IPCC affirms, “[t]here is observational evidence for an
increase of intense tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic since about 1970,
correlated with increases of tropical sea surface temperatures.”40 Apart from their
devastation and consequent loss of life, powerful storms can prove severely destructive of
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Policymakers” in Physical Science, 2013, supra note 7 at SPM-4.
Lauren F Jones, “Treasuring the Chesapeake: An Analysis of Climate Change and Its Impact on the
Chesapeake Bay and Maryland’s Surrounding Coastal Regions” (2009) 38:2 U Balt L Rev 331 at
332 (HeinOnline) (terming this phenomenon as “temperature-dissolved oxygen squeeze”).
RF McLean & Alla Tsyban, “Coastal Zones and Marine Ecosystems”, in James J McCarthy et al,
eds, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001) 335 at 366. In 1997, increased nutrients and sea surface temperature led to
an outbreak of toxic dinoflagellate, which caused large fish kills on the U.S. Atlantic coast, leading
to an economic loss of USD60 million. Again, a persistent brown tide bloom in the Peconic Estuary
system of New York blocked light and depleted oxygen in the water column, severely affecting the
sea grass and reducing the value of the Peconic Bay scallop fishery by approximately 80 per cent.
Ibid. Rising temperatures are found to lead to frequent appearances of red tides in Vietnamese
waters, leading to fish kills and damage to aquaculture production. Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
Vietnam’s Second National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Hanoi: Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, 2010) at 83; see also
Israel, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Israel’s Second National Communication on Climate
Change Submitted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Jerusalem: Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2010) at 87 (several species of toxic blue-green
algae have been reported in the Sea of Galilee).
For an overview of different impacts, see Cynthia Rosenzweig & Gino Casassa, “Assessment of
Observed Changes and Responses in Natural and Managed Systems” in ML Parry et al, eds,
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 79 at 97 (fish species like sardines, anchovies, red mullet and
bass with more southern bio-geographical affinities are moving north); see also Fisheries and
Aquaculture in Our Changing Climate, online: FAO <ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/brochure/climate_chang
e/policy_brief.pdf>; UNFAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, Strategy for Fisheries,
Aquaculture and Climate Change: Framework and Aims 2011–16 (Rome: FAO, 2012) [UNFAO,
Strategy for Fisheries]; see also Cook Islands, National Environment Service, Cook Islands Second
National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change
(Cook Islands: National Environment Service, 2011) at 48 (warmer ocean temperature has affected
pearl farming).
“Summary for Policymakers” in Physical Science, 2007, supra note 7 at 9. Tropical cyclones have
major consequences for Bangladesh. The cyclone of 1970 killed nearly 300,000 people. At the
global level, between 1980-2000, 250,000 deaths occurred due to tropical cyclones, out of which 60
per cent were in Bangladesh. See also Nicholls & Wong, supra note 32 at 338.
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biodiversity.41 It is also believed that temperature increases and freshening can lead to a
collapse of the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation, triggering other profound
impacts.42
Moreover, oceans form one of the largest natural reservoirs of carbon. It is
estimated that, on a daily basis, the world’s seas uptake nearly 22 million metric tons of
CO2.43 The CO2 dissolves and reacts with H2O to form carbonic acid, turning an
essentially alkaline medium into an acidic one.44 Simply stated, ocean acidification is the
decrease in the pH of seawater due to the uptake of anthropogenic carbon dioxide.45
Thus, if we are not successful in our efforts to control excessive dumping of GHGs
(including CO2) into the atmosphere, the carbon chemistry of the oceans will be
considerably altered.46 This increase in CO2 levels will reduce reef calcification47
contributing to coral bleaching and unleash other secondary impacts.48
Given the forgoing, it is clear that climate change impacts on coastal areas fall
under two broad categories: biophysical and socio-economic. Biophysical impacts
include: 1) accelerated coastal erosion;49 2) increased flood frequency;50 3) increased
41

42
43

44

45
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48

49

Commonwealth of Dominica, Initial National Communication under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Roseau: Environmental Coordinating Unit, Ministry of Agriculture
and the Environment, 2001) at 31 (reporting that Hurricane David, devastated the feeding and
nesting sites of Dominica’s endemic parrots and that the population of the two endangered parrots
reached critical levels as low as 60 (A. imperialis) and 200 (A. arausiaca)).
Ibid at 15.
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean
Acidification on Marine Biodiversity, CBD Technical Series No 46 (Montreal: Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009) at 12. AR5 which notes that CO2 concentrations have
increased by 40 per cent since pre-industrial times and the oceans have absorbed about 30 per cent
of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide, contributing to ocean acidification. “Summary for
Policymakers” in Physical Science, 2013, supra note 7 at SPM-7.
Ocean pH has dropped by 30 per cent globally i.e., from 8.2 to 8.1 during the last 200 years. See
generally Ellycia Harrould-Kolieb, Matthew Huelsenbeck & Virginia Selz, Ocean Acidification the
Untold Stories (Washington, DC: Oceana, 2010).
Jean-Pierre Gattuso & Lina Hansson, eds, Ocean Acidification (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011) at 2.
Rachel Baird, Meredith Simons & Tim Stephens, “Ocean Acidification: A Litmus Test for
International Law” (2009) 3 Carbon & Climate LR 459 at 460.
McLean & Tsyban, supra note 38 at 362.
Ibid. Coral reefs in Indonesia, affected by bleaching in 1993 due to warming of sea water showed
very few signs of continued recovery beyond the initial recovery. Luitzen Bijlsma et al, eds,
Preparing to Meet the Coastal Challenges of the 21st Century: Conference Report World Coast
Conference 1993 (The Netherlands: Ministry of Public Works and Water Management, April 1994)
at 303.
Rosenzweig & Casassa, supra note 39 at 92; J Dronkers et al, eds, Report of the Coastal
Management Subgroup: Strategies for Adaption to Sea Level Rise (Geneva: IPCC, Response
Strategies Working Group, 1990) at 4. Already about 40 per cent of the 81,000 kilometers coastline
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precipitation in certain regions (while reducing precipitation in others);51 4) saltwater
intrusion into estuaries and aquifers and disruptions in the fresh-salt water interface;52 5)
changes in wind patterns and intensity;53 6) decline in biodiversity as well as habitat loss
and modification;54 7) increased sea surface temperatures;55 8) increased wave attacks
and storm-surges;56 and 9) spreading of invasive species.57 The main socio-economic
consequences include: 1) large-scale inundation and permanent submergence of large
parcels of coastal land and coastal habitats;58 2) risk to human lives and well-being;59 3)
colossal damage to infrastructure;60 4) disease outbreaks;61 5) losses in recreation
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has been eroded. Masnellyarti Hilman, ed, Indonesia Second National Communication Under The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), (Jakarta: Ministry of
Environment, 2010) at IV-30.
Dronkers et al, eds, ibid.
For instance, in Mauritius while the mean temperature has increased by 0.18 degree Celsius per
decade, rainfall amount during the same period has decreased. Government of Mauritius, Second
National Communication of the Republic of Mauritius under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Government of Mauritius, 2010) at 77 [Mauritius,
Second National Communication].
See generally A Melloul & M Collin, “Hydrogeological Changes in Coastal Aquifers Due to Sea
Level Rise" (2006) 49 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 281–97 (ScienceDirect).
Increase in greenhouse gases will cause changes in the direction and speed of wind in Thailand.
Thailand, Thailand's Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Bangkok: Ministry of Natural Resources & Environment, 2010) at
71.
For instance, coastal wetlands are being lost at a rapid rate, averaging 0.5-1.5 per cent per year. Sealevel rise is expected to increase the rate of net coastal wetland loss. Loss of coastal wetlands of
international importance is expected to be greater for the coasts of the United States, the
Mediterranean Sea, Africa (Atlantic side), East Asia, Australia, and Papua New Guinea. Bijlsma et
al, eds, supra note 48 at 311.
For more on this topic, see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
Rosenzweig & Casassa, supra note 39 at 92-93.
Warmer winter water temperatures due to changing climate can provide a thermal refuge for
invading species. Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, Marine Invasive Species:
State of the Gulf of Maine Report (np: Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, 2010) at
5.
A one-meter rise in sea level is predicted to impact nearly 145 million people, causing damage to
nearly 2,223,000 square kilometres of land area and racking up costs estimated at USD944 billion.
See generally D Anthoff, RJ Nicholls, RSJ Tol & AT Vafeidis, “Global and Regional Exposure to
Large Rises in Sea-level: A Sensitivity Analysis”, Working Paper 96 (Norwich: Tyndall Centre for
Climate Change Research, 2006).
For instance, it is believed that coastal communities, particularly in low-income countries are
vulnerable to a range of health effects due to climate variability like cholera, shell fish and reef fish
poisoning. Nicholls & Wong, supra note 32 at 334-35.
It is doubtful whether the majority of coastal protection structures like seawalls, and coastal dikes
can withstand the pressures from the sea. McLean & Tsyban, supra note 38 at 362. Already, in the
United Kingdom to maintain sea defenses and shore protection works around the 4,300 kilometres
of coast, approximately USD500 million has to be spent. Ibid at 365. These coastal defences will in
due course lose their stability and become less functional. In the event of a one-meter SLR, it is
estimated that to keep the present level of functions and stability for about 1,000 Japanese ports the
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amenities and tourism values;62 7) damage to cultural and historical assets;63 and 8)
reductions in fisheries, forests and agriculture.64 Some of the major impacts of climate
change on coastal areas and the extant international legal regimes applicable to the
situation are identified next.

2.3 “RECEDING COASTLINES”: IMPACT
TERRITORIES

ON

COASTAL AREAS

AND

MARITIME

To give effect to the principle that the “land dominates the sea,”65 (essentially, coastal
frontage) under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOSC), all
coastal states are entitled to certain maritime zones, such as internal waters, 66 a territorial
sea,67 a contiguous zone,68 an exclusive economic zone,69 a continental shelf70 and, in
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total expenditure will be about USD110 billion. Ibid at 366. As well, already many coastal cities are
heavily dependent on artificial coastal defenses like Tokyo, Shanghai, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and
London. Many of these will require upgradation based on new designs. See Nicholls & Wong, ibid
at 333. Ports, railways and roads will be vulnerable to coastal flooding. Ibid.
Higher temperatures, precipitation and humidity facilitate the spread of diseases such as
chikungunya, malaria, diarrhea and dengue. Mauritius, Second National Communication, supra note
51 at 81; Hilman, ed, supra note 49 at IV-45.
The economies of some of the coastal countries are heavily oriented towards coastal activities like
beach tourism (sun, sea, and sand) and these can be heavily impacted by climate change and SLR.
Nicholls & Wong, supra note 32 at 335-36.
A 0.5 metre rise in sea level can cause havoc on the Nile delta if no protective measures are adopted.
It is expected that nearly 52 per cent of monuments and historic sites will also be lost forever.
McLean & Tsyban, supra note 38 at 367.
See generally Gerald C Nelson et al, Climate Change Impact on Agriculture and Costs of
Adaptation, Food Policy Report (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute,
2009); see also UNFAO, Strategy for Fisheries, supra note 39.
North Sea Continental Shelf, [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 52 (explaining the application of the principle in
determining the continental shelf).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, 21 ILM
1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [LOSC], art 8.
The territorial sea is the belt of ocean measured seaward from the baseline of the coastal state and
extending 12 nautical miles. In its territorial sea, a coastal state exercises complete sovereignty,
subject to a right of innocent passage guaranteed to foreign ships. Ibid, arts 17-19.
The contiguous zone runs for another 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea and is determined
from the baseline and in the contiguous zone, states can prevent and punish the violation of customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws. Ibid, art 33.
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends to 200 nautical miles, again measured from the
baseline. Ibid, art 57. In this area, a coastal state has sovereign rights for the purposes of exploration,
exploitation, conservation and management of living and non-living natural resources in the water
column. Ibid, art 56. In the EEZ, while the coastal state has sovereign rights over the natural
resources and their economic exploitation, the international community is guaranteed freedoms of
navigation and over-flight, as well as the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines. Ibid, art 58.
See ibid, part V (entitled “Exclusive Economic Zone”).
The continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond a
country’s territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of
the continental margin. Ibid, art 76(1). It generally runs to 200 nautical miles from the baseline even
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certain cases (if prescribed geomorphological conditions exist), an extended continental
shelf.71 Within each of these zones, states exercise varying combinations of sovereignty,
sovereign rights and jurisdictions, which progressively diminish as the distance from the
coastline increases.72 The perimeter of all maritime zones is measured from the baseline,
which can be normal,73 straight,74 or archipelagic.75 Baselines also play an essential role
in the delimitation of maritime boundaries.76

71
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74

if it does not physically extend that far. Ibid. In cases where it does go farther, it is generally limited
to 350 nautical miles from the baseline (art 76(6)). In the continental shelf, the state enjoys
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the seabed
and subsoil.
See ibid, art 76(4)–(6).
US, Senate, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, and the Agreement
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
with Annex: Message from the President of the United States, 103d Cong, 2d Sess, Treaty Doc 10339 (1994) at 2, online: US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaties, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/>.
Coastal states generally rely on normal baselines to demarcate their maritime zones, with the lowwater line (“as marked on large-scale charts that are officially recognized by the coastal State”)
constituting the normal baseline. LOSC, supra note 66, art 5. Two terms are important here: chart
and low-water line. Chart refers to a nautical chart used by mariners to aid navigation, and the Mean
Low-Water Spring Tide or the Lowest Astronomical Tide usually determines the low-water line.
The phrase “as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State” provides the
state with discretion to choose the vertical datum. International Law Association, Sofia Conference
(2012): Baselines Under the International Law of the Sea at 31, online: International Law
Association <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1028> [ILA, Sofia Conference].
Additional rules have also been drafted to determine normal baselines for islands situated on atolls
and for islands having fringing reefs with low-tide elevations, i.e., the baseline is the seaward lowwater line of the reef. LOSC, ibid, art 6.
The crux of these rules is enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,
stating that that in cases where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, then recourse can be had to straight baselines.
LOSC, ibid, art 7. Article 7(2) allows the drawing of straight baselines where the coastline is highly
unstable due to the presence of a delta or due to other natural conditions. If drawn sensibly, straight
baselines will not significantly enlarge the limits of the maritime zones if normal baselines are
utilized; hence, the matter revolves around the proper plotting of straight baselines. To ensure this
will be the case, the LOSC states that the straight baseline should not depart “to any appreciable
extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.” Ibid, art
7(3). Low-tide elevations such as mud flats and sand bars are naturally formed areas of land,
surrounded by water, that remain above water at low tide but disappear at high tide. Due to these
features, the LOSC states that low-tide elevations can be utilized to draw straight baselines only if
lighthouses or similar installations permanently above sea level have been built on them. Low-tide
elevations without such structures can still be utilized if they have general international recognition.
Again, if low-tide land elevations are situated wholly at a distance exceeding the breadth of the
territorial sea from the mainland or an island, they cannot have a territorial sea. Specific rules have
also been provided in the case of rivers, bays and historic bays. Tony George Puthucherril, “Rising
Seas, Receding Coastlines, and Vanishing Maritime Estates and Territories: Possible Solutions and
Reassessing the Role of International Law” (2014) 15:1 Int’l Community LR [unpublished, accepted
for publication at Queen Mary University of London].
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As rising seas push water inland to erode the coastlines, key baseline points like
low-tide elevations (drying rocks),77 fringing reefs,78 riverbanks,79 and islands become
75

76

77

Archipelagic states are permitted to draw archipelagic straight baselines to join the outermost points
of the outermost islands and drying reefs of their archipelago. LOSC, ibid, art 47. In drawing such
baselines, the rules stipulate that the main islands and an area subject to a specified water-to-land
ratio should be included within them (art 47(1)). As well, the rules state that the length of the
baselines must not exceed 100 nautical miles, with the exception that up to three per cent of the total
number of baselines enclosing the archipelago can exceed this length, to a maximum of 125 nautical
miles (art. 47(2)). The baselines should not depart in any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago (art 47(3)). The baselines should not depart in any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Baselines must not be drawn to and from
low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations that are permanently above sea level
have been built on them or the low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest island. Furthermore, archipelagic
baselines are not to be drawn in a manner that cuts another state off from its territorial waters or the
high seas. The waters landward of these baselines are called archipelagic waters, and while the state
has sovereignty over these waters, ships of other nations are guaranteed the right of innocent
passage and sea-lane passage through them. Ibid, art 2(1) (emphasizing the sovereignty of the
archipelagic State over its archipelagic waters). The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to
the archipelagic waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. Ibid, art 49(1). Ships of all states enjoy the right
of innocent passage through archipelagic waters. Ibid, art 52(1). All ships and aircraft enjoy the right
of archipelagic sea-lanes passage. Ibid, art 53(2). Archipelagic countries like the Maldives have used
this method to determine their maritime zones. Michael Gagain, “Climate Change, Sea Level Rise,
and Artificial Islands: Saving the Maldives’ Statehood and Maritime Claims Through the
Constitution of the Oceans” (2012) 23 Colo J Int’l Envtl L & Pol’y 77 at 95 (HeinOnline).
The LOSC prescribes the relevant rules when it states that
[w]here the coasts of two States are opposite or next to each
other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement
between them, to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond
the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.
LOSC, ibid, art 15; see also ibid, art 74 (delimitation of the EEZ between states with opposite or
adjacent coasts) & art 83 (delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or
adjacent coasts). Even though “the equidistance method is widely used in the practice of maritime
delimitation: it . . . does not automatically have priority over other methods of delimitation and, in
particular circumstances, there may be factors which make the application of the equidistance
method inappropriate.” See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), [2007] ICJ Rep 659 at 741. In certain circumstances,
due to certain peculiar geographical configuration of the coasts, the equidistance line can prove
inequitable. In Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta), [1985] ICJ Rep 13 at 47, it was
held that “the equidistance method is not the only method applicable . . . and it does not even have
the benefit of a presumption in its favour. Thus, under existing law, it must be demonstrated that the
equidistance method leads to an equitable result in the case in question.” Even in such situations the
appropriate test is “to begin with the median line as a provisional line and then to ask whether
“special circumstance” require any adjustment or shifting of that line.” Maritime Delimitation in the
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, [1993] ICJ Rep 38 at 61. “For the delimitation of the
maritime zones beyond the 12-mile zone, it will first provisionally draw an equidistance line and
then consider whether there are circumstances which must lead to an adjustment of that line.” Thus,
there is again requires reliance on basepoints.
These can serve as a baseline point if they are located within the territorial sea. According to some
commentators, if a drying rock is located within 12 nautical miles from shore, permanent
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submerged.80 This unsettles the baselines, which may ambulate81 to reflect new physical
realities and conditions. Correspondingly, certain maritime zones will also shrink,
resulting, mutatis mutandis, in a decrease in related entitlements and prerogatives that the
coastal zone would otherwise enjoy.82 In other words, as coastal territories vanish, so,
too, will some maritime zones and the entitlements associated with them. At the same
time, this may expand the scope of rights enjoyed by other states. For instance, the right
to innocent passage that some states have over certain waters could now enlarge into a
freedom of navigation.83 Similarly, as large parts of the exclusive economic zone become
high seas, all states (coastal or land-locked) can conduct fishing and other operations in
waters that were previously off-limits. Such ambulations in baselines and the reduction in
maritime estate can prove particularly devastating in South Asian countries that depend
on maritime resources for economic support and well-being.
In such situations, other than for Bangladesh (whose coastlines are highly unstable
due to the presence of deltas and its double concave nature84 and whose interests may be
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submergence of this rock by a rising sea level could mean a loss of territorial sea generated by the
rock. Charles Di Leva & Sachiko Morita, “Maritime Rights of Coastal States and Climate Change:
Should States Adapt to Submerged Boundaries?”, Law & Development Working Paper Series No 5,
at 16, online: The World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/>.
Since the seaward low-water line of the reef is used to determine the baseline for islands having
fringing reefs as the sea rises, the extent of the territorial sea may change for these islands. Ibid.
As seen from the rules, in cases where the baseline is a straight line across the mouth of the river
between points on the low-water line of its banks, as and when the sea rises, there could be erosion
of the river bank, shifting further inland the base points used to generate the maritime zone. Ibid.
Under article 121 of the LOSC, islands can generate a maritime estate, provided the island is not an
artificial installation and is always above sea level. Consequently, formations visible only at low tide
and permanently submerged banks and reefs cannot generally produce maritime zones. Therefore,
rising seas could swallow an entire island or rock, thereby depriving the ability of the island to
generate the necessary maritime zones. Ibid at 17.
Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, “Implementing a New Regime of Stable Maritime Zones to Ensure the
(Economic) Survival of Small Island States Threatened by Sea-Level Rise” (2011) 26 Int’l J Mar &
Coast L 263 at 271-76 (arguing a case for a regime of stable baselines); see also David D Caron,
“Climate Change, Sea Level Rise and the Coming Uncertainty in Oceanic Boundaries: A Proposal
to Avoid Conflict” in Seoung-Yong Hong & Jon M Van Dyke, eds, Maritime Boundary Disputes,
Settlement Processes, and The Law of the Sea (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhof, 2009) 1 at 10.
Julia Lisztwan, “Stability of Maritime Boundary Agreements”, Note, (2012) 37 Yale J Int’l L 153 at
165 (HeinOnline).
Leva & Morita, supra note 77 at 20.
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar
Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay
of Bengal (BANGLADESH/MYANMAR), 16, Judgment (14 March 2012) ¶279 (International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea), online: ITLOS, Search <http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=2>.
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protected via article 7(2)85 for other coastal countries in South Asia and elsewhere), the
ambulatory nature of the baselines does not bode well for current or future growth. 86
Pakistan, for example, has relied on a system of straight baselines to demarcate its
maritime estate; thus, when rising seas claim these basepoints, the maritime claims of this
country will also be considerably reduced.87
As we can see, climate-change-induced SLR threatens to redraw the map of the
world, and South Asia is no exception to this.88 In consonance with the generally
accepted understanding of the concept of statehood, the Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States89 (Montevideo Convention) enumerates the following as its
constituting elements, namely that “[t]he State as a person of international law should
possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory;
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.”90 In particular,
for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) like the Maldives, the Tuvalu, the Kiribati and
the Marshall Islands that lie only a few meters above the sea, the situation can be
catastrophic as they face total inundation of their land mass.91 These countries are formed
mainly out of low-lying atolls and have a very limited resource base.92 It is forecasted
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This provision was primarily inserted into the LOSC text due to the efforts of Bangladesh and was
drafted with the specific case of Ganges/Brahmaputra River delta in mind. It can be applied in the
case of other deltaic countries such as Burma, Egypt, Nigeria and Vietnam. Myron H Nordquist, ed,
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary (The Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993) at 101. It enables the drawing of straight baselines
(including in other countries that face similar dilemmas) where the appropriate points can be
selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent
regression of the low-water line, this shall remain effective unless and until it is changed by the
coastal state in accordance with the stipulations in the LOSC.
Stoutenburg, supra note 81 (arguing a case for a regime of stable baselines); see also Caron, supra
note 81.
See generally US, Bureau of Oceans & International & Environmental & Scientific Affairs, Limits
in the Seas: Straight Baselines Claim: Pakistan (No 118) (Office of Ocean Affairs, 1996); see also
Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act 1976 (22 December 1976, Pakistan).
It is difficult to predict when exactly these events will unfold since as pointed out earlier the rate of
SLR can vary and is dependant on several factors. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
For the text, see Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 165
LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934).
Ibid, art 1.
Stoutenburg, supra note 81 at 268.
For more details regarding the geographical features of atolls see Colin D Woodroffe, “Reef-island
Topography and the Vulnerability of Atolls to Sea-Level Rise” (2008) 62 Global & Planetary
Change 77 at 78 (Science Direct). The majority of these islands like the Marshall Islands, the
Maldives, and the Caribbean Islands are heavily oriented towards coastal activities like beach
tourism (sun, sea, and sand) and fishing. UN RIO+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development, The Future We Want, A/CONF.216/L.1*, 19 June 2012, ¶178.
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that rising seas will gobble up entire parts of the majority of SIDS, 93 leading to the
“sinking” islands phenomenon.94
This scenario is not without precedence. In 1999, Kiribati lost two of its
uninhabited islands (Tebua Tarawa and Abanuea) to rising seas. 95 The IPCC affirms that
“[s]ea-level rise impacts on the low-lying Pacific Island atoll states of Kiribati, Tuvalu,
Tokelau and the Marshall Islands may, at some threshold, pose risks to their sovereignty
or existence.”96 In the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, large parts of the Maldives were
completely under the sea for a few minutes.97 In the Sundarbans in India, the residents of
the Lohachara Island (located at the confluence of the rivers Ganges and Brahmaputra)
had to permanently relocate, as the island was swamped by the Bay of Bengal.98
Since mean SLR is a gradual process, the disappearance of islands like the
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Koko Warner et al, In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human
Migration and Displacement (CARE International, 2009) at 18-19. Carteret Islanders, part of Papua
New Guinea, had to abandon their homes as the island was rendered uninhabitable due to king tides,
salinization of water sources, dying trees, etc. See Richard Shears, “The world's first climate change
refugees to leave island due to rising sea levels”, MailOnline (18 December 2007) online: MailOnli
ne, Advanced Search <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/index.html>; see also Neil Tweedie,
“Carteret Islands: ‘The sea is killing our island paradise'”, The Telegraph (9 December 2009) online:
The Telegraph, Archive <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/>. Already, in Papua New Guinea,
inhabitants of the Carteret Islands and the Duke of York Islands had to be relocated. In the
Maldives, the residents in the island of Kandholhudoo had to be relocated because of the tsunami.
See Susin Park, Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island
States, UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, PLA/2011/04 (Switzerland: Division
of International Protection, 2011) at 2-3; see also Walter Kälin & Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People
Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches,
UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA/2012/01 (Switzerland: Division of
International Protection, 2012) at 2-3.
See Submission: Climate Change and Statelessness: An Overview, UNHCR (15 May 2009) at 1.
Alex Kirby, “Islands disappear under rising seas”, BBC News (14 June 1999) online: BBC News <
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/>; see also Pacific at Risk: Our Islands, Our Lives, online: SPREP
<http://www.sprep.org/att/publication/000142_Pacific_at_Risk.pdf>.
W Neil Adger, Shardul Agrawala & M Monirul Qader Mirza, “Assessment of Adaptation Practices,
Options, Constraints and Capacity” in ML Parry et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
717 at 736.
See also UN, UNTV: 21st Century, Maldives: Safer Islands, online: UN News & Media Multimedia,
Television, 21st Century <http://www.unmultimedia.org/> (reporting that Maldives lost 20 islands
during the 2004 tsunami). USAID, Tsunami Displacement: Lessons for Climate Change Adaptation
Programming Findings for the Maldives – Overview Report (Washington, DC: USAID, 2010) at 8.
Subhra Priyadarshini, “Vanishing islands, Displaced Climate Casualties, Underlying truth”, The
Telegraph [of Kolkata] (30 October 2006), online: The Telegraph, Archives, Weekly Features,
Knowhow <http://www.telegraphindia.com/>. However, there is controversy as to the true causative
factor. Achintyarup Ray, “Vanishing islands: Blame on KoPT”, The Times of India (3 April 2009),
online: The Times of India, Archives <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/international-home>.
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Maldives will also likely be a slow but sure process.99 Even before the total obliteration
of their land territory, it is probable that many of the coral-reef islands in the Maldives
will be rendered uninhabitable, triggering migrations of coastal populations to other
lands.100 Of particular concern will be the impact of salinity intrusion into their
freshwater lenses, the destruction of coastal agriculture, and coral bleaching. 101 Already,
the Maldives is struggling to find freshwater sources. As these islands are slowly denuded
of their ability to sustain “human habitation or an economic life,”102 and as their land
territory vanishes, the Maldives faces the danger of degenerating into a disadvantaged
sub-category of island, called “rock,”103 which can produce only territorial waters and
contiguous zones.104
In others words, it is possible that the exclusive economic zone that the Maldives
once generated could vanish. As the sea moves further inland and as the islands
disappear, the Maldives may lose its other maritime zones as well and the exclusive and
sovereign right to exploit resources, particularly, the fish stocks that these waters harbour.
This can have major economic implications, since the maritime zones and attendant
resources form the country’s primary economic backbone.105 The Maldives also faces the
prospect of losing significant portions of its population to climate-change-related
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Rosemary Rayfuse, “W(h)ither Tuvalu? International Law and Disappearing States” (University of
New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Paper 9, 2009) at 6.
See generally Tony George Puthucherril, “Adapting to Climate Change and Accelerated Sea-Level
Rise through Integrated Coastal Zone Management Laws: A Study of the South Asian Experience”
in Aldo Chircop, Scott Coffen-Smout & Moira McConnell, eds, Ocean Yearbook, vol 26 (Leiden:
The Netherlands, 2012) 533 at 573.
See David Freestone, “International Law and Sea Level Rise” in Robin Churchill & David
Freestone, eds, International Law and Global Climate Change, International Environmental Law &
Policy Series (London: Graham & Trotman, 1991) 109 at 112.
LOSC, supra note 66, art 121(3).
Rocks are basically islands, but they are a disadvantaged category of islands. Islands are
economically useful and supports human habitation. Under the definition of island in the LOSC an
island has four features, namely, 1) naturally formed 2) area of land, 3) surrounded by water, 4)
above water at high tide. Ibid, art 121(1).
Ibid, art 121(3).
If an island has no maritime neighbours within 400 nautical miles, it can generate 431,014 square
kilometers of territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf rights. On the other hand, if it is considered
to be a mere “rock” incapable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights, it can still create a
territorial sea of 1,550 square kilometers. The voluntary reclassification of Rockall by United
Kingdom from full “island” to “rock” resulted in a loss of around 60,000 square nautical miles of
fishery zone. See generally Clive Howard Schofield, The Trouble with Islands (LLM Thesis, The
Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of British Columbia, 2009) [unpublished]; see also Clive
Schofield, “Shifting Limits? Sea Level Rise and Options to Secure Maritime Jurisdictional Claims”
(2009) 3:4 Carbon & Climate LR 405 at 409 (HeinOnline) [Schofield, “Shifting Limits?”].
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disasters like cyclones and typhoons, with survivors migrating to other areas, rending the
social fabric. Thus, out of the four conditions essential to statehood as enumerated in the
Montevideo Convention, at least two (a permanent population and a defined territory)
will be seriously compromised, throwing into doubt the country’s statehood status.
Among the measures suggested to protect the rights and interests of countries like
the Maldives, in respect of the maritime zones, a range of promising solutions has been
proposed, some of which are analyzed here. One solution is to proceed in a state of
inaction or maintain the status quo, allowing nature to determine the course of events. In
such a scenario, the seas would slowly move in and determine the equilibrium. While this
would save countries the trouble of diverting scarce economic resources and spending
huge amounts of money to construct costly barriers to the sea, 106 this ‘status quo’
approach has several disadvantages. As mentioned, coastal states would lose land and
infrastructures as well as inhabitants; for small island states like the Maldives, this could
spell the end of their existence.
To address the issues inherent in diminishing maritime estate, an astute way to deal
with the crisis would be to organize a conference on the Law of the Sea to fill in the gaps.
Failing that, a new protocol on SLR could be developed107 or the UN General Assembly
could be convened to pass resolutions to provide guidance on the matter. Additionally,
the amending procedures contemplated under the LOSC could be utilized to modify or
reinterpret the rules to cope with new and unforeseen situations.108 For instance, since
one of the main issues of concern is the ambulatory nature of baselines and outer limits of
the various maritime zones, these demarcation points could be permanently fixed.109
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But see Nicholls & Wong, supra note 32 at 317 (“[a]daptation costs for vulnerable coasts are much
less than the costs of inaction (high confidence)”).
David Freestone & John Pethick, “Sea Level Rise and Maritime Boundaries: International
Implications of Impacts and Responses” in Gerald H Blake, ed, Maritime Boundaries, vol 5, World
Boundaries (NY: Routledge, reprint 1997) 73 at 79. This was one of the primary suggestions of the
CZMS of the IPCC. In its “Suggested Ten-Year Timeline for the Implementation of Comprehensive
Coastal Zone Management Plans,” the CZMS had recommended the adoption of such a protocol by
1992 to “provide a framework for international and multinational cooperation in dealing with the
full range of concerns related to impacts of sea level rise and climate change impacts on the coastal
zone.” WMO, UNEP & IPCC, Climate Change: The IPCC Response Strategies (Washington DC:
Island Press, 1991) at 129, 139-40.
LOSC, supra note 66, arts 312-14.
Both the baselines and the outer limits of the different maritime zones need to be permanently fixed.
If only the outer limits of the different maritime zones were fixed and the baselines were allowed to
ambulate it will harshly impact the archipelagic states, as they may not be able to comply with the
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Using the provision on unstable coasts, straight baselines could be drawn in new areas.
Article 7(2) may provide a legal architecture to resolve problems that arise in cases where
coastlines are highly unstable, particularly where the instability is exacerbated by SLR.
By relying on this method, appropriate points can be selected along the furthest seaward
extent of the low-water line. Straight baselines would remain effective until they are
changed by the coastal states, in accordance with the LOSC. If a state chooses not to take
any action to change its baseline, the old baseline will remain effective. Adoption of such
a measure will ensure that if the low-water line were to retreat due to SLR, the affected
coastal states will retain their maritime zones. This will particularly benefit SIDS, which
might otherwise loose not only their maritime estates but also their statehood.
As well, article 5 provides considerable leeway to coastal states in determining their
normal baselines, which is the charted low-water line.110 Hence, it is the state that
determines the choice of large-scale charts, with a presumption weighted heavily on the
side of states despite the proviso that the chosen chart be a “sufficiently accurate
representation of the normal baseline.”111 Again, due to unique geographical
circumstances, article 7(2) permits the pictorial version of the straight baseline to remain
effective. Accordingly, it has been suggested that coastal states threatened by SLR and
consequent erosion “officially recognize” a chart that shows features that existed prior to
these being claimed by the rising sea and thereby maintain the status quo.
Similarly, the LOSC also allows states to establish the outer limits of their
continental shelf for both the 200-nautical-mile limit and to any extended shelf. Since
these limits are described as “permanent” in the LOSC, any subsequent recession of
baselines due to SLR will not affect the breadth of the continental shelf. In particular, if
we can interpret article 76(9) (which obliges coastal states to deposit with the UN
Secretary-General any charts and/or other relevant information that permanently
describes the outer limits of its continental shelf) as requiring even those coastal states
that have a continental shelf that extends only to 200 nautical miles to deposit relevant
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archipelagic baseline rules, which stipulate a specific water-to-land ratio and a maximum allowable
length for the archipelagic straight baselines. Stoutenburg, supra note 81 at 275.
LOSC, supra note 66, art 5; ILA, Sofia Conference, supra note 73 (noting that the phrase “as marked
on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State” provides the coastal State with
discretion to choose the vertical datum).
ILA, Sofia Conference, ibid.
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information to enable the permanent fixation of the outer limits of the continental shelf,
this could guard the state against any subsequent regression in the baseline and/or
shrinkage of its maritime zones.112
In line with this approach, numerous commentators have argued that there is merit
in permanently fixing the boundaries of all maritime zones so as to divest them of their
ambulatory character.113 Such an approach aligns with the principles of fairness and
equity, since a freeze would not erode any of the entitlements and jurisdictional rights
that coastal nations enjoy over their maritime spaces and resources. Furthermore, it would
ensure that states do not encroach on other states’ maritime zones.114 Nevertheless, these
propositions can be disputed on the basis that coastal states stand to gain more ocean
space as their coasts retreat. For instance, if the coastline were to recede by one mile,
given fixed baselines, the coastal state can claim an additional mile of ocean space, which
will become its internal waters and accompanying resources. If its baseline were
ambulatory, the state would continue to have a twelve-mile territorial sea but the high
seas would increase by one mile.115 However, this argument fails to take into account the
fact that the increase is primarily because the state has lost one mile of its land territory,
which is now under water. Thus, it makes good sense to have baselines permanently
fixed.
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Stoutenburg, supra note 81 at 269-70.
Judge Jesus observes, “it would seem reasonable for the sake of stability that, once the baselines
have been established and given publicity to, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1982
Convention, such baselines should be seen as permanent base- lines, irrespective of changes.” JL
Jesus, "Rocks, New-born Islands, Sea Level Rise and Maritime Space" in JA Frowein et al, eds,
Negotiating for Peace-Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel (New York: Springer, 2003) 579 at 601;
Schofield, “Shifting Limits?”, supra note 105 at 416. Rayfuse advocates, “a more lasting solution to
the challenges to coastal states posed by sea level rise will require the international community to
adopt new positive rules of international law to freeze existing baseline claims”. Rosemary G
Rayfuse, “International Law and Disappearing States: Utilising Maritime Entitlements to Overcome
the Statehood Dilemma”, University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, (Paper
52, 2010) (SSRN) at 12 [Rayfuse, "International Law"]. “A less expensive, but probably also less
dependable means for these States to prevent negative consequences as a result of sea level rise ... is
to contribute towards the creation of a new rule of customary international law which allows coastal
States in case of sea level rise to maintain the original outer limits of their maritime zones.” AHA
Soons, “The Effects of a Rising Sea Level on Maritime Limits and Boundaries” (1990) 37(2) Nethl
Int'l L Rev 207 at 216, 231. “[S]tates should move toward permanently fixing ocean boundaries and
away from the current regime of ambulatory boundaries …” Caron, supra note 81 at 14.
See generally Alain Khadem, “Protecting Maritime Zones from the Effects of Sea Level Rise"
(1998) 6(3) Boundary and Security Bull 76 (referring to the possibility of inter-state conflict over
navigation and sovereignty rights over living and non-living resources).
Lisztwan, supra note 82 at 170.
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While these suggestions may help to maintain the de jure status, at a de facto level
the charts are an inaccurate representation of ground realities.116 Such stabilization will
render the basepoints constant. However, as the rising seas claim more land, the internal
waters of coastal states will enlarge, which may prove detrimental to international
shipping. A coastal state has sovereignty over its internal waters, which means it can
exclude foreign ships at will.117 As mariners rely on these charts for navigational
purposes, to adopt such a course of action places international shipping at risk. Already
there have been several legal conflicts over whether the charted low-water line is the
actual low-water line.118 In such a situation, it may then be necessary to develop two sets
of charts – one for maritime jurisdictional purposes, and the other for navigational safety.
An alternative would be to design charts that superimpose ground realities over the
original maritime zone measurements.
Moreover, SLR rates may not be uniform, which further complicates matters. For
instance, in some coastal countries, the rate of SLR may be accelerated due to localized
geographical factors or increased groundwater extraction. In such cases, baselines for this
country will move further inland in comparison to a neighbouring state. Under
international law, a treaty can become void due to a fundamental change in circumstances
(article 62(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969119 [clausula
rebus sic stantibus]). In a situation where a treaty establishes a boundary that includes a
maritime delimitation treaty,120 the application of this rule is expressly precluded. As
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Schofield, “Shifting Limits?”, supra note 105 at 413.
In such cases, the coastal state only continues to retain sovereignty over the territory which has
presently become submerged. Stoutenburg, supra note 81 at 275-76.
For instance, see generally Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain, [2001] ICJ Rep 40. Even though the nautical charts of Qatar pointed out that Qit’at Jaradah
was not an island but was a low-tide elevation the International Court of Justice, analysed the
evidence submitted by the parties and expert opinion, in particular the opinion of the experts from
Qatar to the effect that Qit’at Jaradah was not scientifically proved to be a low-tide elevation.
Accordingly, the court concluded that Qit’at Jaradah is an island that should be considered for the
drawing of the equidistance line. Ibid; see also In the Matter of Arbitration Between: Guyana v
Suriname, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, Award (17 September 2007) ¶396. One of
the issues related to the accuracy of the low-water line on chart recognised as official by Suriname.
Guyana contended that it was an inaccurate representation. However, on examination of the
evidence the Tribunal rejected Guyana’s contention and accepted the validity of the basepoints and
the chart. Ibid.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27
January 1980) art 62.
Stoutenburg, supra note 81 at 280; see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey), [1978]
ICJ Rep 3, ¶85 (essentially equating a maritime boundary agreement with those establishing land
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well, such treaties fall within the category of “objective or status contracts,” and thus
their consequences go well beyond the parties to the treaty. Accordingly, states can
protect many of their maritime entitlements by delimiting their maritime boundaries in
bilateral treaties with neighbouring states, rendering any subsequent regression of
coastlines due to SLR of no consequence. However, this may not be a viable solution for
SIDS that are geographically secluded.121
As far as the issue of protecting statehood is concerned, as seen previously, rocks
are incapable of generating an EEZ or continental shelf. A related issue is whether SIDS
should be allowed to retain control over their maritime spaces or if these areas should
automatically be allowed to become high seas when the islands that generate these
maritime zones turn to “rocks” or are inundated. As mentioned above, it is common
knowledge that SIDS have contributed the least to the phenomenon of climate change
and therefore it is profoundly inequitable that they should suffer the worst impacts of
climate change and SLR.122 On the grounds of equity and fairness, again a water-tight
case can be made for such states being allowed to retain their rights over maritime zones
and the valuable resources contained therein. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether these
states or their dispersed populations could actually exercise effective control over
maritime spaces, since the native populations would have migrated to other lands and the
uninhabited rocks may be located thousands of miles away from their new places of
habitation.
Still, there is sufficient rationale for allowing these vanishing SIDS to persist with
their maritime territories. It may be extremely difficult for SIDS to find a state willing to
sell its land, particularly coastal frontage land. Thus, permitting SIDS to use these
maritime spaces and the remaining land guarantees them with an opportunity to sustain
their fishing and offshore industries. Maritime spaces are highly prized and to divest a
state of their rights over these spaces and resources is patently unfair. While there are
presently several instances of countries administering islands that are situated hundreds
and thousands of kilometers away, for SIDS exercising rights over the water column and
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frontiers and stating that it “is subject to the rule excluding boundary agreements from fundamental
change of circumstances”).
See also Stoutenburg, supra note 81 at 281.
Schofield, “Shifting Limits?”, supra note 105 at 416.
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the corresponding seabed may involve considerable logistical issues if the new territory
that is willing to accommodate the displaced population is not as close as possible to the
sinking rocks.
In such a scenario, another possible option is for SIDS to forego statehood and
merge with another state that has superior resources and the capacity to administer the
maritime spaces of the now submerged state.123 An amalgamation between the two
countries would result in the maritime territories enjoyed by the SIDS being passed to the
host state, creating a larger country with a command over greater resources and an
increased ability to safeguard any maritime estate that may be located far away from its
land territory. Thus, it becomes extremely important for SIDS to retain control over their
maritime estates, which they can use as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table
discussing the modalities of the merger, should the need arise.124
A suggestion to allow states like the Maldives to persist in their statehood is to
provide for the creation of de-territorialised states125 or “sui generis international
persons.”126 Under this provision, states retain statehood status by functioning from the
land territory of other states. A closely related idea is that of a ‘‘government-in-exile.’’127
In articulating the functions of such entities, Rayfuse observes:128
In the context of disappearing states, the
deterritorialised state entity would … consist of a
‘government’ or ‘authority’ elected by the registered
voters of the deterritorialised state. In essence, this
‘authority’ would act as a trustee of the assets of the
state for the benefit of its citizens wherever they
might now be located. The maritime zones of the
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Rayfuse, "International Law", supra note 113 at 8 & 9 (describing the relocation of Icelanders in
what is now southern Manitoba, and their ultimate integration into Canada); see also Schofield,
“Shifting Limits?”, ibid at 415.
Rayfuse, "International Law", ibid, at 12.
Ibid at 10. The author refers to the Sovereign Order of the Military Hospitaller Order of St John of
Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta (or the Order of St John or the Knights of Malta. Having lost its
territory when rejected from Malta by Napoleon in 1798, it has historically been considered a
sovereign international subject, and is recognised by a large number of states. It also enjoys the
rights of active and passive legation, treaty making and membership of international organizations.
As well, the Papal See was recognized as a state despite possessing no territory between 1870, when
it was annexed by Italy. Ibid.
Freestone, supra note 101 at 116.
Rayfuse, "International Law", supra note 113 at 10 & 11.
Ibid at 11.
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disappearing state would continue to inure to and be
managed by that ‘authority’ such that the resource
rents from their exploitation could be used to fund
the relocation and continued livelihood of the
displaced population – whether diasporic or wholly
located within one other ‘host’ state. Although not
having sovereignty over its new property
acquisitions the ‘authority’ would continue to
represent the state at the international level and the
rights and interests of its citizens vis-à-vis their new
‘host’ state or states. These rights could include the
right to maintain their original personal, property,
cultural, linguistic and nationality rights for
themselves
and
their
descendants
while
simultaneously being granted full citizenship rights
in the new ‘host’ state or states.
However, it is doubtful as to how far and to what extent these entities would be able to
protect their citizens’ rights. There is a strong possibility that these countries may remain
as states only on de jure and not de facto.129
Another solution to the territory conundrum is for the disappearing state to buy new
territory in another state, which is what the Maldives and Tuvalu are trying to do. 130 The
transaction can be concluded via a treaty of cession, which will transfer sovereignty over
the ceded land to the disappearing state.131 Upon conclusion of the sale, the disappearing
state can relocate its population to the new territory.132 While it is unlikely that a state
may willingly sell a part of its territory to another, there is still a possibility that land129
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UNHCR Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective,
UNHCR [nd] at 5, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html>.
In 2001, Tuvalu approached Australia and New Zealand with a request to accommodate its
population. While Australia refused, New Zealand agreed to a 30-year immigration program under
which 75 Tuvaluans are accepted per year provided they are of good character and health, less than
45 years of age, possess English language skills, and must have a job offer in New Zealand.
However the offer is completely inadequate given that Tuvalu has a population of approximately
11,000. Rayfuse, "International Law", supra note 113.
Selma Oliver, “A New Challenge to International Law: The Disappearance of the Entire Territory of
a State” (2009) 16 Int'l J Mar & Coast L 209 at 238-39 (HeinOnline) (referring to several such sales
and gifts of land territory between states). In 1867, Russia sold Alaska. Here the purchase was based
on an offer by Russia and the transaction was affected via a treaty of cession and US paid USD7.2
million. Again Denmark sold territories in the West Indies in 1916, Spain sod the Caroline Islands to
Germany in 1899 and Venice was ceded to France by Austria and then by France to Italy in 1866.
Ibid; see also Rayfuse, “International Law", ibid at 7.
Rayfuse, “International Law", ibid.
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surplus nations may, on altruistic considerations, be willing to forgo a part of their land
territory to accommodate the people of sinking countries, particularly since these nations
are not the ones who have contributed to the phenomenon.133 However, relocating people
to distant lands may not be ideal, so the re-location should preferably be to areas that are
geographically close to where their islands once stood. While international law cannot
compel a state to donate or sell part of its land territory, 134 international financial support
can be provided to enable countries to purchase alternate land and to re-establish viable
communities.135 Purchase of territory seems to be the best possible solution in the
circumstance, as it enables continuity of statehood, citizenship, and preservation of
cultural heritage.
While the above mentioned solutions are basically legalistic in nature, a range of
practical and engineering-based solutions have also been suggested to protect the
interests of disappearing states and those that are fast loosing their coastal frontage. One
important suggestion in this regard is the construction of artificial islands, such as the
Hulhumalé in the Maldives.136 This artificial island, built on a reclaimed lagoon, is two
meters above sea level.137 Even though states do have rights to construct artificial islands,
the legal position under the LOSC is that artificial islands are unable to generate the
necessary maritime zones, except certain safety zones around them, which is also not
more than 5,000 meters.138 Consequently, it has been suggested that the LOSC be
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"[F]rom a practical perspective it is difficult to envisage any state now agreeing, no matter what the
price, to cede a portion of its territory to another state unless that territory is uninhabited,
uninhabitable, not subject to any property, personal, cultural or other claims, and devoid of all
resources and any value whatsoever to the ceding state." Ibid at 8.
Oliver, supra note 131 at 238.
Rayfuse, "International Law", supra note 113.
The project involves the reclamation of 188 hectares of land. It was completed in 2002. Necessary
infrastructural and residential developments were completed in 2004 and the very first settlement
(1000 people) began in 2004. Housing Development Corporation, Introduction, online: Housing
Development Corporation, Introduction <http://www.hdc.com.mv/index.php>.
Gagain, supra note 75 at 119. Simon Gardner, "New Maldives Island Rises From The Depths"
Rense.com (14 April 2012), online: Rense.com <http://rense.com/general60/newmaldivesisland
.htm>.
As far as artificial islands that are constructed within a coastal state’s internal waters and territorial
sea, the state can exercise sovereign rights over the same. If the artificial island is situated either in
the EEZ or in the continental shelf then the coastal state has “exclusive jurisdiction over such
artificial islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal,
health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.” LOSC, supra note 66, arts 60 & 80. In these
zones, the coastal state has only jurisdiction over the artificial islands and does not possess
sovereignty. Moreover in respect of artificial islands constructed in these zones, the coastal state has
to give other states notification of their construction, as well as maintain a permanent warning
50

amended to provide legal status to these artificial structures.139 Even then whether
artificial islands are a practicable solution in the long run is moot. Artificial structures
pose a host of environmental problems. They have been found to aggravate erosion in
other areas. Moreover, whether these artificial structures will be able to sustain human
habitation and withstand the battering from intense storms and surges, king tides, etc. is
also doubtful. Such structures can also adversely impact the economic mainstay of island
countries, as tourists flock to these islands primarily to enjoy the pristine beauty of nature
(i.e., beaches and reefs). Artificial concrete structures can repel tourists (as well as their
tourist dollars), detrimentally affecting the economy of these regions.140 Creation of
artificial islands may be a temporary solution, but ultimately this will also prove to be
futile given the fast pace at which the sea is rising and other changes in the oceanic
environment. Continuance of life on these islands will become extremely difficult and
ultimately relocation may be required.
An important suggestion to preserve the basepoints is to protect, or armour, the
coastlines.141 Currently under the LOSC, outermost permanent harbour works such as
jetties, piers, quays, wharves, breakwaters and seawalls142 are treated as part of the coast
and can be used to delimit the territorial sea.143 In addition, coast protective and land
reclamation works144 are also treated as part of the coast.145 Even though armouring can
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system of their existence. Again they cannot be constructed in areas where their presence will
undermine the use of internationally acknowledged sea-lanes. The coastal state is obliged to pass
laws to prevent marine environmental pollution from the construction of its artificial islands and if
in case the artificial island is partially or completely abandoned, then the coastal state has a general
obligation to remove it, or with respect to an artificial island not completely deconstructed, the
coastal state must give suitable notification to other states regarding the dimensions, location, and
depth of the remains. Ibid.
See generally Gagain, supra note 75.
Lilian Yamamoto & Miguel Esteban, “Vanishing Island States and Sovereignty” (2010) 53 Ocean &
Coastal Mgmt 1 at 7 (ScienceDirect).
Freestone, supra note 101 at 117-22.
ILA, Sofia Conference, supra note 73 at 26.
LOSC, supra note 66, art 11.
ILA, Sofia Conference, supra note 73 at 27.
Artificial extensions of the coast can extend the normal baseline. In the Netherlands, an extension to
the Port of Rotterdam by land reclamation has extended the coast a couple of kilometers seaward,
leading to a shift in the low-water line. Ibid at 28. Similarly, in the case concerning Land
Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v Singapore), Malaysia
wanted Singapore (pending the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal) to suspend all land reclamation
activities in the vicinity of the maritime boundary between the two States or of areas claimed as
territorial waters by Malaysia. Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the
Straits of Johor (Malaysia v Singapore), 12, Order (8 October 2003) at 23 (International Tribunal
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be expensive, it does have the advantage of having the ability to maintain the status quo
at least for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, hard armouring also has several environmental pitfalls. While their
construction has been found to arrest erosion in one part of the coast, the erosion may be
magnified in other areas, as these affect the littoral drift. 146 Again, the construction of
hard structures like storm walls may end up preventing the natural inland migration of
wetlands, ultimately leading to their loss and thereby negatively impacting the livelihood
of artisanal fishers.147 In certain situations, soft armouring measures like beach
nourishment and mangrove and wetland conservation may prove more useful and
environmentally friendlier.148 However, there are limitations in utilising soft armouring
measures as well and therefore the choice of a measure aimed at the physical protection
of the coastlines, including the basepoints, should be decided as part of a more
comprehensive strategy targeted towards intelligent coastal management. It is in this
context that ICZM assumes relevance, as it provides a practical opportunity to implement
coastal armouring as part of a larger and composite package towards sustainable coastal
development.
2.4 “VULNERABLE COASTAL COMMUNITIES”: IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SLR
ON COASTAL COMMUNITIES
In 2005, the Inuit in the Arctic petitioned the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights for relief against human rights violations guaranteed under the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.149 These violations were occasioned by the
“acts and omissions” of the United States which contributed overwhelmingly to GHGs
that warmed the atmosphere, leading to climate change.150 The specific averments
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for the Law of the Sea). It seems that one of the key concerns of Malaysia was that, “a
reconfiguration of Singapore’s coasts would functionally and legally extend Singapore’s baseline
seaward to Malaysia’s disadvantage in a delimitation of maritime spaces between the opposite
states”. ILA, Sofia Conference, supra note 73 at 28.
Dronkers et al, eds, supra note 49 at 9.
See generally Sudarshan Rodriguez et al, Policy Brief: Seawalls (UNDP/UNTRS: Chennai &
ATREE: Bangalore, 2008).
Dronkers et al, eds, supra note 49 at 9.
Inuit Petition, supra note 1 at 28.
Ibid at 103.
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emphasised that the tranquil life and culture of the Inuit were being harmed. 151 The
primary petition was to declare that the United States is “internationally responsible for
violations of rights”152 and to recommend that the United States adopt mandatory
measures to limit its GHGs emissions.153 The petition was dismissed on the grounds of
insufficiency of information to prove alleged facts.154
The Inuit’s grievances are not unique. Coastal communities in South Asia – be it
the Meenavar in India, the Mukkuvar in Sri Lanka, Jaladash in Bangladesh, Mohana in
Pakistan, and the fishing communities in Maldives are also feeling increasingly
threatened by climatic changes and SLR,155 and several have had to migrate to other
regions.156 One of the gravest impacts of climate change is that it will uproot millions of
residents, leading to their displacement and consequent migrations. In 2008, it was
estimated that “sudden-onset natural disasters,” displaced nearly 36 million people and
that of these, more than 20 million were displaced by “sudden-onset climate-related
disasters.”157 In contrast, in the same year, the total population of people (both internally
displaced and refugees) living in forced displacement due to conflict was 42 million, with
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The allegations are that there were drastic reductions in the average annual amounts of sea ice,
permafrost thawing leading to collapse of structures, impacts on health, availability of country food,
and drinking water and safety concerns. The traditional wisdom of the Inuit dealing with survival on
ice (Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit) was being rendered redundant due to these changes. See generally,
ibid. Subsequently, in 2008, the native Inupiat Eskimo coastal village of Kivalina in Alaska brought
a public nuisance lawsuit in a federal court in San Francisco against several oil, power and coal
companies including ExxonMobil Corp. seeking damages of up to USD400 million on the grounds
that the sea ice attached to the Kivalina coast was getting thinner and breaking up earlier, exposing
the village to coastal storm waves and surges. The erosion reached such a point that Kivalina was
becoming uninhabitable and therefore the village had to be relocated. The matter was dismissed by
the U.S. district court on the grounds that regulating greenhouse emissions was a matter that lay
within the political rather than the legal domain. Native Village of Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corp, 663
F Supp (2d) 863 (ND Cal, 2009).
Inuit Petition, ibid at 118.
Ibid.
Letter from Ariel E Dulitzky, Assistant Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (16 November 2006) online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/packages/
pdf/science/16commissionletter.pdf>.
For instance, see Inam Ahmed, “Climate bell tolls: Livelihood changes with weather”, The Daily
Star [of Dhaka] (7 December 2009) online: The Daily Star <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDe
sign/news-details.php?nid=116709>.
For instance, see generally Mirjam Macchi, “Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Climate
Change”, Issues Paper (IUCN, March 2008).
See generally OCHA, IDMC & NRC, Monitoring Disaster Displacement in the Context of Climate
Change: Findings of a Study by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (Switzerland, United Nations Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009).
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4.6 million newly internally displaced during that year.158 In 2009, 16.7 million people
were newly displaced by sudden-onset disasters (out of which 15.2 million were
displaced due to climate related disasters),159 and in 2010, the figure was 42.3 million
people (out of which 38.3 million were related to climate disasters).160 It is estimated that
by 2050, the number of people who will be forced to move out due to climate change will
range between 25 million to one billion.161
While droughts, desertification and food shortages can trigger migrations and crossborder movements,162 the problem will be particularly acute in low elevation coastal
zones. Although these areas constitute only 2.2 per cent of dry land, they hold nearly 10.5
per cent of the world’s population.163 Even more worrying is the fact that the problem of
climate change-induced migrations will almost exclusively be a developing country crisis
not only because of the huge populations that live on their coasts but because of the
countries’ low adaptive capacity, widespread poverty, and lack of good governance.164
One of the major theatres where the problems of climate change displacement will
be played out in its extremity is South Asia. The IPCC estimates that a one-metre rise in
sea level will put nearly 125 million people at risk, three quarters of whom live in East
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“Summary”, in ibid; see also ibid at 10. In 2008, earthquakes caused more displacement than any
other type of disaster. However, this was primarily because of the Sichuan earthquake and if this
was removed from the analysis, floods and storms will account for 93 per cent of disaster-related
displacement in 2008. Ibid.
IDMC & NRC, Displacement Due to Natural Hazard-Induced Disasters Global Estimates for 2009
and 2010 (Switzerland: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2011) at 8. In 2009, 15.2 million
people, 91 per cent of the total, were displaced due to climate-related disasters, categorized as
hydrological, meteorological or climatological (floods and storms). Nine per cent of the remaining
was displaced by geophysical hazards, namely earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. 87 per cent of
the displacement happened in Asia, the maximum displacement occurred in India. Ibid at 9.
Of the total number, 90 per cent were displaced due to climate-related (hydrological, meteorological
or climatological) disasters (floods and storms). Again Asia topped the list and here the maximum
displacements occurred in China. Ibid at 11.
IOM, Frank Laczko & Christine Aghazarm, eds, Migration, Environment and Climate Change:
Assessing the Evidence (Geneva: IOM, 2009). In the Indian subcontinent, if we continue with a
business as usual approach of dumping GHGs and if the global temperatures rise by 4-5 degree
Celsius, 125 million migrants will be uprooted. Out of this 75 million will be from Bangladesh and
the rest from India. See generally Sudhir Chella Rajan, Blue Alert: Climate Migrants in South Asia:
Estimates and Solutions – A Report by Greenpeace (Greenpeace India Society, 2008).
See generally Warner et al, supra note 93.
Etienne Piguet, “New Issues in Refugee Research: Climate Change and Forced Migration”, PDES
Working Papers (Research Paper No 153, 2008) at 7.
Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, “Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits” in Jane
McAdam, ed, Climate Change and Displacement Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford and
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2010) 37 at 38, 55.
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and South Asia, and it is these people who will need re-settlement.165 Another study
points out that 146 million people live at an altitude of less than one meter on the banks
of major rivers, deltas and estuaries, and in the flood zones in South Asia (Indus, GangesBrahmaputra, etc.) and East Asia (Mekong, Yangtze, Pearl River, etc.).166 These two
regions account for nearly three quarters of the population at risk. 167 In extreme cases,
entire populations of coastal countries like in the case of the Maldives will need to be
relocated.
In general, climate-change-displaced populations can be classified into two types.
The first and largest type consists of people who will be displaced internally (i.e., within
their national boundaries) by climate change-related phenomena.168 The second type
comprises people who will be forced to cross international borders.169 This category
includes the inhabitants of SIDS like the Maldives170 and countries like Bangladesh,
where land and resources are already stretched to the limit and are therefore unable to
accommodate huge influxes of people.171 This classification is pertinent in determining
both the nature of problems and the rights that are available to both these groups under
international law.
Another related aspect that warrants a mention here is that climate change and SLR
lead to two potential situations that will impair the stability, sustainability, and continuity
of coastal settlements. The first situation is the slow-onset disaster of SLR and
consequent inundation of coastal land. This is a steady and gradual process of
degradation of the coastal environment, forcing people to move out of their homes over a
165
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Ibid.
Piguet, supra note 163 at 8.
Ibid.
UNHCR Climate Change, Natural Disasters, supra note 129 at 2.
Barnett & Webber, supra note 164 at 40.
For more details on the geography of Maldives, see Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy,
State of the Environment 2011 (2011) at 22 [Maldives, State of the Environment 2011].
The Minister Abul Maal Abdul Muhith in the interview states
[t]wenty million people could be displaced [in Bangladesh] by the
middle of the century, . . . We are asking all our development
partners to honour the natural right of persons to migrate. We can't
accommodate all these people – this is already the densest
[populated] country in the world. . . . The convention on refugees
could be revised to protect people. It's been through other
revisions, so this should be possible.
“UK should open borders to climate refugees, says Bangladeshi minister”, TheGuardian (4
December 2009) internet video: theguardian, online: theguardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/e
nvironment/2009/nov/30/rich-west-climate-change>.
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period of time.172 While the impact is direct, there is scope to implement adaptation
actions, which will help to reduce and control these impacts to a certain extent. The
adaptation measures’ chances of success depend on a host of factors, including the socioeconomic capacity of the affected populations to absorb the impact, the timing and
implementation of the measures, the degree of intelligent planning (i.e., integrating
adaptation into the broader coastal management scheme), etc.173 If these adaptation
measures fail to produce results, relocation, resettlement, and rehabilitating coastal
communities are the only options.
The second situation interacting with climate change and SLR is the occurrence of
intense disasters like severe storm surges, hurricanes, tsunamis and earthquakes, which
can devastate coastal regions and cause widespread upheaval.174 Although not directly
attributable to the climate change phenomenon, such events will be greatly aggravated by
climate change and SLR as these will significantly reduce the ability of coastal
communities and ecosystems to cope up with intense natural disasters. Moreover,
ongoing SLR and climate change will weaken coastal infrastructure and affect the
resiliency of coastal ecosystems, rendering them more vulnerable to sudden ‘acts of
God.’
It must be pointed out that this important classification based on the degree of
possible impacts, can also be examined from the perspective of the continued availability
of land, the basic resource necessary to support human habitation. The first is the worstcase scenarios as in the case of sinking SIDS where SLR and climate change could
ultimately lead to a situation of deterritorialziation, displacement, statelessness and
eventual crossing of international borders.175 The second contemplates situations where
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See Walter Kälin, “Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement” in Jane McAdam, ed, Climate
Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart
Publishing, 2010) 81 at 85.
For more discussion on climate change adaptation, see Ch 5.
While the link between global warming and stronger hurricane activity has yet to be affirmed, the
IPCC states that “[t]here is observational evidence for an increase of intense tropical cyclone
activity in the North Atlantic since about 1970, correlated with increases of tropical sea surface
temperatures.” “Summary for Policymakers” in Climate Change 2007, supra note 7 at 2.
The IPCC observes that “[s]ea-level rise impacts on the low-lying Pacific Island atoll States of
Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tokelau and the Marshall Islands may, at some threshold, pose risks to their
sovereignty or existence.” W Neil Adger, Shardul Agrawala & M Monirul Qader Mirza,
“Assessment of Adaptation Practices, Options, Constraints and Capacity” in ML Parry et al, eds,
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to
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the impact of the climate hazards and SLR are extremely severe and land degradation and
water contamination is very high. Even if coastal frontage is lost to the rising waves,
there is still the possibility of utilising land available inland for rehabilitation. 176 As well,
there is the possibility that through appropriate adaptation measures (anticipatory and
reactive),177 land-use178 and water management strategies179 the degraded land can be
nursed back to continue to support human habitation.
Migration and re-settlement can be an overwhelming experience. In many
instances, the displaced peoples have very limited coping and adaptive capabilities and
the cornerstone of their economic development is based on subsistence agriculture,
artisanal fishing, traditional aquaculture, and community-based forest management.180
They also do not have the economic capacity to finance international migration to a
wealthier country.181 In other words, these are communities whose existence is dependant
on and intertwined with the ecosystem goods and services available in a particular region,
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the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 717 at 736.
For instance, Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated nations in the world, and land is
scarce. Nevertheless, through a right mix of adaptation strategies, land use and water management,
up-land areas may still be able to accommodate displaced coastal populations. See Jane McAdam,
“Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer”
(2011) 23:1 Int'l J Refugee L 2 at 12 [McAdam, “Swimming”].
For an overview of the different adaptation strategies, see generally Jessica Grannis, Adaptation
Tool Kit: Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Land Use (Georgetown Climate Center, 2011).
“Floating Gardens in Bangladesh”, Practical Action: Technology Challenging Poverty: Technical
Brief, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/climatechange/17849-0e277b46b31f98942e6bc81bb2
2319243.pdf>.
RF Michael Snodgrass, Note, “The Reuse of Household Water: A Small Step Toward Sustainable
Living and Adaptation to Climate Change” (2010) 22 Geo. Int’l Envtl L Rev 591 (QL) (advocating
the widespread use of grey water); J Mwenge Kahinda, AE Taigbenu & RJ Boroto, “Domestic
Rainwater Harvesting as an Adaptation Measure to Climate Change in South Africa” (2010) 35:1314 Physics & Chemistry of The Earth Parts A/B/C 742 (ScienceDirect) (listing rainwater harvesting
as one of the specific adaptation measures for water-stressed Africa). See generally World Water
Assessment Programme, Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk, vol 1, The United Nations
World Water Development Report 4 (Paris: UNESCO, 2012) at 66.
In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu constructed
several pucca houses for displaced residents. However, more than 88 per cent of the sites were
alternative sites. Coastal communities, however, wanted ‘in-situ’ houses, as they feared that they
were losing their customary rights to the coast, which would also result in livelihood loss. National
Peoples’ Tribunal on Post-tsunami Rehabilitation: Housing, Land, Resources and Livelihoods 18
and 19 December 2008, Chennai: Interim Verdict of the Jury, at 5, 9, online: Habitat International
Coalition <http://www.hic-net.org/news.php?pid=2937> [National Peoples’ Tribunal].
In Bangladesh only five per cent of the flood affected rural households can afford to send people
abroad. McAdam, “Swimming", supra note 176 at 11-12; see also Barnett & Webber, supra note
164 at 41-42 (identifying three major barriers to migration, namely, financial, informational and
legal).
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and so it is often the case that these populations prefer not to move at all unless
absolutely necessary.182 Certainly, international migration would be for them a last resort.
Technically, the groups that migrate and move within a country may be able to
access the guarantees contained in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
1998 which defines internally displaced persons to include those displaced by “natural or
human-made disasters.”183 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, is a
normative framework that provides guidance to states on all aspects of internal
displacement.184 Essentially, it is a “restatement of existing norms” and addresses “the
specific needs of internally displaced persons worldwide by identifying rights and
guarantees relevant to their protection”185, from the time of “forced displacement,”
“during displacement,” and during their return, “resettlement and reintegration.”186
Interestingly, many of the principles enshrined in the Guiding Principles are recognised
by the national Constitution’s and jurisprudence in South Asian coastal countries.187
Even though this document has wide acceptance by nations, it has no legal
consequence and therefore its implementation is found to be waning.188
Many climate-change-displaced people who have crossed international borders
often find themselves in legal ‘twilight zones.’ The starting point of the analysis here is:
how are such peoples to be referred to? And, secondly whether the international legal
regime on refugees (namely, the Refugee Convention and its related protocol) is
applicable to such people. Descriptive terms such as “environmental refugees,”189
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National Peoples’ Tribunal, supra note 180.
UNESC, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Submitted
Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39: Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998, ¶2.
Ibid, introductory note, ¶5.
Ibid, ¶9.
Ibid, annex, ¶1.
For instance, during displacement, internally displaced persons are entitled to the inherent right to
life protected by law. Ibid, annex 1, s 3, prin 10. The right to life is guaranteed by the constitutions
of India (article 21), Bangladesh (article 32), Pakistan (article 9), and the Maldives (article 21).
The Guiding Principles is a “restatement of existing norms”, and therefore it do not require formal
adoption. Francis Mading Deng, “The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement” (2001) 5 Wash
UJL & Pol’y 141 at 147 (QL); see also Roberta Cohen, Statement, “Hardening Soft Law:
Implementation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” (2008) 102 Am Soc Int'l L
Proceedings 187 at 189 (HeinOnline) (articulating three reasons as to why there was only a
restatement of the law and not a hard law instrument).
See generally Silke Marie Christiansen, Environmental Refugees: A Legal Perspective (Nijmegen:
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2010).
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“climate change refugees,”190 and “environmental migrants”191 have been coined to label
those who cross international borders due to climate-change-related factors.192 However,
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has serious
reservations about the use of such terms, as they opine that these have no foundation in
international refugee law:193
[w]hile often used, particularly in the media, it would be
incorrect to give the words a legal meaning that has not
been endorsed by the legal community. UNHCR is
actually of the opinion that the use of such terminology
could potentially undermine the international legal
regime for the protection of refugees whose rights and
obligations are quite clearly defined and understood....
While environmental factors can contribute to prompting
cross-border movements, they are not grounds, in and of
themselves, for the grant of refugee status under
international refugee law. However, UNHCR does
recognise that there are indeed certain groups of
migrants, currently falling outside of the scope of
international protection, who are in need of humanitarian
and/or other forms of assistance.194
At the 2011 Nansen Conference, their usage was once again decried due to the legal
incorrectness implicit in the terms climate refugees and environmental refugees, and
“environmentally displaced persons” found more favour.195 However, it is submitted that
“environmentally displaced persons” also suffers from the same inconsistencies that
plague the other terms in that it fails to relay the nuances between internal and external
190
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Tiffany TV Duong, “When Islands Drown: The Plight of “Climate Change Refugees” and Recourse
to International Human Rights Law” (2010) 31 U Pa J Int’l L 1239 at 1250 (HeinOnline).
“Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive
changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have
to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move
either within their territory or abroad.” Ninety-Fourth Session: Discussion Note: Migration and the
Environment, MC/INF/288, 1 November 2007, ¶6 at 1, online: International Organization for
Migration
<http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/94/M
C_INF_288.pdf>.
Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 93 at 27-8.
UNHCR Climate Change, Natural Disasters, supra note 129 at 8.
Ibid at 8, 9.
The Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century, Oslo, Norway,
June 5-7, 2011 (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011) at 19.
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migrations in situations where climate change is the causative factor for the migration. In
short, it is clear that we are yet to develop an appropriate nomenclature to describe these
groups that reflects the essence of the problems that they face, their entitlements and
aspirations and that which has widespread acceptance at the international level.
As far as the second issue is concerned, coming as it does on the heels of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1948, the Refugee Convention of 1951 is the
sole binding human rights instrument that affords protection to refugees by guaranteeing
them ‘rights.’ Central to the application of the refugee regimes is the question: Who
qualifies for refugee status: As “[A] term of art in international law,”196 a refugee, under
the 1951 Refugee Convention, is someone who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.197
If a person meets the specifics of this definition, then the Refugee Convention applies and
the refugee is immediately clothed with extensive legal protections, including the right
not to be forcibly repatriated to the home state, which s/he has fled in the first place
(principle of non-refoulement) due to threats to life or freedom.198 Therefore, it is
necessary to examine whether those who are displaced by climate-change-related
phenomenon like SLR and have crossed international borders into another state can claim
refugee status.199
The first element in this definition is that of persecution. Proving persecution in the
context of SLR requires more than legal ingenuity in terms of interpretative skills, for it is
196
197
198
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UNHCR, UNHCR and Climate Change: Involvement, Challenges & Response, online: UNHCR <htt
p:// www.unhcr.org/4ad5820f9.pdf>.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22
April 1954) art 1(A)(2).
Ibid, art 33(1).
To provide an understanding of these concepts reference is made to refugee jurisprudence under
Canadian law. See infra notes 176-79.
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practically impossible to treat climate change impacts as persecution on the grounds of
race,200 religion,201 nationality, membership of a particular social group202 or political
opinion.203 Secondly, it is also not possible to pinpoint a persecutor. The governments of
the island states of Maldives, Kiribati, or Tuvalu are not persecutors in that they are not
responsible for climate change or SLR, as their carbon footprint is practically
negligible.204 It could then be argued that since industrialised countries are the primary
emitters of GHG emissions that have precipitated the present problem, these countries
may emerge as the persecutors. But then the irony is that rather than fleeing from the
alleged persecutor, the inhabitants of most of these countries are seeking shelter with the
persecutor.205 In other words, the new dynamic turns the refugee regime on its head.
In sum, a prima facie analysis of the definition leads to the inescapable conclusion
that those displaced by climate change and who have crossed international borders are
disqualified from claiming the benefits under the Refugee Convention and its Protocol.206
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Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1296, 68 Imm LR (3d) 131
(holding that there was failure on the part of the board to consider evidence, which established nexus
between violent incidents [attacks on an Indo-Guyanese by Afro-Guyanese], and grounds of race
and ethnicity).
Fosu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 90 FTR 182, [1994] FCJ 1813.
Following the decision of the Ghanaian government to suspend the activities of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses, the applicant was arrested by the police and charged with disobeying a government order
and committing acts of sabotage prejudicial to national security (the applicant kept religious
pamphlets in his home, contrary to the prohibition). The Refugee Division handed the case back to
the Board for reconsideration. Yang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCJ
1463 (TD) (holding that, in determining whether Falun Gong is religion or not, it, should be
approached from the point of view of the persecutor, i.e., the Government of China. Since the
government dealt with the Falun Gong under the Bureau of Religious Affairs, it was considered a
religion).
Women in China who have more than one child are faced with forced sterilization; they thus share a
founded fear of persecution and so form a particular social group. Cheung v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), (1993) 2 FC 314 (CA). TZU (Re), (2002) RPDD 174.
Membership in a social group like the village cooperative, which resisted military action to occupy
farmlands, cannot be considered mere opinion, political or otherwise. See Barima v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994) 1 FC 30 (TD); Canada (Attorney General) v
Ward, [1993] SCJ 74.
See Duncan Clark, “Maldives first to go carbon neutral”, The Guardian (15 March 2009) online:
theguardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/mar/15/maldives-president-nasheed-car
bon-neutral>; “Tuvalu vows to go carbon neutral”, BBC News (20 July 2009) online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8158604.stm>.
Jane McAdam, Climate Change Displacement and International Law Climate Change Displacement
and International Law: Side Event to the High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges,
8 December 2010, Palais des Nations, Geneva, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/4d05ecf49.
pdf>.
Ibid (discussing case law in Australia and New Zealand where the residents of Tuvalu and Kiribati
unsuccessfully argued that they ought to receive refugee protection from climate change impacts).
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Overwhelming academic opinion also comports with the view that the Refugee
Convention is inapplicable to climate refugees.207 However, this does not mean that the
Refugee Convention is not applicable at all, as there can be situations when the
convention can be applied to those who are displaced by climate change.208
As far as the coastal South Asian region is concerned, the problem of climate
related displacement acquires serious dimensions. For instance, given the high probability
that the rising seas will swallow the archipelago of the Maldives,209 it is generally
believed that Maldives residents will migrate to elsewhere within the South Asian region
due to cultural affinities. Here, India and Sri Lanka may emerge as potential
destinations.210 It is also presumed that the bulk of the displaced people from Bangladesh
will migrate to India.211 Already saddled with its own climate-displaced population, India
will experience an enormous strain on its resources.
Interestingly, none of the South Asian coastal countries are parties to the 1951
Refugee Convention and its related Protocol, nor do they have any concrete legal
standards or norms at the respective national level for refugee protection.212 It can in fact
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For instance, see Tiffany TV Duong, “When Islands Drown: The Plight of “Climate Change
Refugees” and Recourse to International Human Rights Law” (2010) 31 U Pa J Int’l L 1239
(HeinOnline).
The protection under the Refugee Convention will be available where the victims of natural disasters
flee if the government consciously withholds or obstructs assistance to punish or marginalize a
group on one of the five grounds. UNHCR, Submission: Forced Displacement in the Context of
Climate Change: Challenges for States under International Law, Paper, 6th Session of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 6) from 1
Until 12 June in Bonn (19 May 2009) at 9-10.
UNDP, Human Development Report 1999: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and
Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 45.
The comparative political stability that India has enjoyed from the time of its independence (e.g.,
democratic institutions, a free and independent judiciary and media, a vibrant Bill of Rights, respect
for multi-culturalism and secularism and the common cultural heritage of various South Asian
countries) has its genesis in the Indian mainland. Of late, India’s economy is growing at a brisk pace
and the cost of living is comparatively low. All of this renders India an attractive destination, and
India also has a long tradition of accommodating Tibetans, the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, the
Afghans, and the Chakmas. See Prabodh Saxena, “Creating Legal Space for Refugees in India: The
Milestones Crossed and the Roadmap for the Future” (2007) 19:2 Int'l J Refugee L 246 at 247, 248;
see also Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 93 at 18.
Rajan, supra note 161 at 1.
Even though the inflow of refugees into India began the partition of this country, India is not as yet a
party to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol and has not legislated on this subject. Therefore,
protection to refugees flows primarily from constitutional mandates and on liberal judicial
interpretations. Judicial process has extended many of the constitutional provisions, like the right to
life and the equality clauses, to refugees. Chairman, Railway Board v Chandrima Das, (2000)
[2000] (2) SCC 465 (India SC) (a Bangladeshi national gang raped by railway employees in an
Indian Railways building is entitled to compensation under article 21, which was held available not
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be concluded that climate-change-displaced persons in South Asia who may be forced to
cross international borders are in a state of suspended animation vis-à-vis their legal
status, due mainly to the legal vacuum at the international and national levels. Therefore,
it is possible that migrants who cross international borders seeking refuge in other South
Asian countries may be subjected to severe human rights abuses, unless and until legal
arrangements are put in place to secure their basic rights. Already there have been several
instances of conflicts between the local population and the so-called illegal immigrants in
India.213
As will be detailed in the next chapter, in most of the South Asian coastal countries,
development generally proceeds without heed to embed climate change adaptation
measures (particularly, coastal climate change adaptation (CCCA)) within existing
developmental strategies. Decades of investment have already gone into developing
coastal settlements and infrastructure. It must also be noted that, in most cases, salinity
ingress, rising sea levels, extreme weather events and disasters are not the primary causes
of displacement. These are factors that emerge as the final trigger; exacerbating already
existing conditions of poverty, vulnerability, and substandard living. 214 Climate change
merely compounds existing vulnerabilities. Hence, it is necessary that coastal planning
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only to all citizens but to all persons). It was held that the principle of non-refoulement is
encompassed in article 21 and is available as long as the presence of the refugee is not prejudicial to
national security. Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v India, (1998) [1998] INDLAW Guj 69 (Gujarat
HC). The Indian Supreme Court directed the state of Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that the life and
personal liberty of all Chakmas residing within the state be protected and that attempts to forcibly
evict them by organized groups should be repelled. Eviction should occur only in accordance with
the law. Arunachal Pradesh v Khudiram Chakma, (1994) [1994] Sup (1) SCC 615 (India SC).
Thousands of illegal immigrants are entering India from Bangladesh almost on a daily basis through
the porous borders on the eastern front, and this has led to the outbreak of riots, such as the one in
July 2012 in the Indian state of Assam between indigenous Bodos and migrants of Bangladeshi
origin. See Sanjib Kr Baruah, “Illegal migrants turn Assam into drug hub” Hindustan Times [of
India] (20 August 2012) online: hindustantimes <http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Illegal-migrants-turn-Assam-into-drug-hub/Article1-916434.aspx>; but see Banajit
Hussain, “Riots & the bogey of Bangladeshis” The Hindu [of India] (8 August 2012), online: The
Hindu <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article3738939.ece>. For more details, see Arpita
Bhattacharyya & Michael Werz, “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in South Asia Rising
Tensions and Policy Options across the Subcontinent” (3 December 2012), online: Center for
American Progress <http://www.americanprogress.org>.
Brendan Gogarty, “Climate-change Displacement: Current Legal Solutions to Future Global
Problems” (2011) 21:1 JL Information & Sci 167 at 179 (HeinOnline); McAdam, “Swimming",
supra note 176 at 14-15.
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and management in these countries deal with even basic socio-economic issues like
poverty removal, stymie environmental degradation and improve adaptive capacities.215
In sum, climate change and SLR are realities that are upon us, which will
profoundly impact the lives and basic rights of millions of coastal residents all over South
Asia and even beyond. Presently, as it stands the international instruments that provide a
semblance of protection to the rights of the climate change displaced are caught in a time
warp and have not developed according to rapidly changing societal needs and the
changing environmental landscape. As well, even at the national levels in the South
Asian region, the basic human rights of the climate displaced are not adequately
protected. It is apparent that since those who cross international borders to flee from their
sinking homes do not fall within the ambit of the traditional legal framework on refugee
protection, their legal status remains in limbo.216 Even more worrying is the fact that we
do not have an appropriate and internationally agreed upon terminology to describe them,
as the term climate-change refugee is seen as a misnomer.217 This situation persists even
though, in a matter of decades, vast swathes of coastal regions may be inundated by
seawater and entire nations displaced.
As mentioned earlier, in worst-case scenarios, the sea rises to inundate and flood
the coast, and land can be permanently lost leading to displacement. Nevertheless,
certain, adaptation actions may be able to hold back the water for a while, even though a
lot in such cases will depend on the success of mitigative actions. Conversely, even in
other situations, coastal lands and associated ecosystems may be nursed back to health
and reclaimed, as happened after the 2004 tsunami.218 However, in such cases, the
rehabilitation must be planned in such a way that if disaster were to strike again, coastal
communities would not be put at unnecessary risk.
It is in this foreground that the need for intelligent planning towards CCCA, relief
and rehabilitation gains importance. CCCA in the context of climate related displacement
including SLR basically involves a three-pronged effort – firstly, it contemplates
measures that directly aim to adapt to climate change impacts including SLR by
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In Bangladesh, poverty removal is an integral part of its ICZM process. For more discussion on this
topic, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.3.
See generally Part 2.4, above, for more details.
For a discussion on terminology and related classifications regarding climate displaced, see ibid.
Kälin, supra note 172.
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reinforcing corroding coastlines and sinking islands and secondly, it seeks to improve the
economic and adaptive capacities of coastal populations so that they are better enabled to
absorb the impacts of climate change hazards and related shocks and thirdly, it seeks to
enhance the resilience of coastal ecosystems. And here, as the subsequent chapters will
attest, appropriate CCCA actions can be implemented via ICZM and this can serve to
slow down or reduce the extent of migrations in the long run.

2.5

“VULNERABLE ECOSYSTEMS”: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
RESOURCES AND ECOSYSTEMS

ON

COASTAL

The ocean space and marine resources adjacent to coastal states and coastal resources per
se are rife with economic and development opportunities. However, SLR and other
climate change processes can severely impact coastal resources such as groundwater,
coral reefs, and coastal wetlands (particularly mangrove forests) that are highly essential
to the well-being of South Asian coastal communities. Some of these aspects are
explained next.

2.5.1 Impacts on Coastal Aquifers
In adopting the UN Millennium Declaration, the heads of state resolved “[t]o halve, by
the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people who are unable to reach or to afford
safe drinking water.”219 Even though vast distances have been covered and substantial
improvements achieved in securing universal access to potable water,220 climate change
threatens to hinder further progress. In October 2011, the island state of Tuvalu declared
a state of emergency due to dwindling water supplies.221 A lack of rainfall nearly dried
out the island and the situation was made worse by rising sea levels which led to
increased salinity intrusion. In response, New Zealand airlifted water containers and
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United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2, UNGA, UN Doc A/55/L2 (2000) ¶19.
Already the target has been met in Northern Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Asia
and South-Eastern Asia, giving rise to a new challenge of ensuring safe water supply. United
Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 (New York: United Nations, 2010) at 5859.
“Tuvalu declares emergency over water shortage”, BBC News (3 October 2011) online: BBC News
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15147043>.
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desalinisation plants to Tuvalu to tide over the crisis.222 A state of emergency over
dwindling water supplies was declared in Tokelau as well.223
Coastal aquifers are shallow and sandy and remain in close contact with the sea,
rendering them highly vulnerable to pollution in comparison to hard rock aquifers. 224 As
the seas begin to rise, most coastal aquifers are at risk of salinisation.225 What compounds
the problem is the increasing abstraction of groundwater at rates over and above
sustainable yield levels.226 Reduced precipitation and increasing urbanisation also affects
the recharge possibilities. Additionally, extreme weather events and intense storms lead
to overtopping, contaminating freshwater lenses, open dug wells, and other water
sources.227 The persistence of such conditions can produce a host of problems, such as a
drop in the water table, aquifer collapse, land subsidence and salinity intrusion.228
The IPCC observes that “[m]ost measures to compensate and control the
salinisation of coastal aquifers are expensive and laborious.”229 To date, international
water law has paid only scant attention to this resource, focusing instead on surface water
rights and its management.230 In most cases, these instruments apply only to
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“Tuvalu: state of emergency declared over water shortages”, The Telegraph (3 October 2011)
online: The Telegraph <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/tu
valu/8803267/Tuvalu-state-of-emergency-declared-over-water-shortages.html>.
“South Pacific water shortage hits Tokelau”, BBC News (4 October 2011) online: BBC News <http:/
/www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15163543>.
A two to three per cent mixing with sea water renders freshwater unfit for human consumption and
irrigation and a four per cent mix can destroy the resource. FAO, Seawater Intrusion in Coastal
Aquifers: Guidelines for Study, Monitoring and Control, Water Reports No 11 (Rome: FAO, 1997)
at 7.
SLR will increase salinity in the groundwater aquifers in the Nile delta, particularly those that are
situated in the Northern strip. See Egypt, Egypt Second National Communication under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Cairo: Egyptian Environmental Affairs
Agency, 2010) at 74.
For example, in the Khobar zone of the Dammam transboundary aquifer, in the Bahrain region,
groundwater levels have plummeted to such low levels that it now stands below the mean sea level.
Bahrain, Public Commission for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife,
Bahrain's Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework on Climate
Change (Bahrain, 2012) at 33.
UNEP, Maldives: State of the Environment 2002 (UNEP, 2002) at 31 [UNEP, Maldives]. 40,000
drinking water wells were either destroyed or contaminated as a result of the tsunami of 2004. Tissa
Illangasekare et al, "Impacts of the 2004 Tsunami on Groundwater Resources in Sri Lanka" (2006)
42 Water Resources Research 1.
Georgetown is subsiding at a rate of about 10 millimeters per year due to groundwater “mining”.
See Guyana, Guyana Initial National Communication in Response to its Commitments to the
UNFCCC (2002) at 94 [Guyana Initial National Communication].
Nicholls & Wong, supra note 32 at 342.
UN: Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May
1997, 36 ILM 700 [UN Watercourses Convention] (dealing with transboundary aquifers). Even
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transboundary groundwater aquifers.231 What this implies is that groundwater
management is essentially a domestic matter that falls within the purview of national
governments and their legal systems. This renders national regulation and management of
the resource extremely critical.
In most coastal regions of South Asia, there is an overwhelming dependence on
groundwater as a primary source of potable water.232 However, salinity intrusion into
coastal aquifers is a major problem aggravated by over-extraction.233 For instance, in
India, salt-water intrusion has been reported from the coastal states of Tamil Nadu,
Pondicherry and from the Saurashtra region in Gujarat state. 234 Salinity intrusion has
been reported from the coastal city of Karachi in Pakistan.235 In coastal Bangladesh,
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though the term groundwater finds mention in United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa,
1994 (UNCCD), only once where “salinization and exhaustion of aquifers” is mentioned in the
context of Northern Mediterranean justifying the need for an Annex (Annex IV, article 2 (f)) several
of the provisions are wide enough to contemplate groundwater management. See 21 September
1994, 33 ILM 1328 (adopted 17 June 1994) [UNCCD]; see also ibid, art 10(2)(d) (enhancement of
national hydrological capabilities and development of sustainable irrigation programmes). In
addition, soft law instruments also emphasize groundwater management. See The Dublin Statement
on Water and Sustainable Development, 31 January 1992 (International Conference on Water and
the Environment, Dublin, Ireland) online: UN Documents <http://www.un-documents.net/h2odub.htm>. Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 states, “protection of groundwater is ... an essential element of
water resource management”. Nicholas A Robinson, ed, Agenda 21 & The UNCED Proceedings,
vol 4, 3rd series, International Protection of the Environment (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc,
1993) at 357, ch 18, ¶18.37. Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development, 2002, talks about mitigating the effects of groundwater contamination by
establishing, inter alia effective legal frameworks at the national level. “Plan of Implementation of
the World Summit on Sustainable Development” in UN, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September 2002, A/CONF.199/20* (New
York: UN, 2002) 6 at 21, ¶25(d).
The Dammam aquifer is a large transboundary groundwater system that runs like an “umbilical
cord” under Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Oman, providing nearly one-third of
the water requirements of these nations. The aquifer is under severe stress due to over-exploitation,
and SLR has increased the rate of salt-water intrusion. Bahrain, Bahrain's Second National
Communication, supra note 226 at 31.
For more details, see generally Tushaar Shah, “The Groundwater Economy of South Asia: An
Assessment of Size, Significance and Socio-ecological Impacts” in M Giordano & KG Villholth,
eds, The Agricultural Groundwater Revolution: Opportunities and Threats to Development,
Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture Series No 3 (Wallingford: CABI
Publishing, 2007) 7.
In Europe, 53 out of 126 groundwater areas show saltwater intrusion. David Coates et al, “Water
Demand: What Drives Consumption?” in World Water Assessment Programme, Managing Water
under Uncertainty and Risk, vol 1, The United Nations World Water Development Report 4 (Paris:
UNESCO, 2012) 44 at 66.
Héctor Garduño et al, India Groundwater Governance: Case Study, Water Papers (Water Unit,
Transport, Water and ICT Department, Sustainable Development Vice Presidency, 2011) at 10.
See generally A Mashiatullah et al, “Groundwater Salinity in Coastal Aquifer of Karachi, Pakistan
(A Preliminary Investigation)” (2002) 7:3-4 Sci Vision 195.
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approximately 20 out of 37 million people living on the coasts (over 57 per cent) are
adversely affected by salinity in their drinking water, and a majority of these people
solely depend on groundwater to meet their basic needs.236 In the Maldives, freshwater
lenses lie atop salt water and thus, as the SLR, salt water penetrates into the freshwater
lens, leading to contamination. Due to the peculiar geographical features of these islands,
sewage contamination of groundwater is another related major issue.237 While the capital
city of Male has desalinated water, residents in the other islands of the Maldives rely on
rainwater for drinking purposes. Despite its poor quality in some of the islands, people
are forced, out of necessity, to use the groundwater.238 A common theme that emerges in
all of these countries is aquifer over-exploitation, overlaid by a progressive rise in sea
levels. Despite this, groundwater governance in South Asia is poorly organised.239
Under both common and civil law systems, groundwater rights are tied up with
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Aneire E Khan & Mikhail I Islam, “Water salinity and maternal health”, The Daily Star [of Dhaka]
(5 June 2011) online: The Daily Star <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?ni
d=188591>.
Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, supra note 170 at 88.
Ibid at 84.
In India, one of the earliest recognitions of the need to protect freshwater lenses and coastal aquifers
from salinity intrusion from excessive extraction came from the judiciary. Attakoya Thangal v
India, 1990 (1) KLT 580, was a decision by the Kerala High Court regarding the validity of a
scheme evolved by the local administration in the coral islands of Lakshadweep to augment water
supplies by drawing out ground water from the coastal aquifers. In affirming that water management
was one of the biggest challenges of the present century, the court held that “the right to sweet
water, and the right to free air, are attributes of the right to life, for these are the basic elements
which sustain life.” Ibid. As there were conflicting opinions regarding the true nature of impacts, the
court directed that the water development scheme be referred to the Union Ministry of Science and
Technology and to the Ministry of Environment, for opinion. Implementation was permitted only if
these two specialised bodies favoured the scheme. Ibid; see also MC Mehta v India, (1997) 11 SCC
312 (India SC) (directing the central government to constitute the Central Groundwater Board as an
authority under section 3(3) of the Environment Protection Act, 1986, for regulating and controlling
indiscriminate extraction of groundwater). For instance, see the Kerala Ground Water (Control and
Regulation) Act 2002 (No 19 of 2002, India). It seeks to conserve groundwater and control and
regulate its extraction. The government has been empowered to constitute the State Ground Water
Authority under section 3. The Act contemplates registration by groundwater users where pumps
driven by engines of horsepower up to 1.5 and tube wells fitted with pumps driven by engines of
horsepower above 3 (s 2(1)(f)). The government can, on the recommendation of the State Ground
Water Authority, regulate the extraction or use of ground water in an area in public interest and
declare the same to be a notified area (s 6(1)). Despite copious surface water resource, Bangladesh
relies increasingly on groundwater. Unfortunately, groundwater resources are contaminated by
naturally occurring arsenic, which is a serious health issue. Bangladesh, in 1985, brought out its
Ground Water Management Ordinance. However, the operation of this law was suspended within
two years to facilitate irrigation expansion. This law was an insufficient response and it is
inadequate to ensure the comprehensive management of groundwater resources. It prescribes
nothing to protect the health of coastal aquifers.
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land rights.240 What this means is that in the language of the law, the term ‘land’ includes
water, and groundwater is treated as belonging to the landowner. This is the cornerstone
principle on which most groundwater legal regimes are organised and developed.241 To
elaborate, under common law, for instance, groundwater is treated as chattel attached to
the land property, with rights belonging to the landowner on the basis of the ad coleum
principle.242 A necessary adjunct is the rule of capture,243 and accordingly none has rights
of action against another, who by sinking wells or other works on his/her land, draws off
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For instance, see the French Civil Code which states that
[o]wnership of the ground involves ownership of what is above and below it.
An owner may make above all the plantings and constructions,
which he deems proper, unless otherwise provided for in the
Title of Servitudes or Land Services. He may make below all
constructions and excavations which he deems proper and draw
from these excavations all the products which they can give,
subject to the limitations resulting from statutes and regulations
relating to mines and from police statutes and regulations. Ibid,
art 552.
See 2 Earl Jowitt's The Dictionary of English Law 1053 (1959).
“Land”, in its restrained sense, means soil, but in its legal
acceptation it is a generic term, comprehending every species of
ground, soil or earth, whatsoever, as meadows, pastures, woods,
moors, waters, marshes, furze, and heath; it includes also houses,
mills, castles, and other buildings; for with the conveyance of the
land, the structures upon it pass also. And besides an indefinite
extent upwards, it extends downwards to the globe’s centre,
hence the maxim, Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos; or, more curtly expressed, Cujus est solum A ejus est
altum.
For instance, Canadian Water Law is also based on English common law. Accordingly, in line with
the rule of absolute capture, groundwater users can extract water having no regard to possible
impacts on neighbours. See Program on Water Governance: Fact Sheet: Groundwater Use
Regulation online: Water Governance <http://www.watergovernance.ca/factsheets/pdf/FS_Gro
undwater_Regs.pdf>.
See Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, Classified and Illustrated (1845) ¶172
(HeinOnline) (stating that “Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelom”, which means he who
possesses land possesses also that which is above it). Also pointing out
Not only has land in its legal signification an indefinite extent
upwards, but in law it extends also downwards, so that whatever
is in a direct line between the surface and the centre of the earth
by the common law belongs to the owner of the surface: “not
merely the surface, but all the land down to the centre of the
earth and up to the heavens” (x); and hence the word “land,”
which is nomen generalissimum, includes, not only the face of
the earth, but everything under it or over it; and if a man grants
all his lands, he grants thereby all his mines, woods, waters, and
houses, as well as his fields and meadows. (d). Ibid, ¶175.
Acton v Blundell (1843), 152 ER 1223 (Ex Ch).
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and appropriates the underground water.244 In other words, this is a case of damnum
absque injuria.245 Many countries, in accordance with their common law lineage, base
their groundwater legal regimes on the common law approach to land ownership, and the
common law countries in South Asia (namely, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan) are no
exception to this rule.246 Since only landowners can enjoy groundwater rights, this can, in
certain circumstances, prove particularly harsh in countries that have a skewed system of
land tenure and where the land rights of traditional coastal fishing communities, pastoral
groups, and tribes are based on community-based land ownership. Legally, these groups
can be excluded from enjoying ground water rights.247 And moreover, since the rule of
capture prevails, landowners enjoy almost unrestricted freedom in mining the water.248 A
growing realisation of the dangers in persisting with this inequitable principle has led to
its dilution at least in India.249
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Eric Opiela, “The Rule of Capture in Texas: An Outdated Principle Beyond its Time” (2002) 6 U
Denv Water L Rev 87 (QL).
Tony George Puthucherril & Lekshmi Vijayabalan, “The Law and Practice on Ground Water
Conservation and Management – A Case Study with Specific Reference to the State of Kerala”
(Paper delivered at the National Workshop on Water Quality Management and Conservation: Role
of the Legal System, National Law School of India University, Bangalore, 16 August 2002)
[unpublished].
This archaic common law principle is embodied in the Easement's act of India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh. For instance, see Indian Easement Act 1882 (No 5 of 1882, India), s 7, illustration (g).
It outlines the natural rights available to the owner of the land, namely, “[t]he right of every owner
of land to collect and dispose within his own limits of all water under the land which does not pass
in a defined channel ....” See also Easements Act, 1882 (No V of 1882, Pakistan) s 7(g); Easements
Act, 1882 (No V of 1882, Bangladesh) s 7.
In India, groundwater development is still in the hands of private individuals. Hence, there is the
possibility that rich upper caste landlords who own most of the land will turn into “water-lords”. In
rural India, the person who controls groundwater is extremely important. With the proliferation of
borewells and the fruits of this modern technology accruing only to the rich upper caste farmers,
drying up wells of small farmers is not uncommon. The rich farmer, taking advantage of the
situation, often sells water to small farmers but cuts off supplies at crucial moments, ravaging crops
and entrapping the farmers in debt. Soon afterwards, the land is taken over by the rich landlords,
using water as a weapon. In the Ramanad district of Tamil Nadu, a class of people known as the
Thaneer Adipathy or Water Lords has emerged. These people own most of the land and charge huge
amounts to pump water. The common law rule has also been carried to excess in protecting the
landowner. For instance, a company can sink wells at any depth and force large quantities of water
from it and sell it, yet not be liable to other well owners on nearby premises whose wells were either
dried up or diminished in quality because of this operation. Water companies’ purchase lands solely
for the purpose of abstracting percolating water for sale without being liable for the destruction of
other wells in the neighbourhood. This is precisely what has happened of Kerala, where Coke’s
water mining in the Palakkad district has parched the lands of more than 2,000 people residing
within 1.2 miles of the factory. See generally Puthucherril & Vijayabalan, supra note 245.
Even in countries like Canada, whose legal system is based on common law tradition, the rule of
capture holds the roost. Ibid.
For more details, see supra note 239.
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Given the problem of SLR and growing exploitation and contamination of coastal
aquifers, it may be necessary to revisit the inequity latent in the legal principles relating
to groundwater rights (both civil and common law). A proactive and precautionary
approach will have to be adopted towards groundwater management, particularly of
coastal aquifers. This requires, first and foremost, that there be a clear understanding that
limits will have to be imposed upon the quantity of water that can be extracted.
Regulations will have to be placed to ensure distributive justice and sustainable
development of the resource. Second, the hydrological compartmentalisation of water
into surface and ground water should give way to a more integrated and holistic approach
to the management of water resources that includes both vertical and horizontal
management.250 It has to be understood that there is a close inter-relationship between
groundwater and other ecosystems like wetlands, swamps, etc.251 Destruction of such
ecosystems can considerably hamper aquifer dynamics. As well, the pollution from
coastal and upstream areas can contribute to the contamination of coastal aquifers and in
such cases, where groundwater quality is compromised; remedial measures may prove to
be cost-prohibitive and sometimes even futile. Therefore, it is necessary that interlinkages are developed between water management with broader coastal management and
planning.
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See The Andhra Pradesh Water, Land and Trees Act, 2002 (No 10 of 2002, Andhra Pradesh, India).
It is a comprehensive piece of legislation, which imbibes this philosophy. The Act aims to promote
water conservation and tree cover and to regulate the exploitation and use of ground and surface
water, with a view to protecting and conserving water sources, land, and environment. Ibid.
Wetlands share an important and intricate relationship with groundwater. It is possible for a wetland
to depend on aquifer outflow as a source; in a similar vein, the downward seepage of water from the
wetland can help to recharge the aquifer. See Resolution IX.1 Annex C ii Guidelines for the
Management of Groundwater to Maintain Wetland Ecological Character, at 3, online: Ramsar
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_ix_01_annexcii_e.pdf>. Even though the Ramsar
Convention text does not deal with groundwater per se, the Conference of Parties to the Ramsar
Convention has adopted resolutions and recommendations, some of which are relevant to
groundwater management. For instance, see ibid. It provides guidance regarding the interaction
between wetlands and groundwater to help develop strategies for impact assessment and sustainable
groundwater management that can help maintain the ecological character of wetlands as well. Ibid at
4. Similarly, Goal One, which deals with “wise use” in the Strategic Plan 2009-2015, calls upon all
Contracting Parties to ensure that planning activities and decision-making processes, particularly
those relating to groundwater management, are based on integrated water resources management
and use an ecosystem approach. Resolution X.1: The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009-2015, at 3, 10,
online: Ramsar <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_x _01_e.p df>.
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2.5.2 Impacts on Coral Reefs
Often described as the tropical rainforests of the oceans,252 coral reefs are home to several
marine species253 and provide major ecosystem services.254 It is no surprise that many
coastal communities, including those in South Asia, depend on reefs for their
livelihood.255 At a global level, it is estimated that coral reefs provide livelihoods to 100
million people and their annual net benefit is about USD30 billion.256 Despite the
overwhelming importance, the reefs are under severe stress from a range of threats,257
including destructive fishing practices,258 mining,259 operational discharges from ships,260
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Nellemann, Hain & Alder, eds, supra note 17.
Marine and Coastal Biodiversity, Coral, online: CBD <http://www.cbd.int/marine/coral.shtml>.
These include regulating (serve as breakwaters to protect coastlines from storm surges and waves),
provisioning (supports coastal fisheries, the pharmaceutical industry, provides construction
materials) cultural (tourism, spiritual and aesthetic value) and finally supporting (nutrient cycling,
nursery habitats). Ibid; see also Lauretta Burke et al, Reefs at Risk Revisited in the Coral Triangle
(Washington, DC: World Resource Institute, 2011) at 1. Healthy, well-managed reef in the Indian or
Pacific Oceans can yield between 5 and 15 tons of sea-food per square kilometer per year in
perpetuity. Again coral reefs protect 150,000 kilometers of shoreline in more than 100 countries and
territories. At least 94 countries and territories benefit from reef tourism and in 23 reef countries, it
accounts for more than 15 per cent of gross domestic product. Ibid.
The Coral Triangle also referred to as the “Amazon of the Seas”, spans the marine waters of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. It is
the global heart of coral reefs and home to nearly 30 per cent of the world’s coral reefs and 75 per
cent of all known coral species. Moreover, it sustains nearly 3,000 species of fish, which is twice the
number found anywhere else in the world and forms the main sustenance of more than 130 million
people living within the Coral Triangle. Burke et al, ibid at vi.
Marine and Coastal Biodiversity and Climate Change, online: CBD <http://www.cbd.int/doc/bi
oday/2009/banners/cbd-ibd-banners-5-en.pdf>.
At a global level, it is estimated that nearly 60 per cent of the world’s reefs are under immediate and
direct threat from overfishing, destructive fishing, coastal development, watershed-based pollution,
or marine-based pollution and damage. Burke et al, supra note 254 at 1.
Blast fishing uses dynamite to stun or kill fish via shock waves; fish that float to the surface are then
collected. However, blasting kills all marine life in the area, including sensitive corals. Pouring
cyanide into the water around reefs stuns the fish, which are then captured for the ornamental
aquarium fish market. The use of cyanide also affects surrounding corals and other marine life.
Since the 1960s, more than one million kilograms of cyanide has been used illegally for fishing in
the Philippines alone. Marjorie Mulhall, “Saving the Rainforests of the Sea: An Analysis of
International Efforts to Conserve Coral Reefs” (2009) 19 Duke Envtl L & Pol'y F 321 at 326-27
(QL).
Coral reefs are mined for limestone, which is mixed with sand to make cement. Limestone is also
used to make calcium supplement pills and for clinical trials. As well, corals are mined for use in
aquariums, as home decorations, and for jewellery. Ibid at 329.
A typical one-week cruise on a large ship (3,000 passengers and crew) generates almost 800 cubic
meters of sewage; 3,700 cubic meters of grey water, half a cubic meter of hazardous waste, 8 tons of
solid waste, and nearly 100 cubic meters of oily bilge water. MARPOL’s regulations are met with
varying degrees of compliance within the cruise industry and beyond. Burke et al, supra note 254 at
24.
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run off,261 sedimentation,262 and negligent tourism practices263. It has been reported that
in 93 out of 109 countries, coral reefs have been damaged by human activities264 and “are
disappearing faster than they can be counted.”265
The total area of coral reefs in India is estimated to be around 2,375 square
kilometers, with primary concentrations located in the Gulf of Mannar, the Gulf of Kutch,
the Andaman and Nicobar islands, and in the Lakshadweep comprising atoll.266
Pakistan,267 Sri Lanka,268 and Bangladesh269 also have coral reef systems. Being an atoll,
the coral reef systems of the Maldives is the eighth largest in the world and are spread
over a 4513 square kilometres area, comprising approximately five per cent of the
world’s reef areas.270 However, despite their size, the reefs in the Maldives are under
considerable stress, with coral bleaching and coral extraction reported to be the major
threats.271
Even though human activities are the main causes of coral stress, rising ocean
temperatures and ocean acidification are also contributing factors. As highlighted earlier,
the primary impacts of climate change on coral reef systems are changes in ocean
temperature and chemistry.272 Higher sea surface temperatures and the amplified
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Ibid at 21.
Ibid at 23.
Careless swimmers and divers, improperly placed boat anchors, sewage and other wastewater
discharge from hotels and resorts is a serious problem. Mulhall, supra note 258 at 328.
Living Corals Presented by Odyssey Expeditions, online: Marine Biology, Coral Reefs <http://ww
w.marinebiology.org/>.
JC Sylvan, “How to Protect a Coral Reef: The Public Trust Doctrine and the Law of the Sea” (2006)
7:1 SDLP 32 at 33 (QL).
Ibid.
Pakistan, Pakistan: Fourth National Report (Islamabad: Ministry of Environment, 2009) at 11.
Arjan Rajasuriya, “Coral Reefs of Sri Lanka: Current Status and Resource Management” in Vineeta
Hoon, Regional Workshop on the Conservation and Sustainable Management of Coral Reefs:
Workshop Proceedings of the MS Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai, India, 1997
(Chennai: CRSARD, 1997) at B-69.
In Bangladesh, coral ecosystems are found around St Martin's Island. Bangladesh, Fourth National
Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Bangladesh: Department of Environment, 2010)
at 62.
Maldives, Fourth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity Maldives (Male’:
Ministry of Housing and Environment, 2010) at 13.
UNEP, Maldives, supra note 227 at 16.
The oceans are naturally alkaline, with an average pH of around 8.2. Since 1750, the uptake of
anthropogenic carbons has increased. This dissolves in the ocean to form carbonic acid (H 2CO3),
which lowers the pH. This can affect all marine organisms that need carbonate to build their
calcareous skeletons and shells, such as corals, seashells, crabs and crayfish, starfish and sea
urchins. Nellemann, Hain & Alder, eds, supra note 17 at 35-36. It is the symbiont algae in corals
namely, the photosynthetic zooxanthellae that provide energy and oxygen necessary for the growth
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presence of GHGs in the atmosphere can lead to coral bleaching.273 As well, frequent and
extreme climate events can also batter the fragile reefs.274 Although corals can recover
after bleaching events, they are less resilient and more susceptible to diseases and the
series of anthropogenic interferences often prevent their recuperation.275
Degradation of coral reef systems can prove particularly threatening to fishingdependant coastal communities. Millions of artisanal fishers in tropical and sub-tropical
countries, particularly in South Asia, depend solely on coastal fisheries for their
livelihood and food requirements. It is estimated that over 90 per cent of the world’s fish
is caught in the area that lies within 200 nautical miles of the coast, and the majority of
the catch is within the first five miles.276 Within this scenario, coral reefs play an
important role in supporting the relatively shallow, near-shore water fisheries. In South
Asia, most of the fishing activities are non-industrial operations that rely on traditional
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and formation of the calcium carbonate skeleton that forms the coral colony. Belize Institute of
Environmental Law and Policy (BELPO) Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting
Inclusion of the Belize Barrier Reef Reserve System in the List of World Heritage in Danger As A
Result of Climate Change and for Protective Measures & Actions (15 November 2004), at 13
online: UF <http://www.law.ufl.edu/> [Belize Petition]. Coral bleaching happens when corals are
subjected to persistent stress that exceeds its tolerance levels. Nellemann, Hain & Alder, eds, ibid at
28. Bleaching can happen in response to higher temperatures or higher solar radiation, causing the
corals to lose their zooxanthellae and thereby turn white as the skeleton reflects through the tissue.
Ibid.; see also Belize Petition, ibid. Since the coral reefs support a vast array of diverse marine
ecosystems, this can have significant secondary implications for marine biodiversity that extend well
beyond the mere “isolated” deaths of a few fringing reefs, as it “jeopardizes the life of the entire
ecosystem.” Ibid.
JEN Veron et al, “The Coral Reef Crisis: The Critical Importance of <350 ppm CO2” (2009) 58 Mar
Pollution Bull 1428 (ScienceDirect); Nellemann, Hain & Alder, eds, ibid at 29 (the first major
bleaching event was in 1988 and since then several such incidents have occurred like the bleaching
in Caribbean in 2005); see also CBD & UNEP, Status and Trends of, and Threats to, Mountain
Biodiversity, Marine, Coastal and Inland Water Ecosystems: Abstracts of Poster Presentations at
the Eighth Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD Technical Series No 8 (Montreal: Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 2003) at 99 (pointing out that the 1998 mass bleaching led to a
loss of 16 per cent of the world’s living corals).
Australian Gov't, An Assessment of Damage to Maldivian Coral Reefs and Baitfish Populations
from the Indian Ocean Tsunami Prepared by an Australian Government Mission and the Maldives
Marine Research Centre (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005) (reporting that the Indian ocean
tsunami of 2004 did not cause much damage to the corals in the Maldives). Higher average
temperatures have led to the outbreak of several coral diseases like black band and coral plague.
Belize, Second National Communication to the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Belmopan, 2009) at 56; Clive Wilkinson, ed, Status of
Coral Reefs of the World: 2008 (Townsville: Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network and Reef and
Rainforest Research Centre, 2008) at 14.
Burke et al, supra note 254 at 2.
Dafna Hopenstand, “Global Warming and its Impact on Near-Shore Communities: Protection
Regimes for Fish and Coastal People Affected by Coral Reef Damage” (2002) 8 Wis Envtl LJ 85 at
93 (QL).
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modes of capture and harvest.277 As most fishing communities are steeped in poverty and
lack access to basic and essential services,278 coral bleaching can magnify adverse
consequences.279 For instance, the bleaching event of 1998 caused extensive damage to
the coral reefs of the Maldives, killing an estimated 90 per cent of the total coral.280
Accordingly, changes in sea surface temperatures and other climate change impacts on
corals can prove damaging to the overall fishing industry as well as to the individuals
who rely on it.281
As corals die, secondary impacts emerge such as increased mortality of marine life
and reductions in the diversity of marine biodiversity, leading to shifts and collapses in
fishery stocks. The repercussions of these developments can be particularly devastating
for fishing communities.282 Reduced catches can lead to migration and even conflicting
demands for “the negotiation of new treaties among nations facing different levels of fish
stock or the renegotiation of current treaties between such nations.” 283 To sum up,
protection of coral reefs is critical for the stability and continuity of coastal communities.
Presently, there is no exclusive and dedicated instrument at the international level
on coral conservation, even though supplemental or indirect roles in protecting the reef
systems are being played by the LOSC,284 the Convention on Biological Diversity,285
United Nations Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
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280
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See generally Chandrika Sharma, “Coastal Area Management in South Asia: A Comparative
Perspective” (Background Paper prepared for the South Asia Workshop on Fisheries and Coastal
Area Management, 26 September - 1 October 1996, Madras, India) (Chennai: ICSF, 1997).
See IUCN, CORDIO & ICRAN Managing Marine and Coastal Protected Areas: A Toolkit for
South Asia (Switzerland & Bangkok, IUCN Gland, 2008) at 55.
“States, either directly or through appropriate subregional, regional or global organizations or
arrangements, to intensify efforts to assess and address, . . . the impacts of global climate change on
the sustainability of fish stocks and the habitats that support them”. See UNGA, Resolution Adopted
by the General Assembly [without Reference to a Main Committee (A/64/L.29 and Add.1)] 64/72.
Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and
related instruments Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 64th Sess, A/RES/64/72 (19
March 2010) ¶3.
UNEP, The Maldives, at 280, online: UNEP <http://www.unep.org/tsunami/reports/TSUNAMI_
MALDIVES_LAYOUT.pdf>; Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, supra note 170 at 67.
Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, ibid.
Fish stocks in certain reef areas in the Federated States of Micronesia are seriously depleted forcing
locals to find alternative sources of fish and other foods. Hopenstand, supra note 276 at 92.
Ibid.
See generally LOSC, supra note 66.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993) [CBD].
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Heritage,286 the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention),287 and the International Maritime Organization
(through its designations like special areas288 and particularly sensitive sea areas).289 The
Honolulu Declaration on Ocean Acidification and Reef Management, 2008 provides
guidance in adapting policy and management practices to enhance coral reef resilience to
ocean acidification.290 In this regard, the constitution of the informal partnership of the
International Coral Reef Initiative to preserve coral reefs around the world is also
important.291 However, the most important international instruments applicable to coral
reef health are the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, with mandates on mitigation
measures like emissions avoidance and carbon sequestration.292
The Maldives and Sri Lanka have enacted laws that proscribe the mining of corals
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292

UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 November
1972, 27 UST 37, 11 ILM 1358 (entered into force 17 December 1975) [World Heritage
Convention].
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 2 February
1971, 996 UNTS 245, 11 ILM 963 (entered into force 21 December 1975) [Ramsar Convention].
Under the MARPOL Annexes, certain sea areas have been designated as special areas. For more
details, see Special Areas under MARPOL, online: IMO, Our Work, Marine Environment, Pollution
Prevention, Special Areas Under MARPOL <http://www.imo.org/Pages/home.aspx>.
A Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) is an area that needs special protection through action by
IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological, socio-economic, or scientific attributes
where such attributes may be vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities. To be
identified as a PSSA, the area should meet at least one of the following criteria: ecological; social,
cultural, and economic; and scientific and educational. As far as ecological criteria are concerned,
the following are required: Uniqueness or rarity, Critical habitat, Dependency, Representativeness,
Diversity, Productivity, Spawning or breeding grounds, Naturalness, Integrity, Fragility, and Biogeographic importance. See IMO, Resolution A.982(24) Adopted on 1 December 2005(Agenda item
11) Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,
24th Sess, A 24/Res 982 (6 February 2006) ¶¶4.4.1-11. Once an area is designated as a PSSA, then
specific measures can be employed to regulate maritime activities in that area such as routeing
measures, installation of vessel traffic services, and strict application of MARPOL discharge and
equipment requirements for ships. Some PSSA’s identified include the Great Barrier Reef, Australia
(designated a PSSA in 1990); the Sabana-Camagüey Archipelago in Cuba (1997); Paracas National
Reserve, Peru (2003), and the Galapagos Archipelago, Ecuador (2005). For further details, see
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, online: IMO, Our Work, Marine Environment, Pollution
Prevention, Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas <http://www.imo.org/Pages/home.aspx>.
See generally Elizabeth McLeod et al, The Honolulu Declaration on Ocean Acidification and Reef
Management (Gland: IUCN, 2008).
International Coral Reef Initiative: An Informal Partnership to Preserve Coral Reefs around the
World, online: ICRI <http://www.icriforum.org/>.
For instance, the Kyoto Protocol specifies the emission targets on a country-by-country basis for
developed countries, keeping 1990 as the base year for the first commitment period from 2008 to
2012. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 16 March
1998, 37 ILM 32 (adopted at Kyoto 11 December 1997 and entered into force 16 February 2005)
[Kyoto Protocol] art 3, annex B. In fact, it requires that some of the Annex I states that have signed
and ratified the protocol reduce emissions to an average of five per cent below 1990 levels during
the 2008-2012 period (art 3).
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but they are observed more in breach than in practice.293 India has yet to enact a law on
coral conservation, working instead under the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972.294 A crucial
development towards fostering coral conservation in South Asia is the creation of the
South Asia Coral Reef Task Force under the South Asia MCPA (Marine Conservation
and Protected Areas) project. Funded by the European Union, the task force is intended
“to facilitate coordination in the management of coral reefs and associated ecosystems at
a national level, and to promote collaborative action at the regional level, encouraging
trans-boundary responses to shared environmental challenges.”295
In sum, coral reefs act as natural sea defences.296 However, given the rate of
degradation of the corals in, for instance, the Maldives, it is doubtful whether they will be
able to safeguard the islands against SLR for much longer.297 Thus, it is imperative that
sensitive coastal ecosystems such as these be protected, but without forsaking
development opportunities. It is balancing these two needs – ecosystem protection and
economic development – that ICZM assumes relevance. On the other hand, there is also
an urgent need to rapidly reduce global emissions of GHGs, which underscores the
importance of mitigation measures.
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For instance, see The Fisheries Law of the Maldives the Fisheries Law (Law No 5/87, 1987
Maldives), the Environment Protection and Preservation Act of Maldives (Law No 4/93), and the
Maldives Tourism Act (Law No 2/99). See Coast Conservation Act (No 57 of 1981 Sri Lanka), as
amended by the Coast Conservation (Amendment) Act, No 64 of 1988, s 31A(1). The Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources Act prohibits persons from using or attempting to use any poisonous, explosive or
stupefying substance or other noxious or harmful material or substance in Sri Lanka waters for the
purpose of poisoning, killing, stunning or disabling any fish or other aquatic resources. Aquatic
resources have been defined in section 66 to include living aquatic organisms. (No 2 of 1996, Sri
Lanka) s 27(1). The Marine Pollution Prevention Act is also relevant. Even though it does not deal
specifically with corals, it deals with one of the causes that contribute to reef destruction, namely,
water pollution. See (No 59 of 1981, Sri Lanka).
See Tamil Nadu v Messers Kaypee Industrial Chemicals Private Ltd, (2005), [2005] AIR 304
(Madras HC). This case related to the use of corals for the manufacture of lime. Even though it was
contended that the fishermen used to collect only dead corals, the death due to discharge of hot
water from a nearby thermal power station, and due to global warming, the Madras High Court held
that as long as the respondents purchased dead corals that were washed ashore, the authorities could
not interfere. However, if the sea-farer killed the animal, the Wildlife Protection Act would be
applicable. Ibid. For an overview on the state of the coral environment in Sri Lanka, see Priya
Monaguruswamy & Asha Dhanasini, Sri Lanka -- Corals at Risk: The Need for Protection, online:
eLAW <http://www.elaw.org/node/1679>.
South Asia Coral Reef Task Force, online: SACEP, South Asia Coral Reef Task Force (SACRTF)
<http://www.sacep.org/>.
John C Pernetta, ed, Marine Protected Areas Needs in the South Asian Seas Region, A Marine
Conservation and Development Report, vol 3: Maldives (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 1993) at 17.
Ibid.
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2.5.3 Impacts on Mangrove Forests
Among the portfolio of measures suggested to mitigate the presence of GHGs is the
development of geo-engineering and related technologies.298 These seek to enhance
carbon-absorbing processes (artificially and naturally) on land and sea to offset the
negative consequences of climate change. Geo-engineering efforts have also served to
shine a spotlight on the importance of coastal and near-shore marine ecosystems,
particularly on the ability of ‘blue carbon sinks,’ i.e., vegetative coastal environments
such as mangroves, tidal salt marshes, peat lands and sea grass meadows that have the
potential to capture and sequester carbon.299 In comparison to green carbon, blue carbon
has a very high sequestration potential. These ecosystems are important for other reasons
as well, including: 1) helping to improve livelihood opportunities for impoverished
coastal communities, and augment food security; 300 2) protecting coastal areas from
harmful waves and storm surges;301 3) performing essential ecological processes like
filtering and sustaining coastal aquifers;302 4) serving as fishing grounds and habitats for
a large number of species;303 and, 5) acting as carbon sinks.304 It is estimated that these
ecosystems can sequester carbon at rates higher than what mature tropical forests can
accomplish.305
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Ralph Bodle, “Geoengineering and International Law: The Search for Common Legal Ground”
(2010) 46 Tulsa L Rev 305 (QL).
Indonesia has lost about 30-40 per cent of its sea grass areas while Thailand has lost 20-30 per cent.
Stephen Crooks et al, “Mitigating Climate Change through Restoration and Management of Coastal
Wetlands and Near-shore Marine Ecosystems: Challenges and Opportunities”, Environment
Department Paper 121 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011) at 19; see also Jeremy Corbin,
Restoring Mangrove Forests in Indonesia Through the Use of Market-based Incentives: Lessons
Learned from International Case Studies (MMM, Dalhousie University, 2013) [unpublished].
Mangroves play an important role in supporting local economies. For instance, both in the Indus
delta and along the Balochistan coast in Pakistan, mangroves are harvested for fuel. For more
details, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.2.
Daniel M Alongi, “Mangrove Forests: Resilience, Protection from Tsunamis, and Responses to
Global Climate Change” (2008) 76:1 Estuarine, Coastal & Shelf Science 1 at 6 (ScienceDirect).
Mangrove ecosystems are effective as nutrient traps and ‘reactors’, helping to mitigate and decrease
coastal pollution. Dan Laffoley & Gabriel Grimsditch, eds, The Management of Natural Coastal
Carbon Sinks (Gland: IUCN, 2009) at 14.
For instance, see Guyana Initial National Communication, supra note 228 (noting that mangrove
swamps act as natural breeding and nursery grounds for brackish water shrimp and fin fish species).
UNEP, Christian Nellemann et al, eds, Blue Carbon: A Rapid Response Assessment (GRID-Arendal,
2009) at 7.
Mangroves and other coastal ecosystems can amass huge quantities of carbon in organic rich
sediments of up to five times more than the capacity of temperate and tropical forests. “Mangroves
Among the Most Carbon-Rich Forests in the Tropics; Coastal Trees Key to Lowering Greenhouse
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Nevertheless, despite the economic and environmental potential of these
ecosystems, large swathes of mangrove forests and other coastal ecosystems are being
increasingly degraded and drained.306 The dormant stores of carbon entrapped in these
systems is then released into the atmosphere, contributing to anthropogenic climate
change. For instance, reclamation for agriculture in the Sunderbans mangrove ecosystem
has left it severely strained,307 while in Mumbai, which is nearly encircled by mangroves,
development projects are rapidly replacing them.308 The situation is similar in
neighbouring Sri Lanka, which had nearly 11,500 hectares of mangroves in 1994 but now
has only 6,000-7,000 hectares.309 In Pakistan, mangroves are falling victims to land-based
sources of pollution.310 It is pertinent to note that none of these countries have direct and
dedicated legislations devoted to mangrove forest conservation. This is generally left to a
patchwork of forest conservation laws (terrestrial-based) and general environmental
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Gases”, Science News (5 April 2011), online: ScienceDaily <http://www.sciencedaily
.com/releases/2011/04/1104041 73247.htm>.
For instance, see The Goa Foundation v The Konkan Railway Corporation, (1992), [1992] AIR 471
(Bombay HC) (upholding the construction of a railway line through the Kazhan estuarine wetlands);
see also People United for Better Living in Calcutta-Public v West Bengal, (1992), [1993] AIR 215
(Calcutta HC) (restraining the state from reclaiming further wetlands, but left open the possibility of
an exemption to this decision). The court did not curb the setting up of a petrochemical park in an
Indian coastal Ramsar site on the ground that the objection raised “is opposed to the concept of
sustainable development as well as to the progress and prosperity of the nation.” Ramgopal Estates
Private Ltd v Tamil Nadu, (2007) [2007] INDLAW 964 (Madras HC).
Reclamation of the Sunderbans began in the year 1770 and it continues to this day. It has been
estimated that nearly 150,000 hectares of mangroves have been destroyed during the past 100 years.
See K Kathiresan, “Threats to Mangroves: Degradation and Destruction of Mangroves” in United
Nations University Syllabus for Training Course on Mangroves and Biodiversity (2010) 476 at 479,
online:
United
Nations
University
<http://ocw.unu.edu/international-network-on-waterenvironment-and-health/unu-inweh-course-1-mangroves/Degradation-and-destruction-ofmangroves.pdf>.
To accommodate the requirement of a second international airport for Mumbai, at Navi Mumbai, 98
hectares of mangroves were destroyed. However, strict conditions were imposed to ensure that the
developer create a mangrove park to compensate for the mangroves that were to be cut down for the
project. Ministry of Environment and Forests: Subject: Navi Mumbai International Airport, online:
MoEF <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/Press%20Release%20-%20Navi%20Mum
bai%20Airport.pdf>.
Sarasi Paranamanna, “Destruction under the Guise of Development: Mangroves of the Negombo
Lagoon”, Daily Mirror [of Sri Lanka] (1 September 2012), online: DailyMirror Archives
<http://archives.dailymirror.lk/>; Sarasi Paranamanna, “Mangroves Destroyed to Make Way for
Concrete”, Daily Mirror [of Sri Lanka] (8 September 2012), online: DailyMirror Archives <
http://archives.dailymirror.lk/>.
Manzoor Iqbal Khattak, Mahmood Iqbal Khattak & Muhammad Mohibullah, “Study of Heavy
Metal Pollution in Mangrove Sediments Reference to Marine Environment Along the Coastal Areas
of Pakistan” (2012) 44(1) Pakistan J Botany 373.
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statutes; in certain cases, the responsibility falls on coastal laws.311
The LOSC,312 the Ramsar Convention,313 the World Heritage Convention,314 the
international forestry regime,315 the CBD,316 and the sink regulation and forestry-related
aspects of the climate change regime are relevant to the conservation of mangrove forests
and other coastal ecosystems. In particular, the UNFCCC,317 the Kyoto Protocol,318 the
clean development mechanism rules relating to forest projects,319 the Land Use, land-use
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For instance, the entire Indian coast was once rich in mangrove vegetation, and historically, the
Kerala coast was described as a mangrove forest. However, that state is now left with only 16 square
kilometers of mangroves. Nonetheless, India still harbours some of the best mangrove swamps in the
world, located in the alluvial deltas of Ganga, Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna and Cauvery rivers, and
on the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands. India, Report of the Committee to Review the Coastal
Regulation Zone Notification 1991 (Chairman: MS Swaminathan, New Delhi: Ministry of
Environment & Forests, 2005) at 9, 39. The mangroves of Sunderbans, home to the famous Royal
Bengal Tiger, are the largest single block of tidal holophytic mangroves in the world. It is estimated
that the total area covered by mangroves in India is about 6,700 square kilometers, which amounts to
about seven per cent of the world’s mangroves. India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, India's
Second National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Delhi: Ministry of Environment
& Forests, 2001). Apart from the threats that these unique eco-systems face from development
projects, many of the mangrove concentrations in India are on the brink of extermination due to
global warming. For instance, the Sunderbans runs the risk of being lost to the rising sea. Subir
Bhaumik, “Fears rise for sinking Sundarbans”, BBC News (15 September 2003), online: BBC News
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/>. The two primary forest management and conservation laws, the Indian
Forest Act, 1927 and the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, are the primary legislative basis for
mangrove protection. In addition, there are certain programmes on mangrove conservation, and
India has also established a National Committee on Mangroves and Coral Reefs. However,
economic development projects have encroached on mangrove forests. For an example of both the
legislature and the judiciary failing to take action against a company that submitted a doctored plan
to obtain possession of lands that contained a mangrove forest, see Ajit D Padiwal v India, (1998),
[1998] AIR 147 (Gujarat HC). The company subsequently set up constructions that degraded this
mangrove forest, which was protected under the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Ibid.
As a constitution for the oceans, it may seem that the LOSC does not provide much for the
protection of corals. However, there are provisions in the LOSC, which can indirectly relevant to
coral conservation, See for instance article 194 which calls upon states to take measures to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment. See generally LOSC, supra note 66.
Ramsar Convention, supra note 287.
World Heritage Convention, supra note 286.
See generally UNCED, Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, [Adopted at Rio de Janeiro,
June 13, 1992] 31 ILM 881; UNGA, Non-legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests: Note
by the Secretariat, 62nd Sess, A/C.2/62/L.5 (22 October 2007).
CBD, supra note 285.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York on 9 May 1992) [UNFCCC] opening
plenary, arts 4(1)(a)-(d) & 4(8)(c).
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 292.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) finds its basis in the Kyoto Protocol, under which a
developed country can work towards its GHG reduction targets through emission-reduction project
activities implemented in developing countries. Ibid, art 12. Through these projects, saleable
certified emission reduction (CER) credits can be earned, which can then be counted towards
meeting Kyoto targets. UNFCCC, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), online: UNFCCC, Kyoto
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change and forestry Guidelines (LULUCFG),320 and the REDD+ policy321 are
significant.322 The United Nations Environment Programme has also launched Blue
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Protocol, Mechanisms, Clean Development Mechanism <http://unfccc.int/2860.php>; see also
Rowena Maguire, “Deforestation, REDD and International Law” in Shawkat Alam et al, eds,
Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxon: Routledge, 2013) 697 at 707 (for
details regarding forest Clean Development Mechanism). Even though CDM projects can
accommodate coastal resources like mangrove forests, there are not many blue carbon-related
projects, mainly because there are no exclusive methodologies under the CDM framework for
establishing baselines and for monitoring results for blue carbon projects. This is a serious
weakness, which may require amendments in criteria to provide for blue carbon projects that aim to
protect or rehabilitate degraded coastal ecosystems. Gabriel Grimsditch, “Options for Blue Carbon
within the International Climate Change Framework” (2011) 11:2 Sustainable Dev L & Pol'y 22 at
23 (HeinOnline).
Maguire, ibid at 706-07.
REDD and its analogs are based on the principle that countries able to reduce their emissions by
curbing deforestation should be financially compensated for doing so. Even though reducing
emissions from deforestation (RED) can be traced to the submission by Papua New Guinea and
Costa Rica at the UNFCCC’s COP 11 (Montreal), the concept received further fillip at the COP 13
in Bali, where it was elevated as an integral pillar of the Bali Roadmap. The Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) also produced a draft decision on approaches to
stimulate action relating to REDD. Subsequently, the COP at the Copenhagen affirmed the utility of
REDD by adopting the draft instrument prepared by the SBSTA. It is interesting also to note that it
was at the Copenhagen meet that REDD metamorphosised into REDD+ indicating a “transition to
an enhanced, broad-based approach that includes conservation, sustainable forest management, and
forest carbon stock enhancement”. At COP 16 in Cancun, Parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed to
adopt REDD+, a comprehensive policy to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation by
providing financial incentives to forest nations to prevent deforestation and restore forests though
sustainable forestry practices. The plus in REDD stands as recognition of the ability to conserve and
enhance carbon stocks. See Randall S Abate, “REDD, White, and Blue: Is Proposed U.S. Climate
Legislation Adequate to Promote a Global Carbon Credits System for Avoided Deforestation in a
Post-Kyoto Regime?” (2010) 19 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 95 at 100 (HeinOnline); see generally Jay
Tufano, “Forests and Climate Change Policy: An Analysis of Three REDD-Plus Design Options”
(2011) 5:4 Carbon Climate LR 443; see also Maguire, ibid.
Conserving and augmenting sinks is one of the most economical and sustainable ways to implement
mitigation actions. Generally, such ecosystems, particularly mangrove forests, can be brought under
the international forestry regime. However, the principle of national sovereignty has circumscribed
the development of binding international forestry law rules. Under the UNFCCC all parties have a
duty to promote sustainable management, conservation and enhancement of GHG sinks and
reservoirs in the oceans and in coastal and marine ecosystems. UNFCCC, supra note 317, art 4.1(d).
In accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the primary duty to
reduce and control GHG emissions rests with developed countries. Developing countries do not
have any clear-cut obligation in this respect. By indirectly drawing in developing countries into its
remit, the emissions trading regime under the Kyoto Protocol circumvents these situations and thus
emerges as the centerpiece legislation that can help sink conservation. It also provides a platform to
dovetail the interests of both developing and developed countries, as it offers Annex I nations a
mechanism to attain their targets at less costs, while at the same time providing developing countries
an opportunity to contribute to mitigation efforts and to profit from these efforts. By utilising
market-based mechanisms as a compliance strategy, and by providing sufficient incentives in
conserving their green cover, forest conservation has been rendered a palatable proposition to all
nations concerned. However, this holds true more for cases of terrestrial based sinks like forests and
less for cases of near-shore marine and oceanic ecosystems, which remain on the periphery of the
present regime. In fact the regime holds out very few incentives in conserving blue carbon sinks like
mangrove forests and preventing their degradation, even though such ecosystems have a much
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Carbon Initiative to advance a global partnership for the sound management of coastal
and marine ecosystems to ensure that their carbon sequestration and storage functions are
maintained and for this purpose it supports the development of global, regional and
national policies for ecosystem management and possible financial instruments.323
Despite the high potential to sequester carbon, blue carbon stores do not enjoy full
recognition in international emission reduction strategies and the focus of International
law is predominantly on terrestrial carbon sinks.
At the national levels, it is evident that mangroves are under severe stress in the
South Asian coastal countries, where these ecosystems are often cleared to make way for
coastal development. This is now compounded by climate change impacts, a situation
that demands immediate and comprehensive protection of these vulnerable ecosystems.
Although mangroves have the propensity to migrate inland, this is not always possible
due to the heavy concentration of coastline development.324 Moreover, inland ecosystem
migration can trigger other environmental consequences such as contamination of
freshwater resources and brackish habitats.325 All this requires action on many fronts,
again underscoring the need for effective ICZM that can help manage and protect these
sensitive ecosystems, while at the same time, continuing to secure sustainable livelihoods
and other economic opportunities.

2.6 CONCLUSION
In analysing “Rising Seas, Receding Coastlines, Vulnerable Coastal Communities and
Ecosystems,” which is an overview of the present and future impacts of climate change
and SLR from a South Asian perspective, in the context of applicable international and
national law, the following significant points emerge. First and foremost, SLR is an issue
of widespread concern amongst coastal states. Already, significant SLR has taken place
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greater capacity to sequester carbon than tropical forests. The lack of appropriate carbon accounting
methodologies and the full scientific awareness about these ecosystems have been cited as reasons
as to why these ecosystems are not presently preferred. Grimsditch, supra note 319.
For further details, see Blue Carbon Project: Project Overview, online: GRID ARENDAL, Projects
& Activities, Blue Carbon Project <http://www.grida.no/marine/>; UNEP, Blue Carbon Initiative,
online: UNEP <http://www.unep.org/>.
For more on the concept, see generally Christine Schleupner, “Evaluation of Coastal Squeeze and Its
Consequences for the Caribbean Island Martinique” 51:5 (2008) Ocean & Coast Mgmt 383
(ScienceDirect).
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Environment, Sri Lanka’s Second National Communication on Climate
Change (Sri Lanka: Climate Change Secretariat, 2011) at 92.
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and will likely accelerate in the near future. 326 Even though the international climate
change regime has entered a second commitment period,327 it is doubtful whether the
regime will be able to turn down the heat unless and until drastic steps are taken. 328
Consequently, the amount of GHGs being pumped into the atmosphere continues to grow
at alarming levels highlighting the importance of climate change adaptation. Second,
climate change impacts on coastal areas, resources and communities raise a myriad of
complex legal issues that touch upon aspects like maritime boundaries, refugee rights,
statelessness, and protection of coastal biodiversity. Due to huge concentrations of
populations in coastal regions, high poverty levels and heavy dependence on ecosystem
goods and services, coastal populations have very poor adaptive capacities, and to the
impacts of climate change and SLR in South Asia will be severe. The Maldives is
expected to sink while large parts of Bangladesh will be lost to rising waters, leaving
these countries saddled with massive displaced populations, who may move to
neighbouring countries. Other coastal countries in South Asia face similar problems of
land and maritime territory loss and displacement. Furthermore, this region may also
loose its rich coastal and marine biodiversity. The story is far more complicated and
animated than what has been described above.
The third point is that an analysis of extant international law reveals that there is a
normative gap in terms of prescriptions and ground realities. At the time when most of
the instruments identified above were developed, SLR and climate change were not
issues of concern. Consequently, International law has not evolved as much as necessary
in terms of normative development to provide states guidance on how to deal with the
legal consequences that emanate in the face of extreme climate change impacts. The
conjecture that emerges is that there is a normative vacuum in terms of legal principles
and avenues that impose explicit obligations to tackle the full range of issues brought to
the fore by climate change and SLR. Ultimately, the challenges posed are sui generis in
326
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See Part 2.2, above, for more discussion on SLR.
See generally UNFCCC, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol Draft Decision Proposed by the
President Draft Decision -/CMP.8: Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol Pursuant to its Article 3,
Paragraph 9, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9 (8 December 2012).
See generally Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, The World
Bank, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4oC Warmer World Must be Avoided (Washington DC: The
World Bank, 2012).
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nature and these test our fundamental legal understandings and assumptions regarding
these issues and therefore these require a unique legal response. At the international level,
there is a need for stronger legal compacts, which may also require a fundamental rewriting of well-established rules to assist governments as, at the national level in South
Asia, since the national level legal frameworks on the identified issues are also
comparatively inadequate in providing a management and regulatory basis. As well, most
of the issues examined are politically contentious, and some of them involve far reaching
questions of human rights, and they entail huge costs in terms of social, environmental
and financial aspects. This can pose severe consequences for social welfare, lead to
anarchical situations, mass migrations, derail development and impede economic growth.
However, the world community seems to be dragging its feet over the issue. There are
other pragmatic difficulties in securing agreement on the specific elements of an hard law
instrument on the subject, the tortuous nature and time periods involved in most treaty
negotiations, the issue of ratification and coming into force of the treaty – all render the
development of international agreements, a difficult prospect.329 This inaction in
addressing the problem of rising sea levels by the world community has been compared
by the former president of Nauru, Rene Harris, to that of a modern holocaust.330
One primary reason for this inaction is that despite incontrovertible scientific
evidence affirming climate change, and even if it is acknowledged that we have crossed
the tipping points and that climate change and its consequences are irreversible, it is
extremely difficult to predict with precision what the actual effects will be, where exactly
will it occur, what will be the precise magnitude and on what time scales will they occur.
Due to the lack of visible propinquity of predicted impacts, it may be indefeasible to
329
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For instance, the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound
Recycling of Ships, 2009, was adopted in 2009 to coincide with the glut in the number of single hull
oil tankers that would be available for recycling by 2010. Accordingly, the convention was to enter
into force 24 months after the date on which 15 States, representing 40 per cent of world merchant
shipping by gross tonnage, would have ratified it. See International Conference on the Safe and
Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships: Agenda Item 8, Adoption of the Final Act and Any
Instruments, Recommendations and Resolutions Resulting from the Work of the Conference: Hong
Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009,
Text Adopted by the Conference, IMO/SR/CONF/45, 19 May 2009 (opened for signature 1
September 2009) art 17. This convention is yet to enter into force due to insufficient ratifications.
See Recycling of Ships: The Development of the Hong Kong Convention, online: IMO, Our Work,
Marine Environment, Ship Recycling <http://www.imo.org/Pages/home.aspx>.
Phil Mercer, “Islanders press Bush on global warming”, BBC News (17 August 2001), online: BBC
News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1496591.stm>.
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publicly admit that it is already too late in the day to halt the harmful consequences
through mitigative steps alone and that concerted measures need to be taken on a war
footing on various fronts. An admission as to the disastrous consequences that await us
may trigger the panic button leading to climate change alarmism. Actions on these fronts
may be expensive, and given the lack of resources and capital, and the international
community battling a host of daunting issues on several other fronts, it may be unwise
and politically suicidal to begin talk about sinking nations and displaced populations
when we are still unsure as to the precise nature of the impacts.
The narrative in this chapter clearly highlights the disparate character of
international rules on this subject and the need for new rules of international law to
provide guidance to deal with the exacerbated effects of climate change and SLR. While
new international treaties and legal regimes may have to be developed, the fact is that this
is a time consuming process, as the wheels of International Law grind rather slowly and
this may require more precise data and consensus among nations, which may be difficult
to secure. Accordingly, one of the more practicable approaches for countries in South
Asia whose coastlines will be affected by climate change impacts and SLR is to cooperate at the regional level (since some of the problems can be best addressed at the
regional level) and provide for a regional instrument that prescribes rules relating to more
intelligent coastal management, one that furthers sustainable development in coastal
areas.
The fourth point that emerges is that since the solutions to climate change are more
complex and arcane, it brings to the fore the need for a more practical, holistic and
effective coastal management, grounded on a precautionary-based adaptive approach, to
help to reign in the destructive climatic forces at least to a certain degree. In other words,
for the degraded South Asian coastlines, the objective should be to ensure SCD through
the unique methodology of ICZM, linking it up with CCCA. And here a legal statute has
an underpinning role to play in facilitating ICZM implementation and in supporting
Coast Conservation Act, 1981, through an ICZM process. Essentially, these aspects
constitute the problématique of this thesis, which will be examined and developed in the
succeeding parts of this study.
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CHAPTER 3

THE SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE ON INTEGRATED
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AND COASTAL
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION WITH SPECIFIC
REFERENCE TO COASTAL LAWS

3.1 INTRODUCTION
In October 2009, under the leadership of the then President Mohamed Nasheed, the
cabinet of the Maldives held an underwater meeting in scuba gear. Ministers and
officials, shouldering compressed - air tanks, dove into the turquoise waters off Girifushi
Island and took their seats at a table arranged on the seafloor in the backdrop of a coral
reef teeming with fish and other marine life.1 The meeting went on for half an hour, with
members communicating with one another and with their President via white boards and
hand signals. The primary purpose behind this unconventional venue was to influence a
positive outcome at the United Nations Climate Change Conference to be held later that
year in Copenhagen.2 At a subsequent press conference, when President Nasheed was
asked by reporters what would happen if the summit failed, he somberly replied: “[w]e
are going to die.”3
Even though the world’s first underwater cabinet meeting failed to create ripples in
terms of concrete outcomes at the Copenhagen Summit, it nevertheless did serve to
highlight the predicament faced by small island states, which are some of the world’s
lowest-lying places on Earth.4 While the primary contributors to the incessant dumping of
GHGs into the atmosphere are the developed nations, the paradox is that the harmful
consequences of this pollution will disproportionately befall developing nations
(including small island states), which have the least capacity to adapt to climatic
changes.5
1

2
3
4
5

“Maldives government holds underwater cabinet meeting”, The Telegraph (17 October 2009)
online: The Telegraph <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/6356036/Mald
ives-govern ment-holds-underwater-cabinet-meeting.html>.
“Maldives politicians submerge”, ReutersVideo (17 October 2009) YouTube Video, online:
YouTube <http ://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odFmDiYWJ0M&feature=related>.
See also “President Nasheed: “Our country will not exist”, 350org (22 September 2009) YouTube
Video, online: YouTube <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QLmP40gYH7c>.
“Maldives politicians submerge”, supra note 2.
“Summary for Policymakers: A Report of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change” in James J McCarthy et al, eds, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 1 at 8; see also Asia-Pacific Human
86

The five coastal countries of the South Asia region have a combined coastline
length of about 11,500 kilometers,6 with low elevation coastal zones spread over an area
of about 160,000 square kilometers. These coastal zones house upwards of 135 million
people7 and support 40 per cent of the economic activities of the region, including most
of the critical economic infrastructure.8 This region also supports some of the most
diverse and rich concentrations of coastal biodiversity and marine species.9 The Gulf of
Mannar, the Maldivain atolls and the Sunderban mangroves are but a few examples. In
addition, the presence of perennial rivers such as the Brahmaputra, the Ganges, the
Godavari, the Indus, and the Mahaweli Ganga have led to the creation of large networks
of backwaters, estuaries, salt marshes and mangroves that sustain diverse flora and fauna.
Importantly, these ecosystems are home to some of the largest conglomerations of coastal
populations in the world.
Coastal ecosystems in South Asia are under considerable stress due to the huge
coastal populations these regions accommodate. Moreover, these mostly poor populations
depend primarily on coastal resources and ecosystems for their livelihood and
sustenance,10 putting further stress on marine resources and coastal ecosystems.
Exploitation is not always based on sustainability principles, and this has significantly
hampered the resilience of these ecosystems. For instance, when the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami hit South Asia, the destruction was far less in regions where there were extensive
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Development Report: One Planet to Share: Sustaining Human Progress in a Changing Climate
(New Delhi: Routledge, 2012) at 20 (pointing out that “vulnerability perpetuates poverty, and
poverty, in turn, exacerbates vulnerability”) [Asia-Pacific Human Development Report].
SASP, Objectives and Activities, online: SACEP <http://www.sacep.org/html/sas_objectives.htm>.
LOICZ South Asia Mode, About South Asia Coast, online: <http://www.loiczsouthasia.org/sou
thasiacoast.php>.
Ibid.
UNEP, Global Synthesis: A Report from the Regional Seas Conventions and Action Plans for the
Marine Biodiversity Assessment and Outlook Series (UNEP Regional Seas Programme, 2010) at 52.
Data from the SAARC Coastal Management Centre suggests that, as of 2000, nearly 54.80 per cent
of the population in Bangladesh, 26.30 per cent of the population in India, 81.10 per cent of the
population in Maldives, 09.10 per cent of the population of Pakistan, and nearly 100 per cent of the
population of Sri Lanka living within 100 kilometers of the coastline depend on fishing. SAARC,
Coastal Statistics, online: SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre <http://www.sczmc.org
/coastal-statistics/> [SAARC, Coastal Statistics].
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mangroves, which acted as a buffer to dissipate the wave energy; 11 conversely, in areas
where the mangroves were degraded, the destruction was immense.
As seen in the previous chapters, South Asia, especially its coastal regions, is slated
to be worst hit by climate change and sea level rise (SLR). The projected rise in sea level
is expected to cause significant damage to coastal land and ecosystems and will affect
millions who live in this area. On the sub-continent alone, it is estimated that nearly 130
million people live in the low-coastal elevation zones.12 Moreover, as the entire land
territory of the Maldives lies in the low coastal elevation zone, it is predicted that this
country will be lost to rising sea levels. Sri Lanka also stands to lose substantial chunks
of its land territory. Indeed, Sri Lanka has already had to deal with significant coastal
erosion. The burgeoning population, scarce resources, and high levels of poverty means
that even a small variation in climate can lead to irreversible damage that will push large
numbers of people into further destitution, as they have the little capacity and few
resources to adapt to climate change impacts.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) observes that, by the most
conservative estimates, the sea level will be about 40 centimeters higher at the end of
century.13 This will increase the number of people that are exposed to floods annually
from 19 million to 94 million, and almost 60 per cent of this increase will be in South
Asia.14 According to the IPCC, the current rate of SLR in Asia’s coastal areas is one to
three millimeters per year, which is marginally higher than the global average. 15 An
annual SLR rate of 3.1 millimeters has been reported over the past decade, compared to
1.7-2.4 millimeters per year over the 20th century as a whole, which suggests that SLR
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Environmental Justice Foundation, Mangroves: Nature’s Defence against Tsunamis: A Report on
the Impact of Mangrove Loss and Shrimp Farm Development on Coastal Defences (London: EJF,
2006) at 8.
Sudhir Chella Rajan, Blue Alert: Climate Migrants in South Asia: Estimates and Solutions – A
Report by Greenpeace (Greenpeace India Society, 2008) at 6.
Rex Victor Cruz et al, “Asia” in ML Parry et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation
and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 469
at 484.
Bangladesh, Climate Change Cell, Climate Change and Bangladesh (Dhaka: Department of
Environment, 2007) at 10 [Bangladesh, Climate Change and Bangladesh].
Cruz et al, supra note 13 at 479; see also, UNEP, SAARC & DA, South Asia Environment Outlook
2009 (Kenya: UNEP, 2009) at 47.
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has accelerated in relation to the long-term average.16 Additionally, an anticipated rise in
sea surface temperature of two to four degree Celsius will increase the incidence of
tropical cyclones by 10 to 20 per cent in South Asia.17
The coastal mega-cities of South Asia, namely, Mumbai (20 million), Kolkata (15.6
million), Karachi (13.1 million), Dhaka (14.7 million)18 and Chennai (6.9 million), 19 are
situated only a few meters above sea level. It is expected that the rising seawaters will
inundate large tracts of land, destroy coastal wetlands and other estuarine systems,
increase salinity, impact the availability of fresh water, and destroy coastal agriculture
and aquaculture, leading to the displacement of millions. It is also expected that rising
coastal water temperatures in South Asia will exacerbate the incidence and toxicity of
cholera.20
This chapter provides an overview of the current state of coastal zone management
(CZM) in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives by setting out the context
of this study to determine the relevance of the South Asian experience in coastal law
making. Essentially, it is a report on the state of coastal governance and of coastal
management laws, systems and practices in South Asia. Specifically, the central query
that will guide the exploration is how is coastal South Asia preparing for SLR and other
climate change impacts via their coastal laws? As such, it examines the extent to which
the coastal laws in these countries further the concept of integrated coastal zone
management (ICZM) and coastal climate change adaptation. And here, the analysis will
based on four parameters, namely: 1) the coastal situation in the country; 2) major threats
to the coastal zone, including the problems posed by SLR; 3) an overview of the features
of the coastal law, policies, practices, and relevant institutions on coastal zone
management and what specific measures they envisage for CCCA; and 4) critical flaws
and gaps in the national coastal zone management efforts, including the coastal laws that
have hampered SCD. In doing so, it identifies major loopholes in the current CZM legal
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Cruz et al, ibid at 479.
Ibid.
Asia-Pacific Human Development Report, supra note 5 at 121.
IOC/UNESCO et al, A Blueprint for Ocean and Coastal Sustainability (Paris: IOC/UNESCO, 2011)
at 9.
Cruz et al, supra note 13 at 471.
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apparatuses at the respective national levels that have hampered ICZM development, in
effect setting the stage for this study.
Apart from this introduction, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 3.2
examines the development of ICZM legal regimes and coastal climate change adaptation
(CCCA) in South Asia by chronicling the experiences of India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
Maldives and Pakistan. Based on these status reports, section 3.3, carries out a coastal
law audit. The study concludes by emphasizing the need for a regional framework to help
operationalise ICZM law in South Asia and to facilitate adaptation to climate change and
SLR.

3.2 SEA LEVEL RISE, INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, AND COASTAL
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN SOUTH ASIA
3.2.1 India
Lapped by the warm waters of the Arabian Sea to the west, the Bay of Bengal to the east,
and the Indian Ocean to the south, India boasts a lengthy coastline of about 8,158
kilometers. Of this, nearly 6,064 kilometers are mainland coastline, and the remainder is
island coastline of the Andaman and Nicobar and the Lakshadweep Islands (2,094
kilometers).21 The entire coastal landmass falls within nine maritime states and four
union territories.22 These waters are rich and unique from marine biodiversity and ecoconservation perspectives. The several major and minor rivers and their tributaries that
criss-cross the Indian land mass before discharging into the two seas have gifted the
country with a wide array of coastal ecosystems like estuaries, mangroves, beaches,
backwaters, salt marshes, lagoons, coral reefs, and wetlands.23 In addition, the bay islands
of the Andaman and Nicobar group and the atoll island group of Lakshadweep add to the
rich marine and coastal biodiversity of this country.
21
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India, R Ramesh, R Purvaja & A Senthil Vel, National Assessment of Shoreline Coast: Puducherry
Coast (Chennai: NCSCM, Ministry of Environment & Forests, 2001) at 30; Centre for Environment
and Development, Draft Final Report, World Bank Assisted Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Project: Environmental and Social Assessment, E2303 v2 (Thiruvananthapuram: Ministry of
Environment & Forests, 2009) at 1 [Draft Final Report].
States & Union Territories, online: GOI web directory <http://goidirectory.gov.in/state.php>.
For an overview, see India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Report of the Committee Chaired by
Prof. M.S. Swaminathan to Review the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification 1991 (New Delhi:
Ministry of Environment & Forests, 2005) at 7-10 [India, Report of the Committee Chaired by Prof.
M.S. Swaminathan].
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The Indian coastline is the locus of huge agglomerations of people, industry, and
development projects. It is estimated that more than 250 million people reside within 50
kilometers of the coastline and that the 73 coastal districts (out of a total of 593 districts)
accommodate nearly seventeen per cent of the national population.24 Seventy-seven cities
dot the Indian coastline, of which Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Kochi and Visakhapatnam
are among the largest and most densely populated urban cities in South Asia. The density
of population in coastal areas ranges from less than 25 people per square kilometer to as
high as 700 or more in others.25 To support this vast population, the coastal regions
accommodate a colossal infrastructure, including thermal and nuclear power plants, an
array of industries, mines, sewage treatment plants, and major and minor ports.26
India’s coasts are also attracting an increasing number of tourists.27 Apart from
acting as bases for the launching of catamarans and other traditional craft, and for
repairing and drying nets and other gear, beaches have traditionally been popular
recreational sites. Of late, they have been transformed into heavily developed areas
housing tourist resorts, amusement parks, hotels, etc. All of this development has led to
the displacement of many fishing villages and vast stretches of beaches have been
barricaded.28 Even though such development projects bring jobs to local communities and
stimulate the local economy, they also bring in their wake a series of socio-economic and
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Draft Final Report, supra note 21. According to data from SAARC Coastal Zone Management
Centre, as of 2000, nearly 26.3 per cent of the country’s population lived within 100 kilometers of
the coastline. SAARC, Coastal Statistics, supra note 10; see also Gov’t of India, Space Applications
Centre, Coastal Zones of India (Ahmedabad: Space Applications Centre, 2012) (pointing out that
nearly 25 percent of the country’s population lives within 100 kilometers of the coastline).
R Krishnamoorthy et al, “Environmental and Human Impacts on Coastal and Marine Protected
Areas in India” in Guido Visconti et al, eds, Advances in Global Change Research: Global Change
and Protected Areas (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001) 373 at 392. There are
nearly 3,600 fishing villages in India and the total fishing population is about 14.66 million.
Ramesh, Purvaja & Vel, supra note 21.
It is estimated that there are nearly 308 large-scale industrial units situated on the Indian coasts.
Draft Final Report, supra note 21 at 2. The Indian coastline houses 13 major ports and 187 minor
ports, which supports over 90 per cent of India’s foreign trade by sea. See also Ministry of Shipping,
Ports Wing online: Ministry of Shipping <http://shipping.nic.in/index1.php?lang=1&level=
0&linkid=16&lid=64>.
See generally Ligia Noronha et al, eds, Coastal Tourism, Environment, and Sustainable Local
Development (New Delhi: TERI, 2002).
See generally, Rohini Mohan, “A Storm Foretold: Coastal Wars”, Tehelka.com 47:8 (26 November
2011) online: Tehelka.com <http://tehelka.com/a-storm-foretold/>. For more stories on the state of
degradation facing India’s beaches and coastline, see “Gujarat’s Mangroves Under Threat – NDTV
Report”, Save Our Beach (8 June 2009) YouTube online: Save Our Beach
<http://saveourbeach.wordpress.com/tag/Indias-dying-beaches/>.
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environmental problems, since several of these tourism-related and other developmental
projects are being implemented at the expense of the health of fragile coastal
ecosystems.29
From the above, it is clear that coastal area resources play a critical role in
supporting India’s national economy and in sustaining the subsistence economies of local
communities. Nevertheless, misguided exploitation of these resources exceeds
sustainable yields, leading to resource degradation. For instance, mechanisation in the
fishing sector has led to a sharp decline in the catch available to the traditional sector,
which has seriously hampered livelihood prospects.30 Furthermore, access and
usufructuary rights to beachfronts and to other coastal resources currently enjoyed by
traditional fishing communities are fast giving way to mega-development projects.31
In addition to non-point sources of pollution, the near absence of effective
treatment plants and the presence of a large number of pollution-intensive industries have
led to the dumping of enormous quantities of hazardous and municipal wastes into
coastal waters.32 An instance in point is the shipbreaking yard at Alang in Gujarat state,
where shipbreaking is carried out under primitive conditions. As there is no containment
of the wastes, deadly carcinogens and bio-accumulative heavy metals flow directly into
the Arabian Sea.33 Frequent algal blooms on the east and west coasts are clear indications
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Ibid.
Cochin Trawl Net Boat Operators Association v Kerala, (1992) [1992] AIR 342 (Ker HC).
For an overview on the impacts on special economic zones and the fishing community, see Manshi
Asher, “SEZs: Stirring up a storm along the Indian coast” InfoChange (July 2007), online:
Infochange, Analysis, Trade and Development, News & Features <http://infochangeindia.org/>; see
also Dighi Koli Samaj Mumbai Rahivasi Sangh, Secretary, Jagannath Ambaji, Mumbai v India,
(2009) [2009] INDLAW 797 (Bombay HC) (upholding the acquisition of public land and handing it
over to a private entrepreneur for developing a port); Bhikaji Jagannath Waghdhare, Mumabi v
India, Department of Atomic Energy, (2009) [2009] INDLAW 1001 (Bombay HC) (upheld
acquisition of lands of coastal communities under urgency clause for the Jaitapur nuclear power
plant).
The total amount of industrial wastes discharged is about 13,500 million liters/day (MLD), of which
8,000 MLD are partially or fully treated and the rest discharged into the oceans untreated. 87 cities
and towns in the coastal areas generate about 5,560.99 MLD of wastewater, of which only 521.51
MLD are treated. Thus, nearly 90.62 per cent of the wastewater finds its way into coastal waters
without any treatment. Draft Final Report, supra note 21 at 92.
See generally Tony George Puthucherril, From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling:
Evolution of a Legal Regime, David Freestone, ed, 5 Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development
(The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) [Puthucherril, From Shipbreaking]; Research
Foundation for Science v India, (2007) [2007] AIR 3118 (India SC) (directing the government of
India to formulate a comprehensive code for shipbreaking). Shipbreaking activities discontinued in
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of the poor quality of coastal waters.34 With increasing economic activity and heightened
demand for power, the growing number of thermal and nuclear power plants situated on
the coasts poses severe environmental threats.35 Even now, wetlands and mangrove
swamps are considered merely dumping grounds for garbage and a breeding ground for
mosquitoes; as a consequence, they are filled in to make way for the construction of
housing colonies, roadways, power plants and industrial units.36
The burgeoning population and widespread poverty among coastal communities,
compounded by overexploitation of coastal resources, competing uses, destruction of
habitats, implementation of a plethora of developmental projects in coastal areas (the
environmental soundness of many of which are seriously disputed), rampant pollution
and the dumping of all sorts of wastes into coastal waters have considerably affected the
health of India’s oceans and coasts.37 As mentioned in chapter one, the overarching
effects of SLR and climate change will exacerbate these problems.38 The predicted rise in
mean sea temperature may increase the frequency and intensity of tropical storms and
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Ramanathapuram district, taking into account the impact on marine and coastal ecology. TNSS
Steels Private Ltd v India, (2009) [2009] INDLAW 4295 (Madras HC).
See generally Tony George Puthucherril, “Ballast Waters and Aquatic Invasive Species: A Model
for India” (2008) 19 Colo J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y 381 (QL) [Puthucherril, “Ballast Waters”].
Nuclear plants release nearly 50 per cent of their generated heat into the coastal and marine
environment. Draft Final Report, supra note 21 at 93; see also Citizens for a Just Society, through
its Vice President, K Pullaiah v India, (2005) [2005] 5 Bom CR 316 (Bombay HC) (refused to deal
with the issue of radioactive nuclear waste leaks from the Babha Atomic Research Centre into the
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water discharged from the cooling system into the creek. Bombay Environmental Action Group v
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Mohan, supra note 28; see also Nauzer K Bharucha, “500 acres in city may open up for
development”, The Times of India (26 December 2011) online: The Times of India <http://time
sofindia.indiatimes.com/archive.cms>; Chinmayi Shalya, “2 mangrove stretches at risk from
dumping” The Times of India (20 February 2013) online: The Times of India <http://times
ofindia.indiatimes.com/archive.cms>.
The construction of a harbour in 1989 and two breakwaters in Puducherry stopped the littoral drift
leading to severe coastal erosion. India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Final Frontier: Agenda
to Protect the Ecosystem and Habitat of India’s Coast for Conservation and Livelihood Security,
Report of the Expert Committee on the Draft Coastal Management Zone (CMZ) Notification,
Constituted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Under the Chairmanship of Prof. MS
Swaminathan (New Delhi: Ministry of Environment & Forests, 2009) at 21 [India, Ministry of
Environment & Forests, Final Frontier]; Coastal and Marine Pollution: National Institute of
Oceanography, DonaPaula,Goa–403004, India (March, 2008), online: SAARC-SDMC <http://saarcsdmc.nic.in/pdf/workshops/goa/india/COA STAL%20AND%20MARINE%20POLLUTION.pdf>.
The ADB points out that “[c]limate change represents an important potential brake on recent rapid
economic growth in India.” Asian Development Bank, Addressing Climate Change and Migration
in Asia and the Pacific: Final Report (Metro Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012) at 32.
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hurricanes and trigger other catastrophic phenomena like bleaching of corals, extreme
changes in weather patterns, and increased precipitation. Combining climate change
processes and SLR with these other pressures jeopardizes the well-being of coastal
communities and significantly reduces their capacity to adapt to SLR.
India has been identified as one of the 27 countries slated to be most affected by
SLR, with current average SLR along the Indian coast estimated at about 1.3 mm/year. 39
An early study on the impact of SLR on India’s coasts revealed that nearly 5,763 square
kilometers of coastal area in eight coastal states will be affected, displacing a total of 7.1
million people (as of 1981), representing nearly 4.6 per cent of the total coastal
population.40 A more recent study forecasts that by 2050 nearly 37.2 million people will
be at risk from the SLR.41 India stands to lose the entire Lakshadweep archipelago in the
event of a one-meter rise in sea level.
The Kutch region in Gujarat state, Mumbai in Northern Malabar, Southern Kerala,
the Cauvery delta in Tamil Nadu, the Krishna and Godavari deltas in Andhra Pradesh, the
Mahanadi delta in Orissa, and the Ganges delta in the West Bengal are considered to be
the most vulnerable to SLR.42 In the event of a one-meter rise, Gujarat and West Bengal
stand to lose the maximum amount of land; West Bengal, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu
will be most affected in terms of population; and West Bengal, Orissa, and Maharashtra
will sustain maximum damage in terms of land use.43 While a one-meter rise in sea level
will result in an inundation of nearly 4.2 square kilometers in Nagapattinam of Tamil
Nadu, nearly 478 square kilometers in Paradip will be inundated, with the probable
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India, INCCA, Climate Change and India: A 4X4 Assessment, A Sectoral and Regional Analysis for
2030s, No 2 (New Delhi: Ministry of Environment & Forests, 2010) at 47 [INCCA, Climate Change
and India].
Ligia Noronha, “The Rising Seas: Need for Longer-term Perspective in Coastal Planning and
Adaptation for Developing Countries” in TERI, ed, Environmental Threats, Vulnerability, and
Adaptation: Case Studies from India (New Delhi: TERI, 2004) 167 at 174. The World Bank
estimates that more than 60 million people (63,188,208 persons, out of which 31,515,286 are
urbanites) who presently live in the area of the low elevation coastal zone (which covers an
estimated area of 81,805 square kilometers) will be badly impacted by SLR. Draft Final Report,
supra note 21 at 83.
Asian Development Bank, supra note 38 at 25.
Ligia Noronha, BS Choudri & KS Nairy, “Relative Vulnerability of Districts to a Potential SeaLevel Rise Along the Coastline of India” in TERI ed, Environmental Threats, Vulnerability, and
Adaptation: Case Studies from India (New Delhi: TERI, 2004) 121 at 126.
Noronha, supra note 40 at 174-75.
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inundation zone 40 kilometers landward.44 Due to the presence of backwaters and islands,
the Kochi region (net SLR is 1.75 millimeters per year) in Kerala will be severely
affected.45 Overall, the Chennai district in Tamil Nadu is considered to be the most
vulnerable to SLR in India, followed by North Goa and Mumbai.46
It also has been reported that the sea surface temperature of the two seas flanking
the Indian land mass is increasing by about 0.04oC annually. As a consequence, species
of fish like oil sardines, a cheap source of protein for local communities, are migrating to
higher latitudes with colder waters.47 The incidence of tropical cyclones has also
increased.48
India adopted its first coastal law in 1991, the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification
of 1991 (CRZ 1991).49 This law held the field for nearly two decades and had a turbulent
existence. Attempts to replace it with a new legal framework came to fruition in 2011
with the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification of 2011 (CRZ 2011). Even though the new
law supersedes the CRZ 1991, its legal architecture draws heavily on the CRZ 1991.
Therefore, an inclusive study on India’s coastal law requires an analysis of both of these
coastal laws and of the sequence of events that led to the CRZ 2011. Additionally, this
legal regime is supported by extensive judicial intervention that not only shaped the 1991
law but will influence how the 2011 law is implemented.
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INCCA, Climate Change and India, supra note 39 at 56.
Ibid at 47.
Noronha, Choudri & Nairy, supra note 42 at 131. The megalopolis of coastal Mumbai, with a
population of nearly 18 million, an SLR rate of 1.20 millimeters per year, and an 80 kilometre
coastline, is highly vulnerable to the combined effects of global warming and SLR. A significant
portion of Mumbai is built on reclaimed land and, as the population continues to grow, the
degradation of mangroves and the pollution of creeks and coastal waters increases. It is predicted
that a one-meter rise in sea level will inundate about 86.75 square kilometers of the city. Noronha,
supra note 40 at 183. A recent study notes that while a one-meter rise in average sea level will
permanently inundate about 1,091 square kilometers along the Tamil Nadu coast, the total area at
risk will be nearly six times as large. It also calculates the total replacement value of infrastructure
(ports, power plants and major roads) that will be impacted by SLR to be approximately USD11
billion (somewhere between INR47,418 and INR53,554 crores [in 2010 terms] according to the
present rate of exchange). Sujatha Byravan, Sudhir Chella Rajan and Rajesh Rangarajan, Sea Level
Rise: Impact on Major Infrastructure, Ecosystems and Land along the Tamil Nadu Coast (Madras:
CDF, IFMR [nd]).
Until 1985, almost the entire catch of oil sardines was from the Malabar upwelling zone and there
were practically no catches north of 140N along the west coast. However, in the past two decades,
catches between 140N and 200N contributed nearly 15 per cent of the total Indian sardine catch by
2006. INCCA, Climate Change and India, supra note 39 at 75-76.
Ibid at 48.
The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO114(E) 1991, India). This coastal law is a piece of
subordinate legislation and applied throughout the country.
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3.2.1.1

The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991

The need to protect Indian’s coast line found concrete expression in 1981, when the then
Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, addressed letters to the chief ministers of all
coastal states, directing them to ensure that the coastal zone up to 500 meters from the
high-tide line (HTL) was kept free from all development activities.50 However, due to
pressure from the tourism industry, the central government reduced the distance from 500
to 200 meters.51 Subsequently, in 1983, administrative guidelines were issued to regulate
the development of beaches.52 Finally, in 1991, the central government adopted the CRZ
1991 as a piece of subordinate or delegated legislation under the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986, and its rules, to accord special protection to coastal areas.53 As
50
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India, CEE Coordination Team, Report of the Public Consultation with Fisherfolks and Community
to Strengthen Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification, 1991 (Ministry of Environment &
Forests, 2010) at 7 [India, Report of the Public Consultation with Fisherfolks].
Shyam Divan & Armin Rozencranz, Environmental Law and Policy in India: Cases Materials and
Statutes, 2nd ed (India: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 477.
Ibid at 478.
Under the theory of separation of powers, law making is primarily the prerogative and function of
the legislature. However, due to the ever-increasing functions performed by the modern state, the
legislature was compelled to delegate a part of its law-making function to the executive. In such
situations, the assumption is that the legislature does not abdicate its essential function of law
making, but only authorizes a delegate to perform a subsidiary part of that function. Delegated
legislation may take different forms, such as ordinance, order, by-law, rule, regulation, notification,
etc., and under article 13 (3)(a) of the Constitution of India, they are all treated as law. As there is no
terminological consistency in the family of delegated legislation as employed in Indian
Administrative Law, terms like rules, regulations, etc., are used interchangeably. An essential
feature of delegated legislation is that there has to be publication or promulgation, which is generally
done through the official gazette. As well, it is one of the essential principles that a subordinate
legislation has to be in conformity with its parent statute. If this is not the case, then the subordinate
legislation will be struck down as being ultra vires of the parent Act. In other words, the subordinate
legislation is practically hemmed by the mandate of the parent statute. For a discussion, see Sukhdev
Singh v Bhagat Ram, (1975) [1975] AIR 1331 (SC India); BK Srinivasan v Karnataka, (1987)
[1987] AIR 1059 (SC India); see also NK Jayakumar, Administrative Law, 1st ed (New Delhi:
Prentice-Hall of India, 2005) at 14; see also SS Vishweshwaraiah, “Delegated Legislation” (Lecture
delivered at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore, 26 July 2004) [unpublished].
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (EPA, 1986) was enacted under entry 13, list I, of schedule
VII of article 253 of the Constitution of India in 1950. Its preamble clearly states that it was enacted
to implement the decisions taken at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
1972. The EPA, 1986 is a comprehensive piece of legislation that confers wide powers on the
federal government to make delegated legislation on any matter relating to environmental
protection. This law is so wide in scope and so broad in its delegation that it led to the development
of a new trend towards the centralization of India’s environmental law and of protecting the
different strands of the environment through delegated legislation rather than by enacting fullfledged statutes. For examples, see the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000; Ozone
Depleting Substances (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000; Municipal Solid Wastes (Management
and Handling) Rules, 2000; the Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and
Response) Rules, 1996; the Bio-Medical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1998; the
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will be subsequently seen, the nature of the law is a vital element in determining the
stability of a coastal law regime.54
The CRZ 1991 declared the coastal regulation zone (CRZ) to be that portion of
seas, bays, estuaries, creeks, rivers and backwaters influenced by tidal action in the
landward side up to 500 meters from the HTL and the land between the low-tide line
(LTL) and the HTL.55 The CRZ was divided into four categories: CRZ-I,56 CRZ-II,57
CRZ-III,58 and CRZ-IV59. To achieve an orderly conduct of development activities, each
CRZ category was designated for a different level of development based on a different set
of restrictions on the setting up and expansion of industries and on the conduct of
operations or processes within this zone. As a general regulatory measure, the CRZ 1991
prohibited thirteen activities (subject to exemptions) within the entire CRZ.60 In due
course, several amendments widened the scope of these exemptions, considerably
diluting the potency of the regulatory scheme.61 All coastal states and union territory
administrations were required to prepare CZM plans (CZMPs) that identified and

54
55
56

57
58

59
60

61

Batteries (Management and Handling) Rules, 2001; the Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling
and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2009 etc.
See Part 3.2.1.1.1, below, for more on this aspect.
The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991, supra note 49.
Ibid, annex I, ¶6(1). The CRZ-I consisted of “ecologically sensitive and important areas,” the area
between the LTL and the HTL and those that were likely to be inundated by SLR. It also included
areas that may be declared by the central government or by the authorities concerned at the state or
union territory level to fall under category I. Ibid.
The CRZ-II consisted of areas that were developed up to or close to the shoreline. Ibid.
Relatively undisturbed areas and those that did not fall under categories I or II were treated as CRZIII. This included coastal zones of rural areas, irrespective of the degree of development, and also
areas within municipal or other legally designated urban areas that were not substantially built up.
Ibid.
The coastal stretches of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the Lakshadweep Islands, and other
small islands that had not been designated either as CRZ-I, II or III, fell under the CRZ-IV. Ibid.
Some of the major proscriptions related to the prohibition on the setting up of new industries and
expansion of existing ones in the CRZ; the manufacture, handling, storage, or disposal of hazardous
substances; the discharge of untreated wastes and effluents; the dumping of city or town wastes, ash
or other wastes; land reclamation; the bunding or disturbing of the natural course of sea water; the
dressing or altering of sand dunes, hills, and natural features; and the mining of sand, rock and other
substrate materials. Since surface water resources are scarce in coastal areas, and given the high
density of the populations that depend on groundwater to meet their basic needs, protection of
groundwater aquifers is critical. Consequently, over and above the various groundwater laws of
coastal states, the CRZ 1991 imposed certain restrictions on groundwater usage. As a common rule,
it banned the harvesting or the withdrawal of groundwater and the construction of mechanisms for
this within 200 meters of the HTL. Ibid, ¶2.
For the text of various amendments, see Ministry of Environment & Forests, Legislations: Coastal
Regulation Zone, online: Ministry of Environment & Forests <http://www.moef.nic.in/leg
is/crz.htm> [MEF, Legislations].
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classified the CRZ areas.62 The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) was to
approve these CZMPs,63 and all development activities within the CRZ were to be carried
out within the framework of these plans.64

3.2.1.1.1 Evaluation of the CRZ, 1991
The CRZ 1991 was a unique attempt to bring under a single directive a comprehensive
framework for the effective regulation and management of the Indian coastline. It was
based on the fundamental principle that different coastal areas have diverse ecological
features and sensitivity and therefore require varying degrees of protection. The CRZ
1991 did not have a preamble; hence, it is difficult to decipher its underlying objectives.
Nonetheless, the CRZ 1991 was in certain ways far-reaching in its vision and scope, and
some of its provisions were designed to support a sustainable approach to coastal
development. This was evident from the proscriptions that it imposed on thirteen
activities, even though the rigor of these prohibitions was subsequently diluted.65
Furthermore, the classification of the coastal zone into the four categories with specified
limits on coastal development reinforced a sustainable approach to coastal management.
However, the major deficiency of this law was that it failed to adequately provide
for “integration” and for a “principled” approach to ocean and coastal space management.
The CRZ 1991 did very little to transcend the sectoral approach to management of coastal
areas and resources by imposing a more composite, integrative and sustainable
methodology. Some of these aspects are detailed below.
A significant omission in the CRZ design from an ICZM perspective is the absence
of a seaward side in the overall scheme for specialized and integrated coastal
management.66 This is a critical omission, because the health of coastal ecosystems
depends in large measure on the health of the oceans, and vice-versa.67 Managing coastal
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The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991, supra note 49, ibid ¶3(3)(i).
Ibid.
Ibid, ¶3(3)(ii).
Ibid, ¶2.
See generally The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991, supra note 49.
Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W Knecht, Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: Concepts and
Practices (Washington DC: Island Press, 1998) at 45 (identifying spatial integration i.e., integration
between the land and ocean sides of the coastal zone as a core feature of the ICZM process).
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lands without planning for the related seawater component renders the regime inchoate
and unsustainable in the long term.68
Furthermore, nothing in the CRZ 1991 facilitates participatory decision-making,
even though community involvement is an important facet of the ICZM process. 69 This
has had serious repercussions in the effective implementation of the law. For instance, in
identifying and classifying the different CRZ zones, there have been several instances of
wrong classification, which ultimately helped land developers and hoteliers circumvent
the law.70 This confusion could have been avoided had local communities, at least
through the constitutionally stipulated local self-government units,71 been involved in the
process of classification of the different zones. Moreover, greater public involvement also
could have improved the enforcement mechanism, because local communities have better
knowledge of the terrain and are more cognizant of violations.72 Even though the CRZ
1991 was amended nearly 25 times during its two-decade existence, not a single
amendment pertained to conferring significant roles on the local self-government
bodies.73
In its initial version, the CRZ 1991 prohibited thirteen activities in the CRZ with
minimal exemptions. Successive amendments diluted the original intent and increased the
scope of the exemptions, thereby virtually opening up the coast to a large range of
development activities. For instance, an amendment was effected in 2001 that permitted
land reclamation, bunding or disturbing the natural course of seawater “essential for
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Ibid.
Ibid at 129-34. For more on this topic, see also Ch 6, Part 6.3.
The legal battle over a factual dispute as to whether the disputed property fell within CRZ-I or CRZIII went to the Supreme Court for determination. Goa Foundation, Goa v Diksha Holdings Pvt Ltd,
(2001) [2001] 2 SCC 97 (India SC) [Diksha Holdings]; The Goa Foundation v The North Goa
Planning and Development Authority, (1995) [1995] AIR 342 (Bombay HC). The question here was
whether the hotel project was situated on the beach or on an estuarine environment; since the CZM
plan of the state had not been approved, the court relied on an interpretation provided by the
government to conclude that the project was in an estuarine environment. Ibid. Relying on the CZM
plan, it was held that the thermal power plant was situated well beyond the CRZ. Forum for
Sustainable Development, Hyderabad v India, (2010) [2010] 5 ALT 189 (Andhra Pradesh HC).
See generally Constitution of India 1950, parts IX, IX-A (empowering local self-government units).
The Goa Foundation, Represented by its Secretary v Goa, Through its Chief Secretary, (2000)
[2000] 4 Bom CR 709 (Bombay HC). The court concurred with a scheme developed by the state by
which various authorities were asked to carry out weekly patrols and fortnightly and monthly
inspections to detect violations of the CRZ 1991. Ibid.
See MEF, Legislations, supra note 61.
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activities permissible under the notification.”74 Even though reclamation for commercial
purposes was prohibited, the use of such broad language could have inadvertently opened
up more coastal spaces to unbridled development.
Perhaps the most important factor that led to near turmoil in the administration of
this coastal law in India was the ineffective and half-hearted enforcement of the truncated
CRZ 1991. Several amendments were made to legalise violations, which further
undermined the efficacy of this law and emboldened increased numbers of violations.
The CRZ 1991 was issued after copious and rigorous study; however, the ink was barely
dry when the tourism industry started demanding amendments. As it is a piece of
subordinate legislation, it is comparatively easy to effect amendments, which lie more or
less in the domain of the executive. This is one of the factors that facilitated the passage
of the 25 amendments. Moreover, only a few of these amendments were placed in the
public domain and consequently most of them were bereft of valuable and critical input.
Interestingly, a study notes that, up to July 2003, of the 19 amendments carried out, only
three were open for public comment.75 This points to something seriously amiss; the
strategy morphed into one of managing through notifications and subsequent revisions
rather than by a full-fledged statute that would have had the benefit of the collective
wisdom of the elected representatives of the people.
Moreover, the CRZ 1991 did not provide mechanisms for ensuring compliance. It
merely read, “The Ministry of Environment & Forests and the Government of state or
union territory and such other authorities at the State or Union Territory levels as may be
designated … shall be responsible for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions of
this Notification.”76 Coastal states and union territory administrations were required to
prepare, within one year, CZM plans identifying and classifying regulation zones, which
were then to be examined and subsequently approved by the MoEF. Since the CRZ 1991
came into force on February 19, 1991, the coastal states and union territories were to
prepare these plans by February 19, 1992. However, due to non-compliance with these
stipulations, in 1995 (specifically, April 3, 1995), the Supreme Court of India directed all
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For the text, see (N, SO 329(E), 2001, India) at 2, online: MoEF <http://www.moef.nic.in/le
gis/crz/so3 29(e).pdf>.
See generally Manju Menon, Sudarshan Rodriguez & Aarthi Sridhar, “Coastal Zone Management:
Better or Bitter Fare?” (2007) 42 Economic & Political Weekly 3840.
The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991, supra note 49, ¶4.
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coastal states and union territory administrations to frame CZMPs within a period of six
weeks. Despite these efforts to secure the implementation of the coastal law, states
continued with their recalcitrant attitude.
Indeed, non-compliance with the CRZ 1991 and earlier court orders formed the
subject of a challenge before the Supreme Court of India in Indian Council for Envirolegal Action v India.77 This decision was ‘path-breaking’ in several respects, because the
Supreme Court directed the central government to set up state coastal management
authorities for all coastal states and also to set up the national coastal management
authority. States were also directed to file complete CZMPs and the central government
was to finalise and approve these plans within three months of the judgment. In a hardhitting observation, the Supreme Court expressed its anguish over the continued nonobservation of the coastal law:
Enactment of a law, but tolerating its infringement, is worse
than not enacting a law at all … Violation of antipollution
laws not only adversely affects the existing quality of life
but the non-enforcement of the legal provisions often results
in ecological imbalance and degradation of environment, the
adverse effect of which will have to be borne by the future
generations.78
Persistent attempts by the executive to subvert the beneficence of the coastal law by not
implementing it in earnest left the court with no other choice but to step beyond its
traditional confines to prod the executive to discharge its constitutional obligations vis-àvis the coastal law. Still, the coastal law continued as if in ‘suspended animation’, as it
took considerable time for coastal states and union territory administrations to prepare
their CZMPs. Due to this delay, it became difficult to identify the specific zones where
activities were permitted, regulated, or prohibited, considerably hampering the efficient
working of the CRZ 1991.
Surprisingly, the CRZ 1991 did not provide for any administrative apparatus. It was
only consequent to the Supreme Court’s intervention in Indian Council for Enviro-legal
Action79 that the MoEF issued additional notifications under the Environment
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(1996), [1996] INDLAW 1074 (India SC) [Indian Council for Enviro-legal Action].
Ibid, ¶26.
See generally Indian Council for Enviro-legal Action, supra note 77.
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(Protection) Act, 1986 constituting a national CZM authority (NCZMA)80 and authorities
for the different coastal states81 and union territories.82 The three sets of CZMAs were
granted powers to take measures to protect and improve the quality of the coastal
environment and to prevent, abate, and control environmental pollution in the coastal
areas under their control.83
Even though these authorities were empowered to take punitive action against
violations, they were often selective, and generally actions were initiated only against
small-scale operators.84 One major reason for the overall shoddy enforcement of the law
is that the introduction of this coastal regulatory framework coincided with India’s
embrace of globalisation and the initiation of a series of economic reforms. In the new
scheme for economic development, coastal lands emerged as prized real estate and a
facilitator of the rise of a globally-competitive India. Accordingly, the CRZ 1991 was
diluted on one pretext or the other.
From an ICZM perspective, these institutional structures were inadequate and not
sufficiently geared to meet the challenges posed by ICZM. One of the major functions of
the state CZMA is to prepare ICZM plans.85 Neither the CRZ 1991 nor any other
notification that created the state and union territory CZMAs provided any guidance on
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Coastal Regulation Zone Notification for National Coastal Zone Management Authority (N SO991
(E) 1998, India); see also Reconstituting the National Coastal Zone Management Authority (N
SO302 (E) 2011) [NCZMA]. Specifically, the NCZMA was to: examine and give approval to areaspecific management plans; advise the central government; review violations; examine proposals to
modify the CZMPs and make recommendations to the central government; provide technical
assistance and guidance to state and union territory governments and to the state and union territory
CZMAs; and co-ordinate the actions of the state and union territory CZMAs. See NCZMA, ibid ¶¶
II-VIII.
For instance, see Orissa Coastal Zone Management Authority Order (O SO 1759(E) 2008, India)
[Orissa CZMAO]. For their part, the state and union territory CZMAs were to: identify ecologically
sensitive areas in the CRZ and formulate area-specific management plans for such areas; identify
economically important stretches in the CRZ area and prepare ICZM plans; examine all projects that
were proposed in the CRZ and give recommendations before the project proposals were referred to
the central government or to the agencies concerned for approval; identify coastal areas that were
highly vulnerable to erosion or degradation and formulate specific management plans; and examine
proposals for changes in the classification of CRZ areas and make recommendations to the
NCZMA. See ibid, ¶¶II-IX; Andaman and Nicobar Coastal Zone Management Authority Order (O
SO 2058 (E) 2008, India), ¶¶II-IX.
Andaman and Nicobar Coastal Zone Management Authority Order, ibid.
See supra notes 80-82.
India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Final Frontier, supra note 37 at 15-16.
For instance, see Orissa CZMAO, supra note 81, ¶VI.
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what these ICZM plans were to contain. In the absence of specific guidelines, it is
doubtful whether these ICZM plans truly furthered ICZM.
The CRZ 1991 was inadequate on several other counts as well. The law
incorporated very few specific adaptive strategies to meet the dangers that emanate from
the growing intensity of cyclonic storms, sea surges, and SLR, except perhaps the power
conferred on the authority concerned to determine areas that are likely to be inundated by
SLR and include them within Category I for protection.86 There were no provisions to
protect coastal farming communities and coastal agriculture, to promote capacitybuilding to offset the lack of adequate scientific data to support decision-making, or to
facilitate the use of technology-enabled (for instance, satellite-based) monitoring and
enforcement.
In spite of these loopholes, and despite the fact that there is no explicit recognition
of the doctrine of public trust or protection afforded to activities like fish-drying, boatparking on beaches, and net-mending and storage (all of which are integral to the
beneficial enjoyment of the right to livelihood of traditional fishing communities), the
CRZ 1991 had wide acceptance among fishermen.87 The law provided for construction or
reconstruction of dwelling units between 200-500 meters from the HTL in the CRZ-III as
long as it was within the ambit of traditional rights and customary use.88 The CRZ 1991
also provided that hoteliers and developers were to ensure that fencing their property did
not hamper public access to the beach and that a minimum distance of 20 meters was
provided between two hotels or beach resorts so that public access to the beach was not
restricted.89 These provisions endeared the law to the fisher community, as they found
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“Annexure – I Coastal Area Classification and Development Regulations” in Aarthi Sridhar, The
Coastal Regulation Zone Notification 1991, Consolidated Version Annexure 2 [Incorporating
Amendments Upto 24th July 2003], ¶6(1)(i), online: Common Cause, Environment, Laws and
Regulations,
Water
Pollution
<http://www.commoncause.in/environnent/TheCoastalR
egulationZoneNotification1991.PDF>.
India, Report of the Public Consultation with Fisherfolks, supra note 50 at 67.
“CRZ-III” in The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO114(E) 1991, India), Consolidated
Version Incorporating Amendments Upto 24th July 2003, (iii), online: ICSF <http://old.icsf.
net/icsf2006/uploads/resources/legalIndia/pdf/english/resource/1119443024107***CRZ
__Notifications_India.PDF>.
“Annexure-II: Guidelines for Development of Beach Resorts/Hotels in the Designated Areas of
CRZ-III for Temporary Occupation of Tourist/Visitors, with Prior Approval of the Ministry of
Environment & Forests” in The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO114(E) 1991, India),
Consolidated Version Incorporating Amendments Upto 24th July 2003, ¶7(1)(i)(ia), (ix), online:
ICSF
<http://old.icsf.net/icsf2006/uploads/resources/legalIndia/pdf/english/resource/1119443024
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themselves increasingly losing control over beachfronts. They also thought that the
regulatory strategy of 500 meters was uncomplicated and easy to understand.90

3.2.1.2 Sustainable Coastal Development and the Judicial Process
Protection under the CRZ 1991 has proven to be a fertile ground for judicial intervention
in India. Courts have been called upon to determine a range of issues, including the
validity of amendments to the CRZ 1991 Notification91 and the setting up of a naval
museum,92 a hospital,93 a sewage treatment plant,94 resorts,95 and sea link projects.96 In
addition, courts strove to protect several important coastal ecosystems such as
mangroves97 and wetlands98 (to protect fisheries)99 and control marine pollution.100 S
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107***CRZ __ Notifications_India.PDF>.
See India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Final Frontier, supra note 37 at 11.
Indian Council for Enviro-legal Action, supra note 77.
Visakha SPCA v India, (2000), [2000] 6 ALT 666 (Andhra Pradesh HC). The court directed the
CZMA to conduct an inspection of the proposed site which was visited by Olive Ridley sea turtles
before installing a decommissioned submarine and a naval ship to create a museum. Ibid.
Citizens Interest Agency v Lakeshore Hospital and Research Centre Pvt Ltd, (2003), [2003] 3 KLT
424 (Kerala HC). It was held that since the disputed canal was manmade and not tidal, the
construction of the hospital near this canal was not caught by the CRZ 1991. Ibid.
Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation v Gov’t of India, Ministry of Environment & Forests (16
August 2001), WP No 25687/98 of 2001 (Andhra Pradesh HC). It was held that the commissioning
of a sewerage treatment plant to treat about 25 million liters of effluents per day before it enters the
sea will help attain the objectives of the CRZ 1991. Ibid.
Diksha Holdings, supra note 70.
Rambhau Patil v Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (9 October 2001), WP No 348
of 2000 (Bombay HC) [Rambhau Patil] (upholding the construction of Worli-Bandra sea link).
The Bombay Environmental Action Group v Maharashtra (6 October 2005) WPs No 3246 of 2004
& No 1470 of 2003 & 2208 of 2004 (Bombay HC) (guidelines provided to prevent further
destruction of mangroves to ensure their conservation and rejuvenation in Maharashtra state);
Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v Bombay Environmental Action Group, (2011), [2011] 2 SCALE
133 (India SC) (directing the removal of a bund to restore the natural flow of seawater to the
mangroves); Ajit D Padiwal v India, (1998), [1998] AIR 1998 147 (Gujarat HC). The court failed to
take action against a delinquent company even when there was evidence to show that it had
committed substantial degradation of mangrove forests by manipulating records. Ibid.
For instance, see The Goa Foundation v The Konkan Railway Corporation, (1992), [1992] AIR 471
(Bombay HC) (upheld the construction of a railway line through the kazhan estuarine wetlands on
the ground that the destruction was trivial); People United for Better Living in Calcutta-Public v
West Bengal, (1993), [1993] AIR 215 (Calcutta HC) (restraining the state from reclaiming further
wetlands, but left open the possibility of an exemption); TN Godavarman Thirumalpad v India,
(2006) [2006] INDLAW SC 123 (India SC). The court upheld demolition of aquaculture tanks
constructed in the Kolleru wetland sanctuary as the bunds raised diminished the retention capacity of
the lake obstructing the free flow of water into the sea. Ibid.
For instance, see Kerala v Joseph Antony, (1994) [1994] AIR 721 (India SC). The court upheld a
government notification banning the use of purse seine, ring seine, pelagic and mid-water trawl gear
for fishing in the territorial waters to protect the livelihood of traditional fishermen and also to save
pelagic fish wealth from depletion. Ibid.
104

Jagannath v India,101 Goa Foundation v Diksha Holdings Pvt. Ltd.,102 Ramgopal Estates
Private Limited v Tamil Nadu103 clearly reveals certain trends. A clean and healthy coast
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Idols made of clay can be immersed only at designated disposal areas under the supervision of a
monitoring committee. See V Elangovan v The Home Secretary, Tamil Nadu (17 September 2004)
WP No 25586 of 2004 (Madras HC).
For centuries, coastal communities in India have practiced coastal aquaculture by following the
traditional rice/shrimp rotating system. As part of the blue revolution, a more intensive method of
shrimp culture, which enabled production of thousands of kilograms per hectare, was introduced in
the coastal regions. This posed severe environmental risks, leading to this public interest litigation in
the supreme court seeking enforcement of the CRZ 1991, which prohibited the setting up of new
industries and the expansion of existing ones, except those directly related to the waterfront or
directly needing foreshore facilities. Affirming the state’s obligation to control marine pollution and
to protect the coastal environment, the supreme court held that since the shrimp culture industry was
neither directly related to the waterfront nor did it need foreshore facilities, the establishment of
coastal shrimp farms in the CRZ areas was prohibited. Although the shrimp aquaculture industry
had the singular distinction of earning maximum foreign exchange for the country, the court
concluded that it caused considerable damage to local ecology and ordered the demolition and
removal of all aquaculture industries in the CRZ, except traditional and improved traditional ones.
In one stroke, this judgment threw nearly 300,000 aquaculture workers out of work and,
consequently, many review petitions were filed in the Supreme Court. S Jagannath v India, (1997)
[1997] 2 SCC 87 (India SC). In Gopi Aqua Farms v India, [1997] AIR 3519 (India SC), the
Supreme Court declined to entertain these review petitions. Thereafter, the central government
enacted the Coastal Aquaculture Authority Act, 2005, which legitimized intensive aquaculture. See
generally Coastal Aquaculture Authority, Compendium of Act, Rules, Guidelines and Notifications
(Chennai: Coastal Aquaculture Authority, Gov’t of India, 2006). Most coastal inhabitants feel that
this act promotes unsustainable and ecologically damaging activities (including over-extraction of
groundwater and widespread pollution) and that it should be repealed as soon as possible. India,
Report of the Public Consultation with Fisherfolks, supra note 50 at 3.
Diksha Holdings, supra note 70. This case rose from an appeal against the judgment of the Bombay
high court, which dismissed an objection to the construction of a hotel on a plot of land on the
grounds that it came within CRZ-I area due to the presence of sand dunes. In the impugned
judgment, the high court held that even though the hotel project was located in area that had sand
dunes and therefore could be classified as CRZ-I, if such a view were taken, no development could
ever take place along the entire Goan seacoast. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, the primary
issue was more factual. Emphasizing the importance of sustainable development, the court held that
it was imperative that there be a proper balance between the need to protect the environment and the
development process. Society was to prosper, but not at the cost of the environment, and similarly,
the environment was to be protected but not at the cost of development. In this case, since under the
Goa state CZMP approved by the MoEF, the whole of the area wherein the proposed hotel was to be
situated was classified as CRZ-I, the Supreme Court concurred with the high court and held the
construction valid. The court rejected the divergent opinion based on a report by the National
Institute of Oceanography and refused to remit the matter to the MoEF for reconsideration. Ibid.
Pulicat Lake is one of the major Ramsar sites protected under Indian law. Following the
establishment of a thermal power plant and a satellite port, the ecosystem of the area was under
considerable stress. Ignoring these problems, the government decided to set up a petrochemical park
on an island situated close to the lake and to a bird sanctuary. This decision was impugned on the
ground that these projects were in violation of article 207 of the LOSC. Furthermore, it was claimed
that the project violated the CRZ 1991 and would affect the coastal ecology, marine life, and
biodiversity of the area. Based on an environment impact evaluation report, the government brushed
aside these concerns since the total loss would only be marginal. Faced with such conflicting
arguments, the Madras high court directed the petitioners to approach the appropriate authorities
under the EP Act, 1986 for directions to curb the environmental hazards caused by existing projects.
As far the permission for the petrochemical park was concerned, the court adopted a pro105

is essential if the right to live in a clean and healthy environment is to be enjoyed. It was
to protect this interest that the Supreme Court in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action
directed the executive to implement the CRZ 1991 in earnest. The desire to defend this
interest and to ensure sustainable development was taken a step further by the court in
Jagannath, which directed the removal of intensive and semi-intensive aquaculture
farms.
However, the beneficence of this judgment was negated by the other two branches
of government by enacting the Coastal Aquaculture Authority Act 2005,104 which likely
had a cathartic effect on the judiciary.105 Since 2005, in seeking to balance environmental
protection with development in the coastal law context, the judicial balance seems to
have tilted in favor of development. This is evident from the judicial approach in both
Goa Foundation and in Ramgopal Estates where despite a serious discrepancy in the
CZMP106 and grave concerns expressed over the setting up of a petrochemical park in an
already degraded part of the coastal zone,107 respectively, the courts108 brushed aside
these concerns to favor the development projects. This pro-development line of reasoning
in interpreting the coastal law ignored genuine environmental considerations and is
evident in several other cases as well.109 The repeated amendments that have rendered the
CRZ 1991 inconsistent and nugatory have also not served the judicial process well. In
sum, the judiciary in large part failed in its attempt to integrate the two seemingly
competing values of development and environmental protection at least in the coastal law
context.
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development line of reasoning and held that the objection “is opposed to the concept of sustainable
development as well as to the progress and prosperity of the nation”, thereby upholding the project.
(2007), [2007] INDLAW 964 (Madras HC).
(No 24 of 2005, India).
See generally The Coastal Aquaculture Authority Bill 2004 (No LIV of 2004, India), statement of
objects and reasons, online: ICSF <http://old.icsf.net/icsf2006/uploads/resources/legalIndia/pdf
/english/central/1115268683972***Coastal_Aquaculture_Authority_Bill,_2004.PDF>.
Diksha Holdings, supra note 70.
M/S Ramgopal Estates Pvt Ltd v Tamil Nadu (2 March 2007), WP (Madras HC), online: Indian
Kanoon <http://indiankanoon.in/doc/985034/>.
It was the Supreme Court of India that decided Goa Foundation and the Madras High Court that
decided Ramgopal Estates.
For instance, see Rambhau Patil, supra note 96 (upholding the Worli-Bandra sea link project, as
there was substantial compliance with the law even though there was no technical compliance with
procedure).
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3.2.1.3 The Draft Coastal Management Zone Notification, 2008
In 2004, to bring in a degree of coherence and consistency to the coastal law regime, the
central government undertook a comprehensive review of the CRZ 1991.110 The core
recommendation of the review committee was to move the 1991 coastal law away from
the regulatory model and ground it in ICZM. 111 In this light, and in the wake of the 2004
tsunami, the central government decided to notify the draft Coastal Management Zone
Notification, 2008 (CMZ 2008) for the whole country.112 The CMZ 2008 sought to
introduce certain well-established scientific principles of CZM into Indian coastal law
semantics, namely, “integrated coastal zone management,”113 “integrated coastal zone
management plan” (ICZMP),114 and “setback line.”115 In a marked departure from the
CRZ 1991, where the emphasis was on management through regulation, the focus of the
CMZ 2008 shifted to management through planning. This change was reflected in several
key provisions. For instance, the definition of the term ‘coastal zone’ was broadened to
include an aquatic area, in addition to the land component, practically giving effect to the
concept of spatial integration.116
While the CMZ 2008 was indicative of the new thinking on CZM, this law was
severely lampooned by civil society for being the end of the road for coastal protection
and yet another instance of the MoEF yielding to pressure from the pro-development
lobby.117 This draft notification was no improvement over the CRZ 1991. Rather, some
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India, Report of the Committee Chaired by Prof. M.S. Swaminathan, supra note 23.
Ibid at 92, ch 4 (entitled, “Suggestions of the Committee for Integrated Coastal Zone
Management”).
Like the CRZ, 1991, the CMZ, 2008 was also envisaged as a piece of delegated legislation to be
promulgated under the Environment Protection Act, 1986. The CMZ, 2008 was also to have
application throughout the country.
Defined to mean “a process by which decisions are made for protection of coastal population and
infrastructure, protection and conservation of coastal and marine areas and resources and sustainable
development.” Coastal Management Zone Notification 2008 (SO 1761 (E)/ 2008, India) n 3(b).
It is “the land use plan or development plan prepared for implementation of Integrated Coastal Zone
Management.” Ibid, cl 3(c).
It is “a line demarcated along the coast, based on its vulnerability to sea level rise, flooding and
shore line changes as per Guidelines given in this notification in Appendix –I.” Ibid, cl 3(4).
Ibid, cl 3(a). The aquatic area extended to territorial waters limit (12 nautical miles measured from
the appropriate baseline) and the seabed.
Menon, Rodriguez & Sridhar, supra note 75. For one, the preamble was modified at the last minute
to permit new green field airports and the modernization and expansion of existing coastal airports
requiring the clearance of mangroves and wetlands, subject to the usual standard qualifying clause
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suggested, it had diluted the regulatory requirements of the earlier law and opened up
more pristine territory to intensive development (which may not be always sustainable).
The fishing community and eight coastal states strongly opposed this notification.
Consequently, in 2009, the MoEF constituted yet another committee to determine future
steps concerning the CMZ 2008. The committee unanimously recommended that the
central government allow the CMZ 2008 to lapse and that the CRZ 1991, with suitable
amendments, be kept as the basic framework for coastal management.118

3.2.1.4 Re-engineering the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991: The
Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 2011
The CRZ 2011 was introduced to fundamentally re-cast India’s coastal law and supersede
the CRZ 1991. It seeks to ensure livelihood security for fishers and local coastal
communities, promote conservation and protection of the coastal environment and marine
areas, and promote sustainable development based on scientific principles, taking into
account natural hazards and SLR.119 The legal architecture of the CRZ 2011 draws
heavily on the framework provided by the CRZ 1991. Its regulatory design operates as
follows: first, it defines the area of its jurisdiction (namely, the CRZ) and provides for its
classification; second, it enumerates certain general prohibitions on development
activities in the CRZ (subject to exceptions); third, it regulates permissible activities in
the CRZ; fourth, specific norms for development and construction activities in the
different categories of the CRZ are provided; and finally, it explains its methodologies.
Under the CRZ 2011, the CRZ now includes not only the land area from the HTL to
500 meters on to the landward side along the seafront and the intertidal zone, but it also
includes the land area between the ‘hazard line’ and 500 meters from the HTL on the
landward side of seafronts.120 Additionally, the rules provide for new elements in the
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“without compromising environmental considerations”. Aarthi Sridhar et al, Coastal Management
Zone Notification ’08: The Last Nail in the Coffin: A Final Critique (Bangalore: ATREE, 2008) at 4.
India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Final Frontier, supra note 37 at 3.
Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO19(E), 2011, India) pmbl [CRZN, 2011].
Ibid, ¶¶(i), (iii), (iv).
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CRZ,121 of which the most important is the water area and its corresponding seabed
between the LTL up to the territorial water limit of twelve nautical miles. 122 The hazard
line emerges as an important SLR management tool introduced in the CRZ 2011. The line
is mapped by the MoEF through the Survey of India along the coastline of the country
based on tides, waves, SLR, and shoreline changes. 123 The hazard line determines the
type of development that can take place both seaward and landward.124 However,
dwelling units, including those of the fishers, will not be relocated even if they are located
on the seaward side of the hazard line.125 In such cases, the state government has to
provide these dwelling units with necessary safeguards from natural disasters.126
To conserve and protect coastal areas and marine waters, the CRZ area has been reclassified into five categories: CRZ-I,127 CRZ-II,128 CRZ-III,129 CRZ-IV,130 and CRZV.131 As in the CRZ 1991, the CRZ 2011 also provides for a general prohibitory scheme
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In tidal water bodies, the CRZ includes the land area between the HTL and 100 meters or the width
of the creek, whichever is less, onto the landward side and also the land area between the hazard line
and 100 meters. Ibid, ¶¶(ii)-(iii). In tidal water bodies, the water and bed area between the LTL at
the bank to the LTL on the opposite side of the bank also fall under the CRZ. Ibid, ¶7(i)A(a)-(k).
Ibid, ¶(v).
Ibid, ¶5(iii).
Ibid, annex-I, D II 7-8. No development activities other than those listed (e.g., fishing villages,
fishing jetties, ice plants, and fish drying platforms) are permitted between the hazard line and 500
or 100 meters, or the width of the creek to the landward side. Ibid.
Ibid, annex-I, D II 8.
Ibid.
The CRZ-I includes ecologically sensitive areas whose geomorphological features play an important
role in maintaining coastal integrity. In addition, the CRZ-I includes the area between the LTL and
the HTL. Ibid, ¶7(i)B.
Areas developed up to or close to the shoreline fall under CRZ-II. Ibid, ¶7(ii).
Relatively undisturbed areas and those that are not category I or II are considered as CRZ-III. While
coastal zones in rural areas, irrespective of the degree of development, are classified as CRZ-III,
areas within municipal limits or legally designated urban areas are treated as CRZ-III, provided they
are not substantially built up. Ibid, ¶7(iii).
In the CRZ 1991, the CRZ-IV comprised certain coastal stretches in the Andaman and Nicobar, the
Lakshadweep and other islands. The CRZ 2011 excludes these island territories from its regulatory
scope; they are instead subject to an independent legal framework, the Island Protection Zone
Notification. See (N, SO20(E), 2011, India) [Island Protection Notification]. The CRZ-IV now
includes the water area from the LTL to twelve nautical miles on the seaward side and the water area
of tidal water bodies from the mouth of the water body at the sea up to the point where the tidal
influence ceases to exist. CRZN, 2011, supra note 119, ¶7(iv).
Application of a straitjacket legal formulation throughout the country without considering the
peculiar features of coastal ecosystems was bound to unleash implementation issues. This was one of
the reasons that led to amendments to the CRZ 1991, because this notification was perceived by
most coastal states as being too rigid and not accommodative of their specific concerns. The CRZ
2011 seeks to assuage these apprehensions by introducing a new category, namely the CRZ-V,
“areas requiring special consideration.” The CRZ-V is subdivided into sub-category “A” (CRZ areas
falling within municipal limits of Greater Mumbai, Kerala including the backwaters and backwater
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subject to wide exemptions.132 Furthermore, the regulatory scheme of the CRZ 2011 also
provides specific rules regulating development and construction activities in the different
categories (for Mumbai and Navi Mumbai,133 for the coastal states of Kerala,134 Goa,135
and critically vulnerable coastal areas (CVCAs)136) administered by the CZMA
concerned.
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islands, and Goa) and sub-category “B”, ‘critically vulnerable coastal areas’ (CVCAs), which
include the Sunderbans and other identified ecologically sensitive areas. Ibid, ¶7(v).
Ibid, ¶3.
The CRZ 2011 envisages a new development plan for their CRZ areas in Mumbai and Navi
Mumbai, both areas that are vulnerable to SLR. In the CRZ-I areas, roads can be constructed on
stilts without affecting the free flow of tidal water. If mangroves are destroyed, a reforestation
process is prescribed. Mangrove areas should be mapped and notified as protected forest, and solid
waste disposal sites relocated outside the CRZ. Ibid, ¶8V1(i)A, B. Specific regulations are put in
place concerning redevelopment in CRZ-II areas. Ibid, ¶8V1(iii)(b)2. To preserve and protect the
green lung, all open spaces, parks, and playgrounds, even if they are CRZ-II areas, are treated as
NDZs as under the CRZ-III. Ibid, ¶8V1(iii)(e). Fishing settlement areas are treated as CRZ-III areas.
Ibid, ¶8V1(iii)(g).
The high population density in coastal areas of the state of Kerala posed implementation difficulties
for the CRZ 1991. In Parthan v Nayarambalam Grama Panchayath, (2006) [2006] 3 KLT 734
(Kerala HC), the high court directed the Kerala state CZMA to inquire about the possibility of
amending the CZMP and if necessary forwarding it to the Government of India for necessary action.
This decision might have influenced the drafters of the CRZ 2011, which includes new rules for the
backwater islands of Kerala. The CRZ area for the backwater islands was reduced to 50 meters from
the HTL on the landward side. Within this 50 meter zone, no new construction is permitted except
repairs or reconstructions of existing dwelling units of local communities. However, traditional
foreshore facilities and activities related to fishing are permitted within 0-50 meters. Beyond 50
meters, construction of dwelling units of local communities is possible with permission from the
local authority. CRZN, 2011, supra note 119, ¶8V 2(ii)-(v).
Implementation of the CRZ 1991 was always problematic in the state of Goa due to the immense
potential for coastal tourism and the overwhelming dependence of coastal populations on fishing.
Analysis of satellite data of Goa’s coastal area revealed 4,553 structures in violation of the CRZ
1991 within the 200-500 meter zone. A further 2,272 illegal structures were built in the restricted
zone of 100 meters along rivers with tidal influence. India, Ministry of Environment & Forests,
Final Frontier, supra note 37 at 16. Rather than taking action to evict these encroachers, the state
government approached the union government for a one-time exemption for these structures. Since
then, there have been demands to tailor the coastal law to the specific circumstances of Goa. The
CRZ 2011 requires the Goa government to notify fishing villages that require foreshore facilities for
fishing and fishery-related activities. Reconstruction and repair of structures belonging to local
communities is permissible in the CRZ, as is construction of customary temporary and seasonal
structures. To protect coastal biodiversity, development activities are prohibited in the kazhan lands
(which are basically saline floodplains along tidal estuaries in the state of Goa reclaimed over the
centuries by constructing an intricate system of dykes and sluice gates), sand dune areas, and
beaches designated as turtle nesting sites. All of these areas are to be surveyed and management
plans prepared for their protection. CRZN, 2011, ibid, ¶8V 3(i)-(vii).
The entire Sunderbans and certain other identified ecologically important areas are designated as
CVCAs. The management process in such areas is to involve local fishers and communities. The
CRZ 2011 envisages the development of an integrated management plan (IMP) that considers the
need to conserve and manage mangroves, the needs of local communities, and the impact of SLR
and other natural disasters. The IMPs are prepared in accordance with the same procedures as
CZMPs. Ibid, ¶8V 4(a)-(d).
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A serious lacuna in the CRZ 1991 is that it did not subject permissible activities to
any clearance procedure. This regulatory oversight has been overcome in the CRZ
2011.137 Another interesting feature of the CRZ 2011 is that it incorporates a postclearance monitoring mechanism.138 It is mandatory for the project management to
submit biannual compliance reports to the regulatory authority concerned, which are
displayed on its Web site.139
As mentioned previously, the CRZ 1991 did not provide for any enforcement
mechanism, yet another oversight that encouraged rampant violations. To ensure effective
implementation and enforcement of the coastal law, the CRZ 2011 vests responsibility for
monitoring and enforcement in the state and union territory CZMAs.140 To assist in this
task, the state government and union territory administrations can establish district level
committees consisting of at least three representatives from local traditional coastal
communities, including fishers.141 To strengthen good coastal governance, the coastal law
seeks to secure transparency in the working of the CZMAs, and accordingly they are
required to maintain a dedicated web site where all relevant documents are to be
posted.142
The most important management tool in the CRZ 2011 is the CZMP. It is to be
prepared by the state government or union territory administration within 24 months from
the date of the notification by engaging scientific institutions like the National Institute
for Sustainable Coastal Zone Management.143 Moreover, it should be prepared in
consultation with concerned stakeholders, including through public hearings, 144 and the
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After examining certain documents like the rapid EIA report, comprehensive EIA, disaster
management report and risk assessment report and management plan, in accordance with the CZMP
and the CRZ notification, the CZMA makes recommendations to the state environmental impact
assessment authority and, in certain cases, to the MoEF. Once a clearance is granted, it is valid for
five years. Ibid, ¶4.2(i). It is now provided that project proponents should submit the proposal
together with certain documents and reports to the state or union territory CZMA concerned. Certain
permissible activities like the laying of pipelines, conveyancing systems and transmission lines,
mining of rare minerals, and exploration and extraction of oil and natural gas require clearance from
the MoEF. Ibid, ¶4.2(ii), (iv).
Ibid, ¶4.2(v).
Ibid.
Ibid, ¶6(c).
Ibid.
Ibid, ¶4.2(vi). This includes the agenda, minutes, decisions and actions taken, violations, relevant
judicial orders, the approved CZMPs, and so on are posted.
Ibid, ¶5(2), (6).
Ibid, annexure I, part IV.
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draft submitted to the relevant CZMA for review.145 The CZMA incorporates suggestions
and objections received from stakeholders in the draft plan, which, together with
recommendations, are to be submitted to the MoEF for approval.146
The CZMP is the blueprint within which all development activities in the CRZ are
implemented. It demarcates the HTL, the LTL, and the hazard line.147 It also classifies
coastal zones and buffer zones in mangrove areas and identifies tidal influenced water
bodies, fishing villages and common property infrastructure in fishing communities. As
well, it demarcates the water areas of CRZ-IV and the fishing zones and fish breeding
areas, indicating pollution levels and facilities for rescue and natural disaster relief
operations.148 Once approved, the CZMP is posted online.149 The CZMP is not a static
document and can be revised every five years.150

3.2.1.5 The CRZ, 2011: An ICZM-friendly Law and an Adaptive Tool to
Manage SLR?
The CRZ 1991 was the first coastal law in India. While far from ideal, it did nevertheless
serve as an important step in introducing a regulatory framework for coastal zones in that
country. The primary weakness of the law was that it did little to transcend the purely
sectoral approach to CZM. Its implementation was also abysmal, and the numerous
amendments to the original notification diluted the regulatory requirements and opened
up coastal zones to further development. The 2008 attempt to replace the CRZ 1991 with
a new ICZM framework also came to naught, since it favoured development over
environmental and community considerations. It was in this context that India notified the
CRZ 2011. Introduced after a series of consultations with the fishing community and
other stakeholders like non-governmental organisation working in the field, India’s new
coastal law has several features that are relevant from an ICZM perspective. The question
then is: do these new features produce an ICZM-friendly legal framework? Given that
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Ibid, ¶5(vii).
Ibid, ¶5(viii), (ix).
See generally ibid, ¶5; ibid, annexure I.
Ibid, annexure I.
Ibid, annexure I, IV(c). It is to be posted on the web site of the MoEF and relevant state and union
territory CZMAs.
Ibid, ¶5(xi).
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SLR poses a grave threat to the Indian coastline, it is also necessary to examine whether
the coastal law facilitates adaptation to SLR. These aspects are considered below.
Based primarily on the regulatory scheme of the CRZ 1991, the CRZ 2011 retains
the general prohibitions applicable to certain activities (which could detrimentally affect
coastal ecosystems) in the CRZ area, subject to exemptions that have been carved out
over the years. These prohibitions include no new construction in the CRZ-I, on the
seaward side of the CRZ-II or in the NDZ of the CRZ-III. In addition, the CRZ 2011
preserves the CRZ 1991 features concerning the need to obtain environmental clearance
from the MoEF, guidelines on setting up tourist resorts, and preservation of access
rights.151
As far as the novel features of the CRZ 2011 are concerned, it spells out a
procedure for clearance for activities that can be carried out in the CRZ, subject to
specific time frames.152 Furthermore, it provides for post-clearance monitoring, requires
submission of biannual compliance reports by project proponents, use of scientific inputs,
and includes provisions that enhance transparency.153 For the first time, district-level
committees with local representation assist CZM authorities in the implementation of the
coastal law. Provisions for public hearings during the preparation of CZMPs enhance
stakeholder participation in the CZM regime.154 At the same time, the CRZ 2011 avoids
some of the controversial provisions of the CRZ 1991, such as an exception that
permitted setting up service industries in the CRZ of special economic zones, which
threatened the rights of fishermen.155 The CRZ 2011 also fundamentally re-casts the CRZ
classification system and restricts its application to mainland India. A new legal regime
has been put in place for the management of the marine islands.156
Despite the experience gathered from administering the CRZ 1991 for over two
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See ibid, annexure III (entitled, “Guidelines for development of beach resorts or hotels in the
designated areas of CRZ-III and CRZ-II for occupation of tourist or visitors with prior approval of
the Ministry of Environment and Forests”).
For instance, the notification points out that authorities are to implement schemes for phasing out
the discharge of untreated wastes and effluents within a time period not exceeding two years from.
Ibid, ¶3(vi).
For details on post clearance monitoring, see ibid, ¶4.2(v).
Ibid, annexure I, IV (public views on the CZMP).
Site Visit to M/s Mundra Port & SEZ Limited Port Site at Mundra and M/s OPG Power Gujarat
Private Limited on 6th-7th December 2010’, online: MoEF <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/publicinformation/site-visit-Mundra-OPG.pdf>.
Island Protection Notification, supra note 130.
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decades, there are nonetheless serious discrepancies in the CRZ 2011 that can undermine
its successful operation in the long-run. Unfortunately, rather than enacting a full-fledged
CZM legislation, the MoEF once again has persisted with the strategy of managing
sensitive coastal ecosystems through a notification (subordinate legislation), thereby
retaining wide executive powers to amend the coastal law. In doing so, it seems that the
MoEF has re-sown the seeds of confusion that have characterised the administration of
the CRZ regime for the past 20 years. A dedicated statute on CZM would have gone a
long way to ending the ad hoc approach that has characterised the Indian CZM regime.157
Notwithstanding the fact that a subordinate legislation has limited legal remit,
another shortcoming of the CRZ 2011 is that it does little to further a principled approach
to coastal and oceans management. The law does state the need to ensure livelihood
security and to promote sustainable development, and in certain provisions it reflects the
precautionary principle. However, there is no mention of other principles that advance
sustainable development and management of coastal areas and resources, like the polluter
pays or the inter-generational equity.
The CRZ 2011 breaks new ground with its provisions to control marine pollution in
the coastal zone.158 Previously, India had no comprehensive regime to control this type of
pollution. Although the responsibility to work with these provisions lies with CZM
authorities, past experience shows that monitoring and enforcement of rules relating to
the landward component of the CRZ was a difficult task for CZM authorities. It is
doubtful whether they have adequate capacity and infrastructure to monitor
implementation of the new rules in relation to the seaward component of the CRZ.
157

158

A dedicated coastal statute offers both upsides and downsides. As far as the upsides are concerned,
it ensures consistency in practice. Since legislative time and resources are limited, amending a
dedicated statute is difficult. A statute can be amended only by the concerned legislature, which
passed the law, and, it cannot be amended every now and then. At the same time, subordinate
legislation can amended easily as the power to do so lies solely within the executive domain. The
Union Ministry of Environment and Forests in India has utilised this power to amend Coastal
Regulation Zone Notification, 1991 every now and then and as the discussion points out, these
amendments were carried out only to dilute the beneficence of the law. The coastal environment is
dynamic and SLR brings up new challenges, which the lawmakers would not have anticipated. This
does not mean that the law needs to be amended frequently to reflect these changes. Rather, while
the law and its substantive fundamentals remains more or less constant, being based on a principled
approach, changes that are more or less managerial or procedural are to be carried out to the ICZM
plan. As will be seen in the subsequent sections of this study, a coastal law should be on firm
grounding, to bring in consistency in practice, while changes to respond to new realities are to be
reflected in the ICZM plan. It should not be the other way round.
CRZN, 2011, supra note 119, ¶(IV)(a).
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While the CRZ 2011 has omitted the controversial provisions relating to special
economic zones in the CRZ 1991,159 it retains several contentious ones and fails to
address certain critical issues, as did its predecessor. Accordingly, it continues to permit
roads on stilts or pillars, even in CRZ-I areas, i.e., ecologically sensitive areas, like
mangroves, coral reefs, sand dunes, and nesting grounds of birds.160 This permission was
granted despite strong apprehensions expressed by the fishing community that such
provisions would be subjected to abuse.161
The Indian economy is one of the fastest growing in the world and nuclear energy
is emerging as a crucial component in its energy mix. The country has six nuclear power
plants at different stages of construction in addition to the 20 currently in service. 162 Due
to the easy availability of water, coastal regions are a preferred location for nuclear power
plants, leading to contamination of the coastal and marine environment.163 Against the
backdrop of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan that caused serious damage and
leakage of radiation from the Fukushima nuclear power plant, questions are being raised
in India about the safety of its nuclear power plants in coastal regions. Of particular
concern are the Koodankulam nuclear reactor164 and the Jaitapur nuclear power station (a
European pressurized reactor) in Maharashtra.165 When commissioned, the Jaitapur plant
will be one of the largest nuclear power-generating stations in the world.166 Interestingly,
both the CRZ 1991 and CRZ 2011 exclude Atomic Energy Department projects from the
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For the text of the relevant notification, see (N SO470 (E) 2002, India).
CRZN, 2011, supra note 119, ¶3(iv)(a).
Staff Reporter, “Elevated Expressway Opposed” The Hindu [of India] (1 August 2010), online: The
Hindu <http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Chennai/article544745.ece>.
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, online: NPCIL <http://www.npcil.nic.in/>.
Tony George Puthucherril, “Harnessing the Atom: Strengthening the Regulatory Board for Nuclear
Safety in India Based on the Canadian Experience” (2008) 26 J Energy & Nat’l Res L 553
(HeinOnline).
G Sundarrajan v India (31 August 2012) WP No24770 of 2011 (Madras HC) (clearing the decks for
the commissioning of Units I and II of the Kudankulam nuclear power project); see also G
Sundarrajan v India (6 May 2013) CA No 4440 of 2013 (SC India) (upholding the Madras High
Court decision granting clearance to the project) [Sundarrajan, 2013].
“Debate: Time to Review Jaitapur?-1”, The Times of India, Video (19 April 2011), online: The
Times
of
India
<http://www.timesnow.tv/Debate-Time-to-review-Jaitapur1/videoshow/436
7863.cms>.
Ketki Angre & Prachi Jawadekar Wagh, “Villagers Protest against Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant”
NDTV (28 December 2010) online: NDTV <http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/villagers-protestagainst-jaitapur-nuclear-power-plant-75503>.
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ambit of their regulatory requirements.167 This could have serious consequences, as it was
revealed that the environmental clearance for the Jaitapur nuclear power station did not
provide for the effects of a tsunami.168 With Fukushima as a recent example, this lack of
provision is a serious lapse for a nuclear reactor that is to be situated on the coast.169
With reference to the concept of ICZM, the centerpiece of the integration provisions
in the CRZ 2011 is the inclusion of territorial waters and the water area of tidal water
bodies within its jurisdictional ambit. In operationalizing this jurisdiction over the water
space component of the coastal zone, the intent is to control the discharges of effluent,
waste and pollution from a wide range of community and industrial activities. This law
clearly provides for spatial integration. Furthermore, the CRZ 2011 adds a fifth category
to the CRZ – CVCAs – to strengthen the ICZM process.170 The designation and
management of CVCAs will involve fishermen and local communities in the development
of integrated management plans.171 Enhanced stakeholder participation in the
implementation of ICZM in India is an important step forward.
Despite providing for spatial integration and the preparation of integrated
management plans for CVCAs, the CRZ 2011 does not advance the concept of
integration of the coastal management legal regime far enough. For instance, as pointed
out earlier, a plethora of laws are relevant to CZM, including those applicable to
fisheries,

water

pollution,

forest

management,

coastal

aquaculture,

planning,

environmental impact assessment, and disaster management.172 The CRZ 2011 does
nothing to integrate this vast body of laws or their prescriptions,173 nor does it ensure co167
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The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991, supra note 49, ¶2(i)(b); CRZN, 2011, supra note
119, ¶3(i)(b); see also Sundarrajan, 2013, supra note 164, ¶¶130-32 (turning down the argument
that as a project of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited and not of the Department of
Atomic Energy, the Koodankulam nuclear power plant, located within 500 metres of HTL was a
prohibited activity under CRZ notification 1991).
Bahar Dutt, “Tsunami not Factored into Jaitapur N-plant” IBNLive (15 September 2011), Video,
online: IBNLive <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/tsunami-not-factored-into-jaitapur-nplant/1461463.html>; see CRZN, 2011, ibid, annexure-IV.
Staff Reporter, “Elevation Reduces Chances of Tsunami at Jaitapur: Kakodkar” The Hindu [of
India] (15 March 2011), online: The Hindu <http://www.hindu.com/2011/03/15/stories
/2011031562621400.h tm>.
CRZN, 2011, supra note 119, ¶7(v)B.
Ibid at 16, ¶4(a)-(e).
For instance, see The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Forest (Conservation)
Act, 1980; Coastal Aquaculture Authority Act, 2005 and National Disaster Management Act, 2005.
One of the more practical ways to ensure legal integration between the different statutes is to
provide rules to resolve conflicts between the different legislative prescriptions. For instance, see
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operation and co-ordination of activities between the different ministries (at both the
federal and provincial levels), statutory authorities, and administrative agencies with
responsibilities in the coastal zone.174 This is a significant lapse, given that the CRZ 2011
extends jurisdiction over territorial waters as well. Interestingly, the Government of India
has initiated an ICZM project at both the national and state levels with financial
assistance from the World Bank.175 The primary activities under the national component
involve mapping the hazard line and ecologically sensitive areas, establishing a national
centre for sustainable CZM, and building to capacity.176 In the states, the project seeks to
implement ICZM in Orissa (covering the coastal stretches of Paradeep to Dhamra and
Gopalpur to Chilka),177 Gujarat (Gulf of Kutch),178 and West Bengal (for DighaShankarpur and Sagar Island, the Sunderbans).179 On closer examination, it can be seen

174

175
176

177

178

179

Section 6(1) ensures overriding effect to the provisions of the National Environmental Management:
Integrated Coastal Management Act, 2008, (South Africa) in the event of a conflict between this law
and any other legislation in relation to coastal management.
An important feature of the now aborted CMZ, 2008 is that it provides for the constitution of a
National Board for Sustainable Coastal Zone Management, a large body consisting of not more than
32 members with mandate to provide advice to the Central Government on coastal zone
management matters. The Union Minister for Environment and Forests chairs this body while the
Union Minister in-charge of the Ministry of Earth Sciences acts as the co-chair. The body also
consists of experts (from diverse fields like coastal ecosystems, marine biology, maritime law,
meteorology, disaster management, and environmental economics), representatives from the
National Commission for Women, Ministry of Urban Development, Ministry of Panchayati Raj,
representatives from fishers (1 male and 1 woman), aquaculture, tourism, mining, and ports,
representatives of coastal Rural District Panchayats and coastal Urban Local Authorities, etc. Even
though this body performs advisory functions, and cannot undertake regulatory tasks, it is an
important measure that can facilitate greater co-ordination between the different stakeholders.
India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Press Brief, “India, World Bank sign two loan
agreements for Coastal Zone Management and Remediation of Polluted Sites” (22 July 2010).
The Society of Integrated Coastal Management comprises experts from coastal science and
management and is the nodal agency to implement this project. Society of Integrated Coastal
Management, Implementation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project (New Delhi:
SICOM, [nd]), online: MoEF <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/publicinformation/SICOM%
20Brochure.pdf> [SICOM, Implementation of ICZMP].
Major activities include constitution of a state project management unit, ICZM plan preparation,
construction of embankments, construction of multi-purpose cyclone shelters, establishment of solid
waste landfill, mangrove plantation and protection of wetlands, ecotourism, conservation of
archaeological and cultural assets, capacity building, etc. Ibid; see also Integrated Coastal
Management Society of Odisha, online: ICZMP <http://www.iczmpodisha.org/>.
Major activities include constitution of a state project management unit, ICZM plan preparation,
socio-economic development of villages, mangrove restoration, coral transplantation, underground
sewage system, ecotourism, livelihood improvement, marine oceanarium, marine national park, etc.
SICOM, Implementation of ICZMP, supra note 176; see also Gujarat State Project Management
Unit, online: GECICZMP <http://www.geciczmp.com/>.
Major activities include constitution of a state project management unit, ICZM plan preparation,
ecotourism, 100 per cent household electrification in Sagar, beach cleaning and beautification,
drainage system, construction of cyclone shelter facilities in Sunderban, livelihood improvement and
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that many of the project areas are CVCAs identified under the CRZ 2011. 180 Thus, India
has adopted a cautious approach in implementing ICZM, restricting its current efforts to
this narrow category, which, in due course, may be extended, to other coastal states and
union territories.181 Here, it seems, the emphasis has shifted to developing adequate
capacity to implement ICZM subsequently on a grander scale.
The provisions in the CRZ 2011 regarding conservation and protection of coastal
stretches and promotion of sustainable development are practically inadequate to respond
to the effects of rising sea levels. Without a doubt, the law is weak from the perspective
of adaptation to the adverse consequences of climate change, including SLR. In the CRZ
1991, areas threatened by inundation were categorized under CRZ-I.182 In effect, these
areas were subjected to a high degree of protection, as little to no new construction was
possible. This protective and precautionary measure has been completely abandoned in
the CRZ 2011. Demarcation of the hazard line is the principal methodology envisaged in
the CRZ 2011 to address rising waters.183 Determined on the basis of tides, waves, SLR
and shoreline changes, the area under the CRZ expands if the hazard line falls beyond
500 meters from the HTL on the landward side. Once determined, no development
activities are permitted in the area between the hazard line and 500 meters on the
landward side, except fishing villages and their related fishing facilities, infrastructure
and local communities (e.g., dispensaries, roads, and schools).184 Furthermore, the CRZ
2011 provides that the dwelling units of local communities, including those of fishermen,
will not be relocated even if the dwelling units are located on the seaward side of the
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market access in Sagar, post-fish-harvest handling and fish auction centre at Digha, etc. SICOM,
Implementation of ICZMP, ibid.
The entire Sunderbans mangrove area, the Gulf of Khambat and the Gulf of Kutchchh in Gujarat,
Malvan, Achra-Ratnagiri in Maharashtra, Karwar and Coondapur in Karnataka, Vembanad in
Kerala, Gulf of Mannar in Tamil Nadu, Bhaitarkanika in Orissa, Coringa, East Godavari and
Krishna in Andhra Pradesh have been declared as Critical Vulnerable Coastal Areas. CRZN, 2011,
supra note 119 at 16, ¶4(b).
India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Press Brief, “Society to implement India’s major Coastal
Zone Management Project launched” (15 September 2010).
See Notification under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2)(V) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
and Rule 5(3)(D) of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 Declaring Coastal Stretches as
Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) and Regulating Activities in the CRZ (N SO114 (E) 1991, India),
annexure–I, n6.1(i) (entitled “Coastal Area Classification and Development”).
For more details, see CRZN, 2011, supra note 119, annexure I, ¶D (entitled, “Hazard mapping”).
Ibid, ¶¶7-8.
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hazard line. Instead, state governments are to provide these units with necessary
safeguards from natural disasters.185
In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 and the large death toll
attributed to the close proximity of fishing hamlets to the sea, the coastal state of Tamil
Nadu, one of the worst affected, issued a notification to move fishing communities away
from the coast and to discourage settlements so as to prevent beachfront land
development.186 Since then, most coastal states have discouraged fishing communities
from setting up hamlets or continuing habitation in close vicinity of the sea. Justifiable on
the grounds of safety, this retreat strategy has been viewed with suspicion by many
environmental NGOs and fishing communities. They consider these measures as an
attempt to ensure that these lands are rendered free of claims by fishing communities in
order to make them available to corporate development projects, tourism infrastructure,
or special economic zones.187 Setback and hazard lines, they believe, will lead to largescale forced evictions, ruining the lives and livelihoods of fishing communities.188 It is to
assuage these fears that the CRZ 2011 expressly provides that the dwelling units of local
communities, including those of fishers, will not be relocated.
The CRZ 1991 restricted new construction close to the shoreline and provided for a
200-meter no-development zone in CRZ-III areas. The CRZ 2011 practically reduces the
200-meter NDZ to 100 meters, allowing construction or reconstruction of dwelling units
of traditional coastal communities in this stretch of land.189 This provision essentially
permits entry of people into the 100-to-200-meter zone, an area previously out of bounds
to all. These changes, together with the provision not to re-settle fishers living seaward of
the hazard line, mean that traditional fishers (who have the least capacity to adapt to
climate change and SLR) are unnecessarily being put at risk.
This situation could have been avoided if awareness programmes had been
launched to sensitize coastal communities to the dangers posed by SLR and settlement in
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Ibid, ¶8.
Natural Calamities - Tsunami 2004 - Housing Reconstruction Policy 2005 (GO Ms No 172, Tamil
Nadu) online: Revenue (NC III) Department <http://www.tn.gov.in/gorders/rev/rev-e-1722005.htm>.
Manju Menon, Sudarshan Rodriguez & Aarthi Sridhar, Coastal Zone Management Notification ‘07:
Better or Bitter Fare?: A Critique (Bangalore: ATREE, 2007) at 12, online: dakshin foundation
<http:/ /www.dakshin.org/DOWNLOADS/BitterorBetterFare.pdf>.
Ibid.
CRZN, 2011, supra note 119, ¶IIIA(ii).
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close vicinity to the rising sea. Furthermore, the CRZ 2011 could have included
provisions recognising the doctrine of public trust, such as those provided in the South
African National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act
2008.190 Such a provision could have assuaged public fears that these lands, once cleared
of fishers, would subsequently be usurped for development projects.191 As will be seen in
chapter six, the doctrine of public trust emerges as a significant bulwark against any
attempt by the state to transfer public trust properties for development purposes, since the
property has to be maintained for particular types of uses.192 The doctrine of public trust
envisions the state as trustee of all natural resources for public use and enjoyment; indeed,
as trustee, the state has a legal duty to protect such resources.193 Even though, both the
CRZ 1991 and the CRZ 2011 secure the right of public access to the beachfront, 194 this
right is not viewed from the prism of the doctrine of public trust, particularly in the new
coastal law. These are significant omissions and much confusion on this count could have
been avoided if the management of coastal areas were grounded in public trust.
It would have been apposite if the CRZ 2011 had retained the previous restrictions
on construction of new dwellings in the CRZ-III NDZ and yet permitted local fishing
facilities. Furthermore, in cases where the hazard line has been determined, new
settlements in highly vulnerable areas on the seaward side of the hazard line should be
discouraged;195 moreover, existing vulnerable human habitations should be protected and,
as required, re-located to higher ground, based on the rate of SLR. In this way, these
vulnerable lands could still benefit traditional fishing communities by permitting fishingrelated infrastructure until rising waters engulf the areas.
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National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act, (S Afr), No 24 of 2008,
s 12 (state is a trustee of coastal public property) [SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act].
India, Report of the Public Consultation with Fisherfolks, supra note 50 at 22.
Joseph L Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention”
(1970) 68 Mich L Rev 471 at 477 (HeinOnline).
The doctrine of public trust in Indian environmental law is the product of judicial legislation and
innovation. MC Mehta v Kamal Nath, (1997) [1997] 1 SCC 388 (India SC); MI Builders v Radhey
Shyam Sahu, (1999) [1999] AIR SC 2468 (India SC); KM Chinnappa v India, (2003) [2003] AIR
SC 724 (India SC); West Bengal v Kesoram Industries Ltd, (2004) [2004] 10 SCC 201 (India SC);
Intellectual Forum v AP, (2006) [2006] 3 SCC 549 (India SC); Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd v
Minguel Martins, (2009) 3 SCC 571 (India SC); For discussion on the public trust doctrine and
coastal zone management, see also Ch 6, Part 6.3.
CRZN, 2011, supra note 119, annexure-III, ¶I(c), (p).
For instance, see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 190, s 25(1). It prohibits or
restricts the building, erection, alteration or extension of structures that are wholly or partially
seaward of that coastal setback line. Ibid.
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The Coastal Management Subgroup of the IPCC identified the concepts of retreat,
accommodate and protect as three broad adaptation responses to SLR. 196 No one strategy
is superior to the others, and the choice of one is based primarily on realities in the field.
In certain cases, a combination of all three strategies may be required for optimal results.
By providing that, for instance, fishing communities not be relocated, the CRZ 2011
forecloses the range of options available under retreat and accommodation and casts an
onerous responsibility on state governments to protect dwelling units, thereby placing its
faith squarely in protection options. Traditionally, state governments in India have relied
on hard structures like sea walls or on armouring coastlines with rocks to protect the
coastline. For instance, 332 kilometers of Kerala’s 590-kilometer coastline is already
encompassed by concrete sea walls.197 However, in many places along the Indian
coastline, sea walls and rocks have not been able to hold their ground against an
advancing sea and have also triggered severe environmental impacts. 198 Both agricultural
and fishing communities reject sea walls as they prevent rainwater runoff into the sea,
lead to flooding of agricultural lands, or cut off unimpeded access to the sea for local
fishermen.199 In several areas, sea walls have put an end to catamaran-based fishing.200
In short, then, CRZ 2011, like its predecessor, continues to be weak in
operationalizing ICZM goals and essentially follows a pro-development paradigm. It is
inadequate in terms of its prescriptions, both in implementing ICZM and in adapting to
climate change. Furthermore, it provide very little normative guidance to prepare either
the Indian coastline or the residents of coastal communities to adapt to current and future
climate-related challenges. Moreover, the concept of hazard line management is highly
flawed. In seeking to protect the interests of traditional fishing communities, this law
opens up the coastline to more people, placing populations with the least adaptive
capacity at undue risk from rising waters. Thus, from the above appraisal, it is clear that
the battle to bring coherence to the coastal law fabric in India is far from over. It is only a
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J Dronkers et al, eds, Report of the Coastal Management Subgroup: Strategies for Adaption to Sea
Level Rise (Geneva: IPCC, Response Strategies Working Group, 1990) at 147-48.
For anti-sea erosion works, see Gov’t of Kerala, Minister of Water Resources, Projects and
Programmes Under the Chief Engineer - Irrigation & Administration, online: Department of
Irrigation <http://www .irrigation.kerala.gov.in/pjt_&_pgm/Anti_sea_erosion_%20works.php>.
Sudarshan Rodriguez et al, Policy Brief: Seawalls (UNDP/UNTRS, & ATREE, 2008).
Ibid at 2.
Ibid.
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question of time before we once again see controversies, amendments, and rancorous
court battles over this narrow but vital strip where the land meets the sea.

3.2.2 Pakistan
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan201 has a 990-kilometer coastline encircling the northern
rim of the Arabian Sea.202 This generous coastal expanse has helped the Pakistani
landmass generate substantial maritime estate, accounting for over 30 per cent of its land
area.203 In terms of physiographic and geological characteristics, the coastal areas of
Pakistan are basically a “sub-tropical desert”204 that can be divided into two sections: the
Balochistan coast (760 kilometers in the Balochistan province) and the Sindh coast (230
kilometers in the Sindh province).205 The Balochistan coastal segment can be further subdivided into Mekran (the Gwadar district) and Lasbela (the Lasbela district),206 while the
Sindh coast can be apportioned into the Indus delta and the Karachi coastline.207
In coastal Balochistan, Mekran is tropical and semi-arid, fresh water supplies are
limited, and rainfall is scanty. Accordingly, the soils are highly saline, which discourages
the development of human settlements and agriculture.208 Consequently, Mekran is the
least developed portion on the Pakistani coastline and is comparatively pristine.
Nevertheless, with the commissioning of the Gwadar deep-sea port and a series of other
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A Shah Amjad, I Kasawani & J Kamaruzaman, “Degradation of Indus Delta Mangroves in
Pakistan” (2007) 1:3 Int’l J Geology 27 at 27.
Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency, Brief on Environmental Problems of the Marine and
Coastal Areas, online: Intervention <http://www.environment.gov.pk/PRO_PDF/Position Paper/Ma
rine %20pollution.pdf >.
Pakistan has 22,820 square kilometers of territorial waters, 240,000 square kilometers of exclusive
economic zone and its continental shelf area is about 50,270 square kilometers. Pakistan: National
Strategy and Action Plan for Mangroves for the Future (2010) at 5, Mangroves for the Future
<http://www.mangrovesforthefuture.org/assets/Repository/Documents/NSAP-Final-Doc2.pdf>
[Pakistan: National Strategy and Action Plan]; see also FAO, Fishery and Aquaculture Country
Profile: Islamic Republic of Pakistan (FID/CP/PAK, 2009), at 2.
John C Pernetta, ed, Marine Protected Areas Needs in the South Asian Seas Region, A Marine
Conservation and Development Report, vol 4: Pakistan (Gland: IUCN, 1993) at 1 [Pernetta,
Pakistan].
The tail end of the southwest monsoon waters the Sindh coast. The Balochistan coast is semitropical and arid. The Balochistan coastal areas are characterized by oceanic waters and is rocky, has
some coral-reefs, and there is a thin scatter of mangrove stands. The Sindh coast has a shallower
profile with a combination of mangrove forests, mudflats, and sandy beaches. Pakistan: National
Strategy and Action Plan, supra note 203 at 3.
IUCN Pakistan & Gov’t of Balochistan, Balochistan Conservation Strategy (Karachi: IUCN
Pakistan & Gov't of Balochistan, 2000) at 97.
Sindh Programme Office, Preliminary Compendium of Coastal and Marine Protected Areas in
Pakistan (Karachi: Sindh Programme Office, IUCN-The World Conservation Union, 2005) at 11.
Ibid at 10.
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projects that may soon see fruition,209 it is expected that there will be more development
in Balochistan, necessitating effective CZM. In contrast, the Lasbela segment, situated
close to Karachi, houses the Gadani shipbreaking yard (in its heyday, one of the world’s
largest)210 and several other industrial estates.211
Similarly, there is sharp contrast between the Sindh portions of the coastline: while
one section is highly developed (Karachi segment), the other (Indus delta) is pristine and
highly important from a biodiversity perspective, but under severe stress. The primary
economic activity in the coastal zones, along with most of the population, is concentrated
in the coastal city of Karachi,212 which is the capital of the Sindh Province and the
economic nerve center of Pakistan.213 Not surprisingly, then, the 70-kilometer stretch of
coastline near Karachi is more developed than the rest of Pakistan’s coastal area.214
Karachi is home to one of the biggest ports in South Asia215 as well as to fishing harbors
and power plants (including the Karachi nuclear power plant).216 It is also a major
industrial hub housing several establishments.217
The Pakistani coastline harbors several unique living and non-living resources,
including mangroves, which are being degraded at an alarming rate. 218 In addition, and as
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See Hasan Yaser Malik, “Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port” (2012) 19:2 J Political Stud 57;
“Pakistan hands management of strategic Gwadar port to China”, Reuters [Islamabad] (18 February
2013) online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/18/us-pakistan-portidUSBRE91H
0IU20130218>.
This yard had a total area of 1,400 hectares, divided into 200 plots and a water frontage of 8,000
meters. The industry used to provide employment to nearly 35,000 people, and another half a
million people were indirectly dependent on it. IUCN Pakistan & Gov’t of Balochistan, supra note
206 at 98.
For more details, see Lasbela Industrial Estates Development Authority, online: LIEDA <http://ww
w.lieda.gov.pk/>.
Most of the coastal areas of Pakistan are sparsely populated, except for Karachi, which has a
population of about 18 million people. Ibid.
Official Web Portal of City District Government Karachi, online: CDGK <http://www.karachici
ty.gov.pk/>.
Pakistan, Ministry of Environment, Pakistan’s Initial National Communication on Climate Change
(Islamabad: Ministry of Environment, 2003) at 29 [Pakistan’s Initial National Communication].
Karachi Port Trust, online: KPT <http://kpt.gov.pk/>.
See generally Zia Mian, Some Issues Associated with Pakistan’s Karachi Nuclear Power Plant
(KANUPP) (Working Paper Series #51) (Islamabad: SDPI, 2000).
Karachi has nearly 8,000 small and large industrial units.
Muhammad
Yasin
Janjua,
Environmental Problems of Marine and Coastal Areas of Pakistan, online: SAARC Disaster
Management Centre <http://saarcsdmc.nic.in/pdf/workshops/goa/Pakistan/Environmental%20Porble
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Pernetta, Pakistan, supra note 204 at 13.
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mentioned earlier, the pollution from the shipbreaking industry,219 the constant threat
from oil pollution (due to close proximity to some of the major and busiest shipping
lanes),220 dam construction, and upstream abstraction of water221 are some of the major
challenges the Pakistani coastline faces, rendering it all the more vulnerable to SLR. Like
elsewhere in South Asia, coastal and marine resources, particularly fisheries, play an
important role in supporting the local and national economies. 222 However, most of the
coastal communities live below the poverty line.223
Pakistan falls in the list of ten countries most vulnerable to the impacts of rising sea
levels.224 Currently, SLR along the Pakistan coast is approximately 1.1 millimeters per
year.225 The IPCC predicts that a 20-centimeter rise in sea level will inundate about 1,700
square kilometers of the country’s coastal land (under a scenario of no adaptation
measures).226 It is believed that the Sindh coastal zone is more vulnerable to SLR than the
Balochistan coast because of geographical factors and that the main areas of vulnerability
are the coastal areas of Karachi and the Indus deltaic creek system. 227 In the Balochistan
area, the sea level is rising at a rate of 1.1 millimeters a year, which will aggravate the
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The Gadani beach resulted in the ruin of an important ecosystem that had considerable tourism
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doc/94100938/Fishing-Industry-Final>.
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Tariq Masood Ali Khan et al, “Sea Level Variations and Geomorphological Changes in the Coastal
Belt of Pakistan” (2002) 25:1 Mar Geodesy 159.
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problem of salinity intrusion into the aquifers.228 SLR is a serious problem in coastal and
industrially important Karachi.229 Apart from the destruction to coastal infrastructure,
rising seawater can also lead to salinity intrusion, further aggravating the water crisis.
Coastal erosion has been noticed at the ports of Gwadar, Pasni and Gadani,230 and on the
islands at the approaches of the creeks in the Indus delta.231 Out of nine vulnerabilities
identified in the National Climate Change Policy, 2012, which affect the Pakistani
coastline, three specifically are the intrusion of saline water into the Indus river delta,
SLR and increased cyclonic activity due to higher sea surface temperatures, and water
stress between upper and lower riparians over water sharing.232 In the paragraphs below,
an overview will be provided of the dynamics of water management vis-à-vis the coastal
zone by exploring the water relations between the provinces in Pakistan and how it is
affecting the Indus delta, magnifying SLR impacts.
The River Indus is one of the world’s largest river systems, measuring about 3,180
kilometers. From its source in China, the Indus flows through India and Pakistan to the
Arabian Sea.233 In Pakistan, the river flows primarily through the provinces of Punjab and
Sindh. When it finally empties into the Arabian Sea, it creates the Indus river delta, which
is 200 kilometers long and 50 kilometers wide and extends over an area of nearly 600,000
hectares on the border between Pakistan and India.234 It is home to nearly 900,000
people. The Indus River discharges some 200 square kilometers of water and 450 million
tonnes of suspended sediment annually into the delta and the related estuary235 to create
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the fifth largest delta system in the world.236 It accommodates nearly 97 per cent of
Pakistan’s mangroves (the remaining three per cent is in Balochistan).237 In fact, this
mangrove forest system is the seventh largest in the world, and the largest in arid
climates. It is home to several unique species, such as the blind Indus dolphin.238
The most critical issue wreaking havoc on this delta and related ecosystems is the
large-scale abstraction of water from the river to support agriculture and other activities
in the upstream areas.239 Pakistan has a vast irrigation network and a significant volume
of the Indus water is diverted to this network,240 pointing out to the centrality of this river
system in sustaining the nation.241 Due to these diversions, by the time the Indus reaches
the Kotri Barrage (about 200 kilometers away from the Arabian sea), the flow is woefully
inadequate and cannot support the natural ecosystems of the Indus delta. 242 It has been
estimated that the freshwater flow has drastically reduced from the annual 150 million
acre feet (MAF) 60 years ago to just 0.72 MAF in 2006.243 The situation is so acute that
while the International Union for Conservation of Nature estimates that 27 MAF is
absolutely essential to maintain the health of the delta, during the negotiations preceding
the water sharing agreement entered into between the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh,
Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province regarding water apportionment Sindh
was of the view that the at least ten MAF needed to be set aside for this purpose.
However, since the other states forwarded different figures, the agreement failed to
decide the matter, leaving the issue to be decided later-on after comprehensive studies.244
Consequently, sea water has intruded inland up to nearly 75 kilometers, severely
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damaging the delta and the aquifers.245 The river hardly adds any sediment to the delta,
with the consequence that the rates of erosion have increased considerably. For instance,
in the Chan creek, erosion is calculated to be as high as 5,446 feet per year.246
In a study involving the three talukas of Keti Bunder, Ghora Bari and Kharo Chan,
in Sindh Province, approximately 30,000 households incurred an average annual loss of
USD70,000 in crop damage and USD45,000 from reduction in fish catch due to saltwater
intrusion.247 It is estimated that nearly, 28,000 people in Keti Bunder will be displaced
within the next ten years due to SLR, which has already swallowed 28 out of a total of 42
settlements.248 Keti Bunder has lost significant land area to the sea.249 The large-scale
destruction of the mangroves has also rendered this area highly vulnerable to cyclones
and tsunamis.250
These environmental changes have triggered socio-economic tensions as well. Due
to the lack of potable water, supplies are brought in to Keti Bunder in tankers, which are
then bought up by the landlords who then sell them at exorbitant rates to the locals.251
Earlier, only 20 per cent of the population of Keti Bunder was involved in fishing.252
However, due to increased salinity intrusion and destruction of coastal agriculture (Keti
Bunder used to export red rice), now nearly 80 per cent of its population is engaged in
fishing.253 At the same time, to add to their woes, there has been a considerable decline in
the fish stock as well. The major variety, the palla, an anadromous fish that swims up
into the delta from the Arabian Sea for spawning, is disappearing fast due to the low
discharge of water from the Indus.254 Increasing salinity has also affected the palla and
the stock has declined from about 7,900 tons in the 1959 to less than 200 metric tons in
1995.255
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Despite the conclusion of the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960,256 the sharing of the Indus
waters between India and Pakistan has been contentious. Within Pakistan itself, there
have been disputes among the provinces over water sharing. 257 To resolve these issues,
the provinces entered into a water apportionment accord in 1991. 258 In 1994, due to
severe drought, the Punjab government proposed a new formula for water sharing known
as “historical uses” and obtained a higher reallocation.259 Since then, water sharing
among the provinces has been a thorny issue. The failure of the federal government and
the provinces to ensure a steady and adequate flow into the delta can aggravate the
problem of SLR in this coastal region.260
Before proceeding to examine the coastal law framework of Pakistan, it is
necessary to examine how Pakistan is approaching the issue of climate change
adaptation, and in particular coastal climate change adaptation. The growing realisation
that, despite its low carbon footprint, Pakistan will be one of the many countries worst
affected by climate change, prompted this country to establish a Ministry of Climate
Change.261 Recently, Pakistan has approved a NCC Policy, 262 which provides a
framework for addressing some of the climate change related issues that it faces. The
goal of this policy is “[t]o ensure that climate change is mainstreamed in the
economically and socially vulnerable sectors of the economy and to steer Pakistan
towards climate resilient development”, and adaptation is an area of primary focus.263
Specifically, to this end, the NCC Policy identifies the following adaptation measures for
the coastal zone: developing salinity tolerant crop cultivars for coastal agriculture;
promoting aquaculture; maintaining optimal river water flows to ensure continuity of
natural processes; controlling land-based sources of pollution; maintaining marine
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ecosystems and fish habitats; building natural barriers, plantation and regeneration of
mangroves, coastal palms and other trees to control erosion and to minimise the
disastrous impacts of cyclones and tsunamis; and constructing barriers to protect lowlying coastal human settlements against rising seas and cyclones.264
As far as the legal framework to protect and manage coastal areas is concerned, the
1973 Constitution of Pakistan determines its contours. Apart from India, Pakistan is the
only other federal polity among the coastal countries of South Asia. Since the subject
“environmental pollution and ecology”265 finds a place in the concurrent legislative list,
both the federal and provincial governments can legislate on matters relating to the
environment. However, in practice, it is the provinces that have enacted laws for the
coastal management, even though there are a large number of federal environmental laws
that can apply to the coastal zone.266 The origin of ICZM in Pakistan can be traced to the
“International Workshop on Integrated Coastal Zone Management” organised in October
1994 in Karachi.267 The primary objective of this Workshop was “to draft guidelines for
the integrated coastal zone management planning process” and it emphasised in clear
terms that ICZM is “the most imperative and immediate need for Pakistan.”268 It is on the
basis of the recommendations of this Workshop that the provinces of Sindh and
Balochistan enacted their coastal laws. The salience of the prescriptions of both these
laws are detailed below.
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3.2.2.1

The Coastal Laws of Pakistan (Sindh and Balochistan)

The province of Sindh enacted the Coastal Development Authority Act (CDAA) in
1994269 and subsequently amended it in 2006.270 The legislative mandate of this law,
which extends to the coastal areas271 of Sindh, is to provide for the development,
improvement and beautification of the coastal areas in the districts of Thatta and
Badin.272 The Sindh CDAA contemplates coastal management by two sets of authorities.
At the apex is the Provincial government of Sindh, which has the power to provide
directions on policy matters from time to time.273 In addition, it has rule-making powers
to implement the purposes of the Act274 and the power to approve the master plan and the
development schemes prepared by the Coastal Development Authority.275
The primary authority contemplated under the Coastal Development Authority Act
is the Sindh Coastal Development Authority.276 Subject to the general or special
directions from the government, the Authority exercises thirteen major far-reaching
functions277 and prepares a master plan that deals with the “development, improvement,
expansion and beautification” of coastal areas and development schemes for coastal
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areas.278 It can also acquire property279 and is vested with power to make regulations to
carry out the purposes of the Act.280
To facilitate the Authority’s functioning, the Act vests its general direction and
administration with a governing body281, which is chaired by the Minister for Planning
and Development Department.282 The governing body exercises all powers and can do all
"acts and things" done by the Authority.283 In discharging its functions, the governing
body acts on sound principles of planning, development, operation, management and
maintenance of coastal areas, and here the directions provided by the government guide
it.284 The governing body is empowered to constitute committees like financial, technical
and executive to carry out the purposes of the act.285 Another interesting feature of the
Sindh coastal law is that, on the one hand, while it contains provisions to ensure
accountability on the part of the Authority,286 it also has provisions that clothe the
Authority with immunity from legal proceedings for acts done to further the purposes of
the Act.287
After Sindh’s brush with coastal law-making, it was Balochistan’s turn. This
province enacted the Balochistan Coastal Development Authority Act in 1998288, which is
modeled largely on the Sindh legislation. Subsequently, this coastal law was amended in
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2001289 and in 2003.290 The Balochistan coastal law provides for coastal regulation and
management at two levels. First, the Government of Balochistan is empowered to provide
directions on policy matters from time to time and in cases of dispute decide whether a
matter falls within the realm of policy or not.291
While the Government is conferred with overarching powers for coastal
administration, the key authority for coastal management in Balochistan is the
Balochistan Coastal Development Authority, which is responsible for the “planning,
development, preservation, monitoring, construction, operation, management and
maintenance of the coastal areas Balochistan for the purposes of fostering of all resources
concomitant to coastal development and for waters connected therewith or ancillary
thereto.”292 The Balochistan Coastal Development Authority has corporate trappings293
and is subject to governmental directions; furthermore, it is tasked with the
implementation of wide-ranging functions,294 including the preparation of a master plan
and development schemes for coastal areas.295 The Authority is also vested with a coastal
development authority fund.296 Similar to the Sindh Coastal Development Authority, the
Balochistan coastal law places general administration of this authority with a governing
body, which can exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things, as is carried out
by the Authority.297 The constitution of the governing body was revamped by the 2003
amendment and presently, no less a constitutional authority than the Chief Minister of
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Balochistan is the chairman of the governing body, an indication as to the importance the
province affords to coastal management.298 In addition, the administrative secretaries of
some of the major government departments of Balochistan, two members of the
provincial assembly, and two nominated experts on coastal affairs are inter alia members
of the governing body.299 This body is also empowered to delegate its powers, functions
and duties and can constitute financial, technical, and executive committees for carrying
out the purposes of the act.300
As far the territorial application of this coastal law is concerned, it extends to the
coastal areas of Balochistan and adjoining upland areas up to 30 kilometers from the high
tide water line.301 However, townships, villages, defence and other Federal government
installations, Lasbela Industrial Estates Development Authority (LIEDA), the Gaddani
shipbreaking yard and areas are excluded from its jurisdictional ambit.302 As will be
explained subsequently, the exclusion of such wide areas substantially reduces the
potency of this coastal law.
As mentioned, the Balochistan coast is comparatively unoccupied and unspoiled.
However, due to the thriving ship breaking industry, attempts have been made in certain
quarters to turn the coastal regions into dumping yards for wastes including radioactive
substances. In re: Human Rights Case (Environment Pollution in Balochistan)303 was a
public interest litigation case that came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Pursuant to
a news item entitled “N-Waste to be dumped in Balochistan,” which expressed
apprehensions that certain business groups were attempting to purchase coastal areas in
Balochistan to dump waste material such as nuclear wastes from developed countries, the
court directed the Chief Secretary of Balochistan to inquire the matter. The dumping of
such wastes which could affect the health of the people, the environment, marine life, and
the development of ports, thereby leading to the violation of article 9. The Chief
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Secretary reported that while land was allotted to the shipbreaking industry, no plot was
allotted for dumping nuclear waste. Even though the records revealed no foul play, the
court was aware that dumping is a clandestine act in the garb of a legal and proper
business activity. This demanded constant vigil on the part of the authorities by regularly
checking vessels and also by ensuring that the allottees were not engaged in dumping
industrial or nuclear waste on the land or in the sea or destroying it by any device.
Accordingly, the Balochistan Development Authority was directed to submit to the court
a list of those who were allotted land on the Balochistan coast. Again, the Government
functionaries were directed to insert a condition into the terms of allotment that the
allottee was not to use the land for dumping, treating, burying or destroying by any
device, waste of any nature including industrial or nuclear waste in any form. The
concerned authority was also to obtain a similar undertaking from all those who were
already allotted the land. This decision is extremely relevant from the perspective of
coastal management as it emphasised in clear terms the need to maintain and protect the
coastal ecosystems from land-based sources of pollution.

3.2.2.2 Discussion
As mentioned, it was the Workshop of 1994 that set ICZM in motion in Pakistan.
Nevertheless, in 2011, another Workshop on ICZM was organised and it was apparent
that not much progress had been made in implementing ICZM, even after the lapse of
some seventeen years.304 Despite this gloomy picture, it is commendable that both the
coastal provinces of Pakistan enacted coastal legislations and the necessary institutional
mechanisms were set up fairly early in the day, especially as some of the other coastal
countries in the region were yet to recognise the merit and utility of a coastal law. Both of
the coastal laws were largely appropriate for their time, but in light of changing
circumstances, there is the need to amend these legislations to attune them to new
developments and to base management in an integrated format to support the pressing
need of coastal climate change adaptation. Climate change adaptation is critical to
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Pakistan. However, as has been observed, “Pakistan has a low institutional and financial
capacity to adapt to climatic changes; therefore improving the adaptation capability is
considered to be of the highest priority at this stage”.305
Here, from the perspective of coastal regions, coastal legislations can play an
important role in augmenting adaptive capacities by facilitating ICZM implementation.
While both of these coastal legislations do contain notable points (for instance, the
Balochistan Coastal Development Authority is headed by no less a functionary than the
chief minister of the province, and in the case of Sindh, it is the Minister for Planning and
Development), the fact is that both legislative frameworks may not be able to further
ICZM and CCCA for the following reasons.
First, the concept of spatial integration, which is the central pillar of ICZM, is not
afforded express recognition in either coastal law. There is no provision for a seaward
component in the Sindh coastal law and the regulation is primarily land-based. As
pointed out earlier and as will be seen in detail in chapter six, ICZM implies the holistic
management of both the dry and the wet segments of the coastal zone. At the same time,
though not expressly mentioned, it seems that the Balochistan coastal law contemplates
some sort of integration between the dry and wet sides of the coastal zone. The Preamble
to the Balochistan statute mentioning of “connected waters” and “land” has been defined
to include the seabed below the high-water mark.306 Furthermore, the Balochistan Coastal
Development Authority is also empowered to “[f]ormulate and implement policies and
plans for the purpose of developing, establishing and maintaining its coastal area and
waters along the Balochistan Coast…”307 Despite this, the law is not amply clear with
regards to the exact extent of the seaward limit. Thus, the Balochistan Coastal Act, while
referring to the wet side, does not sufficiently carry the message of coastal integration
forward.
Another aspect of these coastal laws is that they do not contain provisions to
control the problem of land-based sources of coastal and marine pollution. In fact, the
Balochistan Act exempts townships, villages, defence and Federal government
installations, the Lasbela Industrial Estate, and the Gaddani shipbreaking yard from its
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operational remit, thereby considerably reducing its efficacy. This is a serious lacuna and
may not augur well in the long run, given that some of the industries excluded (e.g., the
ship breaking industry) are known major polluters of the coastal environment.
Even though there is provision for the preparation of master plans and schemes in
both statutes, the relevant provisions appear open-ended and there is no legislative
guidance in these laws as to how these plans are to be prepared and no provision for
public participation in their preparation and implementation is contemplated. Again, the
coastal development authorities contemplated under both statutes are top-heavy. There is
no provision for women representation in these bodies. This exclusion can affect the
attainment of sustainable development goals in the long run, as women and children are
the primary sufferers of climate change impacts including SLR.308
Except for the coastal city of Karachi, the coastal regions in Pakistan are
comparatively free from development, so even in the event of SLR, it may be possible for
this country to implement a retreat strategy to deal with the impacts. Taking into account
the specific vulnerabilities of Karachi, it may even become necessary for Pakistan to
develop in due course an adaptation strategy for this city, where salinity intrusion into the
coastal aquifers has already been reported.309 Apart from Karachi, the primary impacts of
climate change and SLR on the coastal zones of Pakistan are closely intertwined with the
diminished water flows into the Indus River Delta and consequent saline intrusion, as
mentioned earlier. However, the coastal law of Sindh does not contain any adaptive
strategy to respond to the impacts of climate change and SLR on Karachi and the Indus
River Delta. These are serious omissions attributable to the fact that the law was drafted
at a time when SLR and climate change were not issues of concern. Presently, the
provinces have taken the lead on CZM, and therefore it may seem that the federal
government has a comparatively lesser role to play. Nevertheless, as the number and
intensity of extreme weather events hitting the Pakistani coast increases, the federal
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government, in co-ordination with the provinces, must formulate a comprehensive
strategy for climate change adaptation for the coastline via ICZM.

3.2.3 Bangladesh
One of the least developed nations in the world,310 the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
is a unitary state that became independent in 1971.311 Bangladesh has a coastline of about
710 kilometers in length, rimming the Bay of Bengal. This comprises approximately 32
per cent of the country312 spread over 19 out of a total of 64 districts.313 The coastal
regions have been classified into three zones (west, central, and east), each characterised
by unique features.314 The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is also treated as part of the
coastal zone.315 Bangladesh is essentially the delta of the Ganges-Padma, the
Brahmaputra-Jamuna, and the Surma-Meghna rivers, and its coastal zone is the last part
of the extended Himalayan drainage ecosystem where these three mighty rivers join the
Bay of Bengal.316 The entire landmass, including its coastline, is dominated by these
three major river systems, which unites with several other smaller rivers to form the
largest deltaic system in the world.317 It is estimated that the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
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University, 2001) [unpublished] at 76.
MS Iftekhar & MR Islam, “Managing Mangroves in Bangladesh: A Strategy Analysis” (2004) 10 J
of Coastal Conservation 139.
M Rafiqul Islam, ed, Where Land Meets the Sea: A Profile of the Coastal Zone of Bangladesh
(Dhaka: The University Press Ltd, 2004) at 4.
Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment & Forest, Initial National Communication under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Dhaka: Ministry of Environment
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Meghna river systems carries each year more than six million cusecs of water and more
than a billion tons of sediment that is finally deposited into the coastal areas adjoining the
Bay of Bengal.318 This renders the coast highly dynamic, resulting in accretions in some
regions and erosion in others.319
The Bangladesh coast is home to several unique coastal ecosystems, including the
Sunderbans (the world’s largest uninterrupted stretch of mangrove forests and a
designated UNESCO World Heritage Site),320 the coral island of St. Martin, the Cox
Bazar beach (the world’s longest beach),321 and several islands and extensions to the
mainland formed primarily from accretion (which are generally unstable and
uninhabitable).322
The Bangladesh coastline is wrecked by a series of climate hazards and is often
described as “a zone of multiple vulnerabilities as well as opportunities.” 323 Each year,
cyclones, storm surges, tornados, floods and erosion hit the country with ferocity.324
Records show that nearly 30 to 35 per cent of the total land surface of the country is
inundated annually during the monsoons.325 In both 1988 and 1998, more than 65 per
cent of the geographical area was inundated.326 The Bay of Bengal is referred to as “the
breeding ground of catastrophic cyclones;”327 it is estimated that a severe tropical cyclone
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World Heritage Convention & UNESCO, The Sundarbans, online: WHC:UNESCO
<http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/798/documents/>. The Sunderbans mangroves support nearly 425
species of recorded fauna, which includes 41-49 mammals, 261-270 birds, 158-177 fish, 35-63
reptiles, 8-12 amphibians and 26 molluscs. Dipak Kamal, Biodiversity Conservation in the Coastal
Zone of Bangladesh (MMM Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1999) [unpublished] at 11.
Third National Report (Submitted by Bangladesh) at 7, online: Convention on Biological Diversity
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/bd/bd-nr-03-en.pdf> [Third National Report].
Islam, ed, supra note 313 at 16-17.
Ibid at 3.
More than a dozen tropical cyclones occur in the Bay of Bengal every year, with three or four hitting
the Bangladeshi coastal zones with wind speeds of 150-240 kilometers per hour. Due to the low
elevation of GBM deltaic plain, resulting storm surges can penetrate as far as 100 kilometers inland.
Four cyclonic storms and associated tidal bores between 1970-1997 have killed nearly 44,668,000
people. Kamal, supra note 320 at 41.
Nearly 80 per cent of the land gets affected by floods, which are primarily, flash floods, rain floods,
monsoon floods and coastal floods. Bangladesh, Initial National, supra note 314 at 15.
UNEP & Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific, Bangladesh: State of the Environment
Report, 2001 (Pathumthai: UNEP, 2001) at 98 [UNEP & RRCAP].
Ibid at 99.
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hits Bangladesh once every three years,328 accompanied by severe storm surges, leading
to severe losses in life and in property.329 Land erosion is another natural phenomenon
that affects the Bangladeshi coastline.
As per the 2001 census, the total population of Bangladesh is approximately 130
million, and the coastal population is about 36.8 million.330 This country is one of the
most densely populated countries in the world, with density in the coastal zones much
higher than in the upland areas.331 Nearly 28 per cent of the population of Bangladesh
lives in the coastal areas.332 While the average population density for the entire country is
839 per square kilometer, for the coastal regions it is 743. The average population density
in the exposed coast is 482 people per square kilometer and 1,012 for the interior
coasts.333 There are about 6.82 million households in the coastal zone, of which 52 per
cent are extremely poor.334 The official poverty indicators point out that the percentage of
the population that lives below the absolute poverty line is slightly higher in the coastal
zone (52 per cent) than for the whole country (49 per cent).335
Coasts play a significant role in supporting the Bangladeshi economy. The Bengali
adage “Mache-Bhate Bangali,” which means a “Bengali body is made up of fish and
rice,” sums up the importance of fish and fisheries in the life of Bangladeshis.336 Fishing,
agriculture, shrimp farming, salt farming, and tourism (mainly domestic) are the primary
economic activities in the coastal area.337 However, the coastal fishing communities live
in deep poverty. Coastal fishers generally have no land holdings, their literacy levels are
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Bangladesh, Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2008 (Dhaka: MoEF, 2008) at
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Meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on ICZMP held on February 13, 2006
(Bangladesh: Water Resources Planning Organization, 2006) at 1 [Coastal Development Strategy,
2006].
The population density in the coastal zones is 1,018 persons per square kilometer than in the upland
areas where it is 827.4 persons per square kilometer). Kamal, supra note 320 at 3.
Ibid at 1.
Md Golam Mahabub Sarwar, Impacts of Sea Level Rise on the Coastal Zone of Bangladesh (Masters
Thesis, Lund University, Sweden, 2005) [unpublished] at 8.
Ibid.
Fourteen out of 19 coastal districts reel under extreme poverty greater than the national average.
Islam, “ICZM Initiatives”, supra note 315 at 76.
UNEP & RRCAP, supra note 326 at 105.
It is estimated that fisheries provide employment to 1.5 million rural people, while providing partial
employment to another 11 million. Bangladesh, Initial National, supra note 314 at 14.
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dismal, and they have very limited opportunities to access credit and the market.338 More
importantly, these communities are frequently exposed to a series of natural hazards like
cyclones and tidal surges that seriously affect their life, security and property; that they
have limited access to even minimal social security services increases their
vulnerability.339 Marine fisheries contribute significantly to the total fish production and
here it is the artisanal fishers that contribute the overwhelming share. 340Anthropogenic
and natural factors affect the health and resilience of Bangladesh’s coastal ecosystems
and affect their ability to support the Bangladeshi economy.
As mentioned, the Sunderbans mangroves represent nearly half of this country’s
forest cover and are rich in biodiversity, providing a habitat for several species of animals
and birds.341 The delta also supports coastal communities whose livelihood and wellbeing are intrinsically linked to the fate of the delta itself. However, since the 1970s, the
Sunderbans has been in a state of progressive deterioration, primarily due to the reduced
inflow of fresh water in the dry season into this ecosystem. This is attributable mainly to
the diversion of the Ganges waters at the Farraka Barrage in the summer months.342
Consequently, salinisation has prevented the natural regeneration of mangroves and has
contributed to the infectious top-dying disease of sundari, the dominant mangrove
species in the Sunderbans.343 Apart from the reduced inflow of freshwater, the
Sunderbans also face threats from conversion of mangrove tracts for aquaculture and
agriculture; pollution; poaching of wild animals like the Bengal tiger, the estuarine
crocodile, marine turtles and horseshoe crab; and the uncontrolled fishing and collection
of prawn seedlings.344
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Bangladesh? (MMM Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2004) [unpublished] at 13. Kamal, supra note
320 at 3 (pointing out that nearly 68.8 per cent of the coastal population is landless).
Ibid at 4.
The contribution of the marine fisheries ranges between 20 to 25 per cent of the total fish
production, out of which the artisanal sector contributes 95 per cent. Ibid at 10.
Kamal, supra note 320 at 3.
M Shafi N Islam & Albrecht Gnauck, “Threats to the Sundarbans Mangrove Wetland Ecosystems
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(2009) 13:W09 Int'l J Ecol Econ Stat 64 at 70-72.
Md Saidur Rahman, “Ecology and Management of Sundarban: A Rich Biodiversity of the World’s
Largest Mangrove Ecosystem” [on file with the author].
Ibid.
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Land-based sources of marine pollution are a major cause for concern. The major
rivers (i.e., the Ganges and the Brahmaputra) carry pollutants from upstream countries
(China, Bhutan, Nepal, India), which traverse through the Bangladeshi heartland before
being dumped into the Bay of Bengal.345 In addition, several other activities like fisheries,
transport, industrial discharges, use of agrochemical fertilizers and untreated sewage also
add to the pollution load. A description of some of these activities and their impact is
offered below.
In recent years, there has been considerable industrial growth in Bangladesh, which
has had significant environmental impacts in the coastal zone. Land based sources of
pollution of coastal and marine waters and related ecosystems are a major problem.
Bangladesh has been operating one of the largest shipbreaking yards in the world at the
Sitakunda region in Chittagong. It is believed that, at present, there are 32 shipbreaking
yards located on a 10 kilometer stretch of the Chittagong coast offering employment to
20,000 workers.346 Like Alang in India, the shipbreaking industry in Bangladesh
functions in a highly “disorganized and primitive way.”347 All of the breaking takes place
in the intertidal zone. Since Bangladesh is the only country that does not insist on a gasfree-for-hot-work certificate,348 a majority of deadly tankers, generally not accepted in
other countries, make their way into these shipbreaking yards. With nearly 90 ships being
dismantled annually, it is estimated that nearly 22.5 tons of PCBs are released into the
coastal environment of Bangladesh.349 The ship scrapping activities have led to the
increased presence of tributyltin in fish organs.350 For a long time, Bangladesh did not
have any direct law to regulate the shipbreaking industry. Following the directions of its
Supreme Court, the Ministry of Environment and Forests put together the Draft
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Bangladesh, Department of Environment in Collaboration with IUCN-The World Conservation
Union, Bangladesh: National Programme of Action for Protection of the Coastal and Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities, at 12, online: <http://www.doe-bd.org/npa_draft.pdf>
[Bangladesh, National Programme of Action].
Kamal, supra note 320 at 62.
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Shipbreaking and Hazardous Waste Management Rules, 2010, to regulate this industry,
although they are yet to be formalized.351
Other pollution intensive industries like tanneries, paper pulp manufacturing and
textile units operate in coastal regions without proper treatment plants, contaminating the
coastal environment.352 Vessel-source pollution is another pollution source, since the
primary mode of transportation is the extensive network of inland waterways.353 There
have been several oil spills from foreign and local ships calling at the Mongla Port that
have threatened the eco-stability of the nearby Sunderbans.354 None of the coastal cities
have proper sewage systems or waste treatment plants. Consequently, the sewage of
nearly 36 million people living in 19 coastal districts directly or indirectly ends up in the
Bay of Bengal.355 Solid waste disposal in coastal cities also makes its way into the marine
environment, particularly during floods and monsoons, since landfill sites are open and
there is no leachate treatment technology in place.356 The use of pesticides to expand
agricultural production has increased tremendously, putting further stress on the coastal
environment.357 Studies reveal that the groundwater in 61 out of 64 districts is arseniccontaminated, and nearly 30 million people are exposed to the associated risks.358 The
problem is most acute in the coastal regions, where both surface and groundwater
resources are contaminated due to saline intrusion from the seas.359 Salinity intrusion has
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Management, BIISS Papers, no 20 (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic
Studies, 2003) at 27 [Azad, Integrated Coastal Zone Management].
Md Saiful Karim, “Implementation of the MARPOL Convention in Bangladesh” (2009) 6 Macq J
Int’l & CEnvtl L 51 (HeinOnline).
Bangladesh, National Programme of Action, supra note 349 at 9.
Ibid at 10.
Craig Meisner, Report of Pesticide Hotspots in Bangladesh, Working Paper: 41045, vol 1
(Development Economics Research Group, World Bank, 2004) ¶1; Bangladesh, National
Programme of Action, supra note 349 at 11.
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Department of Disaster Management, Ministry
of Disaster Management and Relief, Arsenic Contamination, online: Department of Disaster
Management <http://www.ddm.gov.bd/arsenic.php>; Hossain Shahid Mozaddad Faruque & Saiful
Alam, “State of Arsenic Contamination in Bangladesh” (Paper delivered at the International Water
Conference, Hanoi, Vietnam, 14-16 October 2002) at 4-5.
The problem of salinity intrusion is primarily seasonal. During the rainy season, salinity is pushed
back due to the fresh water flow. But in the summer months, saline waters penetrate up to 130
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also contaminated the soils in coastal regions.360 Since more than 30 per cent of the net
available cultivable land of Bangladesh is located in coastal areas, soil salinity
detrimentally impacts food security.361
Bangladesh has an elaborate legal framework to regulate land-based sources of
marine pollution. The Environment Conservation Rules, 1997, specifies standards for
sewage discharge, water quality, and industrial waste discharge.362 The Territorial
Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974 likewise empowers the government to take
appropriate measures to prevent and control marine pollution.363 There are several other
laws that are also relevant.364 Bangladesh has also formulated a National Programme of
Action for Protection of the Coastal and Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities. This document identifies twelve major factors that contribute to coastal and
marine pollution, and proposes seven strategies and action programmes and twelve major
activities to combat land-based marine pollution.365 Although Bangladesh is one of the
few countries in South Asia to have a national programme of action for controlling landbased marine pollution, it must still develop a dedicated enforcement framework to
support the strategies, programmes and action plans it has in place to deal with this
challenge to its sustainable development.
For many years, the contribution of the Bangladeshi fisheries sector to national
development was insignificant. In the early 1980s, as part of an initiative to popularize
shrimp culture, the government allotted tidal land in the Chakaria Sundarban to the
Department of Fisheries. Since then, shrimp farming has accelerated, often at the expense
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kilometers in the lower Meghna and up to 290 kilometers up the Passur River. Bangladesh, Initial
National, supra note 314 at 30.
Ibid.
UNEP & RRCAP, supra note 326 at 104.
The Environment Conservation Rules, 1997 (R SRO No 197-Law/97 of 1997, Bangladesh), sch 9.
(No XXVI of 1974, Bangladesh), s 8.
The Marine Fisheries Ordinance, 1983 (No XXXV of 1983, Bangladesh) s 28 (constitution of
marine reserves), s 29 (prohibition on fishing, dredging, etc., in marine reserves), s 8 (introduces
licensing system for marine fishing). East Bengal Protection and Conservation of Fish Act 1950 (No
XVIII of 1950, Bangladesh) (subsequently amended in 1963, 1970, 1982, 1995 and 2002). This law
empowers the government to make rules to prohibit or regulate the destruction of (including
attempt) fishes by explosives, gun, bow and arrow in inland waters or in coastal territorial waters.
The Environmental Policy 1992, the Forest Policy 1994, the Fisheries Policy 1995 are also relevant
to coastal management.
Bangladesh, National Programme of Action, supra note 349.
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of mangroves, wetlands and agricultural lands.366 While shrimp farming has benefitted
the country in many ways, the reality is that its operation has exacerbated rural poverty.
There have been intense and violent clashes between the owners of shrimp farms and
agriculturists.367 Apart from socio-economic tensions, shrimp farming poses several
environmental concerns. For instance, to facilitate the intake of tidal water, shrimp
culturists have cut through the coastal embankments and built hundreds of unauthorized
sluice gates, which has weakened these structures.368 Such practices raise the need for a
mechanism to resolve conflicting interests relating to the use of coastal space and
resources.369
Bangladesh has established a network of marine protected areas, mainly under the
Bangladesh Wildlife Preservation (Amendment) Act, 1974,370 and under section 5 of the
Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act, 1995, whereby the government can declare
ecologically critical areas. There are eight such areas, and some of them are highly
sensitive coastal ecosystems, including St. Martin’s island, the sea front of Cox Bazar and
Teknaf, a 10 kilometer strip outside the Sunderbans reserve forest, and the Sonadia
Island.371 Despite the MAP network, these ecosystems are under considerable ecological
stress.372 Coral reefs around St. Martin’s have also been destroyed due to shell and coral
collection, dynamite fishing, and recreational activities.373
The peculiar geographical features, lack of infrastructure, low socio-economic
development and widespread poverty, lack of institutional capacity, and higher
dependence on natural resources make Bangladesh one of the most disaster-prone
countries in the world.374 Although the contribution of Bangladesh to global greenhouse
gas emissions is negligible, it will be severely affected by climate change and SLR.
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Within Bangladesh, coastal regions will be the most affected due to its low elevation and
exposure to various water-related hazards.375
SLR can produce various impacts on Bangladesh; the major ones are coastal land
erosion, salinity intrusion, biodiversity loss and destruction of human life and property.376
In addition, SLR can increase riverbank erosion, flooding, and destruction of fisheries.
SLR can lead to the inundation of one-tenth of the total land area along the coastal belt
displacing nearly 10 million people.377 It has been predicted that by 2050 SLR will affect
27 million people in Bangladesh.378 The IPCC forecasts that a one-meter rise in sea level
will inundate about 20 per cent of the Bangladeshi landmass. It is estimated that there
will be a one-meter rise in sea level by 2100, which will inundate 17.5 per cent (25,000
square kilometers) and all of the Sunderbans.379
The economy of Bangladesh is primarily agrarian. It is predicted that SLR will
adversely impact agriculture, and will damage more than a million hectares of
agricultural land and different varieties of rice crop380 and fodder.381 Since the population
density is very high, grazing fields for cattle are rare and, generally, farmers meet their
demand from the rice paddy fields. Any decrease in rice production would result in a
fodder shortage and a decline in livestock population aggravating rural poverty. 382 SLR
may also impact coastal fisheries and aquaculture.383 Due to excessive flooding of the
coastline, the positions of many water channels and estuaries will be altered and salinity
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Ibid at 40.
Asian Development Bank, supra note 38 at 25.
Ibid.
Ibid at 42. The farmers in Bangladesh had nearly 10,000 varieties of rice that belonged to the Aus,
Aman, Boro and IRRI groups. SLR related flooding and salinity increase is expected to affect all
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Since Bangladesh is a densely populated country, there are no specific grazing grounds as such and
therefore grass from paddy fields are used to feed cattle. Therefore, any decrease in agricultural
production will lead to a decline in the livestock population. Ibid at 43.
Abu Muhammad Shajaat Ali, “Rice to Shrimp: Land use/Land Cover Changes and Soil degradation
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While increasing surface water temperatures will affect shrimp, high tides may breach the earthen
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Change Impacts and Vulnerability: A Synthesis (Bangladesh: Climate Change Cell, Department of
Environment, 2006) at 27.
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will spoil the habitat and breeding grounds of exotic species such as the Hilsha fish.384
Salt production is another major industry in Bangladesh, providing employment to
millions. In the event of SLR, salt fields may be inundated, throwing large numbers of
people out of work.385 These impacts can also produce severe health consequences.
Increased salinity and the consequent contamination of potable water, will lead to the
outbreak of water-borne diseases like cholera and diarrhea, and since salinity can impact
food production, it will cause malnutrition.386
The damage to coastal infrastructure from SLR will also be immense. Bangladesh
has a vast network of coastal roads.387 In addition, as all cities in the central coastal
region are connected to the capital city, Dhaka, by waterways, coastal flooding
consequent to SLR will erode the roads and damage port facilities, coastal embankments,
dykes, groins, and storm surge protection infrastructure.388 In short, climate change will
accentuate the rigor of many of the existing problems and natural hazards that this
country faces.
As far as adaptation to these impacts is concerned, Bangladesh has created a
climate change cell under the Department of Environment, Ministry of Environment and
Forests to establish an integrated approach to climate risk management. 389 In addition,
Bangladesh has identified certain vulnerable sectors and the appropriate adaptation
measures for each of them.390 Even though most of these sectors are relevant to the
broader issue of coastal management, as far as the specific measures (i.e., physical and
institutional) are concerned, they are in relation to certain primary physical effects such
as saline water intrusion,391 drainage congestion,392 extreme events,393 and changes in
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Climate Change Cell, Dep't of Environment, Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), online:
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coastal morphology.394 In addition, its National Adaptation Programme of Action of 2005
identifies fifteen measures or projects, some of which are directly related to the issue of
CCCA in the context of SLR.395

3.2.3.1 The Coastal Management Framework
Despite the magnitude of interests and reliance in coastal regions and the overarching
threat of climate change and SLR, Bangladesh does not have a direct law on CZM. There
are a series of legislations and other legal instruments that prescribe general measures in
relation to the coastal zone, the most significant of which is the Bangladesh Environment
Conservation Act, 1995.396 It establishes the Department of the Environment, which has
discretionary power to adopt measures for environmental conservation and control and to
mitigate environmental pollution.397 Other laws and policies have indirect relevance to
CZM,398 and Bangladesh has put in place a system for its development and operation. In
Bangladesh, CZM emanated primarily as reactive responses to several natural disasters
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dams or embankments. The institutional adaptation measures envisaged include groundwater
management, maintenance and operation of sluices and regulators, extension services etc. Ibid at 78.
The physical measures identified are: 1) bringing water from the land into the main drainage system
and 2) draining water into the sea. Institutional measures include establishing water management
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Physical Adaptation measures include construction of cyclone shelters, coastal embankments,
improved warning systems, and mangrove belts. Institutional adaptation measures include
monitoring, forecasting and warning systems, and evacuation procedures. Ibid at 79-80.
Ibid.
Some of the major measures envisaged are: “Reduction of Climate Change Hazards through Coastal
afforestation with community participation”, “Providing drinking water to coastal communities to
combat enhanced salinity due to sea level rise”, and “Promoting adaptation to coastal crop
agriculture to combat increased salinity.” Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forest, National
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), Final Report (November 2005) at 26-42.
The Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act, 1995(No 1 of 1995, Bangladesh).
Ibid, pmbl; see also ibid, ss 3, 4.
Third National Report, supra note 321 at 76-77. ICZM in Bangladesh is basically policy driven,
guided by a series of policy documents like the National Environment Policy, 1992; National
Tourism Policy, 1992; the National Forestry Policy, 1994; the National Fisheries Policy, 1998; the
National Policy for Safe Water and Sanitation 1998; the National Agricultural Policy, 1999; the
National Water Policy, 1999; the Industrial Policy, 1999; the National Shipping Policy, 2000; and
the National Land Development Policy, 2001. While these policy documents may not have express
provisions to spur ICZM development, nevertheless, they assume indirect relevance. Abul Kalam
Azad, Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Bangladesh: Charting out A People Based
Management Framework (MMM Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2002) [unpublished] at 61. The
country has signed 24 and ratified 22 international conventions/treaties/protocols relating to the
environment and natural resources conservation. Ibid at 52. Some of the prominent laws are Forest
Act, 1855, Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950, Territorial Water and Maritime Zones
Act , 1974, Wildlife Preservation Act, 1974, Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Rules, 1977,
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Conservation Rules, 1977. Ibid at 54.
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that battered this country’s coastline.399 In this, the Bangladesh Water Development
Board took the lead, but CZM efforts remained sectoral.400 CZM was initially considered
as an “engineering paradigm” and problems in coastal areas were addressed by
constructing embankments and cyclone shelters.401 Attempts to introduce an area-specific
approach began in 1977 with the establishment of the Offshore Islands Development
Board.402 Thereafter, the Bangladesh National Conservation Strategy, the Coastal
Environment Management Plan for Bangladesh (both in 1987), the Coastal Area
Resources Development Plan (1988), the Special Parliamentary Committee on Coastal
Area Development (1988-90), and a national capacity building initiative for ICZM (1997)
set the stage for the development of an ICZM process.403 The cumulative outcome of
these efforts was the 1999 policy note by the government entitled “Integrated CZ
Management: Concept and Issues,” which provided a conceptual foundation for ICZM.404
This was further elaborated through a Joint Mission of the Bangladesh Government, the
International Development Agency, and the Netherlands Development Assistance that
established the Program Development Office for ICZM in 2002 (with the Ministry of
Water Resources as the lead ministry) and formulated the Coastal Zone Policy 2005.405
The Coastal Zone Policy 2005 (CZP) seeks to “provide … general guidance … for
the management and development of the coastal zone … so that the coastal people are
able to pursue their life and livelihoods within secure and conducive environment.”406
Accordingly, it sets targets for priority actions and arranges for their implementation. It
also provides for an assessment framework. The CZP seeks to create harmony by
transcending sectoral perspectives and deals with eight broad areas aimed at furthering
399

400
401

402
403
404
405
406

It was the catastrophic cyclone and the related tidal surge of 1970, which claimed the lives of more
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development objectives: economic growth for poverty reduction; enhancing livelihood
opportunities; vulnerability reduction; sustainable management and equitable distribution
of coastal resources; empowerment of coastal communities and gender equity.407 It also
calls for measures to conserve and enhance critical aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems,408
control pollution409 and adapt to climate change.410 Furthermore, the CZP provides for
mainstreaming CZM by incorporating coastal development into all national strategy
documents411 and by providing for development of a coastal development strategy.412
Finally, the policy emphasizes the need for an appropriate legislative framework, with the
first step being the preparation of a “Compendium on the Laws Relating to and/or Having
Bearing on Coastal Areas.”413
The 2006 Coastal Development Strategy (CDS) focuses on the implementation of
the Coastal Zone Policy.414 The CDS does not provide an “overall framework and recipe”
for all development actions in the coastal zone.415 Rather, the CDS translates the
development objectives identified in the CZP into nine strategic priorities, including
ensuring access to potable water; ensuring safety from manmade and natural hazards;
environmental conservation; and creating an enabling institutional environment. It also
identifies three strategic routes – “mainstreaming,” “investments” and “governance” – to
implement the strategic priority areas416 and sets the stage for the third tier of
implementation. This tier is the Priority Investment Program, a programme of 20 to 25
projects implemented over a five-year period417 as the responsibility of relevant
ministries and departments.418
One additional aspect that needs mentioning here is who (or what) is responsible
for coastal management in Bangladesh. As noted earlier, three mighty rivers play an
important role in stabilizing, shaping and re-shaping the country’s coastal environment.
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Therefore, it is only natural that the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) plays a lead
role in coastal management by ensuring that the water flow to the sea is maintained and
that there is less salinity intrusion into the estuaries and other water bodies.419 The
MoWR has also constructed embankments to secure the coastal zone and thus has
become the primary agency to implement ICZM in Bangladesh. In addition, several other
ministries and departments have responsibilities in the coastal zone and administer
programmes relevant to an ICZM process. For instance, zoning, which is an integral part
of ICZM, falls within the domain of the Ministry of Land, 420 while the Ministry of
Environment and Forests deals with environmental aspects of ICZM.421

3.2.3.2 Discussion
Despite its rapid strides in operationalizing ICZM, there are some significant flaws in the
Bangladeshi approach to ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation. Clearly,
Bangladesh stands to be severely affected by climate change and SLR and this requires
that the country develop systems and measures to facilitate coastal climate change
adaptation. However, this is no easy task, as the peculiar geographic features, high
population density and widespread poverty render implementation of many CCCA
measures (particularly the retreat strategy) difficult.422 Again, as part of coastal
adaptation efforts, nearly 4,800 kilometers of existing coastal defences need recalibration, while an additional 4,000 kilometers have to be newly created, costing nearly
a billion dollars, which is beyond the financial capacity of this impoverished nation.423
The discussion in the preceding part points out that Bangladesh has yet to enact a
specific legislation for ICZM. Though it recognises that “[s]etting the appropriate
legislative framework is fundamental to effective implementation of the CZP,” 424 the
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CZP is implemented, and the obligation to protect the coastal environment is, as of now,
pegged to a diffused legal framework. According to one estimate, this includes a
minimum of 90 laws.425 Seeking to implement ICZM through such a fragmented legal
framework is not an appropriate approach for Bangladesh, given the anticipated impacts
of SLR. To date, there has only been debate about umbrella legislation on coastal
management. The lack of legally ordained integration between the various ministries and
departments tasked with the responsibility of implementing different facets of CZM has
led to conflicts, and this is perhaps the biggest bottleneck to efficient coastal
management. As pointed out, there are several ministries and departments that have
duties relevant to coastal management.426 The presence of such a vast array of
administrative authorities with jurisdiction over the coastal zones has led to challenges.
For instance, conflicts have been reported between the Ministry of Land and the Ministry
of Environment over administration of water bodies and between the Ministry of
Fisheries and the Department of Forest over fisheries management in the Sunderbans.427
ICZM is a complex process that requires integrated decision-making, something that is
generally hard to secure in countries that have very poor inter-departmental coordination, as different government departments zealously guard their turf. ICZM is all
about compromises and trade-offs, and when it is legally mandated, the parties involved
will have to come together, discuss, develop and implement solutions collectively.
However, as things stand, the present institutional arrangement in Bangladesh is
inadequate to further this objective.428 Not only is there mistrust and conflict between
government departments, but there have also been conflicts between the different
stakeholders (like conflicts between the shrimp culturists and local communities), and
some of these conflicts have turned violent and fatal.429 One prime reason for these
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conflicts is the lack of a dedicated legal statute on coastal management to articulate exact
rights and corresponding duties.
Like most of its counterparts in South Asia, ineffective governance, lack of
effective institutions and widespread corruption plagues Bangladesh. The CZP
emphasizes socio-economic development, eradication of poverty, and gender equity,
which are indicative of the general socio-economic situation. Coastal zone management
is viewed as a broad programme that can eradicate poverty, enhance livelihoods, and
improve governance.430 Clearly, a CZM framework has to be situated within the larger
socio-economic challenges that confront a country. However, to be successful, its
mandate has to be narrower and more realistic. By providing for a sweeping mandate, it
seems that Bangladeshi policy-makers are being overly ambitious. Admittedly, a CZM
programme cannot be oblivious to the socio-economic realities and it will have to address
larger issues of poverty removal. However, it cannot be converted into a tool to tackle the
underlying socio-economic problems facing a country, as this could prove to be its
undoing in the long run. Here, ICZM planning and management can be viewed only as a
sub-set of broader developmental plans and programmes.
Further complicating matters is that coastal management efforts in Bangladesh are
not well-documented and analyzed, thus preventing their use in future endeavors. As
well, ICZM operates in Bangladesh on the basis of specific projects that are funded
primarily by international agencies and foreign governments.431 Once the project or the
funding ends, it is unclear whether sustained efforts are expended to build on the
experience gained.432 This is a serious lacuna in the present coastal management system
in Bangladesh that has actually prevented its entrenchment and metamorphosis.
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3.2.4 Sri Lanka
Separated from the Indian subcontinent by the Palk Strait, the unitary Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka433 has the unique distinction of being the first Asian
country to have a well-defined CZM programme.434 Sri Lanka is an island nation with
1,620 kilometers of coastline435 and an EEZ of 533,000 square kilometers, which is eight
times larger than its land area.436 Fourteen (grouped into five maritime provinces) out of
the 25 districts (grouped into nine provinces) are located on the coasts.437 The capital city
of Colombo and the major railway line and national highway are also situated on the
coasts. The coastal areas make significant contributions to the national economy, which is
expanding, as evidenced by the increasing migration of people to coastal areas and
consequent economic activity.438 The total population of Sri Lanka is 20 million (14
million Sinhalese and 3 million Tamils),439 and the coastal regions accommodate nearly
8.4 million.440 Nearly 65 per cent of the urbanized land area, 17 per cent of agricultural
lands and 20 per cent of home gardens are located in the coastal zones. 441 The coastal
region is also an industrial hub, with 80 per cent of all industrial units. 442 Another
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important driver of the economy, tourism, is mainly coastal-based.443 Tropical Sri Lanka
is rich in coastal and marine biodiversity. However, as will be seen below, these
ecosystems and resources are under considerable stress.
Coastal and marine pollution is on the rise in Sri Lanka, exacting a cost in terms of
human health.444 The large numbers of rivers that flow down to the coasts carry huge
pollution loads from inland areas. Apart from the dumping of industrial effluents,445
pesticide residues and coconut husk retting446 have also adversely affected coastal waters.
Another major pollutant is the discharge of untreated municipal sewage, which results in
fecal contamination.447 Waste disposal also poses problems to the coastal environment.448
Coastal aquifers are being contaminated by leachate of fertilizers, heavy metals,
extensive use of pit latrines, and agricultural run-off.449 In addition, over-extraction of
groundwater has resulted in saline intrusion into the aquifers450 and ballast water
discharged by ships has introduced invasive species.451
Sandwiched between two busy shipping lanes, Sri Lanka has three major ports in
Colombo, Hambantota and Trincomalee, a regional port in Gallee, and a few minor
ones.452 There have been several oil spills in these ports, and the beaches have been
polluted by the accumulation of tar balls.453 This has occurred even though Sri Lanka
enacted the Marine Pollution Prevention Act, 1981, to regulate pollution from oil and
other pollutants generated from sea or land-based sources.454 It also adopted a National
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Oil Spill Contingency Plan, which spells out emergency procedures in the case of an oil
spill.455
The fishing sector is of crucial importance to the Sri Lankan economy.456 While
coastal fisheries are the dominant sector, the offshore fishery is the fastest growing. 457 For
a long time, beach seining dominated coastal fisheries, but its significance declined with
the mechanization of fisheries.458 Generally conducted in bays and in calm waters, beach
seining requires large tracts of beach land for manually hauling the net and for drying the
nets and fish.459 With the development of coastal tourism, the traditional rights enjoyed by
the artisanal sector regarding public access to land on beaches and lagoon fronts has been
denied at several places, resulting in conflicts.460
Coastal fisheries have also been affected by increasing levels of pollution due to
higher industrialization in the coastal zone, and aquaculture operations have ruined local
coastal environments.461 Pond water from shrimp farms are often discharged into
adjoining waters, affecting lagoon fishing and leading to salinisation of wells.462
Mangroves and agricultural lands have been converted to facilitate shrimp culture, and
these actions have triggered a host of other environmental problems.463
In 1961, a series of protected areas was established under the Fauna and Flora
Protection Ordinance, 1937 (as amended).464 This law provides for six categories of
protected areas, including marine sanctuary and nature reserve. The Ordinance has
provisions to protect certain categories of animals and plants, including threatened species
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of corals, fish, turtles, and all marine mammals found in Sri Lankan waters.465 In addition,
the government can declare “fisheries management areas” and “special area management”
under the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act, 1996.466 Despite these laws, protection of
marine and coastal areas exists mainly on paper due to the lack of effective
implementation.467
Tropical Sri Lanka will also be severely affected by SLR, particularly through
coastal erosion along the western and southwestern coasts. 468 Apart from natural factors,
human activities like sand and coral mining and the construction of hard structures to
prevent erosion have amplified the problem. For decades, Sri Lanka has invested
considerable resources in the construction of coastal defense structures. These attempts to
reduce erosion in one area have often aggravated erosion in others.469 It is estimated that
the Sri Lankan coastline recedes, on average, three meters every year.470
Sand mining on beaches or in rivers is one of the primary reasons for coastal
erosion in Sri Lanka as this decreases the presence of coastal sediments. Most
construction activity is concentrated in the northwestern, western and southern provinces,
and it is in these areas that the problem of sand mining is acute and, consequently, so is
erosion.471 Sand mining poses other environmental problems, including lowering of
riverbeds, causing water levels to drop below sea level and resulting in seawater
intrusion.472 Sri Lanka enacted the Soil Conservation Act in 1951 to prevent and mitigate
soil erosion.473 It empowers the Minister to declare “erodible areas”474 and issue
regulations for their management.475 The Mines and Minerals Act, 1992, while granting
licenses for mining, requires the license holder to restore and rehabilitate the land on
which the exploration or mining is carried out.476 In 2005, Sri Lanka formulated a
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“National Policy on Sand as a Resource for the Construction Industry,” 477 which outlines
several management and regulatory principles for sand mining from rivers. It also
provides rules for sand mining from coastal ecosystems like coastal dunes.478
Another catalyst that has contributed to the increasing rate of coastal erosion is
coral mining for the construction industry.479 Although coral mining has existed in Sri
Lanka for long time, it was confined mainly to certain relic reefs. The recent construction
boom has seen an increase in coral mining, contributing to erosion. 480 In response, the
government has banned the mining of sea coral,481 resulting in a decline in the quantity
mined,482but illegal mining involving the use of several destructive practices continues.483
SLR is projected to reach one meter by 2070.484 Since the topography in the coastal
regions is basically flat, the natural drainage path is ineffective and the coastal regions are
already experiencing severe flooding, which SLR will magnify. 485 Salinity intrusion into
groundwater sources in the northern dry zone coastal districts, 486 loss of coastal
wetlands,487 and damage to existing sea defence structures and near-shore
infrastructure488 are some of the possible impacts indentified.
As part of developing its adaptation strategy, the Climate Change Secretariat,489
established under the Ministry of Environment to provide a comprehensive national
approach to address challenges related to climate change, has developed a National
Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, with assistance from the Asian Development
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Bank.490 This document is structured around five strategic thrust areas;491 within each of
these, thematic areas of action are specified along with priority adaptation measures.492 In
addition, Sri Lanka has in its “Second National Communication on Climate Change”
identified certain specific adaptation measures, such as preparation of a groundwater
extraction regulation policy, incorporation of climate change concerns in town and
country planning and wetland conservation programmes, preparation of set-back lines
taking into account SLR, and introduction of salinity-tolerant crops.493

3.2.4.1 Sri Lanka’s Coastal Law
Prior to Sri Lanka’s independence in the 1920s, there was growing interest in coastal
issues, triggered primarily by coastal erosion.494 The initial emphasis was on hard
engineering solutions.495 In 1963, a Coast Protection Unit was set up under the Colombo
Port Commission, which, in 1978, evolved into the Coast Conservation Division (at
present a Department) under the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. 496 To
develop a comprehensive approach to CZM, the Coast Conservation Division lobbied for
the establishment of a legislative framework, which ultimately led to the Coast
Conservation Act, 1981 (CCA).497 Even though, at its enactment, the CCA was way
ahead of its time, in due course, it was increasingly felt that the Act required a substantial
re-write to retain relevance.
The CCA has been amended twice and the recent amendment has almost
overhauled the coastal law of Sri Lanka.498 In fact, after this amendment, the law was
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renamed the Coast Conservation and Coastal Resource Management Act (CC&CRMA)
and its ambit considerably broadened to include not only coast conservation but also
coastal resources management.499 The CC&CRMA calls for four main actions: a survey
of the coastal zone; preparation of a coastal zone and coastal resource management plan
(CZ&CRMP) based on the survey; regulation and control of development activities in the
coastal zone via a permit system; and formulation and execution of work schemes for
coastal conservation and coastal resources management.500 To achieve these objectives, it
vests the “administration, control, custody and management” of the coastal zone with the
Republic,501 which in turn carries out these responsibilities through the two sets of
authorities: the “Director-General of Coast Conservation and Coastal Resource
Management” (Director-General), which is primarily responsible for the administration
and implementation of the CC&CRMA,502 and the “Coast Conservation and Coastal
Resource Management Advisory Council” (the Advisory Council),503 which is primarily
responsible for advisory functions.504 In addition, the Advisory Council also reviews the
CZ&CRMP and environmental impact assessments and forwards recommendations to the
Director-General.505 Apart from these two authorities, the Minister in charge of coastal
conservation is empowered to make regulations to operate certain provisions of this
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statute506 and has the power to declare affected areas, beach parks, conservation and
special management areas, and to formulate regulations relating to their administration,507
and appoint certain members to the Advisory Council.508
Wide powers are conferred on the Director-General to work the CC&CRMA. The
Director-General has the responsibility to formulate and execute coast conservation
schemes;509 prepare and implement the coastal zone and coastal resource management
plan;510 and disseminate information, tender advice and proffer guidance on coast
conservation and coastal resource management to the general public and to other
departments, agencies and institutions.511 In addition, the Director-General cocoordinates the activities of other departments, institutions and agencies that relate to the
coastal zone, including the conduct of research.512 The Director-General can delegate any
of his/her powers to Divisional Secretaries or to prescribed officers. In comparison to the
earlier provision, the amended section now provides for a wider delegation.513
In administering the CC&CRMA, the Director-General is to cause a survey of all
the resources and activities in the coastal zone and prepare a report, 514 on the basis of
which the CZ&CRMP is prepared.515 This document is revised once every five years.516
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As is presently conceived, after the 2011 amendment, the CZ&CRMP emerges as a
detailed blue print for managing the coastal zones covering many areas. It includes
guidelines for coastal resources management and a comprehensive programme for the
conservation of coastal resources targeted towards sustainable development.517 To
maintain “long term stability, productivity and environmental quality of the coastal
zone,”518 development activities therein are subject to a permit system administered by
the Director-General.519 In managing this permit system, the Director-General relies on
criteria prescribed by the Minister.520 The applicant may be required to furnish an initial
environmental examination report or an environmental impact assessment, as the case
may be, which is forwarded to the Advisory Council for its comments.521 The public also
has the right to provide comments on the environmental impact assessment.522 The permit
is issued only if the development activity is consistent with the CZ&CRMP and related
regulations and is valid for such periods as may be prescribed. The Director-General can
attach conditions necessary for the proper management of the coastal zone.523 In cases
where the permit holder violates any of the conditions, the Director-General can vary the
conditions or can even revoke the permit.524
To resolve user conflicts, the 1988 amendment525 to the Coast Conservation Act,
516
517

518
519
520

521
522
523
524

525

Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, ibid, s 9(2).
The plan contains proposals dealing with subjects like coastal erosion management, coastal water
quality, coastal water usage zoning; guidelines in determining the suitability of particular
developmental activities in the coastal zone; identifying the routes paths and corridors to facilitate
public access; recommendations identifying special area management sites, etc. Sri Lanka CCA
1981, supra note 481, s 12(1); Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, ibid, s 9. The CZ&CRMP is submitted to the
advisory council, which in turn makes modifications before submitting it to the minister. Once the
minister receives the plan, it is available for public inspection and comment. Thereafter, subject to
necessary modifications, the Minister grants provisional approval and it is forwarded to the cabinet
for final approval. Sri Lanka CCA 1981, ibid, s 12(2)-(4).
Sri Lanka CCA 1981, ibid, s 14(2).
Ibid, s 14(1).
The minister, having regard to the long-term stability, productivity and environmental quality and
the sustainability of the resources within the coastal zone, can prescribe criteria to be used to
determine whether a permit should be issued. Ibid, s 13; Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, supra note 481, s
10.
Sri Lanka CCA 1981, ibid, s 16; see also Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, ibid, s 12.
Sri Lanka CCA 1981, ibid, s 16(3)(b).
Ibid, s 17.
Ibid, s 19; Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, supra note 481, s 15. The Director can vary the conditions
attached to any permit or revoke the permit, if satisfied that the permit holder has contravened the
conditions attached to the permit and that such variation or revocation is necessary for the proper
management of the coastal zone or the resources therein. Sri Lanka CCA 1981, ibid, s 19.
Sri Lanka CCAA 1988, supra note 481.
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1981 (CCA) provides that “[n]o person shall, by reason of possession or use of any
specific portion of the beach claim to have acquired title to such portion of the beach as
against the State.”526 Furthermore, the right of the public to use or enjoy any portion of
the beach was also guaranteed.527 Despite these amendments, conflicts continued between
the fishing and tourism industries. There have also been conflicts between the artisanal
and mechanized segments of the fishing industry. To address these issues, the 2011
amendment seeks to secure coastal access.528 Accordingly, the Director General is tasked
with the duty to identify through a survey all routes, paths and corridors, which,
facilitates public access to beaches and coastal zones. Based on these findings, a
comprehensive report (coastal access plan) is prepared, which is submitted to the
Advisory Council.529 Based on recommendations, the coastal access plan is modified and
put before the public domain for comments.530 The public can forward their comments
within 60 days, to the Director-General, who incorporates them in the plan.531 Thereafter,
a revised plan is submitted to the minister, who places it before the cabinet for
approval.532 Once the plan secures cabinet approval, it is gazetted to render it
operative.533 As well, the Minister can make regulations specifying matters that need to
be included in the Coastal Access Plan, the activities that can be carried out, and details
regarding ownership of the lands inclusive of extents and locations.534
To secure protection to the coastal environment and to strengthen the provisions
relating to coast conservation and coastal resources management, section 19 of the Coast
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Ibid, s 8 (inserts section 31D(1) in the Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 31D(3) in Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
“[C]oastal access” means the right of the public to approach,
enter, or use an approach to enter into or to go along a coastal
margin in a physical and visual sense and also includes access
along the shoreline, usually a strip of land parallel to the water’s
edge or path or trail which runs parallel to or along the shoreline,
path or trail which connects the nearest public roadway with a
shoreline destination along a reasonable direct route or access to
the shoreline from a public road to the Mean High Water Level.
Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, supra note 481, s 36(1).
Ibid, s 19 (inserts section 22(F)(1) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 22(F)(3) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid (inserts section 22(F)(4) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 22(F)(5) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
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Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2011 inserts new tools into the principal enactment.535
The first is the concept of “affected areas”. The amended section now empowers the
Minister to declare any area within or adjacent, or falling within both such areas in the
coastal zone, any water body or a part thereof, any lagoon or part of any lagoon or its
peripheral areas as an “affected area”.536 All detrimental developmental activities,
including those sanctioned by under the permit (e.g., the filling, obstruction, pollution or
the carrying out of any act that can harm aquatic and marine life) are prohibited in the
affected areas and are liable to be punished.537 In addition, the Minister can make
regulations for the administration of affected areas and activities prohibited in such
areas.538
The second tool is the “beach park”.539 Accordingly, if the Minister is of the
opinion that any area within the coastal zone due to its scenic beauty and biodiversity
needs preservation, the area can then be declared as a “beach park”, and regulations can
be made for its administration.540 The Minister is also empowered to declare
“conservation areas”, in which special measures can be implemented to protect coastal
and aquatic eco-systems. Even though development activities, the collection and
gathering of aquatic resources are prohibited in such areas, the Director-General can issue
permits for scientific study and research.541 Again, the Minister is empowered to make
regulations prescribing the manner and the mode of administration of such areas.542
Another important feature of the 2011 amendment is that it entrenches the concept
of “special management areas” to facilitate a collaborative approach to resource
management.543 Accordingly, the Minister has the discretionary powers to declare coastal
zone areas and those lying adjacent to it or comprising both these areas, as “Special
Management Area,” provided that these are included within the Coastal Zone and Coastal
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Ibid (inserts parts IIIA, IIIB, IIIC and IIID (sections 22B, 22C, 22D, 22E, 22F, and 22G) into Sri
Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts part III A (section 22B(1)) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 22B(2), (3) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 22 B(6) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 22C(1) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid.
Ibid (inserts section 22D(2) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 22D(3) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 22E(1) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
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Resource Management Plan.544 As in the case with others, the minister can make
regulations prescribing administrative details for such areas (i.e., the activities that can be
carried out and the persons entitled to have access).545
Apart from prohibiting the mining of sea corals within and outside the coast,546 the
Sri Lankan coastal law proscribes the filling of land or water bodies within the coastal
zone without a permit.547 In cases where this prohibition is violated, the Director-General
can call upon persons responsible to remove the substances used for filling up the land or
water body and restore the same to its original state within a specified time.548 If the
restoration is not completed, then the Director-General can remove the substance and the
costs can be recovered from the concerned person as arrears due to the state.549

3.2.4.2 Remarks
Even with certain drawbacks, Sri Lanka’s experience with coastal law making is a model
worthy of emulation by other countries not only within the South Asian region but also
beyond. As pointed out, this country has the distinction of being the first Asian nation to
have a comprehensive programme for CZM.
A first-generation coastal law enacted well before the entrenchment of the concept
of ICZM at the international level, the Coast Conservation Act 1981 has been remarkably
resilient in operationalization of ICZM in Sri Lanka. The proclivity towards ICZM is
evident even from the definition given to the term “coastal zone,” which is the area of 300
meters landwards from the mean high water line and two kilometers seawards from the
mean low water line.550 It is notable that the Coast Conservation Act 1981 provides for
spatial integration, which is central to an ICZM process. The recent amendment has
considerably strengthened and fortified the ICZM regime in Sri Lanka. As well, from an
ICZM perspective, this coastal law now provides legal recognition to the right of public
access to coastal areas,551 contains provisions to control marine pollution,552 protects
544
545
546
547
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Ibid (inserts section 22E(1), (2) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 22 E(2) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid, s 29 (inserts section 31BB into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid, s 32 (inserts section 31G into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 31G(1), (2) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Ibid (inserts section 31G(8) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981).
Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 481, s 42.
Sri Lanka CCAA 1988, supra note 481, s 8 (inserts section 31D(1) & (3) into Sri Lanka CCA 1981);
see also Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, supra note 481, part IIID.
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sensitive coastal ecosystems like coral reefs,553 and requires that the CZ&CRMP inter
alia provide for coastal erosion management,554 and zoning of coastal water usage.555 By
including 'zoning of coastal water usage', the drafters of the 2011 amendment seek to
establish inter-linkages between ICZM and marine spatial planning.556
Until the recent amendment of 2011, only one amendment was carried out to this
law during the past three decades.557 This is primarily because this is a framework law
that provides a broad structure and the tools for CZM. The details of the management
process are worked out through CZ&CRMPs. The first CZ&CRMP was developed in
1990. It dealt with managing the critical coastal problems of that time, namely, erosion
control and sand and coral mining. Subsequently, in association with the University of
Rhode

Island,

the

Coast

Conservation

Department

prepared

“Coastal

2000:

Recommendations for A Resource Management Strategy for Sri Lanka’s Coastal Region”
(Coastal 2000), in 1992, which spearheaded Sri Lanka’s movement towards ICZM.558
In the revised Coastal Zone Management Plan of 1997, based on the principles of
Coastal 2000, SLR was linked to the broader goal of coastal erosion control and attention
was also directed to new areas of concern like marine pollution. More importantly, in a
marked shift in perspective, this second generation CZ&CRMP initiated a new bottom-up
and collaborative management strategy to complement the top-down approach by
providing for a new tool, namely, “special area management.”559 In the 2004 version of
the CZ&CRMP, apart from subjects that were dealt with by the earlier CZ&CRMPs, the
emphasis shifted to integrating coastal fisheries and aquaculture, facilitating public
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Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 481, s 25; see also Sri Lanka CCA 1988, ibid, s 8 (inserts section
31C into Sri Lanka CCA 1981, which calls for the demolition of kilns in the coastal zone); see also
Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, supra note 481, s 32.
See Sri Lanka CCA 1988, ibid, s 8 (inserts s 31A which prohibits the mining of corals within the
coastal zone); Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, ibid, s 29.
Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, ibid, s 9.
Ibid.
For the European Union approach on linking ICZM and marine spatial planning, see also Ch 9, Part
9.3.2.2.
Sri Lanka CCAA 1988, supra note 481.
See generally S Olsen et al, eds, Coastal 2000: Recommendations for A Resource Management
Strategy for Sri Lanka’s Coastal Region, vols 1 & 2 (Colombo: Coast Conservation Department and
Coastal Resources Center, Sri Lanka & the University of Rhodes Island, 1992); John R Clark,
Integrated Management of Coastal Zones, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No 327 (Rome: FAO,
1992) at 581.
Revised Coastal Zone Management Plan, 1997, supra note 443 at 97.
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access, and using new regulatory mechanisms. It has been decided to provide greater
emphasis to climate change considerations in the next revision of the CZ&CRMP.560
In conclusion, it can be seen that Sri Lanka has one of the best normative
frameworks on CZM supported by comprehensive ICZM plans. Despite this, coastal
degradation continues, and this points to the need for effective implementation of the
laws. However, other issues must also be considered. Sri Lanka was in the grip of Asia’s
longest running civil war that lasted for more than 30 years.561 During this period, the
writ of the national government did not run in the war-torn regions of the north and the
east. Among the eight SAARC countries, even though Sri Lanka has the highest level of
human development, there is large regional disparity attributable to the prolonged
conflict.562 Now, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam having being militarily
defeated, the first priority of the national government is reconciliation and initiation of
development in these regions.563 Prior to the outbreak of the war, the Tamil-dominated
northern provinces played a very important role in sustaining Sri Lankan fisheries. In
1983, about 40 per cent of the total marine fish production of the country was from
Mullaitivu, Jaffna and Mannar.564 The conflict has completely destroyed the fishing
industry and efforts are now being directed to resuscitating them.565 There is also
considerable potential for tourism development in these regions.
Coming in the wake of a culmination of nearly three decades of civil war, the new
amendment to the coastal law is indicative of Sri Lanka’s intention to utilise and manage
its coastal resources to promote economic development. Thus, the law is not solely about
coast conservation but also about coast conservation and coastal resource management.
Nonetheless, Sri Lanka continues to adopt a dirigiste approach to coastal management
and regrettably, the new amendment to the coastal law practically fortifies the ‘command
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Sri Lanka, Second National Communication, supra note 441 at 93.
Jayashree Bajoria, “The Sri Lankan Conflict” (18 May 2009), online: Council on Foreign Relations
<http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/sri-lankan-conflict/p11407>.
UNDP, Sri Lanka Human Development Report, supra note 439 at 13; see generally ibid at ch 7.
C Bryson Hull, “Sri Lanka president pledges reconciliation, development” Reuters (10 April 2010)
online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/>.
Wadakkin Wasantham, Accelerated Fisheries Sector Development Plan for the Northern Province
in Sri Lanka, online: Ministry of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources Development <http://
www.fisheries.gov .lk/>.
For a summary of damage caused to economic and social infrastructure in the northern province, see
UNDP, Sri Lanka Human Development Report, supra note 439 at 6; see generally ibid at ch 7.
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and control’ method. As of now, there is provision only for a single national ICZM plan.
Moreover, the recent amendment to the law does not contain any provision relating to
decentralization and the involvement of local bodies in coastal management.566 Tamil
representation from the war-torn north has not been secured in the constitution of the
Advisory Council even though the amendment, while recasting the Advisory Council,
specifically provides that the Minister can appoint three persons: one representing
academic staff from the Universities, one representing non-governmental organizations
concerned with coastal environment protection, and the other representing the fishing
industry.567 Employment of such wide legislative language does not necessarily guarantee
representation of Tamil coastal communities in the body.
Such a centralized approach to CZM may not prove successful in the long run.
There may be the need for ICZM plans at the provincial level that takes into
consideration the development aspirations and conservation objectives espoused by each
coastal province in the context of the national constitutional dynamics and development
imperatives.
The CC&CRMA has proven to be a remarkably adaptable tool for achieving
sustainable coastal management. Despite the 2011 amendment, the CC&CRMA may
have to be re-visited in light of new thinking on CZM law. The CC&CRMA does not
embody the concept of a principled approach to coastal and ocean governance. Rather, it
facilitates tightening state control over coastal areas and resources by vesting them in the
Republic.568 In other words, the CC&CRMA is more state-centric and less people-centric.
The Sri Lankan coastal law mirrors the Indian approach, which provides for public
participation in the preparation of CZ&CRMPs but subsequently undermines communitybased management of coastal areas and resources. As well, the strategy for combating
566
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See generally Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, supra note 481. There are four levels of government in Sri
Lanka. At the apex, there is the central government with a 225 member parliament. The next layer is
the nine provincial councils, followed by 18 municipal councils and 42 urban councils, which
administer large and small towns. The 270 Pradeshiya sabhas (village councils) are the last layer,
which administer villages. UNDP, Sri Lanka Human Development Report, ibid at 111. Provinces
and local bodies are dependent on the central government for funds and because of the civil war
there was shortage of funds. Ibid at 113.
Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, ibid, s 7.
See Sri Lanka CCA 1981 as amended by Sri Lanka CCAA 2011, supra note 481, s 2. The Sri Lankan
government has been reluctant to implement the 13th amendment to the constitution, brought about
by the Indo-Lanka Political Accord of 1987, which is an important attempt to devolve power to the
Tamil provinces. UNDP, Sri Lanka Human Development Report, supra note 439 at 3.
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climate change and SLR needs to be strengthened, as the thrust has primarily been
limited to controlling coastal erosion. Climate change and SLR are treated as sub-sets of
coastal erosion when, in reality, the problems posed by climate change and SLR are more
grave and complex and warrant an independent but holistic approach.

3.2.5 The Maldives
The smallest Asian country, the Maldives is a low-lying archipelago situated on the
Laccadives-Chagos submarine ridge in the heart of the Indian Ocean.569 It comprises
nearly 1,192 small low-lying islands, out of which 194 support human habitation,
infrastructure and economic activities and are grouped into 26 atolls to form a chain over
820 kilometers in length, spread over an area that is more than 90,000 square kilometers
in the Indian ocean.570 Maldives remains isolated and is surrounded by a vast Indian
ocean. It has very little terrestrial resources, and with an EEZ that is about 959,100 square
kilometers,571 it has more territorial sea (67,000 square kilometers)572 than land. Thus,
this country depends heavily on the sea and its marine wealth for its existence.
With 80 per cent of Maldives less than a meter above sea level, 573 (the average
ground level being only 1.5 meters above sea level) and with more than half of its
population and other critical infrastructure (airports, ports, sewerage systems, etc.)
located within 100 meters of the coastline, there is high possibility that many of these
islands, the infrastructure and human settlements will be submerged in due course. 574 In
fact, the Maldives is one of the lowest countries on the planet, and if sea levels were to
569
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Maldives, GEF, UNDP & Ministry of Environment, Energy & Water, National Adaptation
Programme of Action (NAPA) [nd] at 7, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/doc
s/napa/mdv01.pdf> [Maldives, NAPA].
Ibid; see also Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy, State of the Environment 2011 (2011)
at 22 [Maldives, State of the Environment 2011]. The largest atoll is Huvadhu Atoll, which covers
an area that is approximately 2,800 square kilometers. The smallest atoll is, Thoddoo Atoll, has an
area of 5.4 square kilometers. Ibid at 22. The largest island is Gan in Laamu Atoll, with an area of
5.16 square kilometers. Ibid at 23. Maldives has two international airports and three domestic
airports, and 11 more are being planned. Ibid at 39.
Maldives, online: Mangroves for the Future <http://mff08.fatcow.com/Countries/Maldives.html>.
John C Pernetta, ed, Marine Protected Areas Needs in the South Asian Seas Region, A Marine
Conservation and Development Report, vol 3: Maldives (Gland: IUCN, 1993) at 1 [Pernetta,
Maldives].
IDA & IFC, Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Maldives, Report No 41400 – MV
(World Bank Group: South Asia Region, 2007) at 81 [IDA & IFC, Country Assistance].
Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, supra note 570 at 61.
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rise by 50 centimeters, this could prove catastrophic.575 With the climb in sea level
predicted to hover around 1.7 millimeters per year, climate change and SLR represents an
“existential threat” to these islands.576 Other climate change impacts will also profoundly
impact the Maldives. Already, 41 islands have experienced severe erosion,577 powerful
tidal waves have hit the islands,578 and the prevalence of vector borne and respiratory
diseases has increased.579 In addition, an increasing trend in sea surface temperature has
been observed580 and tropical cyclones are predicted to increase in intensity by ten per
cent.581 In several ways, this country epitomizes a worst-case scenario of SLR and
climate change impacts on Small Island Developing States.
The population of Maldives is more than 300,000 and more than a third live in the
capital Malé, which has an area of less than two square kilometers.582 With only less than
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Maldives is an archipelago of 26 natural atolls, consisting of 1,190 coral reef islands in the Indian
Ocean. Out of the 200 islands that are inhabited, 89 islands are used as tourist resorts. The islands
are scattered over an area of 750 kilometers from north to south and 120 kilometers from east to
west covering around 90,000 square kilometers. About 99.5 per cent of its territory consists of
ocean. Eighty per cent of the land area in the Maldives is less than one meter above mean high tide
level. The highest elevation in the country is only 2.4 meters above sea level. Climate Change –
Impacts, Policies and Strategies for Adaptation and Mitigation for the Maldives APFIC Workshop
on Implications of Climate Change on Fisheries and Aquaculture, online: Asia-Pacific Fishery
Commission <http://www.apfic.org/uploads/smartsection/357_Maldives.pdf> [Climate Change–
Impacts, Policies]. As well, when the Tsunami struck Maldives, it “pretty much submerged” the
entire country for a few minutes. Jon Hamilton, “Maldives Builds Barriers to Global Warming”
NPR (28 January 2008), online: npr <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=18425626>; see also ibid at 34. Maldives is the sixth smallest sovereign state in terms of land area.
Ninety six per cent of the land area of the islands are less than one square kilometer in area. Only 10
islands are more than 2.5 square kilometers. The largest island Gan (Laamu Atoll), has an area of
6.1 square kilometers. Land is highly scarce and the 358 islands that are currently in use account for
176 square kilometers. The remaining unutilized islands make up only 59 square kilometers.
Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569 at 19.
Ali Hashim, “Address” (Governor’s Speech delivered at the 43rd Annual Meeting, Board of
Governors, Asian Development Bank, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1-4 May 2010) at 2, online: ADB
<http://www.adb.org/AnnualMeeting/2010/GOV/AM2010-MLD.pdf>; see also Maldives, State of
the Environment 2011, supra note 570 at 60.
Ibid at 61.
On 15th May 2007 and four days since, powerful swells hit Maldives affecting 88 islands on 18
atolls. Ibid at 62; Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569 at 16.
Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, supra note 570 at 69.
Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569 at 15.
Ibid.
Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569 at 9. Fifty-six per cent of the population is children and youth with
41 per cent under 15 years of age. The average population size in these islands is 900. Maldives,
State of the Environment 2011, supra note 570 at 27. The population of Maldives has increased by
57 per cent over the last 25 years. Ibid at 35. Thirty-four islands have already reached their carrying
capacity, while 17 islands will exhaust the available land by 2015. Ibid at 64.
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one per cent of this country habitable, land is the scarcest and most precious resource.583
This makes it difficult to accommodate the growing population.584 Previously, all land
was owned by the state, which granted permission to private individuals for construction
purposes. It was only after the introduction of the Maldivian Land Act in 2002 that
individuals could acquire private ownership rights.585 The new Constitution also
recognizes the right of citizens “to acquire, own, inherit, transfer or otherwise transact …
such property”586 subject to the state’s power of acquisition for the “public good.”587
Consequently, private ownership over land is steadily increasing, particularly in Malé and
other urban areas.588 This change in the nature of land tenancy raises the issue of access
to beachfronts for traditional fishing communities.
Since land and water resources are limited, the soil is largely infertile, and coastal
agriculture is confined to a few basic crops.589 Agricultural production in the Maldives is
extremely low, leaving this island a major importer of food products. 590 Moreover, local
products have to compete with imports, which are lower priced.591 In the event of an
extreme climatic event, this could result in serious food shortages and insecurity. 592 The
Maldives has no surface water sources except for a few freshwater ponds (kulhis) and
freshwater lakes and therefore dependence on groundwater is almost complete.593
However, potable groundwater resources are also very scarce, so the overwhelming
majority of the population depends on rainwater tapped from rooftops and stored in
tanks.594 In the capital of Malé, the residents have access to desalinated water through a
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Maldives, NAPA, ibid at 19.
Ibid at 21.
(Law No 1/2002, Maldives), s 1(a).
Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 2008, translated by Dheena Hussain, online: Ministry of
Tourism
Arts
and
Culture
<http://www.maldivesinfo.gov.mv/home/upload/
downloads/Compilation.pdf> [Constitution of the Republic of Maldives].
Ibid, art 40.
The Government of Maldives, “Aneh Dhivehi Raajje”: The Strategic Action Plan, National
Framework for Development 2009-2013, at 444, online: The President’s Office, Republic of
Maldives <http://www.p residencymaldives.gov.mv/> [“Aneh Dhivehi Raajje”].
The total land area of Maldives is only 300 square kilometers. Maldives, State of the Environment
2011, supra note 570 at 23.
Pernetta, Maldives, supra note 572 at 14; see also ibid at 52, 53.
Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, ibid at 53.
Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569 at 35.
Shaheedha Adam Ibrahim, Mohamed Rasheed Bari & Leon Miles, “Water Resources Management
in Maldives with an Emphasis on Desalination”, online: SOPAC <http://www.pacificwater.org/u
serfiles/f/Case%20Study%20B%20THEME%201%20Maldives%20on% 20Desalination.pdf>.
Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, supra note 570 at 82.
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piped network.595 Sewage pollution is a major cause for concern, as it contaminates water
supplies, making it unfit for human consumption.596
Despite the inhospitable nature of its environment, Maldives is the only South
Asian country that has managed to secure the Millennium Development Goal of
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.597 This is a rare and unique achievement for any
country, let alone one from a region in which large sections of humanity live on less than
a dollar a day.598 However, as the economy is primarily tourism-based, any change in the
environment can significantly impact the economic well-being of this country.599
To a great extent, the stability of these islands depends on the health of its coastal
reefs.

600

The coral reefs act as natural sea defenses.601 Given the rapid pace at which the

climate is changing, the corals may not offer adequate protection to the Maldives beyond
2050.602 Until that time, they could potentially delay the worst effects of SLR. However,
the corals are being degraded to facilitate development of tourism-related infrastructure
and are also under considerable threat from bleaching due to changes in ocean
temperature. This has affected tourism prospects, fisheries, and food security.603
A related issue is that of mining, primarily for construction purposes.604 The
massive boom in construction of cement houses and high-rise concrete buildings has led
to an increased demand for sand. To meet this demand, river sand and aggregates are
usually imported from India,605 but this is very expensive. As a result, illegal coral sand
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Ibid at 85.
Ibid at 87.
The World Bank, Maldives Overview, online: The World Bank, Country, Maldives, Overview
<http://www.worldbank.org/>.
Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, supra note 570 at 41.
The tsunami reduced the real GDP growth of this country by -4.6 per cent in 2005. Ibid at 44.
Ibid at 38.
Pernetta, Maldives, supra note 572 at 17.
Ibid.
Jean-Luc Solandt & Chris Wood, Observations of Reef Conditions on Central Maldives Reefs, 2005
(surveyed from 23 June to 7 July 2005, with additional notes from 10-21 January 2005): A Report
by the Marine Conservation Society in Collaboration with Maldives Scuba Tours (2005) at 6.
Climate change related risks on the coral reefs are exacerbated by human activities like coral
mining, anchor and snorkeller damage, improper sewage disposal, and overexploitation of reef fish.
Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569 at 74.
“Sand Mining Might Erase Some Islands from Map of Maldives,” BLUEPEACE Blog (17 July
2008), online: BLUEPEACE <http://www.bluepeacemaldives.org/blog/biodiversity/sand-miningmight-erase-so me-islands-of-maldives>.
Ibid.
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mining continues, threatening the stability of the islands.606
To augment the limited land supply, Maldives has implemented several land
reclamation schemes.607 Sand is pumped from the atoll lagoon floor and layered onto reef
flats to form new land.608 This process is environmentally harmful, as it destroys reef flat
communities, increases the level of suspended sediments,609 and also adversely affects
neighboring coral reef communities.610 Moreover, changing the shape of the island alters
wave refraction patterns, interfering with local wave and current regimes and enhancing
the rate of coastal erosion.611 The lack of space poses problems for waste disposal. The
Thilafushi waste disposal site, built on a reclaimed lagoon, receives all kinds of wastes,
including hazardous substances that threaten the surrounding ocean.612 As well, untreated
sewage effluents are disposed into coastal waters, contaminating the environment.613
The sovereign and independent Maldives is a unitary democratic republic based on
the principles of Islam, which influences its CZM regime. 614 In 2008, the Maldives
adopted a new constitution that guarantees every citizen “the right to a healthy and
ecologically balanced environment.”615 It imposes upon the state “… a fundamental duty
to protect and preserve the natural environment, biodiversity, resources and beauty of the
country for the benefit of present and future generations.”616 Another important feature of
the Maldivian Constitution is that it stipulates decentralised administration.617 To
facilitate people-oriented development, it empowers citizens by promoting grassroots-
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The largest land reclamation project is the creation of the Hulhumale' (Kaafu Atoll), an artificial
island that is approximately two square kilometers, reclaimed to reduce population pressure on
Male'. Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569 at 22.
Pernetta, Maldives, supra note 572 at 15.
“Towards an Artificial Paradise on Earth,” BLUEPEACE Blog (24 May 2008), online:
BLUEPEACE <http://www.bluepeacemaldives.org/blog/biodiversity/towards-an-artificial-paradiseon-earth>.
Pernetta, Maldives, supra note 572 at 15.
Ibid.
Table 2.5: Waste Transported to Thilafushi from Malé, 2003-2008, (in tons), online: Department of
National Planning, Republic of Maldives <http://planning.gov.mv/yearbook2009/Environment/2.5.h
tm>.
“Sewage around Male’,” BLUEPEACE Blog (22 April 2008), online: BLUEPEACE <http://www.bl
uepeacemaldives.org/index.htm>.
Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, supra note 586, art 2.
Ibid, art 23(d).
Ibid, art 22.
Ibid, arts 230-235.
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level democracy.618 The Maldives does not have legislation on CZM. However, there are
several general laws that may make up for this deficiency. A primary reason for the nonenactment of a dedicated coastal statute is the small sizes of the islands, which, in their
entirety, are treated as coasts.619
The most important among the general environmental laws is the Environmental
Protection and Preservation Act of Maldives, 1993 (EPPA) based on the principles of
inter-generational equity and sustainable development.620 The EPPA empowers
government authorities to issue guidelines and to provide advice on matters relating to
environmental protection, which responsible actors should take into consideration in their
activities.621 Section 10 provides that the government can claim compensation for
environmental damage.622 From the perspective of CZM, section 4 is important as it
provides for the identification of protected areas and natural reserves and the
development of rules for their preservation. Accordingly, Maldives has established 39
protected areas, out of which 25 are marine protected sites.623 Other notable features
include provisions for environmental impact assessments,624 the power to terminate
projects that pose undesirable impacts on the environment, and a prohibition on the
disposal of hazardous, toxic or nuclear wastes.625
Fisheries have long sustained life on these islands. More than 20 per cent of the
population depends on fisheries for their livelihood, which are also the primary export.626
In recent years, there has been a marked decline in fish production and local fish
consumption has also decreased.627 Traditionally, Maldivian fishermen relied on the
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Maldives, Act on Decentralization of the Administrative Divisions of the Maldives, 2010 (Draft),
online: shareefweb <http://www.shareefweb.com/documents/LocalGovReforms/MaldivesDraftlaw
&regulations/Draft%20Translation%20of%20decentralisation%20ActMaldives.pdf>.
Abdulla Naseer, “Pre-and Post-tsunami Coastal Planning and Land-use Policies and Issues in the
Maldives”, online: FAO Home <http://www.fao.org/>.
Environmental Protection and Preservation Act of Maldives, 1993 (Act No 4/1993, Maldives), s 1
[EPPA].
Ibid, s 2.
Ibid, s 10.
Maldives, State of the Environment 2011, supra note 570 at 32.
EPPA, supra note 620, s 5; Maldives, Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water, Environmental
Impact Assessment Regulations, 2007 (Maldives, [nd]), regs 3-11.
EPPA, ibid, ss 7-8.
Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569 at 10.
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environment-friendly pole and line fishery.628 However, this may soon be replaced by
long line fishing as the government has withdrawn restrictions on the latter.629 This may
trigger intense competition, which may affect coastal health and adaptive capacity. As
well, climate change has led to the warming of the seas, leading to fish migrations and
further reducing the supply.630
Tourism is the life-blood of the Maldivian economy, contributing to more than onethird of its GDP.631 Since the first resort opened in 1972, this industry has seen an
exponential growth with a turnover of about USD198 million annually632 and a total bed
capacity reaching 19,028 in 2007.633 Despite the 2004 tsunami, tourist arrivals have
increased at an average annual rate of eight per cent over the last 10 years.634 The tourism
industry is primarily regulated by the Maldives Tourism Act, 1999,635 which determines
the zones and islands that can be developed for tourism, the leasing of islands and lands,
and the management of all such facilities, including the operation of tourist vessels,
diving centers and travel agency services.636 From an environmental perspective, section
15 proscribes the dredging of lagoons, reclamation of land, and felling of coconut palms
and trees on any island or land that has been leased for development as a tourist resort,
unless authorized by the Ministry of Tourism.637
The Maldives is party to several international environmental law instruments and
these have influenced the development of its domestic legal regime. They have also
played a pivotal role in drawing the attention of the international community to the
vulnerability of small islands to climate change and SLR. In 1989, Maldives hosted the
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Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise which produced the Malé Declaration on
Global Warming and Sea Level Rise, 1989 (Malé Declaration)638 that set out a
programme of action for small states in relation to climate change, global warming, and
SLR.639 As far as CCCA is concerned, due to the unique physical characteristics of the
islands described earlier and the undiversified nature of its economy, 640 the country has
very little capacity to adapt and minimal variations in temperature and sea levels can
upset the fragile equilibrium. Maldives has developed a National Adaptation Programme
of Action, which broadly recognises the importance of climate change adaptation.641 The
document identifies several adaptation actions, affording top-most priority to building
capacity for coastal protection, CZM and flood control.642 Other prominent coastal
adaptation measures include implementation of integrated reef fishery management; safe
rainwater harvesting; recharging of aquifers, etc.643 In addition, the document also
recognizes several projects to protect the islands from SLR.644 Another important aspect
in relation to implementing adaptation is that given its limited perimeter, scarcity of land
and extreme low elevation, it is practically difficult for Maldives to implement the
options of retreat and establishing setbacks. Accordingly, proactive CCCA schemes, like
beach replenishment, hard coastal armouring, and creation of artificial islands are the
primary options available.
Maldives has yet to enact a specific ICZM law and has adopted a rather sectoral
and fragmented approach to coastal management that is rooted in several general
environmental laws. The most prominent of these is the Environment Protection and
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“Male’ Declaration on Global Warming and Sea Level Rise” (1990) 5:2 Int’l J Estuarine & Coast L
401 (HeinOnline) [“Male’ Declaration”].
Ibid, ¶1.
The fisheries sector provides employment for 13,890 fishermen as well as around 6,000 artisanal
fish processors of ‘Maldive fish’. Fisheries accounts for six per cent of GDP and 98 per cent of
exports. See Climate Change–Impacts, Policies, ibid.
See generally Maldives, NAPA, supra note 569.
Ibid at 43.
Ibid at 43-44.
For instance, “Coastal Protection of Safer Islands to Reduce the Risk from Sea Induced Flooding
and Predicted Sea Level Rise” is priority project no. 2 in the Maldives NAPA. This adaptation
project seeks to demonstrate innovative measures appropriate for the protection of small islands to
reduce their vulnerability. Accordingly, there is to be a detailed technical and engineering study on
coastal protection options and adaptation measures for five safer islands and thereafter
demonstration coastal protection measures will be implemented in these islands. The total project
cost is about USD13,931,000 and predicted long-term output is to increase the resilience of safer
islands. Ibid at 50, 51.
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Preservation Act of Maldives, 1993, which has only indirect relevance to the objectives
of CZM. Due to the small size of the islands, the entire territory is considered as “coast”
and the management response is moulded accordingly. However, in contrast, other small
island states (for example, Barbados645 the Marshall Islands646) have dedicated statutes on
CZM and integrated sectoral efforts to produce a more holistic response to the problems
that confront them. Interestingly, the Malé Declaration647 inter alia recommended,
“where necessary, all states must take immediate measures to establish the institutional
framework to protect and manage their coastal zones and to enact legislation to facilitate
such measures.”648 Maldives is in the throes of developing a national framework for
ICZM,649 and in light of this, implementing ICZM through a dedicated coastal law could
be a more feasible and practicable option for the country to secure its development
imperatives, prevent fragmentation, secure greater integration, and at the same time deal
with the basic challenges to its territorial existence posed by climate change and SLR.
Specifically, a coastal law for Maldives could help this country majorly to protect and
conserve sensitive coastal ecosystems, which can bolster the country’s climate change
adaptation strategies to produce long-term tangible results. Nevertheless, given Maldives’
vulnerability to climate change impacts and the strong possibility that this country may
eventually be lost to the rising waves, it may become necessary for the island nation buy
land territory or even merge with another country.650 Until then, the Maldives has to
persist with a proactive approach to CCCA based on an ICZM process.

3.3

INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AND COASTAL CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION IN SOUTH ASIA: A COASTAL LAW AUDIT

The inescapable conclusion that emerges from these national reports on the state of CZM
in South Asia is that in spite of the convergence of evidence and dire predictions relating
to SLR and climate change, their potential consequences have not been afforded due
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consideration in their national CZM regimes in the different South Asian coastal
countries. The legal aspects of coastal zone management are often sidelined, and hence
there are very few dedicated coastal laws in South Asia that truly support the
implementation of an ICZM process. In general, as is evident from the national reports,
most of these countries have been constrained from adopting a proactive approach to
operationalizing ICZM to ensure the sustainable development of their coastal areas and
resources as the emphasis has largely been on utilising coastal resources to secure shortterm economic benefits which in all cases might not be environmentally sustainable.
More importantly, these countries have also been unsuccessful in employing ICZM as a
core adaptive strategy to counter challenges to the sustainability of their coastal
ecosystems, environment and resources, particularly in the event of SLR.
India’s experience holds several important lessons for coastal managers, the most
important being how a coastal law can be used as an effective instrument for zoning,
when generally it is the land use and planning legislations that provide for the same. This
is a tool that will increasingly be utilized in the coming years to plan and situate coastal
development in the event of SLR. All the same, India presents a classical example where
decision-makers are frequently confronted with this dilemma and, where, for short-term
economic gains and myopic development, genuine environmental considerations are
often slighted. This is why the government could not implement the CRZ 1991 in its true
spirit. The CRZ 1991 may be the only coastal law in the world to have been amended
nearly 25 times during its two-decade lifespan, and yet the government appears unsure on
how to move forward and implement the ICZM agenda to harmonize coastal
development with coastal environmental considerations. Presently, the country’s
coastline is experiencing rapid changes due to economic development, most of which is
at the cost of environmental integrity, resulting in a growing sustainability crisis. As seen,
the recent CRZ 2011 has also not been able to resolve the stalemate, as it adopts a rather
cautious approach to ICZM, and the concept of hazard line management practically
pushes large segments of coastal populations right into harm’s way.651
After decades of internal strife, Sri Lanka is now experiencing a period of peace.
The writ of the national government for a long time did not run in the war-torn Tamil651

See Parts 3.2.1.5, above for more details.
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dominated north and eastern coastal provinces. Even though an ICZM-friendly law has
been in place since 1981, it is doubtful whether the Coast Conservation Act has had any
perceptible impact on the management of the coastal areas in these regions. Moreover, as
seen, the Coast Conservation Act is a first generation coastal law that does not
accommodate the requirements and challenges posed by climate change and SLR.
Immediately upon conclusion of the civil war, the national government passed the Coast
Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2011, with emphasis on coastal resources management.
This was a broad indication of the resolve of the national government to exploit coastal
resources. Nevertheless, the amendment does not facilitate decentralization of coastal
management or ensure public participation in the decision making process; rather, it
fortifies and further entrenches the bureaucratic and centralised model.652 In such a
situation, the coastal law amendment, if imaginatively employed, could have become an
instrument to promote comprehensive economic growth of the war-ravaged coastal
regions and could ensure inclusiveness and the economic well-being of the Tamils.
Bangladesh and Maldives represent worst-case scenarios in terms of the impact of
SLR because both countries stand to lose large chunks of their territories due to the rising
seas. Bangladesh has not yet enacted a national law for ICZM, although it has come a
long way in developing a national policy and a development strategy for ICZM. Being
one of the poorest nations, the primary concerns in Bangladesh are poverty eradication,
employment generation, and reduction of socio-economic inequities.653 Here, ICZM is
viewed as an instrument to attain broader development objectives like gender equality.654
While it is true that an ICZM law is a social welfare legislation that cannot be oblivious to
the larger socio-economic issues that entrap a country and that improving socio-economic
conditions definitely helps advance adaptation capacity, it has to be emphasized that
ICZM espouses a much narrower mandate. As well, Bangladesh has to advance coastal
legislation that can help it manage coastlines effectively and plan for coastal climate
change adaptation, especially since conflicts frequently erupt between different
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See Part 3.2.4, above, for more details on the centralised nature of the Sri Lankan model on coastal
management.
See Part 3.2.3, above, for an overview on the socioeconomic conditions in Bangladesh.
See supra notes 406 & 407.
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stakeholders regarding their rights and entitlements over the coastal zone.655 For
Maldives, climate change and SLR pose questions of survival, which may be beyond the
scope of an ICZM regime.656 Nevertheless, an ICZM law that furthers CCCA may help to
decelerate the process of destruction through careful planning and optimal use of coastal
resources. In the federal state of Pakistan, CZM is a domain determined by the provinces.
Although both Sindh and Balochistan have enacted coastal legislations, given the
dimensions of the anticipated impacts of climate change and SLR in coastal regions, they
may prove inadequate. As well, the protection of the Indus river delta from a rising
Arabian sea requires the maintenance of definite quantities of water supplies clearly
warranting greater intervention at the federal level.657As the discussion reveals, on the
whole, the ICZM law in South Asia stands on extremely weak ground and there are not
many concerted national efforts to bolster it. Except for Sri Lanka, it is doubtful whether
the other coastal countries even have ICZM plans in the true sense of the term.658 The
institutional capabilities in most of the South Asian countries to implement ICZM are
seriously deficient and existing approaches seem unable to respond to the scale of the
problems posed by climate change. Therefore, these approaches have to be realigned and
scaled up to the new challenges and demands. As well, climate change adaptation is
generally treated as a fringe activity in these developing nations. Especially, in the South
Asian context, apart from being a natural resources management and environmental
protection legislation, a coastal law emerges as a classical example of social welfare
legislation as well, a progressive force that can spur the economic development of
impoverished coastal communities and their adaptive capacities and attainment of
sustainable development in the coastal context.659 Unfortunately, the present design of
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these coastal laws, as seen from the above national reports, does not inspire confidence
that SCD can be attained at any time in the near future.

3.4 CONCLUSION
The depth of investigation in this chapter reveals that, in general, the South Asian
coastline is more vulnerable today than at any time in the past and is experiencing rapid
changes such as intense cyclonic storms, salinity ingress, sea surges, rising sea surface
temperatures and SLR. Yet these problems are not specific to South Asia but are rather a
microcosm of coastal problems that confront several coastal regions in different parts of
the world. Specifically, the impact of all this on fishing and other traditional coastal
communities is enormous. And the challenge in South Asia is how to foster SCD while
balancing and promoting environmental, social, and economic development objectives in
mutually reinforcing ways, while at the same time providing for CCCA. The foregoing
discussion points out that, even though some amount of integration has been attempted in
some of the countries at the national level in coastal South Asia, the observable reality is
that there is large disjoint between the obligations prescribed by the different national
coastal law regimes and their practical observance. The existing legal statutes erected for
coastal management do not provide for unanticipated challenges posed by SLR. Most of
the laws are inapplicable to new situations, in large part because these laws operate
primarily on a sectoral basis. Government efforts to manage coastal development and
protection proceeds on an issue-by-issue basis, and there is very little coordination
between the programs. The attitude of the national governments in the South Asian
region has been laggard and this apathy can prove very costly to these nations. The
institutional capabilities in most of the South Asian countries to implement ICZM are
also seriously deficient, with existing approaches unable to respond to the scale of the
problems posed by climate change. Some more obvious reasons for this are political
instability, lack of financial resources, absence of trained personnel, and corruption.
Additional factors have hampered ICZM implementation is that the parties are more
motivated by poverty eradication concerns and their need to quickly develop their
national economies than by climate change concerns. It is clear that these countries are in
various stages of legislative sophistication regarding the ability to protect their
environments. This does not bode well for a region that stands to be severely impacted by
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climate change and SLR. Clearly, ICZM remains at the periphery of coastal management
efforts in South Asia, and this is where the challenge lies. Whatever ICZM programmes
exist, they are still germinating and not showing signs of favorable growth or evolution.
Certainly, there is room for improvement in the coastal management framework of
all of these countries. At heart, there has to be a paradigm shift in how coastal spaces and
resources are administered – a move away from the present piecemeal approach to
coastal management to a new holistic system that is people-centric and environmental
friendly and not merely development oriented. The new approach also has to be
promotive of social-ecological resilience and should integrate actors and actions on a
wide rage of fronts to make them consistent and coherent. More importantly, the
framework should be supportive of adaptive programmes to meet the challenges posed by
the impending calamity of SLR. In sum, what these coastal countries of South Asia need
are new management systems and legal frameworks that can help attain SCD and
promote greater cooperation between these nations. Laws, policies and systems for ICZM
and CCCA should be put in place to reduce conflict and provide for effective
management, with the ultimate aim of sustainable coastal development. In this context, it
must also be noted that climate change and SLR does not recognize man-made
boundaries. Already in South Asia there is a looming possibility of climate change
refugees crossing national borders and moving into nearby coastal countries. As well, it is
also apparent that climate change impacts will not be uniform throughout the region and
that devastation may be more amplified in some countries than in others. It is also evident
that the coastal countries in South Asia are not on the same footing in relation to their
ability to adapt to climate change and SLR and moreover, the consequences of actions in
one country can have transboundary ramifications, some of which can detrimentally
affect the stability and eco-resilience of coastal systems in other countries. It is in this
context that one has to look at the possibility for greater regional cooperation and
regional mechanisms on ICZM implementation. This aspect will be explored in greater
detail in part IV.
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PART II

MOVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE COASTAL DEVELOPMENT BY LINKING INTEGRATED
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AND COASTAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
The purpose of this part is to explain the concepts of sustainable coastal development,
coastal climate change adaptation and ICZM and their inter-relationship. It doing so, it
provides the doctrinal foundation for this thesis and is laid out in three chapters as
follows. The first chapter, namely, chapter four explains the intricacies of sustainable
coastal development. It accomplishes this objective by discussing the concept of
sustainable development, which is premised on the idea that environmental and
development agendas are inseparably inter-linked. It also explores the changing
conceptions of sustainable development and argues that given the brooding omnipresent
nature of the phenomenon of climate change and its potential to overturn development, it
is necessary also to consider climate change mitigation and adaptation concerns, if
sustainable development is to be achieved in its true sense. Based on this nuanced
understanding of sustainable development, the chapter proceeds to explain the concept of
sustainable coastal development. Chapter five is devoted to analysing climate change
adaptation, its status in international law and its relevance to the coastal zone. Even
though sustainable development has widespread international recognition, one major
reason as to why the efficacy of sustainable development has been reduced is the absence
of specific pathways to operationalize such development in different settings.
Fortunately, there is little doubt that ICZM is the most sustainable method for managing
degraded coastlines, and accordingly chapter six describes this concept in greater detail.
It also posits that the interlinking of the lateral development of ICZM and CCCA could
produce ideal and sustainable solutions for the coastline.
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CHAPTER 4

UNDERSTANDING SUSTAINABLE
COASTAL DEVELOPMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION
As the previous chapters demonstrate, reckless development, unsustainable resource
exploitation and marine pollution have placed South Asia’s coastal environments under
enormous stress. Generally, on the waterside of the coastal baseline, the primary stressors
are over-exploitation of fishery resources, degradation of water quality due to land-based
sources of marine pollution, and the spread of invasive species from increased maritime
transportation. On the landward side, to support the needs of an ever-increasing coastal
population, coastal regions accommodate colossal infrastructure in terms of thermal and
nuclear power plants, industries, mines, sewage treatment plants, major and minor ports,
railway and roadways, etc. All of this economic development requires waterfront
expansion, which places excessive demands on fragile coastal ecosystems and resources,
threatening their ecological resilience and sustainability. These problems are further
exacerbated by dehumanising poverty and by large populations concentrated on narrow
strips of coastal land, particularly in low-lying areas, such as, flood plains and the banks
of estuarine environments. The consequences of rising sea levels and changing weather
patterns will only aggravate this situation by increasing vulnerability and stifling future
development.1
It is against this backdrop of growing environmental degradation and growing
threats posed by sea level rise (SLR) and climate change that the concept of sustainable
coastal development (SCD) must be examined. Section 4.2 delineates the concept of
sustainable development, highlighting its uniqueness and centrality in international
environmental law. Based on this understanding of the evolving dimensions of
sustainable development, the section 4.3 defines the term “sustainable coastal
development” or “coastal sustainability.”
1

See generally C Nellemann, S Hain & J Alder, eds, In Dead Water: Merging of Climate Change
with Pollution, Over-harvest, and Infestations in the World’s Fishing Grounds (Arendal: UNEP
GRID-Arendal, 2008) at 42; see also Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean Acidification on Marine Biodiversity, Technical Series
No 46 (Montreal: Secretariat of the CBD, 2009).
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4.2 THE DIALECTIC OF SUSTAINABLE COASTAL DEVELOPMENT
Since the close of the Second World War, global powers have been advancing a set of
goals, under the umbrella term ‘development’, that can be summed up simply as peace
and security, economic development, social justice, human rights, and good national
governance.2 At the outset, environmental protection found no place in this paradigm, as
it was generally believed that pollution and the degradation of the natural environment
was the unavoidable cost of material progress.3 However, the fallacy of this argument
became obvious as environmental destruction began to endanger the stability of lifesupport systems, threaten socio-economic progress, impair the quality of national
governance, and destabilize peace and security. 4 Environmental considerations and
general human progress were then viewed as essential elements that cannot be sidelined
in a developmental discourse, and the concept of sustainable development emerged as an
alternative path towards economic growth. Sustainable development departs from a
model that is determined solely on the basis of higher gross domestic product to one that
is centered on environmental protection, economic development, and social equity and
justice.5
This section begins by tracing the history of sustainable development, its
entrenchment in international and national environmental law, and its changing
dimensions. Based on this understanding of sustainable development, the discussion will
then analyze the meaning of the term SCD, which is the ultimate objective of all
management efforts in coastal zones.
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John C Dernbach, “Making Sustainable Development Happen: From Johannesburg to Albany”
(2004) 8 Alb L Envtl Outlook 173 at 174-75 (HeinOnline) [Dernbach, “From Johannesburg to
Albany”]; John C Dernbach, “Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance”
(1998) 49 Case W Res L Rev 1 at 9-14 (HeinOnline) [Dernbach, “Sustainable Development”].
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Environmental stress can be a source of conflict. World Commission on Environment &
Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) at 290-94. The wars of
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184

4.2.1 The Concept of Sustainable Development and Its Changing Contours
The notion that humankind should live in tandem with the surrounding environment was
a central leitmotif in many ancient civilizations.6 However, this notion officially fell out
of favor in the modern developed world until the Stockholm Conference of 1972, which
emphasized the need to re-work the conventional developmental model to factor in the
concept of environmental protection.7 The primary product of the Stockholm Conference

6

7

Vice-President Weeramantry opines in Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), “[s]ustainable development is thus not merely a principle of modern
international law. It is one of the most ancient ideas in the human heritage.” See [1997] ICJ Rep 7.
See Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, at 107, online: International Court of Justice
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7383.pdf>. Under the Judeo-Christian traditions, God gives
mankind complete domination over the natural world. See Alex Geisinger, “Sustainable
Development and the Domination of Nature: Spreading the Seed of the Western Ideology of Nature”
(1999) 27 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 43 at 49 (QL). This stands in contrast to the Hindu philosophy where,
humans are viewed as integral to nature. Emperor Asoka in the third century B.C. issued an edict to
preserve wild life and environment. “Twenty-six years after my coronation, I declare that the
following animals were not to be killed, parrots, mynas, . . . cranes, bats, queen, ants, terrapins,
boneless fish, rhinoceroses . . . and all quadrupeds which are not useful or edible . . . Forest must not
be burned.” cited in Bihar v Murad Ali Khan (1989), [1989] AIR SC 1 (India SC). The Supreme
Court of India has observed
[t]he Indian society has, since time immemorial, been
conscious of the necessity of protecting environment and
ecology. The main moto of social life has been to live in
harmony with nature. Sages and Saints of India lived in
forests. Their preaching contained in Vedas, Upanishadas,
Smritis, etc. are ample evidence of the society's respect for
plants, trees, earth, sky, air, water and every form of life. It
was regarded as a sacred duty of every one to protect them. In
those days, people worshipped trees, rivers and sea, which
were treated as belonging to all living creatures. The children
were educated . . . about the necessity of keeping the
environment clean and protecting earth, rivers, sea, forests,
trees, flora fona and every species of life.
Fomento Resorts & Hotels v Minguel Martins (2009) CA No 4154 of 2000, ¶36 (India), online:
Indian Kanoon <http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1238478/>.
At Stockholm, there was divergence of opinion between developed and developing countries. For
the developed countries, environmental degradation was the biggest threat facing the planet, while
for the developing nations represented by Group 77, it was poverty. The developing nations feared
that developed countries would use environmental standards to block entry of their goods into
developed country markets. Finally, a compromise was reached to affirm that economic
development was not necessarily incompatible with environmental protection, and that development
could proceed provided it avoided damaging the environment. Lakshman Guruswamy,
“International Environmental Law: Boundaries, Landmarks, and Realities” (1995) 10 Nat Resources
& Env’t 43 (HeinOnline); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, 16 June 1972, 11:6 ILM 1416 [Stockholm Declaration]. The Stockholm Conference
produced a groundbreaking declaration that contains 26 principles, the notable ones being the right
to a quality environment (ibid, prin1), the “responsibility to protect and improve the environment”
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was its Declaration, which, though not binding, spurred the development of international
environmental law,8 with its principles and concepts later confirmed and elaborated upon
in several other treaties.9 The concept received precise articulation when the World
Commission on Environment and Development, chaired by then Prime Minister of
Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, issued her 1987 landmark report entitled “Our
Common Future” or simply, the Brundtland Report.10 The striking aspect of the work of
the Brundtland Commission was that it clearly recognized that the attainment of the four
basic components of development necessarily requires the realization of environmental
protection.11 Subsequently, in 1992, the Earth Summit at Rio endorsed sustainable
development as one of the central tenets of international environmental law, even though
the Rio Declaration did not specifically define sustainable development. 12 Together, the
27 principles of the Rio Declaration13 and the 40 chapters of Agenda 2114 laid the
groundwork for the progressive realization of the goal of sustainable development.15

8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15

(ibid) and the no-harm rule against significant transboundary environmental pollution or damage
(prin 21)).
Guruswamy, ibid.
Marc Pallemaerts, “The Future of Environmental Regulation: International Environmental Law in
the Age of Sustainable Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process” (1996) 15 JL
& Com 623 at 626-27.
See generally World Commission on Environment & Development, supra note 4.
Dernbach, “Sustainable Development”, supra note 2 at 19.
See Alhaji BM Marong, “From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of International Legal
Norms in Sustainable Development” (2003) 16 Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev 21 at 30-31 (QL).
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, 14 June 1992, 31:4 ILM 874 [Rio Declaration]. Some of the prominent principles
introduced by the Rio Declaration include the right to development (ibid, prin 3), common but
differentiated responsibilities (prin 7), reduction and elimination of unsustainable patterns of
production and consumption (prin 8), public participation in environmental decision-making (prin
10), trade-environment linkage (prin 12), the precautionary principle for dealing with scientific
uncertainty (prin 15), the polluter-pays principle (prin 16), promotion of environmental impact
assessment (prin 17), protection of indigenous people and local communities (prin 22), and a
reaffirms the no-transboundary-harm rule (prin 2).
See generally Nicholas A Robinson, ed, Agenda 21 & The UNCED Proceedings, vol 4, 3rd series,
International Protection of the Environment (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1993).
“[H]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a
healthy and productive life in harmony with nature”. Rio Declaration, supra note 13, prin 1. Half of
the Rio principles contain the norm sustainable development. See George (Rock) Pring, “The 2002
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development: International Environmental Law
Collides With Reality, Turning Jo'Burg Into“Joke’Burg”” (2002) 30 Denv J Int'l L & Pol’y 410 at
413 (QL).
186

The Earth Summit also resulted in three major environmental treaties: the United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),16 the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),17 and the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification (UNCCD),18 which also underscored the centrality of sustainable
development. Other important outcomes of the Earth Summit were the creation of the
Global Environment Facility19 and the United Nations Commission on Sustainable
Development.20 Both bodies continue to play significant roles in operationalising
sustainable development. At the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, nearly 189 countries
adopted the Millennium Declaration, pledging themselves to the Millennium
Development Goals to reduce poverty, improve health, promote peace and human rights,
and secure environmental sustainability by 2015.21 The seventh goal calls for the
integration of the principles of sustainable development into country policies and
programmes and to reverse the loss of environmental resources. Recently, Rio+20, which
took place 20 years after the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, renewed political commitment
towards sustainable development. Its primary outcome document, “The future we want”

16

17
18

19
20

21

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
1993, 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993). Convention on Biological
Diversity, online: CBD Home <http://www.cbd.int/>.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York 9 May 1992) [UNFCCC].
Even though negotiated in the framework of the UNCED, the convention was released only two
years later. United Nations: Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 21 September 1994, 33 ILM 1328
(adopted 17 June 1994).
Global Environment Facility: Investing in Our Planet, online: gef <http://www.thegef.org/gef/>.
UN, CSD: About the CSD, online: UNCSD <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/csd/csd_aboucsd.shtml>
(establishment of the Commission on Sustainable Development); Establishment of the Commission
on Sustainable Development, E/1993/207, UNESC, 1993, online: United Nations <http://www.un.
org/documents/ecosoc/res/1993/eres1993-207.htm> (detailing the functions of the Commission);
Institutional Arrangements to Follow up the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, A/Res/47/191, UNGA, 47th Sess (1993), online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/r es/47/ares47-191.htm>.
The eight Millennium Development Goals and its targets are based on the UN Millennium
Declaration by which world leaders committed themselves to a new global partnership to reduce
extreme poverty by 2015. See generally United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2,
UNGA, UN Doc A/55/L.2 (2000); see also Summit on the Millennium Development Goals 20-22
September 2010, online: United Nations Millennium Development Goals <http://www.un.org/mill
enniumgoals/>. For the most recent report, see The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008
(New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008).
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emphasizes the need to “mainstream sustainable development at all levels.” 22 The
document focuses on two themes: (a) a green economy in the context of sustainable
development and poverty eradication; and (b) the institutional framework for sustainable
development. In addition to these themes, the document calls for action on a wide range
of areas such as energy, sustainable cities, food security and sustainable agriculture,
water, oceans, and disaster readiness.
As a legacy of these milestones, sustainable development has emerged as a cardinal
standard to test the eco-soundness of all developmental actions, and now appears in the
majority of environmental treaties, agreements, and legislation (including in a few
national constitutions).23 It is also being increasingly utilized as a touchstone in the
judicial review of environmental cases.24 Yet, despite normative entrenchment of
sustainable development and progressive economic growth in developing countries, both
environmental degradation and poverty remain widespread. That these problems persist is
a testament to the complexities involved in pursuing sustainable development.25 At the
same time, there has been a growing realization that hard law treaties and soft law
commitments are not producing tangible results on the scale initially contemplated.26 In a
marked departure from the general pattern previously adopted to expand international
environmental law by creating new hard and soft law commitments, it was resolved at the
22
23

24

25
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UN RIO+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want,
A/CONF.216/L.1*, 19 June 2012, ¶3.
See David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human
Rights, and the Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). For instance see, "[e]veryone has the
right … to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through
reasonable legislative and other measures that … secure ecologically sustainable development". See
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (S Afr), No 108 of 1996, s 24.
Shehla Zia v WAPDA, (1994) PLD 693 (Pak SC). This case dealt with the setting up of grid station
in a residential area and possible health impacts. In emphasizing the need for sustainable
development, the court held that “a method should be devised to strike balance between economic
progress and prosperity and to minimize possible hazards”. Ibid. The traditional concept of
development and ecology as opposed to each other is no longer acceptable. “Sustainable
Development” is the answer. See Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v India, (1996) [1996] (5) SCC
647 (India SC) [Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum].
Even though global poverty rate will fall below 15 per cent by 2015, it will still be under the 23 per
cent target. See The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011 (New York: United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2011) at 7.
S Jacob Scherr & R Juge Gregg, “Johannesburg and Beyond: The 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development and the Rise of Partnerships” (2006) 18 Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev 425 at 43132 (QL) (outlining difficulties in treaty implementation, like reluctance to utilize dispute resolution
mechanisms and lack of funding).
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2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (Rio+10), held in Johannesburg, to
reinvigorate the implementation of Agenda 21 and the concept of sustainable
development through partnerships.27
As explained, “[t]hese ‘second type’ of outcomes … consist of a series of
commitments and action-oriented coalitions focused on deliverables and … contribute in
translating political commitments into action.”28 This change in emphasis is the product
of a growing realization that achieving sustainable development is not the sole
responsibility of a single actor such as the United Nations or of national governments.
Rather, it is a process requiring input and effort on the part of several players, including
the private sector, transnational corporations, international organizations, academic
institutions, civil society, and, more importantly, local communities.29 Partnerships help
leverage the potential and resources that these players make available, all of which can be
channeled towards attaining sustainable modes of development.30

27

28

29
30

Two types of outcomes were promoted at Johannesburg. The first is type I, which refers to
documents or agreements negotiated by states, including political agreements like conventions and
declarations. The second, namely, Type II outcomes are a series of action-oriented deliverables that
translates political commitments into action. Marion Wilson, “The New Frontier in Sustainable
Development: World Summit on Sustainable Development Type II Partnerships” (2005) 36
VUWLR 389 at 392 (QL). Even though the two are interlinked, Type II partnership initiatives are
not intended to substitute Type I commitments. To have WSSD status, such partnerships must be
registered with the Commission on Sustainable Development. UN Commission on Sustainable
Development, Report on the Eleventh Session (27 January 2003 and 28 April-9 May 2003),
E/2003/29, E/CN17/2003/6, UNESC, Official Records, 2003, Supplement No 9 (2003) ¶22. Some
of the major criticisms against Type II partnerships are that it creates no legal obligations, it diverts
government’s attention from Type I agreements and that there is lack of accountability. Wilson, ibid
at 401-5. Partnerships cannot be a substitute to international treaties rather they should be tied to
international standards, goals and objectives. See Scherr & Gregg, ibid at 425; UNESC,
Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.17/2004/16,
Commission on Sustainable Development, 12th Sess (2004) at 3.
Partnerships/Initiatives to Strengthen the Implementation of Agenda 21 (To be Elaborated by
Interested Parties in Preparation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development for Launching
at the Summit): Explanatory Note by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, Third Summit
Preparatory Committee (PREPCOM 3) 25 March-5 April 2002, New York, online: Johannesburg
Summit 2002 <http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/prepcom3.html>. Some 300
public-private partnerships were created focusing on six major areas, namely, water and sanitation,
energy, health, agriculture, biodiversity and ecosystem management, and finance, trade and
globalization. Hari M Osofsky, “Defining Sustainable Development after Earth Summit 2002”
(2003) 26 Loy LA Int’l & Comp L Rev 111 at 124 (QL).
Wilson, supra note 27 at 392.
Symposium, Keynote Address, The Road from Johannesburg January 28, 2003 (2003) 15 Geo Int’l
Envtl L Rev 809 at 822 (QL). But see Scherr & Gregg, supra note 26.
189

Based on this line of reasoning, the major outcomes of the Johannesburg Summit
were two documents. The first was the Declaration on Sustainable Development,31 a
political statement reaffirming commitment to sustainable development, and the second
was the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation,32 which is also a non-binding, aspirational
document that calls upon national governments to adopt measures to promote sustainable
development in a multitude of areas.33 The concept of partnerships was taken a step
further at Rio+20, where nearly 700 voluntary commitments, mobilizing more than
USD500 billion in actions involving diverse stakeholders (such as national governments,
the United Nations system, financial institutions and NGOs), all targeted the
implementation of sustainable development practices.34
At this point, it is noteworthy to observe the change in emphases in describing the
milestone conferences that led to the development of international environmental law,
which is also indicative of the growing acceptance of the centrality of sustainable
development. While the 1972 Stockholm Conference focused on the human environment,
by 1992 the emphasis had shifted to the environment and development, and then, at the
Johannesburg Conference, shifted further to sustainable development. This term has since
guided developmental actions to ensure that they remained environmentally consistent

31
32

33

34

UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, Draft Political Declaration Submitted by the
President of the Summit: Corrigendum, A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev.2/Corr.l (4 September 2002).
"Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development" in UN, Report of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September
2002, A/CONF.199/20* (New York: UN, 2002) at 6 [Johannesburg Plan of Implementation].
The Johannesburg Plan is divided into 11 sections and it emphasizes that these “efforts will also
promote the integration of the three components of sustainable development, economic
development, social development and environmental protection as interdependent and mutually
reinforcing pillars.” Ibid at 2, ¶2.
The importance of partnerships in implementing sustainable development can be discerned from the
following observation of Sha Zukang, the Rio+20 Conference Secretary General, "[t]his Conference
is about implementation. It is about concrete action. The voluntary commitments are a major part of
the legacy of this Conference. They complement the official outcome of the Conference.” RIO+20
Voluntary Commitments, online: RIO+20-United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/790Summary%20of%20Voluntary%20Commitmen
ts%20Registered%20at%20Rio20%20v6.pdf>. Some of these commitments are coast-related like
“Climate change mitigation through sustainable management of coastal ecosystems”, “Ocean
Watch: Assessment and Promotion of Progress in the Implementation of the 1992, 2002, and 2012
Global Commitments On Oceans, Coasts, and Small Island Developing States (SIDS)”, and
“Building Oceans Readiness: Capacity Development for Integrated Ocean Governance.” Voluntary
Commitments: Governments, online: RIO+20-United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development <http://www.uncsd2012.org/allcommitments.html>.
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and workable in the long-term.35 Despite sustainable development being a fundamental
norm in international36 and national law37 as well as in the enunciations of several
international judicial bodies38 and national judiciaries,39 it is still in the development
phase, so to speak, regarding how it is to be realized.40 As far as its normative definition
is concerned, the principal formulation remains the one suggested by the Brundtland
Report:
[s]ustainable development is development that
meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to
35
36
37

38

39

40

Sumudu A Atapattu, Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law (New York:
Transnational Publishers, 2006) at 91.
For further details on sustainable development application in international law, see infra notes 7684.
For instance, see Sustainable Development Act, RSQ 2006, c D-8.1.1, s 6. It provides the following
guiding principles for attaining sustainable development, namely, health and quality of life, social
equity and solidarity, environmental protection, economic efficiency, participation and commitment,
access to knowledge, subsidiarity, inter-governmental partnership and cooperation, prevention,
precaution, protection of cultural heritage, biodiversity preservation, respect for ecosystem support
capacity, responsible production and consumption, polluter pays, internalization of costs. Ibid.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226 at
241, ¶29. Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ
Rep 14 [Case Concerning Pulp Mills]. This case deals with the installation and operation of pulp
mills on the banks of River Uruguay, which forms the boundary between Argentina and Uruguay.
Way back in 1975, both countries concluded the statute of the River Uruguay, which established the
Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU) for the optimal and rational utilization of
the river. The primary complaint by Argentina was that the two pulp mills that Uruguay authorized
to be built on its side of the river threatened the health of the river and that of the local residents and
were in violation of the statute. The court decided that Uruguay breached the procedural obligations
contained in the 1975 statute, namely, the obligation to inform CARU and Argentina of the activities
that it planned to undertake in the river. But since Argentina failed to prove that significant
environmental damage would occur, the mill could continue to operate. Interestingly, the 1975
statute does not mention sustainable development as one of its objectives. However “optimum and
rational utilization” is the “cornerstone of the system of co-operation established in the 1975 statute
and the joint machinery set up to implement this co-operation" (¶174). In interpreting the term
‘optimal and rational utilization’ the court held it as something akin to sustainable development. It
was held that “. . . the attainment of optimum and rational utilization requires a balance between the
Parties’ rights and needs to use the river for economic and commercial activities on the one hand,
and the obligation to protect it from any damage to the environment that may be caused by such
activities, on the other” (¶175). See generally On Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No 17, Advisory
Opinion (1 February 2011) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Seabed Disputes
Chamber) [On Responsibilities and Obligations, ITLOS, Advisory Opinion].
For instance, see Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum, supra note 24; Andolan v India, (2000) [2000]
(10) SCC 664 (India SC) (sustainable development in the context of dam construction) [Narmada
Bachao Andolan]; People United for Better Living in Calcutta-Public v West Bengal, (1993) [1993]
AIR 1993 215 (Calcutta HC) (sustainable development and wetland conservation).
Michael McCloskey, “The Emperor has No Clothes: The Conundrum of Sustainable Development”
(1999) 9 Duke Envtl L & Pol’y F 153 (WLeC).
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meet their own needs. It contains within it two key
concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the
essential needs of the world’s poor, to which
overriding priority should be given; and the idea of
limitations imposed by the state of technology and
social organization on the environment’s ability to
meet present and future needs.
… In essence, sustainable development is a process
of change in which the exploitation of resources,
the direction of investments, the orientation of
technological development, and institutional
change are all in harmony and enhance both
current and future potential to meet human needs
and aspirations.41
As can be seen from this definition, sustainable development, at a conceptual level,
underscores the need to integrate environmental concerns into developmental decisionmaking. However, the terms obfuscate the undercurrents and conflicts between the
various interests. How and who determine present needs, but what is meant by not
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs?42 Does the term
‘needs’ refer to basic needs or does it imply something broader? 43
definition mask a deeply anthropocentric bias?
41
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And does this
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World Commission on Environment & Development, supra note 4 at 43, 46. The International Law
Association defines it as
a comprehensive economic, social and political process, which
aims at the sustainable use of natural resources of our planet and
the protection of the environment on which nature and human
life as well as social and economic development depend and
which seeks to realize the right of all human beings to an
adequate living standard on the basis of their active, free and
meaningful participation in development and in the fair
distribution of benefits resulting there from, with due regard to
the needs and interests of future generations.
International Law Association, Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development (1992-2002) New Delhi
Conference: Final Conference Report (Kamal Hossain & Nico Schrijver, Members, 2002) at 6.
“[S]ustainable development has become a buzzword largely devoid of content ... a concept [that]
provides little policy traction.” Daniel C Esty, “A Term's Limits: Many flocked to the banner of
sustainable development, but it led them nowhere”, Foreign Policy (1 September 2001) at 74-75.
Sustainable development is only a manifestation of Western ideology and it equates human quality
of life with economic growth and views nature only as a useful resource to man. Geisinger, supra
note 6 at 66-67.
Felix Rauschmayer et al, What About Needs? Re-conceptualising Sustainable Development
(Sustainable Europe Research Institute (SERI) Working Paper No 8, 2008) at 14.
Ole Pedersen, Alwin Pillai & Anne-Michelle Slater, “Justice and Sustainable Development:
Compatibility or Conflict? A Scottish Case Study” in Duncan French, ed, Global Justice and
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Another factor that compounds the sustainable development riddle is the absence of
a specific roadmap to sustainability. Thus, regardless of sustainability being part of
customary international law,45 and regardless of government commitments to
sustainable development and the growing tendency of the general public to internalize a
green culture,46 ecosystems continue to degrade, and poverty and pollution remain
widespread.47 The inability to work out sustainability at macro-spatial scales necessitated
re-thinking just what economic growth and development actually mean and what they
imply. The World Commission on Environment and Development also emphasized that,
in certain circumstances, it was necessary to transform the meaning of the 'quality of
growth', as “[s]ustainable development involves more than growth. It requires a change in
the content of growth, to make it less material- and energy-intensive and more equitable
in its impact.”48
To facilitate this transformation, it is essential to refocus developmental efforts in
order to highlight limitations on exploitation and consumption of natural resources.49
For instance, a hydropower plant should not be viewed merely as a means to produce
more electricity. Rather, the consequences of the project on the environment, on local
communities, on marginalized sections, and even future generations should be given due
consideration. If it is not possible to secure the balance espoused by sustainable
development, abandonment of the project on the grounds that it will disturb a rare
ecological system can be “a measure of progress, and not a setback to development.”50
Clearly, the emphasis should not be on ephemeral short-term economic gains but on longterm sustained economic growth. Such an approach comports with the principles of
precaution in addition to intra- and inter-generational equity.51
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Sustainable Development, Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2010) 363 at 370-71.
Sustainable development falls short of a principle of customary international law and is more a
legitimate expectation. Marong, supra note 12.
Emily Fisher, “Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Same Planet, Different
Worlds?” (2002) 26 Environs Envtl L & Pol’y J 201 at 202 (HeinOnline).
For an overview of coastal and marine pollution and degradation, see Ch 1.
World Commission on Environment & Development, supra note 4 at 52.
Ibid at 53.
Ibid at 54 [emphasis added].
For more details on these principles, see Ch 5, Part 5.3.1.
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The wisdom of not pursuing development in certain cases where the social and
environmental costs are too high has yet to find widespread acceptance, particularly in
South Asia, due to economic compulsions. In the guise of striking a balance between
environment and development, short-term and myopic economic considerations are
afforded predominance over other considerations.52 This is an extremely dangerous
trend, amplified by the far-reaching changes presently occurring in the climate system.53
Has sustainable development been reduced to mere tokenism, a convenient label that is
pasted over a developmental project to pass off its environmental credentials, when in the
majority of cases, the project is environmentally indefensible?54
Conceptually, our present understandings of sustainable development are rooted in
the idea that “the possibilities open to people tomorrow should not differ from those open
today….”55 These, however, do not adequately capture the nuances of this concept, which
is now increasingly being viewed through the lens of human development. Immediately
in the wake of de-colonization and the rise of communism, the dominant belief was that it
was best to leave the engines of development in the hands of the state. 56 However, with
the fall of socialism and a subsequent growing proclivity towards privatization,
deregulation, free-market economy, liberalization and globalization, the development
paradigm had to be re-designed.
52

53
54

55
56

For instance, see Narmada Bachao Andolan, supra note 39. It was held that even though the
construction of the dam would undoubtedly result in changes to environment, it was not correct to
presume that it would result in ecological disaster. India has an experience of over 40 years in dam
construction and the experience shows that it is wrong to assume that the construction of large dams
are not cost effective or that it leads to ecological or environmental degradation. On the contrary, the
construction of large dams has lead to ecological upgradation. Ibid.
For an overview of climate change impacts on the coastal zone, see generally Ch 2.
This is precisely what happened in the South Indian state of Kerala where it was decided to forgo
developmental benefits in the interests of conservation by dropping the Silent Valley Hydro Project.
World Commission on Environment & Development, supra note 4 at 54; see also ibid at 66, note 4;
see generally, Tony George Puthucherril, From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling:
Evolution of a Legal Regime, David Freestone, ed, 5 Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development
(The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) [Puthucherril, Shipbreaking]. At Rio, development
interests won the all-important noun, and all other interests - environment, society, culture,
governance, human rights, etc. were relegated to being the adjective. See Pring, supra note 15 at
412.
UNDP, Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All (New
York: UNDP, 2011) at 17 [UNDP, HDR 2011].
Dani Rodrik, “The ‘Paradoxes’ of the Successful State” (1997) 41:3-5 Eur Econ Rev (Paper and
Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Congress of the European Economic Association) 411 at 412
(ScienceDirect).
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In this period of structural adjustment programmes and transformation, the state
began to retrace from its role of commanding the heights of the economy, and private
enterprise stepped in.57 Non-state actors and the invisible hand of the market fuelled
development.58 While considerable material progress was achieved and large sections of
society began to experience improved living standards, it soon became apparent that the
gap between the haves and the have-nots was widening, discrediting the “Kuznets curve”
hypothesis.59 Wealth continues to concentrate in a small segment of society and the
consumption patterns associated with it are extremely unsustainable.60 Meanwhile, the
majority of the world’s population continue to live in varying degrees of poverty, having
very little or no access to natural resources and other developmental benefits.61
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See generally László Muraközy, The Centrally Planned “Invisible Hand” - The Case of Hungary
(TIGER Working Paper Series No 119, Warsaw, 2010). Market reform during the first five years
has been a monumental disaster in terms of its impact on social welfare. Kent Klaudt, “Hungary
After the Revolution: Privatization, Economic Ideology and the False Promise of the Free Market”
(1995) 13 Law & Ineq 303 (HeinOnline); Richard D Cudahy, “From Socialism to Capitalism: A
Winding Road” (2010) 11 Chi J Int'l L 39 (HeinOnline); see generally Roman Frydman, Andrzej
Rapaczynski & John S Earle et al, The Privatization Process in Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic
States, vol 2, Central European University Privatization Reports (London: Central European
University Press, 1993).
Muraközy, ibid.
The concept states that as income inequality follows an inverse-U shape along the development
process, which first rises with industrialization and then declines as more workers join the high
productivity sectors of the economy. See generally Thomas Piketty, “The Kuznets Curve: Yesterday
and Tomorrow” in Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee, Roland Bénabou & Dilip Mookherjee, eds,
Understanding Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 63; see generally Income
inequality rises first and then drops with development. Jeffrey G Williamson, “British Inequality
During the Industrial Revolution: Accounting for the Kuznets Curve” in YS Brenner, Hartmut
Kaelble & Mark Thomas, eds, Income Distribution in Historical Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991) 57. Despite tremendous progress, the world faces huge backlogs
of deprivation and inequality. Poverty is omnipresent. Nearly 1.3 billion people live on an income of
less than USD1 a day. Even in industrialized countries, there is enormous disparity - one of eight are
affected by some aspect of human poverty. UNDP, Human Development Report 1999: Overcoming
Barriers: Human Mobility and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 28. But
see Abdul Jalil, “Modeling Income Inequality and Openness in the Framework of Kuznets Curve:
New Evidence from China” (2012) 29 Econ Modelling 309 (ScienceDirect) (suggesting that while
the opening up of the economy in 1978 by China led to unprecedented economic growth, it also led
to severe economic inequality).
“While poverty results in certain kinds of environmental stress, the major cause of the continued
deterioration of the global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production,
particularly in industrialized countries . . .” Robinson, ed, supra note 14, ch 4, ¶4.3.
It is becoming clear that climate change related processes is reversing developmental gains. See
World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change (Washington
DC: World Bank, 2010) at 39-44 [World Bank, WDR 2010] (discussing the negative impacts of
climate change on development).
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When it eventually became understood that the inability of economic reforms to
ensure inclusive growth could stymie long-term development, re-conceptualizing our
fundamental understandings and criteria for development became essential. John Rawls,
in his theory of “Justice as Fairness,” sought to tone down the excesses of the market
economy62 through his “difference principle” which, while allowing for inequalities in
income and wealth, emphasizes that those who are better off can be so only if those at the
bottom are also made better off.63
A similar view is adopted by Amartya Sen in “Development as Freedom,” which
brings to the forefront the well-being of humans as both the goal and the means for
development.64 For Professor Sen, development is a process of expanding “the real
freedoms that people enjoy,”65 since achieving development requires the removal of
poverty, tyranny, lack of economic opportunities, social deprivation, and neglect of
public services.66 This nuanced understanding of development found clearer articulation
in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report
series beginning in 1990.67 In this enhanced understanding of sustainable development,
the term development acquires new dimensions that relate to the expansion of human
capabilities.68 Inevitably, the resultant product, 'sustainable human development', is “the
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63

64
65

66

67

68

See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed by Erin Kelly (Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2001) at 61-66.
See generally Rex Martin, “Rawls’s New Theory of Justice” (1994) 69 Chicago-Kent L Rev 737
(QL); David Elkins, “Responding to Rawls: Toward a Consistent and Supportable Theory of
Distributive Justice” (2007) 21 BYU J Pub L 267 (QL); Xiaobing Xu & George Wilson, “On
Conflict of Human Rights” (2006) 5 Pierce L Rev 32 (HeinOnline).
See generally Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
See generally ibid (arguing for a development model that enhances people’s capabilities in contradistinction to an approach that focuses solely on income enhancement). The elaboration of the
“Human Development Approach,” or the “Capability Approach,” has been “the most important
theoretical development in human rights during the past two decades” and has been operationalized
in the Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme. Martha
Nussbaum, “Human Rights and Human Capabilities” (2007) 20 Harv Hum Rts J 21 (WLeC).
Sen identifies five freedoms as instrumental to this goal and consequently vital to overall economic
development: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees,
and protective security. Sen, supra note 64 at 38.
“Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices”. UNDP, Human Development
Report 1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 1. “Human development is the
expansion of people’s freedoms and capabilities to lead lives that they value and have reason to
value. It is about expanding choices”. See UNDP, HDR 2011, supra note 55 at 1.
UNDP, HDR 2011, ibid.
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expansion of the substantive freedoms of people today while making reasonable efforts to
avoid seriously compromising those of future generations.”69
In sum, even with obvious drawbacks, sustainable development has evolved into a
seminal principle that exerts influence over all aspects that interface between
environment and development, seeking to place development on pathways that are
environmentally sound.70 Sustainable development replaces the context and tenor of
economic development, viewing it as qualitative improvement of human life rather than a
quantitative expansion of economic wealth.71 In effect, it is people that form the core
focus of sustainable development and it represents a paradigmatic shift in the way in
which development was previously understood and seeks to synthesize and assimilate the
aspirations of environmental protection with human development objectives based on the
belief that, “[p]rotecting the environment is part of what progress means; it is not the
price of progress.”72
Moreover, sustainable development views the quintessentially discrete concepts of
environment protection and development as synergistic and not antagonistic forces,
seeking to bridge the apparent disconnect between the two. Primarily, it seeks to improve
the quality of life without necessarily increasing natural resource use beyond the carrying
capacity of the ecosystem.73 So profound is the influence of this ideal that it has emerged
as one of the fundamental values of modern civilization, akin to democracy, rule of law,
justice, liberty, and human rights.74 As it has undeniably emerged as a key concept that
enhances people’s rights and freedoms, no nation will ever want to run the risk of being
antagonistic to sustainable development values and principles.75 It should also be noted
that, rather than prescribing a normative one-size-fits-all approach to developmental
69
70

71
72
73
74
75

Ibid at 18.
AV Lowe, “Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments” in AE Boyle & D Freestone,
eds, International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 19 at 31.
French, supra note 5 at 13-14.
John C Dernbach, “Sustainable Versus Unsustainable Propositions” (2002) 53 Case W Res L Rev
449 at 450 (HeinOnline).
Robert John Araujo SJ, “Rio+10 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development: Why Human
Beings Are at the Center of Concerns” (2004) 2 Geo JL & Pub Pol’y 201 at 203 (QL).
Lowe, supra note 70.
Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development a Principle of International Law: Resolving Conflicts
between Climate Measures and WTO Law (Lieden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) at 3.
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issues, current practice segregates issues and views them through a sustainable
development lens. Consequently, sustainable development has extensive application in
varied contexts, including international trade,76 shipbreaking,77 tourism,78 fishing,79 ocean
governance,80 agriculture,81 water management,82 health,83 and forestry.84 Additionally,
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77

78

79

80
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82
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See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Organization],
15 December 1993, 33 ILM 13, pmbl. The major role that international trade can play in promoting
economic development and the alleviation of poverty . . .’ and since ‘the majority of WTO Members
are developing countries . . . we seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of the WTO Work
Programme . . .’ See World Trade Organization (WTO) - Doha Ministerial 2001: Ministerial
Declaration, 14 November 2001, Wt/Min(01)/Dec/I 20 November 2001, 41 ILM 746, ¶2.
Furthermore, the Ministers strongly confirmed their commitment ‘to the objective of sustainable
development, as stated in the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement’: ‘We are convinced that the
aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and
acting for the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and
must be mutually supportive’ (¶6).
International Conference on the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships: Agenda Item
8, Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations and Resolutions Resulting
from the Work of the Conference: Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and
Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009, Text Adopted by the Conference,
IMO/SR/CONF/45, 19 May 2009 (opened for signature 1 September 2009); see generally
Puthucherril, Shipbreaking, supra note 54.
Sustainable tourism is tourism that is not only economically viable, but it also does not destroy the
resources on which the future of tourism will depend, notably the physical environment and social
fabric of the host community. Furthermore, ecotourism falls under the rubric of sustainable tourism.
Alison Gill et al, “The Challenges of Integrating Tourism into Canadian and Australian Coastal
Zone Management” (2003) 26 Dalhousie LJ 85 at 90 (HeinOnline).
For instance, see generally FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Rome: FAO, 1995).
UNGA, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, A/CONF 164/37, 8
September 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (entered into force 11 December 2001).
For instance, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS
397, 21 ILM 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [LOSC], part XII.
See FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome 3
November 2001, FAO Conference Res 3/2001, S Treaty Doc No 110-19, art 1.1 (entered into force
29 June 2004). The objectives of this treaty are conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of their
use for sustainable agriculture and food security. Ibid.
UN: Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May
1997, 36 ILM 700 [UN Watercourses Convention].
In articulating the relationship between health and sustainable development, Gro Harlem Brundtland
observes
[t]he goals of sustainable development cannot be achieved when
there is a high prevalence of debilitating illness and poverty and the
health of a population cannot be maintained without a responsive
health system and a healthy environment. Environmental
degradation, mismanagement of natural resources, and unhealthy
consumption patterns and lifestyles impact health. Ill health, in turn,
hampers poverty alleviation and economic development.
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with the emergence of Type II partnerships as a means to implement normative
prescriptions, sustainable development has become more broad-based and practical
oriented.85

Despite the extensive range of its applicability, the common core of

sustainable development (i.e., the need to coalesce and balance human development,
environment protection and social justice) remains the same, straddling different
situations, issues and regimes.
At this point, it must be emphasised that sustainable development has a new
dimension as well, juxtaposed by climate change. To appreciate the relationship between
sustainable development and climate change, it is helpful to examine the term
“environment” within a sustainable development context.86 Environment includes the
climate system,87 which in turn consists of five core components: the atmosphere,88 the
hydrosphere,89 the cryosphere,90 land surface,91 and the biosphere.92 To maintain
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Hans Christian Bugge, & Lawrence Watters, “A Perspective on Sustainable Development after
Johannesburg on the Fifteenth Anniversary of Our Common Future: An Interview with Gro Harlem
Brundtland” (2003) 15 Geo Int'l Envtl L Rev 359 at 364 (HeinOnline).
For more on sustainable forest management, see A Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development
of All Types of Forests, 13 June 1992, 31 ILM 881.
For further discussion on the concept of partnerships, see supra notes 27-30.
See World Commission on Environment & Development, supra note 4 at 43, 46.
For instance, see Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, c 33, s 3(1).
“[E]nvironment” means the components of the Earth and includes:
(a) air, land and water;
(b) all layers of the atmosphere;
(c) all organic and inorganic matter and living organisms; and
(d) the interacting natural systems that include components referred to
in paragraphs (a) to (c). Ibid.
It is the most unstable component in the climate system and it consists of nitrogen, oxygen, argon,
and trace gases like carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, water vapor, and ozone which absorbs
and emits infrared radiation. APM Baede, “The Climate System: An Overview” in JT Houghton et
al, eds, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
85 at 87.
The hydrosphere comprises all surface and subterranean waters (both fresh and saline as well). Ibid
at 88. In particular, the oceans which cover approximately 70 per cent of the earth and they store and
transport a large amount of energy and dissolve huge quantities of carbon dioxide. Moritz Bollmann
et al, World Ocean Review 2010: Living with the Oceans (Hamburg: Maribus, 2010) at 9.
It consists of the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica, sea ice, permafrost, snow fields and
continental glaciers. It is important to the climate system due to its high reflectivity for solar
radiation (albedo), low thermal conductivity, and in driving deep ocean water circulation. Bollmann
et al, ibid.
Land surface includes vegetation and soils, which play an important role in determining how the
energy received from the sun is returned to the atmosphere. Baede, supra note 88 at 89.
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equilibrium,93 several complex physical, chemical, and biological interactions take place
between and among these systems across a wide range of space and time scales.94
However, the enhanced green house effect triggers a series of perturbations that can
disrupt climate equilibrium, leading to environmental upheavals. This makes it virtually
impossible to balance environmental and developmental considerations, which is a
fundamental requisite in the sustainable development paradigm.95
Climate change has the potential to impact the entire planet and all sectors of
human activity. As observed by the Human Development Report, “[c]limate change may
be the single factor that makes the future very different, impeding the continuing progress
in human development.”96 In a similar vein, the World Development Report also notes
that, “[l]eft unmanaged, climate change will reverse development progress and
compromise the well-being of current and future generations…. Impacts will be felt
everywhere, but much of the damage will be in developing countries.”97 Clearly, climate
change has the potential not only to upset and but to reverse the developmental gains that
have been achieved over the years.98
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It includes the marine and terrestrial life forms. Biota plays an important role in the uptake and
release of GHGs. Marine and terrestrial plants (particularly) forests store significant amounts of
carbon via the photosynthetic process. Ibid.
For long the dominant paradigm that influenced the development of environmental law was the
equilibrium model, which was based on the view of a balance of nature. The equilibrium paradigm
has been rejected in ecology, replaced with a complex, stochastic nonequilibrium one which
provides a more dynamic view of nature. The idea here is that the ever-growing interactions
between humans and the natural environment makes it impossible to return to an ideal state of
nature. In such a situation ecosystems can be managed at best, but not restored or preserved. Even in
such cases there is the need for strong regulation. See A Dan Tarlock, “The Nonequilibrium
Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law” (1994) 27 Loy LA L Rev
1121 (HeinOnline); A Dan Tarlock, “Biodiversity and Endangered Species” in John C Dernbach,
ed, Stumbling Towards Sustainability (Washington, DC: Environmental Law Institute, 2002) 311 at
318-319; see also Douglas J Spieles, Protected Land: Disturbance, Stress, and American Ecosystem
Management, Springer Series on Environmental Management, 1st ed (New York: Springer, 2010) at
27-28.
Spieles, ibid.
Even land use changes, like deforestation, agriculture, irrigation, implementation of development
projects and urbanization, can significantly alter the local, regional and even the global climate and
impact the carbon cycle. Baede, supra note 88 at 92-93.
UNDP, Human Development Report 2010: 20th Anniversary Edition: The Real Wealth of Nations:
Pathways to Human Development (New York: UNDP, 2010) at 102.
World Bank, WDR 2010, supra note 61 at 36.
Yields of major crops in India are projected to decline by 4.5 to nine per cent within the next three
decades. Ibid at 40.
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Given the pervasiveness and complexity of climate change, if sustainable
development is to be attained as part of the requisite to ensure environmental protection,
it is essential that countries reorient their development paths in ways that secure
mitigation (i.e., limits on carbon-intensive growth, where practicable) and adaptation.99
Indeed, mitigation, adaptation and the other elements of sustainable development –
namely, economic development, environmental protection, social justice, are all
intrinsically inter-linked, since the various hazards associated with climate change have
the potential to undermine progress.100 The figure below depicts a contemporary
understanding of sustainable development:

Environmental
Protection

Social Justice
and Equity

Sustainable
Development

Developmen
t

Climate Change
Mitigation and
Adaptation
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Prominent examples include the construction of the Confederation Bridge (connects Prince Edward
Island with mainland Canada) and the Qinghi-Tibet railroad. SLR was recognized in the
construction of the Confederation Bridge and it has been built one meter higher than currently
required to accommodate the rising sea over its 100-year life span. Nearly 500 kilometers of the
Qinghi-Tibet railroad is situated nearly 4,000 meters above sea level on permafrost. Given that
temperatures are rising, a combination of cooling and insulations systems has been used to ensure
that minimum heat is transmitted. W Neil Adger, Shardul Agrawala & M Monirul Qader Mirza,
“Assessment of Adaptation Practices, Options, Constraints and Capacity” in ML Parry et al, eds,
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 717 at 724.
Adaptation coupled with mitigation is as one of the ways to achieve sustainable development. See
Armin Rosencranz, Dilpreet Singh & Jahnavi G Pai, “Climate Change Adaptation, Policies, and
Measures in India” (2010) 22 Geo Int'l Envtl L Rev 575 at 576 (QL).
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Figure 2: Elements of Sustainable Development
Accordingly, sustainable development requires that development should not only be
environmentally friendly but it should also be “climate compatible.”101 It is therefore
essential that sustainable development initiatives explicitly consider the hazards and risks
associated with climate change and seek the means to reduce the same by aggressively
pursuing both mitigation and adaptation in all developmental initiatives. For example,
development projects should promote climate resilience and leave the smallest possible
carbon footprint.102 In short, sustainable development becomes the optimal balance
between environment and development (social and economic) that is climate-friendly. In
other words, development should necessarily encompass measures that are aimed at
mitigation (where possible) and adaptation within the broader goal of securing
environmental protection. Based on this understanding, we now move on to examine the
nuances of sustainable development, as applied to coastal zones.

4.3 SUSTAINABLE COASTAL DEVELOPMENT
The narrow littoral ribbons of land and adjoining salt waters where terrestrial and marine
environments meet are fast emerging as laboratories for testing sustainable development
ideas.103 This is no simple task, as “[t]he qualities that have made coastal regions so
critically important to our species are already under great pressure.”104 Hence, one has to
physically design and carry out the concept of SCD, which has been defined as
“enhancing the capacity of current and future generations to realize their human potential,
within the context of maintaining diverse, healthy and productive coastal ecosystems.”105
101

102
103
104
105

It “is development that minimises the harm caused by climate impacts, while maximising the many
human development opportunities presented by a low emissions, more resilient, future”. Tom
Mitchell & Simon Maxwell, "Defining climate compatible development", Climate & Development
Knowledge Network: Policy Brief (November 2010) at 1.
See Core Writing Team, Rajendra K Pachauri & Andy Reisinger, eds, Climate Change 2007:
Synthesis Report (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008) at 56-62.
Stephen B Olsen, “Educating for the Governance of Coastal Ecosystems: The Dimensions of the
Challenge” (2000) 43 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 331 at 332 (ScienceDirect).
Ibid.
Coastal Management Policy Programme, White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in
South Africa: Our Coast, Our Future (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, April
2000). Defining a sustainable coast in the context of the Mediterranean, as one that exhibits the
following five features, namely, resilience (resilient to future uncertainties of climate change,
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Rather than forestalling coastal development, the objective is to strike a balance
between development and coastal environmental protection objectives to ensure social
equity, particularly in relation to the ability of impoverished coastal communities to
access and enjoy limited coastal resources.106 As well, it seeks to (where practical)
implement mitigative and adaptation actions and improve the quality of life of coastal
communities and help augment their adaptive capacity, critical given the uncertainties
associated with SLR and other climate change hazards. A classical example of a SCD
strategy, in this regard, would be the creation of a mangrove plantation. As seen in
Chapter two, mangroves are part of the blue carbon panoply due to its enhanced potential
to sequester carbon. In addition, mangroves secure livelihood opportunities and human
development, and can act a speed-breaker protecting the shoreline from harmful waves.
SCD requires enhancement of the adaptive capacity of coastal populations and
creation of mechanisms to combat SLR and other climate change related threats. 107 To
achieve these objectives, it identifies and calls upon different stakeholders to implement
actions and programmes that can help increase the productivity of current economic
activities, prevent wastage and duplication of effort, promote alternative and
environmentally sustainable livelihood opportunities, and ensure that all developmental
activities reference the carrying capacity of coastal ecosystems and are targeted to
enhance human development.108
Unquestionably, SCD emerges as the end-goal of all of our management efforts in
coastal zones. The salient question therefore is: what are the feasible means to achieving
SCD? Fortunately, integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) carries a prescriptive
roadmap that can assist a move towards SCD, transforming high-sounding rhetoric into
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including rising sea levels); productive (able to support the economic aspirations of coastal
communities); diverse (ecologically diverse); distinctive (retaining the cultural distinctiveness of
coastal areas); attractive (retain the attractiveness of the coast); healthy (free from pollution). The
ICZM Process - a Roadmap towards Coastal Sustainability - Introduction, online: pegasoproject.eu
<http: //www.pegasoproject.eu/wiki/ICZM_Process_diagram>.
“[T]he key is not only to manage the use of ecosystems, and the goods and services they provide,
but to manage and regulate human activity to avoid jeopardizing their functional integrity.” Chua
Thia-Eng, The Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management: Practical Applications in the
Sustainable Coastal Development in East Asia (Quezon City: GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional
Programme for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 2006)
at 76.
For more on this topic, see Ch 6.
Ibid.
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tangible deliverables. In fact, SCD represents the goal and ICZM the means to facilitate
it. Chapter six illuminates this notion in greater depth. Before proceeding to that section,
the next chapter examines the concept of climate change adaptation and the rubric term
coastal climate change adaptation (CCCA).

4.4 CONCLUSION
In sum, coastal zones in South Asia and in several other parts of the world are under
considerable stress due to climate change as well as demographic and economic growth.
And the impact of this stress is increased loss and suffering, collapse of ecological
systems, and deeply strained social relations particularly in the developing world. The
pressures on coastal ecosystems and resources are increasing at rates faster than the time
and efforts that are presently being expended to stabilise and restore them. Amidst such a
gloomy scenario, SCD provides a new paradigm for all those who have a stake in
maintaining healthy coastlines and in ensuring the well-being of coastal communities. It
can help to alleviate threats, reign in injudicious development practices, and improve
efficiency to strengthen and increase coastal resilience and the adaptive capacity of
coastal communities and to also ensure that future generations are not denied their rights
to enjoy the aesthetics and values associated with coastal zones. In tandem with
sustainability, SCD likewise seeks a convergence between social equity, economic
development and environmental protection, taking into consideration the need for CCCA
and climate change mitigation. This is the key message that is to permeate all aspects of
coastal development and decision-making and is particularly relevant to the South Asian
coastal scenario.

204

CHAPTER 5

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND DYNAMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO COASTAL ZONES

5.1 INTRODUCTION
Homo sapiens are generally considered to be the most adaptable among all species, as
mankind has a long history of employing ingenuity and planning to mould techniques
that have facilitated adaptation to diverse climatic settings.1 Of late, due to the problems
posed by climate change, an assortment of adaptation measures have been developed,
such as new irrigation management systems,2 crop diversification,3 rainwater harvesting,4
and floating gardens.5 Likewise, programmes like “living with floods” have been
implemented, where flood-prone and similarly vulnerable communities are provided with
swimming lessons and life jackets.6

1

2

3

4

5

6

Ian Burton, Elliot Diringer & Joel Smith, “Adaptation to Climate Change: International Policy
Options”, at 3, online: Pew Center on Global Climate Change <http://www.pewclimate.org/docUplo
ads/PEW_Adaptation.pdf>. Coastal communities have been adapting to change for many years
Nicholas A Robinson, “IUCN as Catalyst for a Law of the Biosphere: Acting Globally and Locally”
(2005) 35 Envtl L 249 at 257-58 (QL).
Israel is a leader in drip irrigation that has increased water efficiency. Israel, Ministry of
Environmental Protection, Israel’s Second National Communication on Climate Change Submitted
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Jerusalem: Ministry of
Environmental Protection, 2010) at 43 [Israel, Second National Communication].
Martin Parry, Osvaldo Canziani & Jean Palutik, “Technical Summary” in ML Parry et al, eds,
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 23 at 65.
Stephen N Ngigi, Climate Change Adaptation Strategies Water Resources Management Options for
Smallholder Farming Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: The MDG Centre for East and
Southern Africa, Earth Institute at Columbia University, 2009) at 84. Rainwater harvesting is one of
the specific adaptation measures for water-stressed Africa. J Mwenge Kahinda, AE Taigbenu, RJ
Boroto, “Domestic Rainwater Harvesting as an Adaptation Measure to Climate Change in South
Africa” (2010) 35 Physics & Chemistry of the Earth 742 (ScienceDirect).
Floating gardens are promoted to address the needs of landless farmers in Bangladesh. It is created
by using water hyacinth, earth and bamboo and is used to grow vegetables. “Floating Gardens in
Bangladesh”, Practical Action: Technology Challenging Poverty: Technical Brief, online: FAO
<http://www.fao.org/climatechange/17849-0e277b46b31f98942e6bc81bb22319243.pdf>.
Kevin Watkins, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change: Human
Solidarity in a Divided World (New York: UNDP, 2007) at 165.
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Prior to the advent of the global warming phenomenon, as the natural climatic
variations were limited in space and time, humans could easily and successfully adapt.7
But now, with the shorter time scales at which climatic variations are taking place,
adaptation has become a daunting task. Complicating the situation is the expansion of
human settlements into high hazard zones, placing entire communities at greater risk.8
The abuse of natural systems due to anthropogenic activities is already so extreme that
many critical thresholds have been crossed, making these systems less resilient to climate
variability and change. Thus, successfully responding to anthropogenic climate change is
a gargantuan challenge.9
This chapter explains the concept of climate change adaptation and its relevance to
the coastal zone. It begins with an analysis of climate change adaptation and its various
classifications. Next, it probes the theoretical foundations of adaptation and explores how
adaptation fits into the sustainable development landscape. At the international level, for
long, discourses on climate change solutions have centered primarily on mitigation.
Consequently, the rules on adaptation are yet to attain maturity, and what does exist is
fragmented and disparate. Much of the research thereafter is directed at identifying the
various international rules on adaptation. Based on this foundational understanding of
adaptation, this chapter will subsequently examine its relevance to SLR and climate
change impacts on coastal zones.

5.2 UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
As neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol provides any definition of adaptation or
of affiliated concepts such as adaptive capacity and vulnerability, we turn instead to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which, in the Third Assessment
Report (TAR), has comprehensively defined adaptation as:
[a]djustment in natural or human systems to a new or
changing environment. Adaptation to climate change
refers to adjustment in natural or human systems in
7

8
9

E Lisa F Schipper & Ian Burton, “Understanding Adaptation: Origins, Practice and Policy” in E Lisa
F Schipper & Ian Burton, eds, The Earthscan Reader on Adaptation to Climate Change (London:
Earthscan, 2009) 2 [Schipper & Burton, “Understanding Adaptation”].
Ibid.
Ibid at 1.
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response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be
distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive
adaptation, private and public adaptation, and
autonomous and planned adaptation.10
In the Fourth Assessment Report, adaptation has been defined as:
[i]nitiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability
of natural and human systems against actual or
expected climate change effects. Various types of
adaptation exist, e.g., anticipatory and reactive,
private and public, and autonomous and planned.
Examples are raising river or coastal dykes, the
substitution of more temperature-shock resistant
plants for sensitive ones, etc.11
Vulnerability is another critical component in the adaptation semantic. It is defined as
… the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and
unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate
change, including climate variability and extremes.
Vulnerability is a function of the character,
magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to
which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its
adaptive capacity.12
Maladaptation refers to “[a]ny changes in natural or human systems that inadvertently
increase vulnerability to climatic stimuli; an adaptation that does not succeed in reducing
vulnerability but increases it instead.”13 Another important term in the adaptation lexicon
is ‘capacity,’ which is society’s degree of ability to adapt to changing climatic conditions.
TAR defines it as “[t]he ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate
variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of
opportunities, or to cope with the consequences.”14 Capacity is determined to a large
extent by society’s access to technology and resources, the level of wealth, literacy, and
10
11

12
13
14

Robert T Watson, World Bank & Core Writing Team, eds, Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 365.
Alfons P M Baede, Paul van der Linden & Aviel Verbruggen, “Annex II: Glossary” in Core Writing
Team, Rajendra K Pachauri & Andy Reisinger, eds, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report
(Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) 76 at 76.
Ibid at 89.
Watson, World Bank & Core Writing Team, eds, supra note 10 at 378.
Ibid at 365.
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institutional infrastructure.15 Resilience is “the ability of a social or ecological system to
absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the
capacity for self-organisation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change.”16
There are different kinds of adaptation measures that have application to human
societies and to ecosystems. In cases where measures are initiated prior to the observation
of impacts, adaptation is treated as anticipatory or proactive.17 When adaptation measures
are designed post-occurrence, they are reactive.18 Where adaptation is the result of
deliberate policy decisions, it is planned or proactive, and in cases where the response is
spontaneous, it is treated as autonomous.19 In managed systems, adaptation is generally
anticipatory and planned, while in unmanaged natural systems, it is more reactive and
autonomous.20 Anticipatory adaptations are considered more effective and costefficient.21 Planned adaptation for human societies can take varied forms. These include
creating robust designs for infrastructure, fortifying a society’s ability to withstand a
range of extreme weather events, devising techniques to transfer risks away from
communities that are vulnerable (i.e., providing for the collective sharing of losses),22 and
enhancing the adaptability of vulnerable natural systems by employing setback lines. 23
Adaptation should be considered in the backdrop of a complex set of social,
economic and political variables.24 Most developing countries are reluctant to broach the
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Burton, Diringer & Smith, supra note 1 at 3.
Baede, Linden & Verbruggen, supra note 11 at 86.
“Appendix I: Glossary” in ML Parry et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 869
at 869.
Donald S Lemmen & Fiona J Warren, eds, Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: A Canadian
Perspective (Ottawa: Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Directorate, 2004) at 10.
A Barrie Pittock & Roger N Jones, “Adaptation to What and Why?” in E Lisa F Schipper & Ian
Burton, eds, The Earthscan Reader on Adaptation to Climate Change (London: Earthscan, 2009) 35
at 37-38.
Ibid.
Lemmen & Warren, eds, supra note 18 at 9.
Patricia Park, Anthony Gallagher & Michael Galley, “What Chance Adaptive Coastal Management
for Climate Change? A Legal Dysfunction in Vertical Governance” (2010) 3:1 Sea Grant L & Pol’y
J 59 at 66 (HeinOnline).
For instance, see Department of Environment, Forests and Wildlife, Ministry of Environment and
Forests, Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (SO19(E), India) ¶3.
W Neil Adger, Shardul Agrawala & M Monirul Qader Mirza, “Assessment of Adaptation Practices,
Options, Constraints and Capacity” in ML Parry et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of
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subject of long-term adaptation, mainly because it is simply not on their priority list.
They have more pressing problems, like poverty reduction and the limited amount of
capital and other resources to meet the fiscal demands of adaptation.25 The “long time
horizon and inherent uncertainty” associated with climate change also makes it an
unimpressive candidate for investment.26
Adaptation depends considerably on the availability of sufficient adaptive capacity.
In most developing economies, it is often the politically, socially, and economically
marginalized groups that have the least adaptive capacity. These groups may include
tribal peoples, artisanal fishers, women, children, the elderly, and natural-resourcedependent communities.27 Circumstances such as underdevelopment, unemployment,
large-scale environmental pollution, natural resource degradation, extreme poverty,
gender bias, illiteracy, institutional weaknesses and wide-spread corruption impair
adaptive capability development.28

There is also an increasing tendency towards

systematically alienating traditional communities from accessing the natural resources
upon which their existence and survival depends, further hindering their adaptive
capacities.29 As the experience in some of the South Asian coastal countries demonstrates
traditional communities are often replaced by a different set of players (e.g., tourism
operators, industries, private port operators) who are generally more socially,
economically and politically powerful and who often seek to intensively exploit coastal

25

26

27

28

29

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
717 at 728.
Capital can be financial, natural, social and human. In responding to the problems of increased
storm surge, technological capital may be needed for seawalls; financial capital for insurance and
financing; human capital for improved building techniques; social capital for emergency response
and retreat practices; and natural capital in the form of enhanced coastal wetlands and dune systems.
JB Ruhl, “Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law”
(2010) 40 Envtl L 364 at 385 (QL).
John Smithers & Barry Smit, “Human Adaptation to Climatic Variability and Change” in E Lisa F
Schipper & Ian Burton, eds, The Earthscan Reader on Adaptation to Climate Change (London:
Earthscan, 2009) 15 at 16.
Anne T Kuriakose, Livia Bizikova & Carina A Bachofen, Assessing Vulnerability and Adaptive
Capacity to Climate Risks: Methods for Investigation at Local and National Levels, Social
Development Working Papers (No 116, May 2009) at 7.
The primary determinants of adaptive capacity are economic wealth, technology, information and
skills, infrastructure, institutions, and equity. Barry Smit & Olga Pilifosova, “Adaptation to Climate
Change in the Context of Sustainable Development and Equity” in James J McCarthy et al, eds,
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001) 877 at 895-97.
Ibid at 899.
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resources to further their economic interests which may not be sustainable in the long
run.30 Such barriers can undermine the success of an adaptation process and contribute to
negative consequences. In other words, misguided efforts may result in maladaptation,31
such as planting moisture-sensitive crops in drought-prone areas, constructing dwellings
in flood plains, and draining wetlands to construct infrastructure.32
If adaptation is to be fruitful and cost-effective, it must be anchored in a principled
approach33 and integrated into larger developmental planning and implementation
processes.34 Mainstreaming adaptation in existing efforts aimed at, for instance, poverty
alleviation, biodiversity conservation, and combating land degradation in CZM can
potentially produce greater sustainable results and help increase the adaptive capacities of
vulnerable populations.35 It must be stressed here that adaptation is not solely about
developing capacity and capability to cope with negative consequences. In certain parts
of the world, particularly those in the higher latitudes, higher temperatures may result in
enhanced plant growth, which will provide access to hidden resources.36 In such cases,
adaptation will turn into a discourse about how to sustainably utilize these resources.
Thus, adaptation is crucial in containing the fallout of climate change and in seizing
opportunities that arise from its positive outcomes.
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See generally Perspectives Group, “Swimming against the Tide: Coastal Communities and
Corporate Plunder in Kutch” (2012) 47:29 Economic & Political Weekly 12.
Maladaptation is defined as “[a]ny changes in natural or human systems that inadvertently
increase vulnerability to climatic stimuli; an adaptation that does not succeed in reducing
vulnerability but increases it instead.” “Annexes” in Core Writing Team, Rajendra K Pachauri &
Andy Reisinger, eds, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 2008) 355 at 378.
Smithers & Smit, supra note 26 at 17.
Some prominent principles that can sustain an adaptation process are adopting integrated
approaches; prioritizing the most vulnerable; using the best available scientific knowledge; building
strong partnerships; applying risk management methods; applying eco-system based approaches;
maximizing mutual benefits; and continuous performance evaluation. US, The White House Council
on Environmental Quality, Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task
Force: Recommended Actions in Support of A National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (5
October 2010) at 10.
Saleemul Huq & Hannah Reid, “Mainstreaming Adaptation in Development” in E Lisa F Schipper
& Ian Burton, eds, The Earthscan Reader on Adaptation to Climate Change (London: Earthscan,
2009) 313 at 319.
Ibid.
Arctic Melting May Lead to Expanded Oil Drilling, online: Worldwatch Institute <http://www.world
watch.org/node/5664>.
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5.3 SITUATING ADAPTATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SCHEME
For long, the pendulum has swung disproportionately in favor of mitigation as the
primary response to moderate the problems posed by climate change. Due to the
lackadaisical attitude on the part of states to implement their obligations in relation to
mitigation, and given the magnitude of the problem, it has been reduced to a form of
‘bandaid’ fix. Despite this, mitigation has overshadowed the significance of adaptation.37
As seen earlier, sustainable development or to place it in context given the backdrop of
the present study, SCD is a balancing act where adaptation plays a highly critical, multifaceted role. At the recently concluded Rio+20, the Heads of State, Government and
high-level representatives in renewing commitment to sustainable development declared
that:
We reaffirm that climate change is one of the greatest
challenges of our time, and we express profound
alarm that emissions of greenhouse gases continue to
rise globally. We are deeply concerned that all
countries, particularly developing countries, are
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change,
and are already experiencing increased impacts
including persistent drought and extreme weather
events, sea level rise, coastal erosion and ocean
acidification, further threatening food security and
efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable
development. In this regard we emphasize that
adaptation to climate change represents an immediate
and urgent global priority.38
Climate change adaptation and sustainable development share several commonalities,
such as poverty reduction, improving access to resources, and lowering inequities
between inter- and intra-generations.39 When, due to uncertainty, developmental projects
do not provide for adaptation, there is the possibility that the development will result in
37

38

39

See Schipper & Burton, “Understanding Adaptation”, supra note 7 at 1, 7. Mitigation is all about the
sources of climate change, while adaptation deals with its consequences. E Lisa F Schipper,
“Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Process” in E Lisa F Schipper & Ian Burton,
eds, The Earthscan Reader on Adaptation to Climate Change (London: Earthscan, 2009) 359 at 361.
UN RIO+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want,
A/CONF.216/L.1*, 19 June 2012, ¶190, online: RIO+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development
<http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/381/64/PDF/N1238164.pdf?
OpenElement>.
Smit & Pilifosova, supra note 28.
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negative growth and thus prove unviable in the long run. Moreover, the choice of
implementing an adaptive programme at a later stage is a more expensive prospect and,
in most cases, the chances of its success are remote, since the dangers associated with
climate change will have been magnified.
Adaptation, then, is essentially an extension of good development practice.40 In
situations where there is a higher level of development that is compatible with climate
change related variability, there is also enhancement of adaptive capacity. 41 Conversely,
where development patterns do not take into account the need for adaptation, populations
are exposed to greater levels of risk, thereby undermining the ability of these groups to
adapt.42 By mainstreaming adaptation and placing it front and center in all developmental
processes, the possibility of attaining sustainable growth, diversification of economic
activity, enhancement of resilience capabilities, and promotion of risk pooling are greatly
enhanced.43
The concept of sustainable development runs like a golden thread throughout the
text of the UNFCCC. Specifically, it has express accommodation in article 3.4, which
declares promotion of sustainable development as a party’s right and duty.44 Furthermore,
the UNFCCC states that policies and measures designed to protect the climate system
should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each party and integrated with
national development programmes, “taking into account that economic development is
essential for adopting measures to address climate change.”45 The UNFCCC also calls
upon parties to cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic
system that leads to sustainable economic growth and development, particularly in
developing countries, so as to enable them to better address the problems of climate
change.46
40
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42
43
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46

Nicholas Stern & The Cabinet Office – HM Treasury, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern
Review (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 430.
“Summary for Policymakers: A Report of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change” in James J McCarthy et al, eds, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 1 at 12.
Burton, Diringer & Smith, supra note 1 at 5.
Stern & HM Treasury, supra note 40 at 430.
See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York 9 May 1992)
[UNFCCC]; see also ibid, art 4.1(d).
Ibid, art 3.4.
Ibid, art 3.5.
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Subsequently, the Kyoto Protocol further hammered out sustainable development
norms in relation to the climate change regime.47 The Delhi Ministerial Declaration on
Climate Change and Sustainable Development,48 speaks about the importance of
integrating adaptation concerns into sustainable development strategies while reemphasizing that parties have a right to and should promote sustainable development.49
In addition, this Declaration also specifies measures to secure sustainable development,
like increasing the global share of renewable energy sources, diversifying energy supply,
and technology transfer.50 In the following paragraphs, the principles of precaution and
inter- and intra-generational equity – all of which are central in achieving sustainable
development – will be utilized to justify climate change adaptation.

5.3.1 Precaution, Inter- and Intra-generational Equity, and Adaptation
As the overwhelming magnitude of climate change impacts is primarily theoretic (being
yet future events), their precise nature is uncertain.51 This factor has emerged as the
primary impediment to concerted action by national governments in mainstreaming and
investing resources to implement climate change adaptation initiatives. While it may be
difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule regarding when threshold levels are crossed in
relation to each ecosystem, a certain amount of reliance can be placed on the principle of
precaution to justify adaptation actions. More often than not, science does not provide
appropriate knowledge necessary to trigger actions that can effectively protect the
environment.52 Consequently, for a long time, measures to protect the environment were

47

48

49
50
51
52

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 16 March 1998,
37 ILM 32 (adopted at Kyoto 11 December 1997 and entered into force 16 February 2005) [Kyoto
Protocol to the UNFCCC] art 12 (“[t]he purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to
assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development”); see also ibid, art 2.
Decision_/CP.8: The Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable
Development, Advanced Unedited Version, ¶(e), online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/
1_cpl6rev1.pdf>.
Ibid.
Ibid.
For instance, see Core Writing Team, Rajendra K Pachauri & Andy Reisinger, eds, Climate Change
2007: Synthesis Report (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008) at 45.
Caroline E Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals:
Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality, Cambridge Studies in International and
Comparative Law No 79 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 10-12.
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taken only after a critical mass of scientific knowledge had been accumulated, which
often led to delays in proactively solving problems and to undesirable consequences.
Moreover, the assimilative capacity approach, as evinced by Principle 6 of the
Stockholm Declaration, assumed that science could provide policy-makers with the
necessary means and information to avoid encroachments upon the capacity of the
environment to assimilate impacts. It was presumed that relevant technical expertise
would be available when environmental harm was predicted and there would be sufficient
time to avert harm.53 By the same token, prudent financial management also called for
wise allocation of limited resources and elimination of wastage to the maximum extent
possible.54 Accordingly, the fog of scientific uncertainty was often used as an excuse to
postpone appropriate action to prevent the harm.55
The inadequacies of science have forced a change in emphasis, whereby current
practices have increasingly accepted the principle of precaution.56 The principle of
precaution is based on the theory that it is better to err on the side of caution and prevent
environmental harm, than it is to retroactively attempt to deal with irreversible harm.
While some would accord this principle the status of a norm of international customary
law, its application to any potential situation is influenced largely by the circumstances of
each case.57 The principle involves anticipating and taking measures to avoid
53
54
55
56
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Charmian Barton, “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence in
Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine” (1998) 22 Harv Envtl L Rev 509 at 512 (HeinOnline).
Ibid.
See AP Pollution Control Board v MV Nayudu, (1999) [1999] AIR 812 (India SC); AP Pollution
Control Board v MV Nayudu II, (2000) [2001] 2 SCC 62 (India SC).
Barton, supra note 53 at 547.
If it is not possible to make a decision with ‘some’ confidence,
then it makes sense to err on the side of caution and prevent
activities that may cause serious or irreversible harm. An
informed decision can be made at a later stage when additional
data is available or resources permit further research. To ensure
that greater caution is taken in environmental management,
implementation of the principle through judicial and legislative
means is necessary.
Some argue that the precautionary principle has crystallized into a norm of customary international
law. Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, “The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary
International Law” (1997) 9:2 J Envtl Law 221. There was considerable divergence as to whether
precaution was to be viewed in terms of being a principle (hard commitment) or was it an approach
(flexible). For a discussion on the principles/approach dichotomy, see Simon Marr, The
Precautionary Principle in the Law of the Sea: Modern Decision Making in International Law
(Publications on Ocean Development) 1st ed (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 18; see also Jacqueline Peel,
“Precaution - A Matter of Principle, Approach or Process?” (2004) 5(2) Melbourne J Int’l L 483
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environmental harm or choosing the least environmentally harmful activity.58 In practice,
the precautionary approach entails that in cases where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific knowledge and certainty should not be used to
postpone appropriate measures to prevent environmental harm.59 In other words, from a
legal perspective, the principle implies that, “once a prima facie case is made that a risk
exists, then scientific uncertainty works against the potential polluter rather than, as in the
past, in his/her favour.”60 In effect, the precautionary principle provides a legal basis that
lowers the threshold under which states are compelled to act to protect or prevent
environmental damage even in the face of uncertainty.61
While the inadequacies of science led to the precautionary principle, it in turn led to
the development of a special standard of onus in environmental cases where the burden as
to the absence of the injurious effect of the proposed action falls on those who want to
change the status quo.62 In a practical sense, this amounts to a reversal of the burden of
proof, since in environmental cases evidentiary burden generally falls upon those
opposing the change.63 Accordingly, when there is an identifiable risk of serious or
irreversible harm (for example, the extinction of a species or widespread toxic pollution),
the burden of proof is placed on the person or entity proposing the activity, which is
potentially harmful to the environment.64
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(HeinOnline). This principle has widespread application in domestic jurisdictions. See also Shehla
Zia v WAPDA, (1994) PLD 693 (Pak SC). Even when scientific evidence regarding the biological
effects from exposure to power-frequency fields was inconclusive, the court emphasized the need to
apply the precautionary principle. Ibid.
David Freestone, “The Precautionary Principle” in Robin Churchill & David Freestone, eds,
International Law and Global Climate Change, International Environmental Law & Policy
Series (London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 21 at 31-32.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, 14 June 1992, 31:4 ILM 874 [Rio Declaration] prin 15.
David Freestone & Ellen Hey, “Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle” in David
Freestone & Ellen Hey, eds, The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The Challenge of
Implementation, vol 31, International Environmental Law and Policy Series (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 1996) 3 at 13.
Roda Verheyn, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State
Responsibility (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) at 79 [Verheyn, Climate Change Damage].
See also Foster, supra note 52 at 240.
Barton, supra note 53 at 519; Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v
Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14 ¶¶160-64.
See Barton, ibid at 549.
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Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration calls upon states to widely apply the
precautionary approach “according to their capabilities.”65 The precautionary approach is
also one of the central tenets in the UNFCCC. Article 3.3 states:
The Parties should take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change
and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to
deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.66
A close reading of this provision reveals that the precautionary principle applies not only
to mitigative actions but that it has equal force in adaptation measures.67 From an
adaptation standpoint, application of the principle of precaution implies the following.
First, states are compelled to act even in the absence of conclusive evidence regarding
possible future harms brought about by climate change. Scientific certainty is not needed
in such cases, as the threshold levels are lowered considerably to justify adaptation
actions. Second, the new burden of proof implies that in cases where there is prima facie
evidence that a particular development activity may be affected by climate change
impacts or that the development activity may magnify climate change impacts.
Developers, and those who are interested in changing the status quo, will have to prove
that the proposed activity is compatible with the environment and that adaptation to
climate change impacts has been taken into account. To elucidate this point, if a
developer intends to establish a seaport, then the possible impacts of SLR and extreme
65

66
67

See also UNGA, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, A/CONF
164/37, 8 September 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (entered into force 11 December 2001). It calls upon States
to widely apply the precautionary approach to conservation, management and exploitation of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stock. Ibid, art 6; see also Simon Marr, The
Precautionary Principle in the Law of the Sea: Modern Decision Making in International Law
(Publications on Ocean Development) 1st ed (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) at 17-21. “[B]y stating that
the precautionary approach shall be applied by States “according to their capabilities”, the first
sentence of Principle 15 introduces the possibility of differences in application of the precautionary
approach in light of the different capabilities of each State.” On Responsibilities and Obligations of
States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No 17, Advisory
Opinion (1 February 2011) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Seabed Disputes
Chamber) ¶129.
UNFCCC, supra note 44.
Verheyn, Climate Change Damage, supra note 61 at 74.
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weather events must be considered factors in the port design and measures incorporated.
By the same token, the port and its related infrastructure should not cause significant or
harmful alterations to ecosystems and habitats, such as the clearing of mangroves or
destruction of wetlands, as these activities may precipitate and magnify climate change
impacts, like storm surges and coastal erosion.
Given the uncertainties and the fast pace of changes associated with climate
change, the precautionary principle is increasingly utilized in developmental decisionmaking mostly at the national levels (including in judicial, quasi-judicial and tribunal
proceedings), particularly in the context of SLR and its consequences on coastal
environments. This principle has been applied to, for instance, refuse licenses to extract
groundwater from coastal aquifers,68 to emphasize the need for a coastal hazard
vulnerability assessment for a permit application for dwellings,69 to raise the floor level
of buildings,70 and to decide the appropriateness regarding the sub-division of a lot to
provide for a second one.71 The precautionary principle has also been applied as grounds
68
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See Alanvale Pty Ltd & Anor v Southern Rural Water, (2010), VCAT 480 (Austl, VCAT) (applying
the precautionary principle to turn down applications for groundwater extraction licenses). But see
Paul v Goulburn Murray Water Corporation, (2010), VCAT 1755 (Austl, VCAT), online: AustLII
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/1755.html>. The grant of licenses for
extraction from an aquifer located in the Ovens Valley was challenged. The Tribunal held that the
aquifer was subject to much assessment and monitoring and there was reasonable understanding of
the groundwater and surface water systems within it. Accordingly, the Tribunal distinguished these
proceedings from Allanvale, which turned on the fact that the hydrogeology of the subject areas was
poorly understood. In the instant case since the extractions were so small as to be imperceptible,
there was no need to disturb the licenses. Ibid.
Owen v Casey CC (includes Summary) (Red Dot), (2009), VCAT 1946 (Austl, VCAT) online:
AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/20 09/1946.html>. The tribunal directed a
coastal hazard vulnerability assessment for the subject land. The assessment was to consider factors
like SLR, storm tide and surge, and coastal processes and was to be done by a qualified coastal
engineer or coastal processes specialist. Ibid; see also Cooke v Greater Geelong CC, (2010), VCAT
60 (Austl, VCAT) (emphasizing the need for a coastal hazard vulnerability assessment).
In line with the precautionary principle and to protect the interests of present and future generations,
and taking into account the data, knowledge and policies, available at that point in time, the
suggestion to raise the floor level of the dwelling in accordance with the advice of Melbourne Water
was confirmed. It was characterized as “a prudent response to the anticipated rise in sea levels.”
Cadzow Enterprises Pty Ltd v Port Phillip CC, (2010), VCAT 634 (Austl, VCAT) online: AustLII
<http://w ww.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/634.html>; Suburban Blue Print Pty Ltd v
Hobsons Bay CC, (2010), VCAT 1272 (Austl, VCAT) online: AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.a
u/au/cases/vic/VCA T/2 010/1272.html> (applying the principle of precaution, it was concluded that
since the dwellings had acceptable floor levels, the council's decision refusing construction permit
was set aside).
Myers v South Gippsland SC (includes Summary) (Red Dot), (2009), VCAT 1022 (Austl, VCAT)
online: AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2009/1022.html>; Myers v South
Gippsland SC (No 2) (includes Summary) (Red Dot), (2009), VCAT 2414 (Austl, VCAT) online:
AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2009/2414.html> [Myers v South Gippsland
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for refusal to use and develop a dwelling and remove vegetation from a land located on
an isolated peninsula,72 and to restrain development on land abutting coastal wetlands.73
In light of these applications, it is now not a stretch to say that it is vital that decisionmakers factor in rising sea levels when planning for coastal development.74
The most obvious and pre-eminent factors that contribute to environmental
degradation are population growth and unsustainable resource consumption patterns. To
meet the expanding resource demands, new technologies for drastic exploitation of
natural resources were developed.75 The essence of this trend towards rapacious
exploitation of natural resources is captured by the opulent model, which implies that the
present generation can consume all natural resources without any caps on its exploitation
and use them to generate as much wealth as is necessary, since there is no certainty
regarding the future.76 This stands in contrast to the preservationist view, which, if
stretched to its logical extreme, implies continuance of the status quo. Nevertheless,
judicious exploitation and utilization of natural resources should contemplate the interests
of future generations. In other words, preservation of the environment and its natural
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SC (No 2)]. This case involved an application to subdivide an existing lot into two. In line with the
precautionary principle, a coastal hazard vulnerability assessment was carried out which revealed
that the subject site would be inundated by seawater. Accordingly, the permit was refused. The
tribunal was of the opinion that granting it would be tantamount to consenting to poor planning
outcomes and would unnecessarily burden future generations. Ibid.
West Gippsland Catchment Management Authority v East Gippsland SC, (2010), VCAT 1334
(Austl, VCAT) online: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/1334.html>. The
relevant rules provided that access was to be provided to the dwelling by an all-weather road. The
council granted permit treating waterways as roadways. This was set aside on the ground that under
the Planning and Environment Act, 1987, road refers to passageways over land and a waterway
could not be considered to be an all-weather road. Here the tribunal was influenced by the problem
of SLR. Ibid.
Wade v Warrnambool CC, (2009), VCAT 2177 (Austl, VCAT) online: AustLII <http://www.aust
lii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2009/2177.html>. In refusing to grant permit it was held that, “climate
change impacts will occur over time but decisions about development have long term implications
because of the permanency of structures.” Ibid. In the instant case, there was no indication that such
an approach informed the design and there were also uncertainties regarding the impacts of SLR on
the two lower-lying lots.
“[T]he precautionary approach is an accepted principle in coastal decision making." Melbourne
Water, Planning for Sea Level Rise: Assessing Development in Areas Prone to Tidal Inundation
from Sea Level Rise in the Port Phillip and Westernport Region (Melbourne: Melbourne Water
Corporation, 2010).
For instance, concomitant with population explosion, reliance on groundwater, mined through the
intensive use of bore well technology is pervasive in several parts of the world.
Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony,
and Intergenerational Equity (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 1989) at 23 [Weiss:
Fairness to Future Generations].
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resources – “our common patrimony” – should necessarily focus on the future.77 The
idea that the choices that we make today will have a profound impact on what our future
generations will experience is encapsulated in the principle of inter-generational equity,
which represents the inter-temporal dimension of sustainable development.78
The Stockholm Declaration provided the first formulation of the inter-generational
equity principle in 1972 when it stated that “[m]an … bears a solemn responsibility to
protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.”79 Again, the
Rio Declaration, in principle 3, provides for the right to develop “so as to equitably meet
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”80 The
principle of intergenerational equity is rooted in a compact between the present and
future generations, wherein the present generation is bound by a “fiduciary duty” based
on “planetary trust” to pass on the environment and natural resources which they
inherited from previous generations in a manner that is no worse off than what they
received.81 In bequeathing the environment and the resources to future generations, there
should be no compromise on its nature and quality that would restrict the ability of future
generations to utilize the environment and natural resources to their benefit.82
In her 1983 treatise, Edith Weiss Brown proposes three basic principles of intergenerational equity. The first is the “conservation of options”, which means that each
generation should conserve the diversity of the natural and cultural resource base so as
not to unduly restrict the options available to future generations.83

The second is

“conservation of quality”, which implies that each generation is required to maintain the
quality of the planet so that it is passed on to the future generations in no worse condition
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The Brundtland Commission defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
Alexandre Kiss, “The Rights and Interests of Future Generations and the Precautionary Principle” in
David Freestone & Ellen Hey, eds, The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The
Challenge of Implementation, 31, International Environmental Law and Policy Series (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1996) 19 at 23.
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, 11:6 ILM
1416 [Stockholm Declaration].
Rio Declaration, supra note 59.
Edith Brown Weiss, “The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity” (1983) 11
Ecology LQ 495 at 499 (HeinOnline).
Ibid at 505.
Weiss: Fairness to Future Generations, supra note 76 at 40-42.
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that what the present generation received it.84 Third, “conservation of access” states that
each generation has to provide to its members equitable rights of access to the legacy
from past generations and should conserve it for future generations as well. 85 Intergeneration equity requires the formulation and implementation of specific duties and
obligations in respect to future generations, like conserving resources, compensating for
environmental harm, emergency assistance, and equitable usage.86
Regardless of the wide recognition in numerous international and national
environmental law instruments (particularly, judicial decisions from different common
law jurisdictions), inter-generational equity has yet to muster concrete support as a
principle of customary international law. Overwhelming empirical evidence regarding the
state of the environment at the global level, also presents a picture of continuing
degradation thereby faulting the core assumptions articulated by Edith Weiss Brown
regarding equity between generations.87 As well, there is also an inherent reluctance to
afford legal standing to unborn generations whose interests are unknown. 88 Nevertheless,
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Ibid at 43-45.
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ed, 9 Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) at 231.
For an overview of the state of coastal degradation in the marine and coastal environments, see Ch
1.
Minors Oposa v Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, (1993) [1994]
33 ILM 203 at 204 (Philippines SC). The plaintiffs were minors, represented and joined by their
parents and the Philippine Environmental Inc. to protect virgin tropical rainforests. The petitioners
asserted that they represented unborn generations. Chief Justice Davide in recognizing this claim
held that “. . . every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.” Ibid; see also Metropolitan Manila v
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, represented and joined by Divina v Ilas, (2008), GR Nos
171947-48 (Phil SC), online: Supreme Court of the Philippines <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/j
urisprudence/2008/december2008/171947-48.htm>. The Philippines SC issued a continuing
mandamus to ensure the cleanup and restoration of the Manila Bay and to preserve the water quality
after restoration. It was held
[e]ven assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision
specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and
the men and women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters
of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
Ibid.
But see Farooque v Bangladesh, [1996] WP 998 of 1994, CA 24 of 1995 (Bangladesh SC), online:
Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide <http://www.elaw.org/node/1300>. The SC held that in
Minors Oposa, locus standi was allowed since the right to a balanced and healthful ecology was a
fundamental right and moreover, there were several laws that emphasized conservation of the
country’s forest “not only for the present generation but for the future generation as well.” However,
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it can be relied upon to justify adaptation actions, for “[c]ommonsense tells us that” we
“should not approve coastal developments that are likely to be unduly threatened by
future flooding and/or coastal inundation, creating a mess to be dealt with by future
generations.”89
For equity between generations to work and for development to be truly
sustainable, it is imperative that there be intra-generational equity, i.e., equity within the
current generation. This is perhaps one of the most difficult objectives to realize, given
the socio-economic disparities and asymmetries in power that exist between social
groups, communities and even nations.90 Several developing countries face an economy
that is growing at an expedited pace.91 However, a miniscule portion of the population
gleans the benefits of this economic growth, while the rest continue to live in poverty or
near-poverty conditions.92
An examination of income levels and consumption patterns worldwide also reveals
wide disparities93 exemplified by skewed distribution of material resources, which does

89

90

91

92
93

the Bangladesh Constitution does not contain any analogous provision and therefore did not apply it.
Ibid.
Seifert v Coloc-Otway SC, (2009), VCAT 1453, ¶49 (Austl, VCAT) online: AustLII <http://www.au
stlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2009/1453.html>; see also Taip v East Gippsland SC (includes
Summary) (Red Dot), (2010), VCAT 1222 (Austl, VCAT) online: AustLII <http://www.aust
lii.edu.au/au/cases/vi c/VCAT/2010/1222.html> [Taip v East]. The tribunal refused to grant permit
for the residential development in an area highly vulnerable to SLR and other climate change
impacts on the ground that to do so will fail “to satisfy the purposes of planning . . . for
intergenerational equity, sustainable, fair and socially responsible development and . . . orderly
planning outcome.” Ibid; see also Myers v South Gippsland SC (No 2), supra note 71 (refusing to
grant permit to subdivide the lot as it would unnecessarily burden future generations).
GF Maggio, “Inter/intra-generational Equity: Current Applications under International Law for
Promoting the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources” (1997) 4 Buff Envtl L J 161 at 163-4
(QL). There are several international environmental law instruments that deal with intra-generational
equity. The intra-generational dimension of equity has received scant attention at judicial hands at
the international level. But see Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua), [2009] ICJ Rep 213 at 266, ¶144 (calling upon Nicaragua to respect fishing by the
inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River for subsistence purposes as a customary
right).
For instance, there is rapid economic growth in South Asia, which averages around six per cent a
year. While this has reduced poverty, nearly 571 million people survive on less than USD1.25 a day.
The World Bank, South Asia Regional Brief (25 September 2012), online: The World Bank, News,
Feature Stories <http://www.worldbank.org/>.
The emphasis of the government has shifted to ensuring inclusive economic growth Deloitte:
AIMA, Inclusive Growth: A Challenging Opportunity (September 2011) at 4.
Since 1970, 155 countries home to 95 per cent of the world’s people have experienced tremendous
increases in real per capita income. The annual average income today is USD10,760, almost 1.5
times its level 20 years ago and twice its level 40 years ago. While the richest country today
(Liechtenstein) is three times richer than the richest country in 1970, the poorest country today
(Zimbabwe) is about 25 per cent poorer than the poorest country in 1970 (also Zimbabwe). Jeni
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not augur well for sustainable development. As poverty leads to instability, disease,
despoilment of natural resources and environmental pollution, its alleviation is essential
for sustainable development.94 The emphasis in the economic growth process is thus to
foster inclusive and broad-based economic growth targeting marginalized and povertyridden sections.95 In other words, the strategy is to amalgamate equity with growth.
Intra-generational equity is premised on the belief that each member of the present
generation has a right to access the earth’s natural resources in an equal measure like that
of his/her peers.96 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOSC),97
the Rio Declaration in several of its principles,98 the Convention on Biological Diversity,
1993,99 and the United Nations: Convention to Combat Desertification in Those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa,
1994 (UNCCD)100 reaffirms the importance of intra-generational equity. This theme is
also echoed in goal no. 7 of the Millennium Development Goals, which seeks to ensure
“environmental sustainability”, which all the United Nations member states and the major
international organizations have agreed to achieve by 2015.101
This principle of environmental justice has widespread recognition in national
jurisdictions,102 and both inter- and intra-equity are recurring and prominent themes in the
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40, 42.
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¶21.
Ibid, ¶58(d).
Ramlogan, supra note 86 at 234.
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, 21 ILM
1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [LOSC], part XII, art 136 (deep sea bed mining).
See Rio Declaration, supra note 59, prins 3, 5, 7, 8, 12 & 14.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
1993, 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993) [CBD] ¶¶19 & 20, art 8;
Convention on Biological Diversity, online: CBD Home <http://www.cbd.int/>.
United Nations: Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 21 September 1994, 33 ILM 1328 (adopted
17 June 1994) [UNCCD].
See generally Summit on the Millennium Development Goals 20-22 September 2010, online: United
Nations Millennium Development Goals <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.
Ratlam Municipality v Vardichand, (1980), [1980] AIR 1622 (India SC) (utilizing public nuisance
provisions to clean up a municipality to protect public health). In issuing an injunction to prevent the
mining of uranium and thorium in the Kwale District without proper environmental impact
assessment, Kenya High Court emphasized the importance of intra-generational equity. Rodgers
Muema Nzioka v Tiomin Kenya Ltd, (21 September 2001), Civil Case No 97 of 2001 (Kenya HC)
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international regime on climate change. Particularly significant is article 3(1) of the
UNFCCC, which states that “[p]arties should protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations of humankind ….” The intra-generational dimension of
equity is premised on the assumptions that all human beings have an equal right to the
common atmospheric resource and that the sharing of the carbon commons should be
based on equity. Since the largest share of historical and current global emissions of
green house gases has its origins in developed countries, and in line with the principle of
historic responsibility, developed country parties are called upon to take the lead in
combating climate change and its adverse effects.103
As a necessary corollary, the implication is that developing countries are not to be
unduly restricted in their access to an equitable share of the global atmospheric resource
and carbon space. This theme is echoed again in article 3 of the UNFCCC, which states
that “the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects thereof.”104 As well,
[t]he specific needs and special circumstances of developing
country Parties, especially those that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of
those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that
would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden
under the Convention, should be given full consideration.105
Clearly, the right to development that developing countries also enjoy, in line with the
common but differentiated responsibilities, finds recognition under the UNFCCC. From
an adaptation point of view, intra-generational equity is again fortified in article 4.4,
which states that developed country parties and annex II parties are to assist developing
counties, particularly those vulnerable to the adverse consequences of climate change, in
meeting the costs of adaptation to these adverse effects. Additionally, developed country
parties and annex II parties are also to take practicable steps to finance the transfer of
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online: Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide <http://www.elaw.org/system/files/kenya.tio
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UNFCCC, supra note 44, art 3(1).
Ibid, art 3.1.
Ibid, art 3.2.
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environmentally sound technologies, particularly to developing countries, to enable them
to implement the UNFCCC.106
In conclusion, it can be derived from the above that the umbrella concept of
sustainable development and its attendant principles of precaution, inter- and intragenerational equity provide sufficient juridical basis for triggering adaptation actions.107

5.4 INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS AT IMPLEMENTING ADAPTATION
The starting point of any dialogue on the international legal regime on adaptation
necessarily begins with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the central pillars of the
climate change regime. Accordingly, the discussion below analyses the implications of
the relevant provisions of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol for climate change
adaptation. Thereafter, it provides a succinct description of the various funding
mechanisms established to fund adaptation projects. The importance of other
international environmental law instruments that can trigger climate change adaptation
obligations relevant to the coastal zone will also be examined.
At this point, it must be noted that global warming has potentially significant
implications for the entire panoply of human rights. Therefore, international human rights
law and its prescriptions can play an important role in triggering and supporting
adaptation actions in relation to climate change impacts. On this basis, the logical adjunct
that emerges in articulating a human rights-based approach to adaptation is that decisionmakers must increasingly be guided by core human rights standards in developing and
implementing adaptation programmes.108
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Alexandre Kiss, “The Rights and Interests of Future Generations and the Precautionary Principle” in
David Freestone & Ellen Hey, eds, The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The
Challenge of Implementation, 31, International Environmental Law and Policy Series (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1996) 19 at 27. It should be noted that there is a close inter-relationship
between the principles of precaution and that of inter-generational equity. This is so because the
primary objective of precaution is to ensure that the environment is preserved not only for the
present but also for the future generations as well.
See UNHRC, Human Rights and Climate Change, Res 7/23, 41st Mtg (28 March 2008). It goes
without saying that climate change has significant implications for the right to life. For e.g., rising
sea levels, king tides, storm surges, hurricanes and tsunamis can wipe out entire coastal
communities. Therefore, the first and foremost among the different human rights, namely, the right
to life which is guaranteed by a series of international human rights instruments can impose positive
obligations on the state to implement adaptation measures to protect the right to life from a rising
224

5.4.1 Adaptation under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
Out of a total of 26 articles, even though only one in UNFCCC text specifically refers to
adaptation, the centrality of adaptation measures in combating climate change finds
emphasis in a number of key articles in the UNFCCC text.109 Article 2, which outlines
the objectives of the international climate change regime, points out the need to stabilize
“greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Should the international community
achieve the requisite stabilization, adaptation then becomes superfluous. Unfortunately,
we have crossed the threshold levels and past greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions commit
us to decades of climate change-related impacts. It is unlikely that stabilization of GHG
concentrations at sustainable levels will be “achieved within a time-frame sufficient to
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sea. In this regard, article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR), article
6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR), and article 6 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (CRC) are relevant. Increased salinity will destroy
coastal agriculture and rising ocean temperatures and coral bleaching will lead to the migration of
commercially significant species thereby violating the rights to livelihood and to food. The right to
adequate food is a human right that is enshrined in article 11 of the ICESCR article 24(c) of the
CRC; article 25(f) and article 28 ¶1 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
2006 article 14, ¶2(h) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, 1979, and article 5(e) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 1965. Rising sea levels will contaminate surface and ground water sources leading
to severe shortage of potable water supplies and violation of the human right to water. Even though
there is no express formulation of this right in the of text in international bill of rights, in 2002, the
treaty monitoring body of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966
(ICESCR), namely, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, in its General
Comment No 15, traced a human right to water to articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR. Subsequently,
the General Assembly in 2010, formally recognized the right to water and sanitation via resolution
64/292, which acknowledges that clean drinking water and sanitation are integral to the realization
of all human rights.
Again, climatic changes can seriously impair the right to health. Stagnant water due to flooding can
prove to be a breeding ground for mosquitoes leading to malaria and dengue outbreak. Shortage of
potable water can lead to dehydration and consumption of contaminated water, which can lead to
epidemics like cholera. Article 25 of the UDHR, article 12 of the ICESCR, article 24(1) of the CRC,
all guarantees the right to health. Coastal communities share a symbiotic relationship with the sea,
the land, and the air and with the living creatures that inhabit the coastal waters. In tropical
countries, and in small-island developing states, there is a wealth of traditional knowledge
developed over the years regarding resource management and conservation practices. Any measure
to relocate coastal communities to place them away from harm's way, requires that the culture and
traditions of coastal communities be taken into account. Article 27 of the ICCPR and article 15 of
the ICESCR and Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007 emphasize this aspect.
David Freestone, ‘The International Legal Framework for Adaptation’ in Michael B Gerrard and
Katrina Fischer Kuh (eds), The Law of Adaptation to Climate Change: U.S. and International
Aspects (American Bar Association, 2012) 603 at 604 [Freestone, “International Legal
Framework”].
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allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change….”110 A logical adjunct that can be
inferred is the interpretation that the UNFCCC has an important unstated objective of
promoting adaptation in countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
consequences of climate change.111
On the one hand, article 3.1 requires developed country parties to take the lead in
combating climate change and its adverse consequences by giving effect to inter- and
intra-generational equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
On the other hand, article 3.2 requires that the specific needs and circumstances of
developing country parties, especially those that are most vulnerable to the adverse
consequences of climate change and that bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden
under the convention, be given full consideration. A combined reading of both articles
supports climate change adaptation. This is further reinforced by articles 4.3 and 4.4,
which seek to give effect to these principles by mandating that annex II countries shall
assist the developing country parties to cope with climate impacts, particularly to “the
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.”
Article 3.3 also has an adaptation dimension, as it calls upon parties to “take
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change
and mitigate its adverse effects.”
Article 4.1(b) is described as the “pivotal commitment in the Convention,”112 as it
requires parties to “[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and,
where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to…facilitate adequate
adaptation to climate change.” Since all countries, irrespective of the degree of
development (i.e., whether developed or developing), are slated to be affected, they are
obliged under article 4.1(b) to formulate and implement adaptation programmes even in
the wake of uncertainties.113 However, the respective state parties have been given
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considerable leeway in determining the nature of the measures, taking into account
national and regional development priorities, objectives, and circumstances.114
Furthermore, article 4.1(e) requires parties to cooperate with each other in
preparing to adapt to climate change impacts. Interestingly, this article emphasizes the
need for international cooperation in tackling the issue and it also calls upon parties to
develop and expand upon appropriate adaptation specific actions, like integrated plans for
CZM, water resources and agriculture, protection and rehabilitation of certain areas (e.g.,
Africa) that are affected by drought, desertification, and floods. Even though this article
stresses cooperation, parties are to develop these adaptive actions into their platforms,
taking into account their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives,
and circumstances.115
Additionally, article 4.1(f) is relevant to adaptation. It provides that, where feasible,
parties are to take climate change considerations into account in their relevant social,
economic and environmental policies and actions. Parties are also to employ appropriate
methods, such as impact assessments, to minimize the adverse effects from projects or
measures undertaken by them to adapt to climate change on the economy, public health
and the quality of the environment. In effect, this provision seeks to caution societies
regarding the possibility of the social, economic and environmental policies and actions
that do not take into account how climate change considerations degenerate into
maladaptation.116 Again, the use of terms “to the extent feasible” and “as formulated and
determined nationally” leaves the matter of integration and the scope and application of
impact assessment as issues best determined by respective state parties.117
Implementing adaptation actions generally requires huge amounts of capital, which
developing countries are rarely in a position to raise due to other compelling priorities
and constraints. To this end, the UNFCCC incorporates provisions that provide for
financial support to developing nations.118 A related aspect is that most developing
countries are presently seeking to advance to more sustainable forms of development by
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Ibid, art 4.1.
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Farhana & Depledge, supra note 111 at 222.
Ibid.
See Part 5.4.4, below, for a discussion on how UNFCCC secures financial assistance to developing
nations for implementing its obligations.
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bypassing development phases that are driven by more polluting, less efficient, and
costlier technologies. It is by employing these ineffective technologies that industrialized
nations managed to traverse several cycles, which, while degrading the global commons,
enabled them to attain the present economic development. By providing direct access to
technologies that are more advanced, less polluting and green, developing nations can
now circumvent the pollution-intensive cycles. Realistically, the challenge, then, is how
we can ensure that these new technologies can be accessed, as there are restrictive
technology transfer regimes, such those relating to intellectual property. The UNFCCC
seeks to address these issues by calling upon developed country parties to take
practicable steps to “promote, facilitate, and finance” the transfer of or access to
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly to
developing countries to enable them to implement the terms of the convention.119 The
term “environmentally sound technologies” is broad enough to encompass adaptation
technologies.120
Another important feature of the adaptation scheme embodied in the UNFCCC is
that it underscores the need for all parties to consider the specific needs, concerns and
special situations of developing country parties and the least developed countries (LDCs).
Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC mandates that to meet the specific needs and concerns of
developing country parties (particularly small island countries and countries with lowlying coastal areas) arising from the adverse effects of climate change, the parties are to
give full consideration as to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including
those related to funding, insurance and technology transfer. The LDCs constitute a bloc
of nearly 48 countries representing some of the poorest nations in the world that have the
least capacity to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change. In recognizing this
reality, article 4.9 provides that parties shall take “full account of the specific needs and
special situations of the least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding
and transfer of technology.” This provision is also wide enough to facilitate adaptation
actions in LDCs.
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Broadly, these are some of the salient provisions in the UNFCCC that support
adaptation actions. As can be seen, these provisions are worded generally and are not
adaptation specific. It does not identify clear plans that can facilitate the application of
adaptation in different contexts like water management, coastal planning, forestry, and
biodiversity conservation.121 A considerable amount of interpretative ingenuity is
required to inter-link several of these provisions to weave out a scheme that triggers
adaptation. As we shall see, the situation under the Kyoto Protocol is no different. Being
loaded primarily in favor of mitigation, reliance again has to be placed on creativity to
support adaptation actions. Some major provisions in the Kyoto Protocol from the
standpoint of adaptation are detailed below.
Articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol require that annex I parties minimize
the adverse effects of climate change and the impacts of response measures on
developing country parties. These provisions, which lead to “integration of climate
considerations in non-climate policy and in the greater use of tools such as EIA”, 122 can
also be examined from another angle. As noted earlier, the primary responsibility for
emissions-induced global warming lies squarely on the doorsteps of developed countries.
Moreover, by requiring annex I parties to implement measures to reduce their overall
emissions of GHGs by at least five per cent below 1990 levels in the first commitment
period (2008 to 2012), the Kyoto Protocol practically facilitates the successful
implementation of adaptation measures in developing countries. This is so because if
annex I countries persists with a ‘business as usual’ approach in the matter of emissions,
adaptation in developing countries will be unsuccessful.
Other notable provisions include article 10(b), which requires parties to formulate,
implement, publish and update programmes containing measures to facilitate adequate
adaptation to climate change, and article 10(c), which requires all parties to cooperate in
the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and diffusion of
environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to
climate change in particular to developing countries. The term “environmentally sound
121
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technologies” includes both mitigation and adaptation technologies within its fold.
Similarly, article 10(g) requires that in implementing the commitments enumerated under
this article, parties should give full consideration to article 4.8 of the UNFCCC, while
article 11.1 specifies that in implementing article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol, parties have
to give consideration to article 4.9 of the UNFCCC. Both articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the
UNFCCC are directly relevant to adaptation. Perhaps the most important provision in the
Kyoto Protocol that facilitates adaptation activities is the one that requires that proceeds
from certified project activities be used to assist developing country parties meet the costs
of adaptation.123

5.4.2 Conference of the Parties and Adaptation: Incremental Development of
the Rules
The various Conferences of the Parties (COPs) have played important roles in
highlighting the importance of adaptation and in developing the rules. However, as will
be seen in the following discussion, the COPs have not been able to create a coherent
body of adaptation principles. Apart from the COPs, the UNFCCC regime has fostered
the creation of an innovative mechanism to promote adaptation; namely, the Nairobi
Work Programme, whose salient features are also detailed below.
One of the first COPs that dealt with the issue of adaptation is decision 5/CP.7,
which implements article 4, paras. 8 and 9. Other highlights of this decision from the
perspective of adaptation are as follows: 1) it recognizes that the LDCs are most
vulnerable to the consequences of climate change and that widespread poverty limits their
adaptive capacity;124 2) to avoid maladaptation, adaptation actions should follow an
assessment and evaluation process based on national communications or other relevant
information;125 3) the Global Environment Facility (GEF) should support activities
related to “information and methodology”126 and “vulnerability and adaptation”;127 and 4)
123
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online:
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the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF) should be
utilised to implement activities like ICZM.128 More importantly, this decision also creates
a work programme for the LDCs and a fund to support this work programme. 129 After
this decision, adaptation began to receive attention by subsequent COPs.
The next major decision is the Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation
and Response Measures adopted at the COP 10, which seeks to strengthen the
implementation of actions enumerated under decision 5/CP.7.130 It also urges annex II
parties to contribute to the special climate change fund and to support adaptation actions
as a matter of “top priority.”131
Adopted at the COP 13 held in 2007, the Bali Action Plan (BAP), identifies
adaptation as one of the key pillars “to enable the full, effective and sustained
implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to, and
beyond 2012 . . .”132 It also seeks to address the need for “enhanced action on adaptation”
through a series of measures like international co-operation to support urgent
implementation of adaptation actions, risk management and risk reduction strategies,
disaster reduction strategies, and economic diversification to develop resilience. 133 The
BAP also stresses the need for innovative means of funding to assist developing country
parties, especially those who are particularly vulnerable, in meeting adaptation costs.134
The Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) adopted at COP 16 as an “Outcome of
the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention” affirmed that adaptation should be addressed on a level equal to
mitigation.135 With this in mind, it seeks to implement enhanced action on adaptation and
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Some of the measures contemplated include: transfer of adaptation technologies; establishing or
strengthening early warning systems in developing countries; and enhancing institutional capacity to
integrate adaptation into sustainable development programmes. Ibid, ¶7(b).
Ibid, ¶8.
Ibid, ¶¶11-12.
Decision 1/CP.10: Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures,
FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1, 17-18 December 2004, ¶¶5-14, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/r
esourc e/docs/cop10/10a01.pdf>.
Ibid, ¶3.
Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, (14–15 December 2007) ¶1, online:
UNFCCC <http://unfccc.in t/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3>.
Ibid, ¶1(c).
Ibid, ¶1(e)(iii).
Ibid, ¶1.2.(b).
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invites all parties to work towards securing the same.136 The CAF seeks to achieve this
by enumerating a series of enhanced adaptation actions grouped under five headings:
implementation,137 support,138 institutional arrangements,139 principles,140 and stakeholder
engagement.141 At the recently concluded COP17 at Durban, the need to address
adaptation planning in the broader context of sustainable development planning was
recognized.142 Apart from launching the Green Climate Fund (GCF),143 it draws attention
to the importance of developing national adaptation plans by adopting initial guidelines
for the formulation of national adaptation plans for use by LDCs and even invites
developing countries that are not LDCs to prepare the same based on these guidelines,
taking into account their national circumstances.144
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Ibid, ¶14.
All parties are to plan, prioritize and implement adaptation actions and use existing channels to
provide information on support provided and received for adaptation actions and on activities
undertaken. Again, a process should be established to enable LDC Parties based their NAPA
experience to formulate and implement national adaptation plans and an invitation to other
developing country Parties to employ the modalities formulated to support those plans. Finally, there
should be a two-year work programme to consider approaches to address loss and damage
associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to
climate
change.
Cancun
Adaptation
Framework,
online:
UNFCCC,
<http://unfccc.int/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/items/585 2.php>.
Developed country parties should provide developing country parties, taking into account the needs
of those particularly vulnerable, with long-term, scaled-up, predictable, new and additional finance,
technology, and capacity-building to implement adaptation actions, plans, programmes and projects.
Ibid.
At the global level, the CAF provides for the establishment of an Adaptation Committee to promote
the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner. At the regional level, it
seeks to strengthen and even establish regional centers and networks, particularly in developing
countries and finally at the national level, the CAF envisages strengthening and establishing
national-level institutional arrangements. Ibid.
To facilitate enhanced action on adaptation, the CAF enumerates certain steps like adaptations
should be in accordance with the convention; adaptation should be integrated into relevant social,
economic and environmental policies and actions; the measures should follow a country-driven,
gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable
groups, communities and ecosystems. Finally, it should also be based on best available science and,
where relevant by traditional and indigenous knowledge. Ibid.
The CAF invites relevant multilateral, international, regional and national organizations, the public
and private sectors, civil society and other relevant stakeholders to undertake and support enhanced
action on adaptation at all levels. Ibid.
See generally UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties: Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011: Addendum: Part
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Seventeenth Session,
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012) [UNFCCC, Report of the COP on its Seventeenth
Session, Add.1].
For an overview of the GEF, see infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
UNFCCC, Report of the COP on its Seventeenth Session, Add.1, supra note 142 at 83.
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The Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate
change is yet another milestone that seeks to assist all parties, particularly developing
countries, to augment their adaptive capacity.145 Established as a five-year programme in
2005 at the eleventh COP, it was decided that the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA) of the UNFCCC would pilot it. The programme has been
categorized based on two thematic areas: “impacts and vulnerability” and “adaptation
planning, measures and actions.” Each theme has five action-oriented sub-themes,146
implemented via nine work areas,147 of which two are directly related to adaptation.148
In its entirety, the programme involves several players, such as parties,
organizations (nearly 250 partner organizations),149 experts, the private sector, the global
community and the UNFCCC secretariat. These sectors were in two phases. Phase I
(2005 to mid-2008) saw over 100 organizations engaged in various activities (e.g.,
identification of calls for action and pledged activities), while the second phase (from
mid-2008 to 2010) involved the addition of several more activities.150

Despite the

conclusion of the programme’s second phase at the SBSTA’s 33rd session in Cancun (30
November-4 December 2010), it was decided to continue activities, with the SBSTA
pledging to carry out a review and submit a report at its 34th session.151
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This programme seeks to develop the capacity of parties to improve their understanding, assessment
of impacts; vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, and thereafter make informed decisions.
The Nairobi Work Programme: An Overview, at 1, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource
/docs/publications/09_nwp_overview_en.pdf>. It seeks inter alia to improve understanding and
assessment of impacts, and to make informed decisions on practical adaptation actions to respond to
climate change based on sound scientific, technical and socio-economic basis. UNFCCC, Progress
Made in Implementing Activities under the Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and
Adaptation to Climate Change: Note by the Secretariat, FCCC/SBSTA/2012/INF.1, 16 April 2012,
online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/ sbsta/eng/inf01.pdf> [UNFCCC, Progress
Made in Implementing Activities].
UNFCCC, The Nairobi Work Programme: The Second Phase (Bonn: UNFCCC Secretariat, 2008) at
8-9.
They are methods and tools; data and observations; climate modeling, scenarios and downscaling;
climate related risks and extreme events; socio-economic information; adaptation planning and
practices; research; technologies for adaptation; and economic diversification. Ibid at 10-11.
See generally UNFCCC, The Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation
to Climate Change: The Nine Work Areas of The Nairobi Work Programme, online: UNFCCC
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/09_nwp_wp_9areas_en.pdf>.
See UNFCCC, Progress Made in Implementing Activities, supra note 145.
The Nairobi Work Programme: An Overview, supra note 145 at 2.
UNFCCC, Nairobi Work Programme: Negotiations and Decisions, online: UNFCCC <http://u
nfccc.int/adaptation/nairobi_work_programme/negotiations_and_decisions/items/391
6.php>.
233

At Durban, the COP 17 requested that the SBSTA reconsider the work areas of this
programme with a view to making recommendations to the 19th COP on how best to
support its objectives.152 A request was also made to organize a series of workshops
around themes like water, climate change impacts and adaptation strategies, ecosystembased approaches for climate change adaptation, and the importance of disseminating the
outcomes.153 As a programme of far-reaching impacts, its legacy in creating a critical
mass of knowledge and experience to support adaptation activities has been summed up
by the SBSTA as follows: “[t]he Nairobi work programme has been successful in
creating significant momentum for adaptation through engaging a large number of
organizations representing a wide range of adaptation stakeholders.”154 Thus, it can be
affirmatively stated that the programme has been able to galvanize a large number of
players to generate a corpus of knowledge and information on adaptation.
At the Qatar COP 18, it was decided to provide guidance to developing countries
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance their adaptive
capacity.155 Originally the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA)
preparation and implementation was restricted only to the LDCs. In a marked departure
from this approach, the COP 18 enhanced the scope of the process by calling upon
developed country parties to mobilize financial support through bilateral and multilateral
channels including the SCCF for developing countries, which are not LDCs to implement
the NAPA process.156 As well, the COP also approved the three-year work plan of the
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For the text of the Decision 6/CP.17, titled “Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability
and Adaptation to Climate Change”, see UNFCCC, Report of the COP on its Seventeenth Session,
Add.1, supra note 142 at 3.
Ibid.
UNFCCC, Progress Made in Implementing Activities under the Nairobi Work Programme on
Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change: Note by the Secretariat,
FCCC/SBSTA/2010/INF.7, 4 November 2010, ¶46(a), online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resourc
e/doc s/2010/sbsta/eng/inf07.pdf>.
“Decision 3/CP.18: Approaches to Address Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change
Impacts in Developing Countries that are Particularly Vulnerable to the Adverse Effects of Climate
Change to Enhance Adaptive Capacity” in UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012 Addendum, Part Two:
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighteenth Session, Advance Version,
FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (28 February 2013) at 21, online: UNFCCC <http://unfc
cc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf>.
“Decision 12/CP.18: National Adaptation Plans” in UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the
Parties on its Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012 Addendum,
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighteenth Session, Advance
Version, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.2 (28 February 2013) 3 at 3, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int
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Adaptation Committee, which represents an important effort in “promoting coherence in
adaptation under the Convention and synergies with organizations, centres and networks
outside the Convention and providing technical support and guidance to the Parties.”157
Furthermore, it also calls upon the Adaptation Committee to consider the establishment
of an annual adaptation forum, to inter alia raise awareness and to facilitate enhanced
coherence of adaptation actions.158

5.4.3 Discussion
It is clear that anthropogenic emissions, past and present, have profoundly impacted the
climate system and have set in motion chaotic changes, which will be played out over for
a very long time. To compound matters, the scale and severity of environmental
degradation and poverty at the global level, has reached unprecedented scales than at any
time in human history. Therefore, all nations as a matter of necessity will at some point
have to invest in adaptation. Even though both developed and developing countries are
already moving in this direction, developed nations are better positioned to implement
adaptation actions, as they already have in place good governance, responsible and
responsive institutions, adequate legal support, technology, and the economic capacity to
absorb even extreme climate shocks.159 More importantly, as seen earlier, ever since
sustainable development entered the environmental law horizon, it has changed the tenor
of development and absent consideration of climate change impacts and related
adaptation and mitigation measures, development may prove superfluous on long-term
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/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a02.pdf>. Among the South Asian coastal countries, Bangladesh
and Maldives have developed National Adaptation Programmes of Action. For more details, see
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, NAPAs Received by the Secretariat,
online: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change <https://unfccc.in
t/adaptation/items/4159.php>.
“Decision: 11/CP.18: Work of the Adaptation Committee”, in UNFCCC, Report of the Conference
of the Parties on its Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012
Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighteenth Session,
Advance Version, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.2 (28 February 2013) 2 at 2, online: UNFCCC <http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a02.pdf>.
“Decision 1/CP.18: Agreed Outcome Pursuant to the Bali Action Plan” in UNFCCC, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on its Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December
2012 Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighteenth Session,
Advance Version, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (28 February 2013) at 3, online: UNFCCC <http://unfc
cc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf>.
Watkins, supra note 6 at 168.
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scales. Therefore, it is essential that adaptation and mitigation be juxtaposed into the
development process.
Right from the time of its inception, the focus of the international regime on climate
change was on mitigation. Even with imperfections and serious doubts cast over its
ability to ensure that the global increase in temperature is maintained below 2 degrees
Celsius, the international regime on mitigation has entered the second commitment
period, while the rules on climate change adaptation still remain nascent and vague.
Despite the significance of adaptation in the climate change equation, and a two-decade
existence, the international legal regime on adaption draws its sustenance primarily from
a patchwork of multifarious rules and initiatives rather than a full-fledged dedicated legal
instrument. Moreover, the international rules on climate change adaptation continue to
develop rather slowly and are dependant on the COPs. As seen, the international regime
on adaptation is riddled with ambiguity primarily because nations are unwilling to admit
that the international regime on mitigation has accomplished very little to prevent the
spewing of GHGs into the atmosphere and that nations will have to adapt.160 Then there
is also the uncertainty regarding the true nature and magnitude of climate change impacts.
While there is strong scientific consensus that we have crossed the tipping scales in
relation to several ecosystems vis-à-vis climate change we may have only limited
information regarding all possible scenarios. Given the complexity of climatic systems,
uncertainty in adaptation is unavoidable and therefore we will have to build adaptation
strategies around this uncertainty, as it is a question of survival for many. It cannot be
stressed enough that mitigation and adaptation are two sides of the same coin and must be
vigorously pursued as complementary rather than isolated approaches.
The final theme emerging from the review is two-pronged – namely, that there is a
growing adaptation deficit, and the backbone of the international legal regime on climate
change adaptation is weak. In light of this, it seems, that the time may have emerged for
marshalling an effective adaptation response at the international level, which may take
the form of an exclusive protocol on adaptation that sets out the basic norms of
adaptation as to prompt the development of more coherent, and holistic adaptation
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Freestone, “International Legal Framework”, supra note 109.
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responses.161 In this regard, an adaptation protocol could help transform adaptation from
a being “poor relation,”162 to an equal and integral constituent of the climate change
regime. The Protocol could serve to codify and prescribe new rules on climate change
adaptation, streamline financial arrangements, promote technology transfer, provide for
direct capacity building on adaptation and resilience, and create suitable institutions to
ensure that the funds are being appropriately utilised to further adaptation at the groundlevel. In unison with the Kyoto protocol, the adaptation protocol could help create winwin situations for sustainable development particularly in developing countries. Since
ICZM is an integral part of climate change adaptation, at least in its application to the
coastal zones, an adaptation protocol can provide impetus for the development of specific
rules on ICZM.

5.4.4 Financing Adaptation
No review of the international regime on climate change adaptation is complete without
scrutinizing financing arrangement, which is what this section attempts to do. The
implementation of climate change adaptation measures is a costly endeavor. Carrying the
magnitude of a universal problem, no country is immune from its adverse and widespread
consequences and therefore all nations will have to invest in adaptation. Both developed
and developing countries are already moving in this direction. Developed nations are
better positioned to implement adaptation actions, as they already have in place good
governance, responsible and responsive institutions, adequate legal support, technology,
and the economic capacity to absorb even extreme climate shocks. In contrast, in most
developing countries adaptation continues to be a “fringe activity”163 and the primary
impediment

in

its

implementation

is

financial

unavailability

and

systemic

inefficiencies.164 Consequently, the incremental dangers that accompany climate change
will be superimposed on societies that are characterized by massive poverty, low living
standards, poor livelihood opportunities, environmental pollution, over-exploited natural
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See UNFCCC, supra note 44, art 17.
Freestone, “International Legal Framework”, supra note 109 at 603.
Watkins, supra note 6 at 172.
“Globally, wealthier nations are better placed financially and technologically to cope with the effects
of possible climate change.” World Commission on Environment & Development, Our Common
Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) at 49.
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resource systems, food and water insecurity, low economic growth, and high human
vulnerability.165
The UNFCCC secretariat estimates that by 2030, developing countries will require
about USD28-67 billion annually to adapt to climate change, a figure which is beyond
most developing nations, particularly the LDCs.166 Consequently, environmental justice
postulates that these vulnerable countries and societies must be provided with sufficient
and sustained assistance that will enhance their adaptive capacities. In putting this into
effect and in consonance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated
responsibilities, the UNFCCC articles provide that developed countries are to extend
financial assistance to developing countries to enable them to comply with their
obligations.167 In emphasizing this aspect, in a veiled warning, the UNFCCC text
observes:
[t]he extent to which developing country Parties will
effectively implement their commitments under the
Convention will depend on the effective implementation
by developed country Parties of their commitments
under the Convention related to financial resources and
transfer of technology….168
Adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds is sine qua non for the successful
implementation of climate change adaptation activities. To ensure the same, the
UNFCCC established a financial mechanism under the COP169 that decides policies,
programme priorities and eligibility criteria.170 This financial mechanism, accountable to
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Watkins, supra note 6 at 171.
Presently, there are 48 LDCs, out of which 33 are in Africa, 14 in Asia and one in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Least Developed Countries: Country Profiles, online: UN-OHRLLS
<http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/>. These countries represent the poorest and weakest
segment of the international community. To be categorized as an LDC, the following has to be
satisfied, 1) low-income; 2) human capital status; and 3) economic vulnerability. Least Developed
Countries: Criteria for Identification of LDCs, online: UN-OHRLLS <http://www.unohrlls.org/en
/ldc/related/59/>. UNFCCC, Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in
Developing Countries (UNFCCC, 2007) at 6, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/d
ocs/publications/impacts.pdf>.
See UNFCCC, supra note 44, arts 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 & 4.9.
Ibid, art 4.7.
Ibid, art 11.
Ibid, art 11.1.
238

the COP, has “an equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent
system of governance.”171
Set up in 1991 as a pilot under the World Bank to protect the global environment
and promote sustainable development,172 the GEF was restructured at the Earth Summit,
and included the participation of the UNDP and the United Nations Environment
Programme. It was then taken out of the World Bank system to confer it with greater
autonomy and independence. The GEF’s central role in the financial dynamics of the
climate change regime is that it acts as the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC on an
interim basis. A memorandum of understanding between both of these entities articulates
the relationship between the GEF and the COP to the UNFCCC. 173 Here, the GEF
functions under the guidance of COP, to which it is also accountable. 174 Subsequently,
different funds have been established to finance adaptation activities, and the GEF is
responsible for their administration as well. The overview below reveals the major
sources of funding and their relevance to adaptation.
While the 6th COP in Bonn in 2001 created three funds to assist developing
country parties to meet adaptation costs (namely, the Special Climate Change Fund, the
Least Developed Countries Fund [LDCF] and the AF), the 7th COP allotted GEF the
responsibility to administer the first two funds.175 However, prior to operationalizing
these funds, it was considered ideal to call upon the GEF to finance pilot projects “that
would demonstrate the practical and successful use of adaptation planning and
171
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Ibid, art 11.2.
What is the GEF?, online: Global Environment Facility <http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef>. At
the Rio Earth Summit, the GEF was restructured to become a permanent independent financial
organization that unites nearly 182 member governments, “in partnership with international
institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector-to address global
environmental issues.” Bonizella Biagini et al, Global Environment Facility: Financing Adaptation
Action, at 5, online: Global Environment Facility <http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/
publication/adaptation-actions_0.pdf>. The largest funder of projects to improve the global
environment, the GEF serves as financial mechanism for a series of conventions, including, the
CBD, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001, and the UNCCD, Though not
formally linked to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the GEF
supports its implementation in countries with economies in transition. Ibid at 6; see also What is the
GEF?, ibid.
See Decision 12/CP.2: Memorandum of Understanding Between the Conference of the Parties and
the Council of the Global Environment Facility, FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, 19 July 1996, annex,
online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/15a01.pdf#page=55>.
Ibid, annex, ¶2.
GEF Evaluation Office, GEF Council, Evaluation of the GEF Strategic Priority for Adaptation,
GEF/ME/C.39/4 (22 October 2010) at 3.
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assessment.”176 Accordingly, the GEF established the strategic priority on adaptation
(SPA), in 2001, with a USD50 million corpus trust fund with the object “to support pilot
and demonstration projects to show how adaptation planning and assessment can be
practically translated into projects that provide real benefits and can be integrated into
national policy and sustainable development planning.”177 The SPA is essentially a
pioneering initiative, since, until that time, there were no “on-the-ground adaptation
interventions and the entire focus was on research, assessments, and screening tools.”178
All countries otherwise eligible for GEF funding can access the funds under the SPA. By
the end of 2009, the funds financed 26 projects, some of which are relevant to coastal
management.179
The LDCF traces its origin to article 4.9 of the UNFCCC, which, in recognizing the
special situation and vulnerability of LDCs, states that parties should “take full account of
the specific needs and special situations of the Least Developed Countries in their actions
with regard to funding and transfer of technology.”180 The LDCF was established at COP
7 in Marrakech to support the identification of and to fund urgent and immediate
adaptation actions for the LDCs.181 To implement article 4.9, Decision 5/CP.7 envisages
a work programme for the LDCs182 by establishing the LDCF, which is operated by the
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Evaluation of the GEF Strategic Priority for Adaptation: Full Report, Evaluation Rep No 61
(Washington, DC: Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office, July 2011) at 1.
Adaptation, online: Global Environment Facility <http://www.thegef.org/gef/adaptation>.
Biagini et al, supra note 172 at 11.
GEF-Administered
Trust
Funds,
online:
Global
Environment
Facility
<http://www.thegef.org/gef/trust_funds>. Some of the projects are: Coastal and Marine Resources
Management in the Coral Triangle: Southeast Asia; Coastal and Marine Resources Management in
the Coral Triangle of the Pacific; Participatory Coastal Zone Restoration and Sustainable
Management in the Eastern Province of Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka: Adaptation to Climate ChangeResponding to Coastline Change and Its Human Dimensions in West Africa through Integrated
Coastal Area Management; and Implementation of Pilot Adaptation Measures in Coastal Areas of
Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent & the Grenadines. See Evaluation of the GEF SPA: Full
Report, supra note 176 at 20-21.
UNFCCC, supra note 46.
Least Developed Countries Fund, online: Global Environment Facility <http://www.thegef.org/ge
f/ldcf> [Least Developed Countries Fund].
This work programme has the following elements: establishing or strengthening national secretariats
or focal points in LDCs; provide ongoing training in negotiation skills and language to develop the
capacity of negotiators in LDCs to enable them to participate effectively in the negotiation process;
supporting the preparation and implementation of national adaptation programmes of action;
promote public awareness programmes on climate change issues; development and transfer of
adaptation technology; etc. See Decision 5/CP.7, supra note 124 at part II.
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GEF.183 The LDCF also supports the preparation and implementation of the NAPA,
which are basically country-driven strategies that identify the pertinent and immediate
adaptation requirements of LDCs. Eligibility for project funding under the LDCF is
reserved to all LDCs who are parties to the UNFCCC and have completed the preparation
of their NAPA. Annex II countries along with some annex I countries of the UNFCCC
can contribute funds to the LDCF.184
At their annual meetings, the COPs have provided additional guidance to
streamline the operation of the LDCF at regular intervals. 185 The presence of this fund
183
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See Decision 7/CP.7: Funding under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 10 November
2001, ¶6, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf#page=43> [Decision
7/CP.7]; Governance of the Fund, online: Global Environment Facility <http://www.thegef.org/ge
f/LDCF_Governance>. Governance of the Fund, online: Global Environment Facility <http://www
.thegef.org/gef/SC CF_Governance>.
Decision 7/CP.7, ibid, ¶¶1(c)(iii), 6.
The guidance relates to: providing funding to meet full cost of preparing the NAPAs; ensuring
transparency in relation to the operation of the fund; encouraging the use of national and where
appropriate regional experts; ensuring complementarity and separation of funding from the LDCF
and other funds with which the operating entity is entrusted; adopting streamlined procedures for the
operation of the fund, etc. Ibid. Decision 8/CP.8, calls upon the GEF and its implementing agencies
to ensure the speedy release and disbursement of funds and timely assistance for the preparation of
national adaptation programmes of action; organize regional workshops to advice the LDCs
regarding the preparation of NAPAs; encourages annex and annex II parties to address the needs of
the LDCs with regard to training in negotiation skills and language. See Decision 8/CP.8, Guidance
to an Entity Entrusted with the Operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, for the
Operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund, FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1, 1 November 2002, at
19-20, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop8/07a01.pdf#page=19>. Decision
6/CP.9, requests the GEF to support NAPA implementation. The GEF is to take into account the
following factors to develop their operational guidelines relating to funding NAPA implementation:
ensuring a country-driven approach in line with national priorities; equitable access to the funding,
etc. See Decision 6/CP.9: Further Guidance for the Operation of the Least Developed Countries
Fund, FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1, 12 December 2003, ¶¶2-3, online: UNFCC <http: //unfccc.int/
resource/docs/cop9/06a01.pdf#page=13>. Decision 3/CP.11, provides inter alia the following
further guidance: the operation of the LDCF should be consistent with a country driven approach;
support learning-by-doing and the implementation of the activities identified in the NAPAs; ensure
balanced access to resources; full cost funding to meet additional costs; and invites annex II parties
to contribute to the LDCF for implementing NAPAs. See Decision 3/CP.11: Further Guidance for
the Operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund, FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, 9-10 December
2005, at 10-11, online: UNFCCC, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/05a01.pdf
#page=10>. Decision 5/CP.14, requests the GEF to implement the other elements of the LDCs work
programme in addition to the NAPAs; assist countries that have not submitted the NAPAs to help
them complete and submit the same as soon as possible, establishing a time-frame within which the
LDC parties can access funding and other support for the preparation and implementation of
projects identified in the NAPAs; etc. Decision 5/CP.14: Further Guidance for the Operation of the
Least Developed Countries Fund, FCCC/CP/2008/7/Add.1, 12 December 2008, at 8-9, online:
UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/cop14/eng/07a01.pdf#page=8>. Decision 5/CP.16,
notes the following additional guidance: the GEF to provide funding to the LDC parties to update
their national adaptation programmes of action; invites annex II parties to contribute to the LDCF,
etc. See generally Decision 5/CP.16: Further Guidance for the Operation of the Least Developed
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has ensured that 48 of the world’s countries most vulnerable to climate change impacts
are able to access resources for NAPA preparation.186 At COP 17 held in Durban, the
GEF was requested to continue to provide information to the LDCs regarding project
baselines, applications for accessing funding from the LDCF, and the project
development process.187 Presently, the fund supports 52 projects and programmes in 42
LDCs, representing the largest portfolio of adaptation projects of its kind.188 Of these, 33
projects have already started and, as of December 2011, the LDCF has approved some
USD217 million for projects and mobilized more than USD919 million in cofinancing.189 While 53 per cent of the approved funds are dedicated to increasing
resilience of LDCs in Africa, 23 per cent is for adaptation projects in Asia, 21 per cent is
for Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and the remaining three per cent is earmarked
for Latin America and the Caribbean. It is important to note that projects related to
coastal management receive the second largest share of funds, nearly 24 per cent.190
Another product of the Marrakesh Accords, the SCCF, seeks to “finance activities,
programmes and measures relating to climate change.”191 These are in the areas of
adaptation, technology transfer, energy, transport, agriculture, forestry, and waste
management, and include activities that seek to assist developing countries that are fossil
fuel-dependent to diversify their economies.192 Among these various activities, adaptation
receives the highest priority in addressing the adverse impacts of climate change. 193 In
implementing adaptation activities, consideration is given to national communications
and NAPA, as well as to other relevant information provided by the party. The SCCF is
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Countries Fund, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.2, 10–11 December 2010, online: UNFCCC <http://unf
ccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/ldc/application/pdf/decision_5.cp.16.pdf>; see also Decision
10/CP.18: Further Guidance to the Least Developed Countries Fund, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, 7
December 2012, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf>
[Decision 10/CP.18].
Least Developed Countries Fund, supra note 181.
For the text of the Decision 9/CP. 17, see UNFCCC, Report of the COP on its Seventeenth Session,
Add.2, supra note 142 at 11.
Least Developed Countries Fund, supra note 181.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Bonizella Biagini & Saliha Dobardzic, Accessing Resources under the Special Climate Change
Fund (GEF, 2011) at 7.
Ibid.
Decision 5/CP.9: Further Guidance to an Entity Entrusted with the Operation of the Financial
Mechanism of the Convention, for the Operation of the Special Climate Change Fund,
FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1, 12 December 2003, ¶1(c), online: UNFCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/d
ocs/cop9/06a01.pdf#page=11> [Decision 5/CP.9].
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operated by the GEF.194
Subsequently, various COPs have provided initial195 and further196 guidance to the
GEF regarding the different modalities for operationalizing the SCCF. COP guidance
lists the following areas for adaptation under the SCCF:

water resources management;

land management; agriculture; health; infrastructure development; fragile ecosystems
(including mountain ecosystems); ICZM; and climatic disaster risk management.197
Additionally, for 39 projects under its adaptation programme, the SCCF has approved
nearly USD150 million and leveraged about USD1.03 billion in co-financing.198 The
importance of the SCCF as a funding for adaptation projects can be gauged from the fact
that, in recent years, the demand for SCCF adaptation resources exceeds the current
supply of resources.199
The genesis of the AF can be traced to the Kyoto Protocol, which calls upon the
COP to ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to
assist vulnerable developing nations in the Kyoto Protocol to meet the costs of
adaptation.200 Noted in the annex to decision 5/CP.6 of the Bonn Agreements on the
Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (from the Sixth COP of the
UNFCCC) is that an AF should be established to finance concrete adaptation projects and
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See Decision 4/CP.7: Development and Transfer of Technologies (Decisions 4/CP.4 and 9/CP.5),
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 10 November 2001, ¶3, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/reso
urce/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf>.
In operating the SCCF, the GEF should promote complementarity of funding and ensure financial
separation between the SCCF and other funds, which it administers; ensure transparency, and
streamline procedures in the operation of the SCCF; etc. See Decision 7/CP.8: Initial Guidance to
an Entity Entrusted with the Operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, for the
Operation of the Special Climate Change Fund, ¶1(a)-(d), FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1, 1 November
2002, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop8/07a01.pdf#page=17>.
Decision 5/CP.9 provides for the following: the SCCF should serve as a catalyst to leverage
additional resources from bilateral and other multilateral sources; activities should be countrydriven, cost effective and integrated into national sustainable development and poverty reduction
strategies. Decision 5/CP.9, supra note 193 at 11-12.
Biagini & Dobardzic, supra note 191 at 7.
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), online: GEF <http://www.thegef.org/gef/SCCF>.
Ibid.
Adaptation Fund, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechan
ism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php>; Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, supra note 47, art 12(8). As
at 31 August 2011, the total accrual of proceeds from the monetization of certified emission
reductions have reached USD166 million. See UNFCCC, Report of the COP on its Seventeenth
Session, Add.2, supra note 142 at 4 (detailing Decision 6/CP.17 re: Nairobi work programme on
impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change).
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programmes in countries that are parties to the Protocol.201 It was also emphasized that
the AF should be financed from proceeds from the clean development mechanism (CDM)
project activities as well as other sources of funding.202 These advances in subsidization
were taken a step further at the seventh COP held in Marrakech, where it was decided
that two per cent of the certified emission reductions issued for a CDM project activity
were to be used towards the AF.203 The parties at Marrakech also delineated which
activities were to receive support from the AF; ICZM-related adaptation activities were
included on the list.204
Once the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, further modalities relating to the AF
were worked out at the COP in Montreal in 2005, which, incidentally was also the first
meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 28/CMP.1 lays down principles to
guide the operation of this fund, specifying a country-driven approach, sound financial
management and transparency, separation from other funding sources, and a learning-bydoing method.205 Decision 5/CMP.2, made at Nairobi in 2006, added more principles206
and also decided on operational specifics.207 The COP held in Bali in 2007, which served
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UNFCCC, Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the
Convention Preparations for the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Decision 8/CP.4), Decision 5/CP.6: Implementation of
the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, FCCC/CP/2001/L.7, 24 July 2001, annex part II, online: UNFCCC
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/l07.pdf> (funding under the Kyoto Protocol).
Ibid.
See generally Decision 10/CP.7: Funding under the Kyoto, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 10 November
2001, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf>.
These include activities like establishing national and regional centers and information networks for
rapid response to extreme weather events; improving diseases and vector monitoring, disease control
and prevention; supporting capacity building; and implementing adaptation in areas like water
resources management, land management, agriculture, health, infrastructure development, and
integrated coastal management. See Decision 5/CP.7, supra note 124, ¶7.
Decision 28/CMP.1: Initial Guidance to an Entity Entrusted with the Operation of the Financial
Mechanism of the Convention, for the Operation of the Adaptation I, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.4,
9-10 December 2005, ¶3, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/
08a04.pdf#p age=3>.
Some of the major principles include, transparency and openness in the governance of the fund;
accountability in management, operation and use of funds; equitable and balanced access to the fund
by eligible countries; efficiency and effectiveness in the management, operation and governance of
the fund; and the fund to operate under the authority and guidance of and be accountable to the COP
which shall decide its overall policies. Decision 5/CMP.2: Adaptation Fund,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1, 17 November 2006, ¶1, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.in
t/resource/ docs/2006/cmp2/eng/10a01.pdf>.
Major modalities include, funding for parties to be available for national, regional and community
level activities; learning by doing; sound financial management including use of international
fiduciary standards; projects to be country-driven based on the needs, views and priorities of eligible
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as the third meeting of Kyoto Protocol parties, decided that the AF would be supervised
and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB)208 under the authority and guidance
of the COP, with full accountability to the COP.209 Furthermore, the AFB would be
serviced by a secretariat210 and a trustee,211 the former which would be guaranteed
functional independence (with its head accountable to AFB),212 and the latter which
would be given “fiduciary responsibility and the administrative competence to manage
the adaptation fund.”213 Rules regarding functions,214 composition,215 financial interest,216
quorum,217 decision-making procedures,218 chairmanship,219 and other miscellaneous
matters were also detailed.220
The COP that served as the fourth meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol was
held in Poznan in 2008. At this meeting, it was decided to confer AFB with legal capacity
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parties, taking into account national sustainable development strategies, poverty reduction strategies;
and funding for concrete adaptation projects in eligible countries. Ibid, ¶2.
Adaptation Fund Board, online: Adaptation Fund <http://www.adaptation-fund.org/about/theboard>.
Decision 1/CMP.3: Adaptation Fund, FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, 14-15 December 2007, ¶¶3-4,
online: Adaptation Fund <http://adaptation-fund.org/system/files/Decision_1-CMP.3.pdf>.
Secretariat services are to be provided to the AFB to support and facilitate its activities. The GEF
provides secretariat services to the AFB on an interim basis. Ibid, ¶¶18-19.
The AF is to have a trustee who has fiduciary responsibilities and the administrative competence to
manage the AF. Ibid, ¶20. The World Bank has been requested to perform the trustee functions on
an interim basis. Ibid, ¶23.
Ibid, ¶18.
Ibid, ¶20.
These functions are: develop strategic priorities, policies and guidelines; develop criteria to ensure
that the implementing and executing entities have the capacity to implement the administrative and
financial management guidelines of the Adaptation Fund; decide on projects, including allocation of
funds; develop and agree additional rules of procedure; monitor and review the implementation of
Adaptation Fund operations; establish committees, panels and working groups, to provide expert
advice, to review performance reports on implementation and ensure independent evaluation and
auditing of activities supported by the Adaptation Fund; develop and approve draft legal and
administrative arrangements for secretariat and trustee services; be responsible for the monetization
of certified emission reductions, and to report annually to the COP. Ibid, ¶5(a)-(m).
Taking into account fair and balanced representation among different groups, the AFB is composed
of 16 members and 16 alternates representing parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Ibid, ¶6.
The members including alternate members are not to have any personal financial interest in the
project activities. Ibid, ¶10.
A simple majority is necessary to constitute the quorum. Ibid, ¶11.
Decisions are to be taken by consensus and in its absence; they are taken by a two-thirds majority of
the members present at the meeting. Ibid, ¶12.
The AFB elects its own Chair and Vice-Chair with one being a member from an annex I party and
the other from a non-annex I party. The positions of the Chair and the Vice-Chair alternate annually
between the annex I and non-annex I parties. Ibid, ¶13.
For instance, rules have been provided regarding frequency of meetings (generally, twice a year);
monetization of certified emission reductions; access to funding; etc. Ibid, ¶¶15, 28-30.
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to enable it to discharge functions more effectively.221 As well, the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) also adopted
the rules of procedure to regulate AFB’s business conduct. Other notable aspects were
also decided upon, such as a memorandum regarding secretariat services to be provided
to the AFB;222 the terms and conditions of services to be provided by the World Bank, as
trustee for the AF;223 and the strategic priorities, policies and guidelines of the AF.224
At the 15th COP in Copenhagen in 2009, which served as the fifth meeting of the
parties to the Kyoto Protocol, the parties endorsed the decision by the AFB to accept
Germany’s offer to confer it legal capacity.225 The CMP also adopted amendments to the
rules of procedure of the AFB,226 and the parties decided to encourage annex I parties and
international organizations to provide additional funding to the AF, over and above the
shares from the CDM proceeds.227 The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) was
requested to initiate a review of the AF and report to the COP (serving as the meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its sixth session).228 However, as the SBI could not
carry out the review (it was considered premature),229 the Body concluded that the CMP,
at its sixth session, should consider undertaking the review of the AF at CMP.7, with the
CMP providing the terms of reference.230
Accordingly, at the COP 16/CMP.6, held in Cancun in 2010, the parties decided to
undertake a review of the AF at its seventh session, with subsequent reviews to be
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Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
on its Fourth Session, Held in Poznan from 1 to 12 December 2008: Addendum, Decision 1/CMP.4,
Adaptation Fund, FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.2, 19 March 2009, ¶11, online: UNFCCC
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/cmp4/eng/11a02.pdf>.
Ibid at 12.
Ibid at 15.
Ibid at 21.
Decision 4/CMP.5: Report of the Adaptation Fund Board, FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1, 18–19
December 2009, recital, ¶1, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cmp5/eng/21
a01.pdf>.
Ibid, ¶5.
Ibid, ¶¶9 & 5.
See generally Decision 5/CMP.5: Review of the Adaptation Fund: FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1,
18–19 December 2009, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cmp5/eng/21
a01.pdf>.
See UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: Subsidiary Body for Implementation Report of
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on its Thirty-second Session, Held in Bonn from 31 May to
9 June 2010, FCCC/SBI/2010/10, 25 August 2010, ¶¶114-15, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/r
esource/do cs/2010/sbi/eng/10.pdf>.
Ibid.
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conducted every three years.231 The CMP.6 also confirmed the terms of reference for the
review whose objective is to “ensure the effectiveness and adequacy of the Adaptation
Fund and its institutional arrangements.”232 Additionally, the CMP.6 requested annex I
parties and international organizations provide funding to the AF, in addition to the share
of proceeds from CDM project activities;233 it also requested that the secretariat conduct
regional or sub-regional workshops to enable parties to familiarize the process and
requirement of accreditation of national implementing entities.234
At the COP 17, held in Durban in 2011 (which served as the seventh meeting of the
Parities to the Kyoto Protocol), the AFB submitted its report. 235 It was decided that the
initial review of the AF be completed at the eighth session.236
The latest addition to the string of funding mechanisms is the GCF, established at
the 16th COP in Cancun, with the objective to allocate resources between adaptation and
mitigation activities to contribute to the achievement of the ultimate objective of the
UNFCCC.237 As noted,
[i]n the context of sustainable development, the Fund
will promote the paradigm shift towards low-emission
and climate-resilient development pathways by
providing support to developing countries to limit or
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the
impacts of climate change, taking into account the needs
of those developing countries particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate change.238
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Draft Decision-/CMP.6: Review of the Adaptation Fund, Advance Unedited Version, ¶1, online:
UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/conf erence_documents/application/pdf/2010
1204 _cop16_cmp_review_afb.pdf>.
Ibid, annex, ¶3.
Ibid, ¶6.
Ibid, ¶8.
See generally UNFCCC, Report of the Adaptation Fund Board: Note by the Secretariat,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/6 (22 November 2011).
See “Decision 7/CMP.7: Review of the Adaptation Fund” in UNFCCC, Report of the COP on its
Seventeenth Session, Add.2, supra note 142 at 5.
“Decision 1/CP.16: The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention” in UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of
the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010:
Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Sixteenth Session,
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011) at 17 ["Decision 1/CP.16"].
“Annex: Governing Instrument for the Green Climate Fund” in Green Climate Fund - Report of the
Transitional Committee, Draft Decision -/CP.17 (Advance Unedited Version) ¶2, online: UNFCCC
<http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_gcf.pdf>.
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The parties also entrusted the work of designing the details of this fund with the
Transitional Committee.239 Subsequently, at the 17th COP, the report of the Transnational
Committee was accepted and approval granted to the governing instrument for the
GCF.240 The COP also decided to designate the GCF as an operating entity of the
financial mechanism of the Convention, in accordance with Article 11 of the
UNFCCC.241 The governing instrument of the GCF confers on it juridical personality and
it is to be managed by a board consisting of 24 members representing, in equal numbers,
developing and developed country parties.242 All developing country parties are eligible
to receive resources from this fund, which will have thematic funding windows.
Furthermore, the Fund will finance and support enhanced action on adaptation,
mitigation, technology development and transfer, capacity-building and the preparation
of national reports by developing countries. It will also support developing countries in
pursuing project-based and programmatic approaches in accordance with climate change
strategies and plans, such as low-emission development strategies or plans, nationally
appropriate mitigation actions, and national adaptation plans of action.243 As of now, the
fund has windows only for adaptation and mitigation.244 In allocating resources for
adaptation, the board has been tasked to take into account the urgent and immediate
needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
consequences of climate change, including LDCs, SIDS and African States, using
minimum allocation floors for these countries, where appropriate.245
In recognising the important role of the GCF in the climate finance architecture, the
COP 18 at Doha stressed on the need to confer juridical personality and legal capacity to
the Green Climate Fund.246 In addition, it also called for the expeditious implementation
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"Decision 1/CP.16", supra note 237.
Decision 3/CP.17: Launching the Green Climate Fund, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (11 December
2011), online: UNFCCC <http://test.informea.org//uploads/decisions/unfccc/_10227_502b64d8
84945_English %20%203%20CP17.pdf>; see also Green Climate Fund, online: Green Climate
Fund: Home <http://g cfund.net/home.html>.
Decision 3/CP.17, ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 63, ¶36.
Ibid.
“Annex: Governing Instrument for the Green Climate Fund” supra note 238, ¶52.
Decision 10/CP.18, supra note 185.
248

of the work plan and related policies and emphasised the need to balance the allocation of
the GCF resources between adaptation and mitigation activities.247

5.4.4.1 Remarks
Drawing from the foregoing parts and connecting the salient points, a few crucial themes
emerge. The first is that despite efforts to secure adequate funds for adaptation activities
in developing countries, the reality is that we are “drifting into a situation of global
adaptation apartheid,”248 as the flow of funds does not come close to the projected
needs.249 Given this wide disparity between the actual demand and the supply of funds
for adaptation activities, the current framework is analogous to using a sponge to mop up
flood waters.250 In certain parts of the world, the situation is so desperate that people are
using imported garbage to construct sea walls,251 while in more affluent societies,
adaptation takes diverse forms, like the construction of luxurious floating houses.252 For
millions of this planet’s impoverished people, climate change adaptation projects
represent a primary lifeline; hence, developed countries must play greater roles in
supporting adaptation activities through adequate funding and technology transfers.
Nevertheless, even vast increases in funding will not alone resolve the adaptation
crisis, since the question as to whether the poor in vulnerable countries are truly able to
benefit depends on a host of intrinsic and extrinsic factors, not the least of which is how
the funds are administered. There is also concern that, due to the overlap between
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Ibid.
Watkins, supra note 6 at 166. The Netherlands is spending up to USD25 billion to upgrade the water
control systems that are already in place to combat SLR. See Lauren F Jones, “Treasuring the
Chesapeake: An Analysis of Climate Change and Its Impact on the Chesapeake Bay and Maryland’s
Surrounding Coastal Regions”, Comment, (2009) 38 U Balt L Rev 331 at 334 (HeinOnline). At the
same time, developing countries are struggling to find funds for basic socio-economic and
developmental issues.
As of 10th January 2010, the total funds made available under the five primary global adaptation
assistance programmes was USD581 million, whereas, the UNFCCC estimates that the annual
adaptation costs in developing countries stand somewhere between USD27 billion to USD66 billion
per year. See generally Jordan Diamond & Carl Bruch, ‘The International Architecture for Climate
Change Adaptation Assistance’ in Ryo Fujikura & Masato Kawanishi, eds, Climate Change
Adaptation and International Development: Making Development Cooperation More Effective
(Washington, DC: Earthscan, 2010) 291 at 292.
Watkins, supra note 6 at 167.
People in the island of Majuro in Kiribati have built sea walls by using imported garbage from the
US. Rising Waters: The Islands, online: ITVS <http://archiv e.itvs.org/risingwaters/islands.html>.
Watkins, supra note 6 at 167.
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adaptation assistance and official development assistance (ODA), donors may divert their
current ODA for adaptation activities rather than provide additional and a more secure
stream of funds for the same.253 This highlights the need to streamline the different
funding activities to avoid redundancies and achieve greater efficiency through improved
coordinated activities, information sharing, and capacity building.254 As well, there has to
be monitoring of these adaptation programmes where the emphasis should be on ground
realities rather than the amounts transferred. The proposed protocol on climate change
adaptation can at minimum inter alia streamline funding mechanisms so as to ensure
adequacy and predictability in their supply, broaden access to funding, diversify revenue
streams into the fund and establish performance and accountability standards to ensure
that adaptation funds are utilised efficiently and that it truly reaches the needy. In
addition, it can also broadly identify major areas and actions that require funding like
coastal management, marine biodiversity protection, support to alternative livelihood
opportunities, etc.
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Ibid at 307.
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5.4.5 Climate Change Adaptation Obligations Under Other International
Environmental Law Instruments

Apart from the primary climate change related instruments,255 a plethora of other
international environmental law instruments can also trigger and support climate change
adaptation actions,256 of which the CBD and the UNCCD are particularly relevant (and
will be discussed below). Admittedly, climate change alters natural processes that have
far-reaching implications for biodiversity conservation.257 As the impacts become more
severe, there will be even greater losses to biota and increased desertification. Already in
several parts of the world, habitats are transforming and species are experiencing changes
in life cycles; some are developing new physical traits, while many are dying or
becoming extinct.
In addition to the UNFCCC, the other conventions adopted as part of the Rio
package (i.e., the CBD and the UNCCD) can also be used to facilitate climate change
mitigation and adaptation. Moreover, measures under one convention can have
repercussions on objectives espoused by the other two.258 To elucidate this aspect, it is
well known that wetlands and mangroves are rich in marine biodiversity, which the CBD
seeks to protect. Concurrently, given the high sequestration potential of wetlands and
forests, sustainable management of these ecosystems fosters effective mitigation. If these
are degraded, then their ability to absorb the excess amounts of carbon is diminished and
natural carbon sinks become defunct forever. Similarly, from an adaptation perspective,
wetlands and mangroves act as an important buffer to protect coastal infrastructure
against sea level rise (SLR) and storm surges; thus, their conservation helps to promote
255
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Slotau, supra note 120 at 195-99.
The international bill of rights, namely, the UDHR, ICCPR with its two Optional Protocols and the
ICESCR can trigger adaptation actions. See generally supra note 108. Noteworthy is the fact that
apart from the Rio instruments, there are several others like the Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar), 1971, the Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972, the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 1979, and Forestry Principles that are relevant
to climate change adaptation and marine and coastal biodiversity conservation.
See Ch 2, Part 2.5, for more details on the impact of climate change on coastal biodiversity.
UNEP & CBD, Options for Enhanced Cooperation among the Three Rio Conventions, Note by the
Executive Secretary, UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/10/INF, 15 December 2004, at 2, online: Convention on
Biological Diversity <http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/sbstta/sbstta-10/information/sbstta-10-inf09-en.pdf>.
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climate change adaptation. Conserving coastal biodiversity can also serve to thwart
desertification and land degradation.
The inter-relationship between the three Rio Conventions can be deciphered from
an examination of article 2 of the UNFCCC, which recognizes the importance of limiting
climate change to levels that will allow ecosystems to naturally adapt to it. This is an
objective, which both the CBD and the UNCCD likewise espouse. Among the three
conventions, the UNCCD expressly fosters this by highlighting the need to coordinate
activities under relevant international agreements, particularly among the Rio
instruments, to maximize benefits and avoid duplication of effort. 259 To build interlinkages between the Rio instruments, a Joint Liaison Group (JLG) consisting of the
secretariats of the CBD, the UNCCD and the UNFCCC was established in 2001. The
JLG works to enhance co-ordination between the three Conventions on a broad range of
issues, including those relating to climate change adaptation.260
From the perspective of climate change adaptation in coastal zones, the CBD has
the most relevance. A summary is provided below on the synthesis attempted between
climate change adaptation and marine and coastal biodiversity conservation under the
CBD. On its own, the CBD devotes energy to articulate links and build bridges between
these themes, thereby providing a more concrete basis for actions. The various CBD COP
meetings have played important roles in articulating this relationship and in providing
further direction for coastal zone adaptation projects. Apart from several general COP
decisions that are relevant to climate change, there are a few specific ones on climate
change adaptation and biodiversity conservation, which are explained next.
One of the initial COPs that articulated this relationship was COP 5, Decision V/3,
which noted that climate change was the primary causative factor leading to extensive
coral bleaching, and that, in line with the precautionary approach, remedial measures
needed to be taken. It sought to transmit this view to the UNFCCC and urged this body
to take all possible actions to reduce the effect of climate change on water temperatures
and to address the socio-economic impacts of coral bleaching on affected countries and
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UNCCD, supra note 100, art 8.1.
Joint Liaison Group online: Convention on Biological Diversity <http://www.cbd.int/coope
ration/liaison.shtml>.
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communities.261 It also sought to integrate the issue of coral bleaching in the programme
of work for the conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biological
diversity and to develop and implement a specific work plan on coral bleaching, in
cooperation with the UNFCCC.262
Meanwhile, Decision VII/15 explained the importance of the ecosystem approach
which “provides a framework for the integrated management of land, water and living
resources”,263 and Decision VIII/30 calls upon parties and governments to develop rapid
assessment tools to design and implement biodiversity conservation measures that
contribute to climate change adaptation, particularly in vulnerable countries. Further, the
decision calls for more involvement of indigenous and local communities and the
promotion of regional cooperation in activities to enhance habitat connectivity across
ecological gradients.264 Decision IX/16 on biodiversity and climate change provides for a
series of guidance measures grouped under four clusters, many of which are relevant to
climate change adaptation perspective.265
The COP via Decision X/33 re-emphasizes the importance of an ecosystem-based
approach to adaptation. In compatibility with national capabilities and circumstances, it
calls upon countries to integrate ecosystem-based approaches into national biodiversity
strategies. As well, it plans to combat desertification and hopes to institute sustainable
land management plans.266 In planning and implementing effective adaptation activities,
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impacts on biodiversity should be considered and biodiversity-rich areas are neither to be
degraded nor converted.267 The decision also prohibits the carrying out of any climaterelated geo-engineering activities that may impact biodiversity until there is adequate
scientific basis.268

5.4.5.1 Remarks
In sum, a number of opportunities exist to integrate climate change adaptation into
several ongoing and future programmes by referencing a range of biodiversity relevant
instruments. However, to secure a more coherent response in relation to coastal zones, it
is necessary that the JLG extend its mandate well beyond the Rio Conventions, build
synergies, and facilitate cross-pollination between other relevant environmental
instruments. More importantly, to adapt to a rising sea and consequent impacts, the JLG
must goad national governments to enact mainstream conservation of coastal and marine
biodiversity and climate change adaptation in line with the precautionary and ecosystembased approaches into all national policies, programmes and plans that apply to coastal
zones. With this understanding of climate change adaptation, the next sub-section
examines its relevance to the coastal zone.

5.5

CLIMATE CHANGE
ENVIRONMENTS

ADAPTATION

FOR

COASTAL

AND

MARINE

In 1988, the IPCC established three working groups, one of which was the Response
Strategies Working Group. This group, in turn, established four subgroups, chief among
which was the Coastal Zone Management Subgroup (CZMS), chaired by New Zealand
and the Netherlands. The CZMS was entrusted with providing information and
recommendations on CZM strategies and long-term policies on adaptation to climate
change and SLR.269 It held two workshops, the first in Miami, Florida, and the second in
Perth, Australia. Representatives from nearly 70 countries participated in both of these

267
268
269

UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33, 29 October 2010, ¶8(j), (k), online: Convention on Biological
Diversity <http://www.cbd.int/climate/doc/cop-10-dec-33-en.pdf>.
Ibid, ¶8(v).
Ibid, ¶8(w).
J Dronkers et al, eds, Report of the Coastal Management Subgroup: Strategies for Adaption to Sea
Level Rise (Geneva: IPCC, Response Strategies Working Group, 1990) at ii.
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workshops and identified several adaptive responses,270 which were compiled in the
report by the CZMS, subsequently adopted by the IPCC in 1990 as part of its First
Assessment Report.271
In crafting adaptive responses for coastal area climate change, the Report of the
Coastal Management Subgroup emphasized the importance of government and the
private sector input in coastal management.272 As well, it articulated three principal
objectives of coastal management: 1) avoiding development in areas vulnerable to
inundation; 2) ensuring the continual functioning of critical natural systems; and 3)
protecting human lives, essential properties and economic activities against the ravages of
the seas.273 Moreover, the report stressed that coastal management programmes should
give due consideration to ecological, cultural, historic and aesthetic values as well as to
human safety and economic development.274 The report also identified several climate
change adaptation measures that are grouped under the three broad categories of retreat,
accommodate and protect.275 However, before proceeding to examine these in detail, it
must be noted that it is difficult to categorize the different measures into silos as
represented by these headings, as there is considerable overlap.
Planned retreat is a form of proactive adaptation that emphasizes hazard-avoidance
and reduction. Although it is difficult to implement in countries where populations are
already concentrated on the coastline, retreat seeks to prevent and remove further influxes
of people and investment to areas that are vulnerable to severe erosion, flooding and
weather events, all of which will be aggravated as SLR intensifies. 276 The simplest form
270
271
272
273
274
275
276

Ibid.
Ibid at iii.
Ibid at 6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 6-8.
See also Printz v Glenelg SC, (2010), VCAT 1975 (Austl, VCAT), online: AustLII <http://www.au
stlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/1975.html>. Initially, no planning permit was required to
develop the land in question, which was the floodway of the Surrey River lying adjacent to a low
laying coastal area. Accordingly, a building permit was issued. During construction the
Environmental Significance Overlay Schedule 4 (ESO4) came into force. It became necessary for
the construction to obtain permit and this was challenged. Even though the assessment was that the
site is at a low risk of coastal impacts, the construction was disallowed. The tribunal was influenced
by Victoria's Coastal Strategy which stressed caution while allowing development in coastal spaces,
so that the future ability to apply adaptation strategies are not compromised. In this case, the
buffering provided by the dune system and the estuary to the urban developed areas of Narrawong,
would be diminished by the dwelling, which was described as a poor design that would occupy the
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of planned retreat involves preventing development on vulnerable properties, placing
restrictions on building within hazard zones, and permitting development in coastal areas
only under stringent conditions.277 Planned retreat can be achieved by increasing public
awareness and by increasing taxes on properties in vulnerable zones, 278 setting high
insurance premiums,279 and establishing setback lines,280 zoning, and buffer zones.281
Retreat envisages different kinds of roles for the government. In the first instance,
governmental effort is directed to limit development.282 This is achieved by providing
information on risks, expropriating land, withdrawing subsidies and incentives for
development in vulnerable areas, enforcing land use restrictions, and prohibiting
reconstruction of property damaged by storms.283 The second role calls upon the
government to lay out the specifics, thereby providing investors with the opportunity to
evaluate the uncertainty and make determinations on whether or not to proceed with
development. This approach can be implemented in various ways, such as by enacting
regulations that prohibit private construction of protective structures, or converting land
ownership into long-term or conditional leases that terminate as and when the sea reaches
a particular point.284
In the third role, the government takes on a more passive position, limiting itself to
ensure that all stakeholders have full knowledge about the rate of expected SLR and the
associated consequences, many of which may be uncertain. 285 In other words, the forces
of nature triggered by climate change are given a free hand to determine changes to
coastal morphology.286 Accordingly, crops and timberlands may be left to deteriorate
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279

280
281
282
283
284
285
286

buffer space. Placing a dwelling in such a setting introduced a foreign built element into a coastal
foreshore setting, which could not blend into the landscape seriously compromising the capacity for
adaptation. Ibid.
Dronkers et al, eds, supra note 269 at 6.
For more details on utilizing tax and market based tools to facilitate adaptation, see Jessica Grannis,
Adaptation Tool Kit: Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Land Use (Georgetown Climate Center, 2011) at
54-56.
Lloyd’s, Coastal Communities and Climate Change: Maintaining Future Insurability, at 23, online:
LLOYD’S <http://www.lloyds.com/> (emphasizing the key role of the insurance industry in
facilitating adaptation).
For an elaboration of the concept, see text accompanying notes 591-93.
For an elaboration of the concept, see text accompanying notes 594-98.
Dronkers et al, eds, supra note 269 at 6.
Ibid.
Ibid at 6-7.
Ibid at 7.
Ibid.
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from salt intrusion or by flooding, and mangroves, marshes and coral reefs may be
allowed to drown with the inward movement of the sea. Market forces will then
determine decisions relating to development, provided that private entities are willing to
accept the risk. As a condition precedent to implementing retreat, it is essential that there
be land for resettlement. Hence, retreat may not be a viable option for small island states
and for areas reeling under intense coastal squeeze, such as mega-coastal cities.287
Accommodation involves advanced planning and the realization that some coastal
zone values will invariably be lost.288 In other words, some people will have to abandon
their homes and relocate to higher ground. Accommodation can take several forms –
from “building codes and resilient designs”,289 to rebuilding restrictions and redesigning
structures to minimize impacts (e.g., elevating residential and commercial buildings on
pilings to protect them from floods).290 Measures like modifying drainage, rezoning
vulnerable properties to discourage inappropriate land use, increasing natural resilience
through coastal dune rehabilitation, beach nourishment291 and wetland renewal and so on
also fall under accommodation,292 as do prohibitions on activities that impair the natural
protection values of coastal ecosystems. These can include restrictions on infilling
wetlands, cutting down mangroves, and mining corals and beach sand.293

287

288
289
290

291
292
293

Nick Abel et al, “Sea Level Rise, Coastal Development and Planned Retreat: Analytical Framework,
Governance Principles and an Australian Case Study” (2011) 14 Envtl Sci & Pol’y 279
(ScienceDirect) (noting that in South East Queensland, Australia, the option of planned retreat is
fast disappearing).
Dronkers et al, eds, supra note 269 at 6.
Grannis, supra note 278 at 23.
In Maasbommel (the Netherlands), houses are built to float on water. These wood-frame
constructions are anchored to flexible mooring posts and they can accommodate a difference in
water level up to 5.5 meters. Facing up to Rising Sea-Levels: Retreat? Defend? Attack?, The Future
of our Coastal and Estuarine Cities, at 8, online: Building Futures <http://www.buildingfutures
.org.uk/assets/downloads/Facing_Up_To_Rising_Sea_Levels.pdf>; see also Taip v East, supra note
89. Residential development permit was set aside, despite the fact that the buildings would suffer
little physical impact from SLR and climate change due to it being raised to a certain level. Services
such as sewer, water, power and telecommunications rely either on ground infrastructure or on
assets that are susceptible to flooding and which were not protected from possible floods raising a
foreseeable risk of failure of these services leading to residents being without sanitary services,
clean drinking water and power. On this count, it was held that it is simply not enough to consider
that the building itself will be protected due to it being raised to a certain level from SLR and that
the sweep of other impacts are relevant and need to be taken into account. Ibid.
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection (2010) USSC
08-1151, 130 S Ct 2592 (2010).
Dronkers et al, eds, supra note 269 at 7.
Ibid.
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The most effective implementation of planned retreat and accommodation is
through legislated setback regulations.294 Setback lines are determined with reference to
the tide line (the high water mark or the low water mark, the vegetation line, or a line that
is associated with the primary dune), and restrictions can take the form of prohibitions on
the setting up of new infrastructure seaward of the setback line.295 Setback lines must be
determined by employing the best available science to ensure that coastal constructions
are moved sufficiently inland to protect them from harmful waves and erosion.296
Buffer zones are another method to implement accommodation and retreat. Akin to
setbacks, properties that offer critical natural processes (like buffering flood impacts,
preserving aesthetics, and ensuring public access) are left untouched so that ecosystems
such as wetlands are able to migrate inland with minimal impediments.297 Zoning and
overlay zones are additional adaptation techniques. Given that a single storm may have
the strength to haphazardly pull down constructed buildings and wash away roads and
other critical infrastructure, zoning emerges as an important land-use planning tool that
can minimize susceptibility to storms and coastal erosion through smart planning.298
Typically, zoning is the responsibility of local governments that divide the area into
zones based on various criteria (e.g., earmarking land for residential, commercial,
industrial and other purposes).299

The demarcations are plotted on a map and,

development proceeds based on the zoning regulations. In order not to disrupt existing
zoning classifications, local governments sometimes superimpose additional regulatory
requirements in areas with special characteristics. This mechanism can be utilized to
create an SLR overlay zone for areas that are most vulnerable to inundation and
294
295

296

297
298
299

Timothy Beatley, David J Brower & Anna K Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone
Management, 2d ed (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002) at 138.
“Review of U.S. Ocean and Coastal Law: The Evolution of Ocean Governance Over Three
Decades, Appendix 6 to the Final Report” in U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean
Blueprint for the 21st Century: Final Report (Washington, DC, 2004) at 28.
In the US, several states require new constructions to be set up only after considering the extent of
erosion over long-time scales (the next 30 to 60 years). James E Neumann et al, Sea-level Rise &
Global Climate Change: A Review of Impacts to U.S. Coasts (Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, 2000) at 20.
Ibid at 26.
Village of Euclid v Amber Realty Company, 272 US 365, 47 S Ct 114, 71 L Ed 303, 1926 US
LEXIS 8.
Cormac Cullinan, Integrated Coastal Management Law: Establishing and Strengthening National
Legal Frameworks for Integrated Coastal Management, FAO Legislative Study, No 93 (Rome:
FAO, 2006) at 187.
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flooding.300 Overlays can disallow or impose new conditions on expansion or renovation
of existing structures, prohibit or impose conditions on the rebuilding of damaged
structures, or require the elevation of rebuilt structures.301 Rebuilding restrictions may
constrain landowners from reconstructing structures substantially destroyed by natural
hazards. This may take the form of a total prohibition on re-construction or permit
construction under stringent conditions.302 Land and easement acquisition can also be
used to implement planned retreat and accommodation.303
Generally, retreat and accommodate strategies are based on the assumption that
inevitably there will be land loss and coastal flooding and that some coastal functions and
values will be lost or altered. The focus is to help retain the dynamic nature of coastal
ecosystems by allowing them to naturally adapt to SLR and other climatic processes.304
The last in the trio of objective of coastal management is protection, which seeks to
insulate coastal residents from harmful impacts. This is achieved, to varying degrees,
through the construction of a range of defensive coastal armouring and other measures to
strengthen the ability of existing protective structures. These commonly take two forms:
hard and soft coastline protection measures (or structural and non-structural devices).
Hard shoreline armouring is the conventional option adopted to combat SLR. It
involves the use of engineering expertise to build solid structures like bulkheads,
seawalls, revetments, dykes, groins, tide gates, and storm surge barriers to barricade the
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301
302

303

304

See Grannis, supra note 278 at 19-20.
Ibid at 19.
Ibid at 31; see also Neumann et al, supra note 296 at 20 (noting that South Carolina’s Beachfront
Management Act, 1988 states that structures incurring damages of more than two-thirds of pre-storm
value cannot be reconstructed).
In the US, states and local governments use public funds to acquire lands (properties damaged by
floods, or hazards) for conservation, and to promote public safety. Grannis, supra note 278 at 47. To
ensure that coastal development does not prevent the inward migration of coastal ecosystems,
rolling easements are used and are implemented via rolling coastal management statues, rolling
conservation easements and conditions imposed through development permits (ibid at 41).
Conservation easements or open space easements seek to preserve the property in its natural state.
Here the landowner is paid for the easement or in the alternative provided a tax benefit in lieu of the
grant. The property continues to be in private hands but development is limited according to the
terms of the easement (ibid at 50-52). For more details on the concept of rolling easements, see also
Ch 7, Part 7.3.1.3.
Luitzen Bijlsma et al, “Coastal Zones and Small Islands” in Robert T Watson, Marufu C Zinyowera
& Richard H Moss, eds, Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate
Change: Scientific-Technical Analyses, Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996) 289 at 311.
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coast against flooding and erosion.305 Their construction is expensive306 and their longterm durability to hold back the magnitude of a rising sea on a large scale is limited. In
certain cases, particularly from an ecological perspective, this measure can have counterproductive consequences on neighbouring properties. For instance, the construction of
storm walls may end up preventing the natural inland migration of wetlands and
mangroves, ultimately leading to their loss,307 and groins can entrap sediments that move
along the shore. Moreover, protection to one area is often achieved at the expense of
increased erosion in another.308 While construction of dams and salt-water intrusion
barriers can safeguard water supplies, they can have negative consequences such as
increasing sedimentation, which will erode coastal headlands and impair the ability of
deltaic wetlands to naturally adapt to a rising sea.309 Furthermore, by interfering with the
process of littoral drift, hard armouring can increase erosion and exacerbate flooding.310
As well, it can restrict public access and prevent the launching and landing of traditional
305
306
307

308

309
310

Grannis, supra note 278 at 36.
The costs involved are site specific and many factors need to be considered like drainage
requirements, labour costs, and foundation preparation work. Neumann et al, supra note 296 at 18.
Eric Gilman et al, Pacific Island Mangroves in a Changing Climate and Rising Sea, UNEP Regional
Seas Reports and Studies No 179 (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, Regional Seas
Programme, 2006) at 9 (noting that landward migration of mangroves can be obstructed by
seawalls). The salt marshes in southeast England appear to be migrating inland along the estuary.
However, flood embankments interrupt the natural movement. Bijlsma et al, supra note 304 at 302.
Groins are a major technique used to stabilize the beach. In certain countries these are constructed
by utilizing the trunks of rhun palm trees, which are jetted into the beach and tied together with
timber. Sometimes they are also constructed by using re-enforced concrete. Dronkers et al, eds,
supra note 269 at 9; Gambia, First National Communication of the Republic of the Gambia to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Gambia: Department of State for
Fisheries, Natural Resources and the Environment, Department of Water Resources, National
Climate Committee, 2003) at 64.
Dronkers et al, eds, ibid at 12.
As originally enacted, South Carolina’s Coastal Zone Management Act of 1977 provided for
seawalls, bulkheads, and other erosion control methods, which were later found to increase coastal
erosion. Accordingly, the Beachfront Management Act amended this Act in 1988; see also Byron
Shire Council v Vaughan, Vaughan v Byron Shire Council, (2009), [2009] NSWLEC 88 and (No 2)
[2009] NSWLEC 110. The Land and Environment Court granted injunction restraining the
respondents from putting up a rock wall since it could potentially produce adverse impacts on
neighboring properties. Ibid. In 1989, with the construction of the harbour and two breakwaters, the
littoral drift, (the natural south to north movement of sand) was affected in Pondicherry, India and
since then the beaches have been eroding. By 2002, Northern Pondicherry lost all its sand and the
government constructed a seven kilometers long seawall, aggravating erosion in nearby state of
Tamil Nadu. India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Final Frontier: Agenda to Protect the
Ecosystem and Habitat of India’s Coast for Conservation and Livelihood Security, Report of the
Expert Committee on the Draft Coastal Management Zone (CMZ) Notification, Constituted by the
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Under the Chairmanship of Prof. MS Swaminathan (New
Delhi: Ministry of Environment & Forests, 2009) at 21.
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catamarans that are used for fishing operations in the vast majority of coastal areas in the
developing world.311 But perhaps the biggest drawback of hard shoreline armouring is
that it lulls the government authorities, developers, and (more importantly) coastal
communities into a false sense of security and complacency that all is well, so that a
'business-as-usual approach' towards coastal development can continue.312 Consequently,
shoreline armouring is now only used when it is absolutely necessary to protect critical
infrastructure or in cases where the area is intensely developed and supports a huge
population, making relocation difficult.313
Preference is given instead to soft armouring (“natural infrastructure” or “living
shorelines”), which offers substantial protection against inundation, tidal flooding, wave
impact, shore erosion, and salinity intrusion.314 Soft armouring measures can take various
forms, like artificial nourishing of beaches, dune creation,315 protection of existing and
creation of new bioshields (such as mangrove replanting,316 wetland restoration,317 and

311
312
313

314

315
316

317

Sudarshan Rodriguez et al, Policy Brief: Seawalls (UNDP/UNTRS: Chennai & ATREE: Bangalore,
2008) at 3.
Grannis, supra note 278 at 38.
Dronkers et al, eds, supra note 269 at 7. See also US, Living Shoreline Protection Act, Md C Ann
Envir §16-201(c)(1)(i) (2008), reads
(c)(1) Improvements to protect a person’s property against erosion shall consist of
nonstructural shoreline stabilization measures that preserve the natural environment,
such as marsh creation, except
(I) in areas designated by department mapping as appropriate for structural
shoreline stabilization measures; and
(II) in areas where the person can demonstrate to the department’s satisfaction
that such measures are not feasible, including areas of excessive erosion,
areas subject to heavy tides, and areas too narrow for effective use of
nonstructural shoreline stabilization measures.
Robert RM Verchick & Joel D Scheraga, “Protecting the Coast” in Michael B Gerrard & Katrina
Fischer Kuh, eds, The Law of Adaptation to Climate Change: U.S. and International Aspects
(Chicago: American Bar Association, 2012) 235 at 250; Living Shoreline Protection Act, ibid.
Grannis, supra note 278 at 39.
In wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami, Malaysia and China are taking steps to protect mangroves,
including their replanting. Poh Poh Wong, “Rethinking Post-tsunami Integrated Coastal
Management for Asia-Pacific Ocean and Coastal Management” (2009) 52 Ocean & Coast Mgmt
405 at 407 (ScienceDirect).
The Pichavaram wetlands in the South Indian State of Tamil Nadu acted as a buffer against the
Indian Ocean tsunami, saving several villages from a total washout. In areas where the mangroves
were destroyed as in the nearby Nagapattinam district the destruction was intense. Ibid at 407. The
degree of protection afforded by mangroves depends on a host of factors like soil texture, angle of
tsunami incursion relative to the coastline, slope of the forest floor, etc. Daniel M Alongi,
“Mangrove Forests: Resilience, Protection from Tsunamis, and Responses to Global Climate
Change” (2008) 76 Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Sci 1 at 6 (ScienceDirect).
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coastal forestry promotion318), and the protection of other coastal ecosystems. While soft
armouring may be less expensive than hard armouring, it may require constant upkeep
and monitoring, and like hard armouring it may be impractical to implement on a large
scale.319
There are several adaptation measures some of which can be classified under the
three broad groupings of retreat, accommodate and protect, while others can be
categorized as miscellaneous, all of which can be utilized to secure CCCA. And this is so
because, CCCA is three-dimensional - it addresses the right to development and
enhancement of human capabilities, it seeks to protect and enhance the resiliency of
coastal ecosystems, and finally, it addresses climate change impacts. Below an analysis
of different CCCA measures is carried out based upon the three-dimensional facet of
CCCA.320

318

319

320

See also Keith Forbes & Jeremy Broadhead, The Role of Coastal Forests in the Mitigation of
Tsunami Impacts, RAP Publication 2007/1 (Bangkok: FAO Regional Office for Asia and the
Pacific, 2007).
In the case of beach nourishment, as the sea level rises and as more sand is scoured away by wave
action, cheaper sand resources may get exhausted and nourishment may cease to be cost-effective.
Neumann et al, supra note 296 at 19.
The above assessment and method for scoring is reflective of the author’s subjective opinion based
on his personal understanding of coastal climate change adaptation. It is accordingly acknowledged
that an alternative assessment and method for scoring is possible.
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Table 1: CCCA Measures and SCD
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Egypt, Egypt Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Cairo: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, 2010) at 91.
Ibid at 88.
World Water Assessment Programme, Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk, vol 1, The
United Nations World Water Development Report 4 (Paris: UNESCO, 2012) at 58 (coastal
desalination plants discharge brine into neighboring waters, with negative impacts on coastal marine
ecology). The disadvantages of desalinization include the use of large quantities of energy, which
can increase GHG emissions, and the process also harms marine life. Angela Haren Kelley,
“Seawater Desalination: Climate Change Adaptation Strategy or Contributor?” (2011) 38 Ecology L
Currents 40 at 44-45 (QL).
Arizona has the best greywater legislation in the world. RF Michael Snodgrass, Note, “The Reuse of
Household Water: A Small Step Toward Sustainable Living and Adaptation to Climate Change”
(2010) 22 Geo. Int’l Envtl L Rev 591 (QL) (outlining the features of greywater laws and use in the
US, Australia and the Middle East and advocates the widespread use of grey water. Mauritius,
Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Vacoas: Government of Mauritius, 2010) at 81 [Mauritius, Second National
Communication].
Saudi Arabia, Second National Communication: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2011) at 104 [Saudi
Arabia, Second National Communication].
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Saint Lucia, Second National Communication on Climate Change for Saint Lucia (Saint Lucia:
Ministry of Physical Development and the Environment, 2011) at 152; Cook Islands, National
Environment Service, Cook Islands Second National Communication under the United Nations
Framework Convention for Climate Change (Cook Islands: National Environment Service, 2011) at
49, 52 [Cook Islands, Cook Islands Second National Communication].
Alfred Micallef & Charles V Sammut, The Second Communication of Malta to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Malta: Ministry for Resources and Rural Affairs, 2010)
at 341.
Israel, Second National Communication, supra note 2 at 93.
Ibid at 23 (prevention of marine pollution from land sources to reduce stress on coral reefs);
Solomon Islands, Initial National Communications under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, at 30, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs
/natc/slbnc1.pdf> [Solomon Islands, Initial National Communications].
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In the village of Massbommel on the banks of River Mass, in Netherlands, 37 water floating homes
have been created. UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change:
Human Solidarity in a Divided World (New York: UNDP, 2005) at 165.
Robin Kundis Craig, “A Public Health Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Points for Climate
Change Adaptation” (2010) 15:2 Widener L Rev 521 at 534(QL).
Singapore, National Environment Agency, Singapore's Second National Communication under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Singapore: National Environment
Agency, 2010) at 32.
Israel, Second National Communication, supra note 2 at 81.
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Suriname, First National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Suriname: National Institute for Environment and Development (NIMOS), 2005)
at 54 [Suriname, First National Communication]; Egypt, Egypt Second National Communication,
supra note 321 at 89 (emphasising the need to strengthen the Mohamed Ali Wall).
Micallef & Sammut, supra note 327 at 269.
Grannis, supra note 278 at 20-22.
Section B Programs Containing Measures to Facilitate Adequate Adaptation to Climate Change, at
401, online: MCTI <http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0215/215085.pdf>.
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Mauritius, Second National Communication, supra note 324 at 86. Tonga, Lu’isa Tu’i’afitu-Malolo,
ed, Second National Communication (Nuku’alofa, Tonga: Second National Communication on
Climate Change Project, 2012) at 120 [Tonga, Tu’i’afitu-Malolo].
Seychelles, Ministry of Environment & Transport, Initial National Communication under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Seychelles: Ministry of Environment &
Transport, 2000) at 89 [Seychelles, Initial National Communication].
One of the adaptation measures adopted by China is to strengthen its coastal monitoring system by
using satellite remote sensing. China, Initial National Communication on Climate Change (Beijing,
2004) at 71 [China, Initial National Communication]. Israel, Second National Communication,
supra note 2 at 93 (advocating the continued monitoring of changes to coastal cliffs, by high
resolution photogrammetric mapping and by airborne laser mapping).
Egypt, Egypt Second National Communication, supra note 321 at 88; Seychelles, Initial National
Communication, supra note 339; see also Saudi Arabia, Second National Communication, supra
note 325.
The lessons learned, the principles, standards, and good practices, developed over the years,
courtesy, the diverse ICZM projects implemented in almost all the coastal regions of the world are
highly relevant in developing climate change adaptation responses appropriate to SLR and other
climate change impacts on the coastal zone. James Tobey et al, “Practicing Coastal Adaptation to
Climate Change: Lessons from Integrated Coastal Management” (2010) 38 Coastal Mgmt 317 at
317; Bahrain, Public Commission for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and
Wildlife, Bahrain’s Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework on
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Climate Change (Bahrain, 2012) at 28 (advocating regional cooperation among neighboring
countries to share information on the regional impacts of development activities on sediment
transport).
Seychelles, Initial National Communication, supra note 339 at 88; Nigeria, Ministry of
Environment, Nigeria's First National Communication under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Abuja: Ministry of Environment, 2003) at 89 (advocating
resettlement); Solomon Islands, Initial National Communications, supra note 329.
Bahrain, Bahrain's Second National Communication, supra note 342.
Bahrain, General Commission for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment & Wildlife,
Bahrain’s Initial Communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Volume I: Main Summary Report (Bahrain: General Commission for the Protection of Marine
Resources, Environment & Wildlife, 2005) at 23 [Bahrain, Initial Communications to the
UNFCCC].
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Ibid.
Korea, Korea's Third National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Low Carbon, Green Growth, at 113, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/natc/kornc3.pdf>. In addition to the usual measures such as total allowable catch,
fishing effort and gear limitations, and closed season, South Africa is implementing the ecosystem
approach to fisheries, the code of conduct for responsible fisheries, and individual quota rights.
South Africa, Department of Environmental Affairs, South Africa’s Second National
Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Pretoria,
South Africa: The Department of Environmental Affairs, 2001) at 141 [South Africa, Second
National Communication].
Climate proofing is defined as
. . . identifying risks to a development project, or any other specified
natural or human asset, as a consequence of both current and future
climate variability and extremes, and ensuring those risks are reduced to
acceptable levels through long-lasting and environmentally sound,
economically viable and socially acceptable changes implemented at
one or more of the following stages in the project cycle: planning,
design, construction, operation and decommissioning.
Cook Islands, Cook Islands Second National Communication, supra note 326 at 45.
Seychelles, Initial National Communication, supra note 339 at 88.
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United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Energy, Second National Communications to the Conference of
the Parties of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Abu Dhabi: Ministry of
Energy, 2010) at 29 (calls for the establishment of a Coastal Adaptation Center). China, Initial
National Communication, supra note 340 (proposing to strengthen its coastal monitoring system,
particularly, satellite remote sensing and geographical information systems).
South Africa, Second National Communication, supra note 347 at 142; Solomon Islands, Initial
National Communications, supra note 329.
David Ownes, “Land Acquisition and Coastal Resource Management: A Pragmatic Perspective”
(1983) 24:4 Wm & Mary L Rev 625 at 630 (QL).
On-going adaptation measures include measures like re-forestation and cutting down trees affected
by disease. Mauritius, Second National Communication, supra note 324 at 91.
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See Vanuatu, National Communication to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1999) at 34; see also Cape Verde, Second National
Communication on Climate Change of Cape Verde: United Nations Framework Convention for
Climate Change (Cape Verde: Ministry of Environment Rural Development and Marine Resources,
2010) at 84.
J Campbell, E Whittingham & P Townsley, “Responding to Coastal Poverty: Should we be Doing
Things Differently or Doing Different Things?” in Chu Thai Hoanh et al, eds, Environment and
Livelihoods in Tropical Coastal Zones: Managing Agriculture–Fishery–Aquaculture Conflicts
(Oxon: CAB International, 2006) 274 at 286 (‘alternative livelihoods’ is the new mantra for many in
the coastal management world).
For instance, see Antigua and Barbuda, Antigua and Barbuda's Second National Communication on
Climate Change (2009) at 139, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/antnc2.pdf>
(advocating the constitution of MPAs).
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Israel, Second National Communication, supra note 2 at 93.
Tonga, Tu’i’afitu-Malolo, supra note 338.
Egypt, Egypt Second National Communication, supra note 321 at 91. China has enacted national
and local laws on the sea, revised its marine environmental protection law and has published
regulations on the marine environmental protection, mangrove protection and coral reef protection)
China, Initial National Communication, supra note 340 at 70.
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All of the above identified coastal adaptation measures are being implemented in
different coastal countries. Apart from the three-dimensional impact of these adaptation
360

361
362

It is the natural-resource dependent poor communities in developing countries that are particularly
vulnerable to climate change. They have traditional knowledge in agriculture, hunting, fishing, and
use of medicinal plants. Many of these communities have been exposed to different kinds of
environmental changes and have developed coping strategies. This wisdom can be utilized to
support adaptation. Mirjam Macchi, “Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Climate Change”,
Issues Paper (IUCN, March 2008) at 7.
Israel, Second National Communication, supra note 2 at 93 (incorporate climate change implications
in the land-use planning of the coastal area).
Bahrain, Initial Communications to the UNFCCC, supra note 345; Suriname, First National
Communication, supra note 334; Egypt, Egypt Second National Communication, supra note 321 at
89; Saudi Arabia, Second National Communication, supra note 325 at 107-8; Mozambique, Ministry
for Co-ordination of Environmental Affairs, Mozambique Initial National Communication under UN
Framework at 76-81.
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measures, a discernible proposition that emerges is that practically, all these adaptation
measures further SCD and can be accommodated and implemented via an ICZM
programme. This aspect is elaborated in the next chapter.

5.6 CONCLUSION
As the discussion clarifies, the international climate change adaptation law is at a
crossroads. There is a growing adaptation deficit, and the backbone of the international
legal regime on climate change adaptation is weak. In fact, the climate change adaptation
regime being reflected in the provisions of the various treaties as well as in the work of
the different COPs and in financing programmes, etc. do not produce a composite
framework supportive of adaptation actions. Instead, the inconsistent and diffused
obligations preclude the formation of a holistic approach to climate change adaptation.
All the same, it is clear that adaptation to the adverse consequences of climate change is
an integral pillar of the climate change regime as it rebuilds confidence in communities
by reducing the negative impacts of climate change and in certain cases it draws
advantage from possible opportunities. It represents one of the most plausible ways to
cope with impacts of climate change over the next few decades. Countries will have to
expend aggressive efforts to combat climate change by investing resources on both lowcarbon development in terms of mitigation and adaptation. However, most countries,
particularly those in the developing world, do not have the necessary resources to meet
their development needs let alone the additional burdens of adapting to climate change.
And this may require the re-writing of the rules on international climate change
adaptation.
As far as coastal climate change adaption is concerned, an ever-rising sea, the
ferocity and increasing occurrence of extreme weather events, and an increasing surge in
people settling in coastal areas all signal the urgent need for coastal climate change
adaption. And as seen, CCCA is a three-dimensional process that addresses the right to
development and enhancement of human capabilities, protects and enhances the
resiliency of coastal ecosystems, and addresses climate change impacts. Therefore CCCA
demands a twin-track approach, where measures must bolster coastlines while at the
same time help people increase their adaptive capacities. As revealed, coastal adaptation
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is a dynamic process with no ‘silver bullet’ solution that can be applied across the board.
The development of a particular response depends on the circumstances of each coastal
region, and adaptation responses have to be practical, flexible and sustained. A major
chunk of the coastal zone climate change adaptation measures delineated in this chapter
are presently being implemented via land-use management planning tools, and reference
is rarely made to the larger ICZM objectives and goals. If sustainable coastal
development is to be attained, this necessarily needs to change and CCCA measures
(even if they continue to be part of land use planning or other strategies) must be
sufficiently integrated to be a necessary component of an ICZM programme. This
message is elaborated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6

MOVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE COASTAL
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ICZM

6.1 INTRODUCTION
The conceptual foundations of integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) can be traced
to the mid-1960s, in the establishment of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission, which formed as a result of a growing awareness that the
environmental issues pertaining to the coast required a distinctive response.1 Initially
known simply as coastal zone management (CZM), the concept got a boost with the
declaration of the US federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 1972.2 A decade later, the
term ‘integrated coastal zone management’ emerged and pilot programmes were initiated
in the coastal countries of Ecuador, Sri Lanka, and Thailand by the U.S. Agency for
International Development, and the Coastal Resources Center at the University of Rhode
Island played an important role in its popularization.3 However, it was not until the Earth
Summit, with its Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 (which can be considered as the Rosetta Stone
of sustainable coastal development (SCD) for providing valuable insights into how
sustainable development is to be operationalized for the marine and coastal environment),
that the utility of ICZM was acknowledged.4 Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 also called upon
coastal states to formulate and implement coastal management programmes,5 leading to
an upsurge in ICZM activities.

1

2
3

4
5

Chua Thia-Eng, The Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management: Practical Applications in the
Sustainable Coastal Development in East Asia (Quezon City: GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional
Programme for the Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 2006) at
14 [Thia-Eng, Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management].
Pub L No 92-583, 86 Stat 1280 (codified as amended at 16 USC §1451-1464 (West 1985 & Supp
1999)).
Jens Sorensen, “National and International Efforts at Integrated Coastal Management: Definitions,
Achievements, and Lessons” (1997) 25:1 Coastal Mgmt 3 at 13 [Sorensen, “National and
International Efforts”]; see also Chua Thia-Eng, “Essential Elements of Integrated Coastal Zone
Management” (1993) 21 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 81 at 82 [Thia-Eng, “Essential Elements”] (outlining
the essential features of a regional project by the Southeast Asian Nations in 1986 sponsored by
USAID to address coastal environmental degradation issues).
James Tobey & Richard Volk, “Learning Frontiers in the Practice of Integrated Coastal
Management” (2002) 30 Coastal Mgmt 285 at 288.
Nicholas A Robinson, ed, Agenda 21 & The UNCED Proceedings, vol 4, 3rd series, International
Protection of the Environment (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1993) at 307, ch 17, ¶17.6(b);
see also Biliana Cicin-Sain, “Earth Summit Implementation: Progress Since Rio” (1996) 20:2 Mar
Pol’y 123 at 126-7 (ScienceDirect).
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Another major catalyst was the significant rise in investments on coastal and
marine related projects by multilateral and bilateral donor agencies.6 While in 1993,
there were only 57 nations that were engaged in CZM activities, by 2002, the number had
doubled, and nearly 95 coastal nations or semi-sovereign states had some sort of ICZM
activities in place. Interestingly, the majority of these programmes were from the
developing world.7
Despite the absence of a dedicated international treaty on ICZM, regular references
occurring in a large number of international environmental agreements have cumulatively
become a central organizing force that helps tie together different coastal and marine
management efforts at national levels.8 Even some of the treaties entered prior to the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) indirectly
influenced the development of ICZM.9 As well, programmes such as the International
Coral Reef Initiative,10 the Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities,11 the Programme of Action for the Sustainable

6

7

8

9
10
11

In Latin America, between 1992 and 2000, international donors invested nearly USD1.3 billion in
coastal management. The World Bank strategy for coastal and marine areas involves investments to
the tune of USD500 million in Africa and USD175 million in lending operations in the Asia-Pacific
region. The ADB has invested USD1.2 billion for marine resources projects in the Asia-Pacific
region. Stefano Belfiore, “The Growth of Integrated Coastal Management and the Role of Indicators
in Integrated Coastal Management: Introduction to the Special Issue” (2003) 46 Ocean & Coast
Mgmt 225 at 226 (ScienceDirect); see also Maren Lau, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the
People’s Republic Of China – An Assessment of Structural Impacts on Decision-Making Processes”
(2005) 48 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 115 at 117 (ScienceDirect). Despite China not having certain
fundamental preconditions to implement an ICZM programme like a functioning legislative system,
high degree of public participation, and an independent coordinating agency, the Chinese
government has also decided to implement ICZM. Ibid.
Jens Sorensen, Baseline 2000 Background Report: The Status of Integrated Coastal Management as
an International Practice, Coastal Zone Canada Association, Baseline 2000 (2nd Iteration, 2002) at
3-1 [Sorensen, Baseline 2000].
Some of the major ones include: the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 1992, the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals, 1979, the Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and
Natural Habitats, 1979, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-boundary
Context, 1991 and the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 1998, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, 1971.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, 21 ILM
1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [LOSC], pmbl.
International Coral Reef Initiative: An Informal Partnership to Preserve Coral Reefs around the
World, online: ICRI <http://www.icriforum.org/>.
UNEP, Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from LandBased Activities, UNEP(OCA)/LBA/IG.2/7 (5 December 1995).
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Development of Small Island Developing States,12 and the Plan of Implementation of the
2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development13 have underlined the benefits of an
integrated approach to coastal management.
This chapter begins with an attempt to define the concept of ICZM. As will be seen,
various definitions on ICZM proposed by academics and international organisations will
be utilised to capture the underlying essence of the concept. The discussion in the next
section then proceeds to examine the structure of an ICZM process. As mentioned earlier,
ICZM is the basic methodological tool to secure SCD. Accordingly, the central pillars in
terms of its core principles that help to operate an ICZM process are described. Even
though ICZM has been in vogue for some time now, coastal areas continue to be
degraded. Some of the major criticisms against this concept are examined in section 6.4.
Thereafter, the central thesis of this part, namely, the utility of linking coastal climate
change adaptation (CCCA) within an ICZM process is described in section 6.5. The
discussion concludes by re-emphasizing the utility of ICZM.

6.2 DEFINING ICZM
Various definitions have been offered to describe ICZM. 14 Leading academics define
ICZM as
a continuous and dynamic process by which decisions
are taken for the sustainable use, development, and
protection of coastal and marine areas and resources.
ICM acknowledges the interrelationships that exist
among coastal and ocean uses and the environments they
potentially affect, and is designed to overcome the
fragmentation inherent in the sectoral management
approach.
ICM is multi-purpose oriented, it analyzes implications
12

13

14

For the text of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island
Developing States, see UNGA, Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of
Small Island Developing States: Bridgetown, Barbados, 25 April-6 May 1994, A/CONF. 167/9
(October, 1994) at 6.
“Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development” in UN, Report of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September
2002, A/CONF.199/20* (New York: UN, 2002) at 7 [Johannesburg Plan of Implementation].
At minimum, 29 key guidance documents have been produced over the past decade and a body of
knowledge is there on important integrated coastal management principles. Sorensen, Baseline
2000, supra note 7 at annex F.
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of development, conflicting uses, and interrelationships
between physical processes and human activities, and it
promotes linkages and harmonization among sectoral
coastal and ocean activities.15
Similarly, for Chua Thia-Eng,
ICZM is a resource management system, which employs
an integrative, holistic approach and an interactive
planning process in addressing the complex management
issues in the coastal area. It could serve as the blueprint
for attaining the goals and objectives of sustainable
development by: maintaining the functional integrity of
the coastal resource systems; reducing resource-use
conflicts; maintaining the health of the environment;
facilitating the progress of multi-sectoral development.16
Jens Sorensen relies on the definition agreed upon at the five-day workshop of ICZM
practitioners from 28 countries, in Charleston, USA, in 1989. The main purpose of the
workshop was to review the progress of ICZM. It was decided that ICZM is “a dynamic
process in which a coordinated strategy is developed and implemented for the allocation
of environmental, socio-cultural, and institutional resources to achieve the conservation
and sustainable multiple use of the coastal zone.”

17

Furthermore, it was decided that an

ICZM process should have the following five attributes: 1) it should be a process that is
spread over a considerable period of time; 2) there has to be a governance arrangement to
establish policies for making allocation decisions; 3) this governance arrangement should
use one or more management strategies to rationalize and systemize allocation decisions;
4) the management strategies should be selected based on a systems perspective which
recognizes the interconnections among coastal systems; and, 5) there should be a
geographic boundary that extends from the ocean environment across the transitional
shore environments to some inland limit.18
The European Union broadly defines ICZM as:

15

16
17
18

Biliana Cicin-Sain et al, “Education and Training in Integrated Coastal Management: Lessons from
the International Arena” (2000) 43 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 291 (ScienceDirect) [Cicin-Sain et al,
"Education and Training"].
Thia-Eng, “Essential Elements”, supra note 3 at 84.
Jens Sorensen, “The International Proliferation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management Efforts”
(1993) 21 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 45 at 49.
Ibid at 49-50.
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a dynamic, continuous and iterative process designed to
promote sustainable management of coastal zones. ICZM
seeks, over the long-term, to balance the benefits from
economic development and human uses of the Coastal
Zone, the benefits from protecting, preserving, and
restoring Coastal Zones, the benefits from minimizing
loss of human life and property, and the benefits from
public access to and enjoyment of the Coastal Zone, all
within the limits set by natural dynamics and carrying
capacity.
The word ‘Integrated’ in ICZM refers both to the
integration of objectives and to the integration of the
multiple instruments needed to meet these objectives. It
means integration of all relevant policy areas, sectors,
and levels of administration. It means integration of the
terrestrial and marine components of the target territory.
ICZM is integrated in both time and space, and is
inherently multi-disciplinary. ICZM should certainly not
be just pigeon-holed under ’environment’.
Although ICZM refers to ‘management’, in fact, the
ICZM process covers the full cycle of information
collection, planning, decision-making, management and
monitoring of implementation. ‘Planning’ is thus
intended in its broadest sense, to mean strategic policy
development, rather than only land use planning or other
sectoral planning ....19
For the World Bank, ICZM is:
[a] process of governance and consists of the legal and
institutional framework necessary to ensure that
development and management plans for coastal zones
are integrated with environmental (including social)
goals and are made with the participation of those
affected. The purpose of ICZM is to maximize the
benefits provided by the coastal zone and to minimize
the conflicts and harmful effects of activities upon each
other, on resources and on the environment.20

The GESAMP defines
19

20

EC, Towards a European Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) Strategy: General
Principles and Policy Options A Reflection Paper (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of
the European Communities, 1999) at 16.
Jan C Post & Carl G Lundin, eds, Guidelines for Integrated Coastal Zone Management,
Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series No 9 (Washington, DC:
The World Bank, 1996) at 1.
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[i]ntegrated Coastal Management (ICM) [a]s a process
that unites government and the community, science and
management, sectoral and public interests in preparing
and implementing an integrated plan for the protection
and development of coastal ecosystems and resources.
The overall goal of ICM is to improve the quality of life
of human communities who depend on coastal resources
while maintaining the biological diversity and
productivity of coastal ecosystems.21
The Mediterranean ICZM protocol, the first supra-national binding legal instrument on
ICZM

22

that binds parties that border the Mediterranean sea, defines it as a dynamic

process for the sustainable management and use of coastal zones, taking into account at
the same time the fragility of coastal ecosystems and
landscapes, the diversity of activities and uses, their
interactions, the maritime orientation of certain activities
and uses and their impact on both the marine and land
parts.23
From the above, it is apparent that ICZM is a fairly established idea in coastal governance
and management. It seeks to control the unabated destruction of the coastal environment
and achieve holistic and SCD through sound proactive planning to restore the health and
productivity of coastal ecosystems. It has as its central tenet the objective of improving
the quality of life of coastal communities, so that they derive the maximum benefits from
the functions and values provided by coastal ecosystems.24
In achieving these objectives, ICZM marks a break from past management efforts
by helping to disentangle the gridlock characterizing the coastal management systems of
most countries. This is a transformation based on multidisciplinary and participatory
approaches, building on traditional and modern coastal management practices.25
Essentially, it is a proactive response (in contrast to reactive and ad hoc approaches), and
21

22

23
24
25

IMO/FAO/UNESCO-IOC/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP & Joint Group of Experts on the
Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP), The Contributions of Science to
Integrated Coastal Management Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
GESAMP Rep Stud No 61 (Rome, 1996).
Julien Rochette, Raphaël Billé & IDDRI, Analysis of the Mediterranean ICZM Protocol: At the
Crossroads between the Rationality of Provisions and the Logic of Negotiations [nd] at 4, online:
CIRCLE-MED <http://www.circle-med.net/doc/ICZM_Med_IDDRI.pdf>.
Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean, [2009] OJ L 34/19,
[ICZM Protocol], art 2(f).
For the various definitions of ICZM, see supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
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it emerges as an iterative and discursive process that seeks to harmonize the multitude of
sectoral, economic, social and environmental policies and plans that operate in the coastal
landscape and the various coastal stakeholders through a comprehensive and systematic
integration to ensure that there is concerted action to achieve SCD.26 In sum, ICZM
exhibits five defining features namely: 1) it is a dynamic process imbued in adaptive
management; 2) it is a roadmap to the ultimate objective of SCD; 3) it seeks to secure
spatial integration, i.e., integration between the dry and wet sides of the coast; 4) it is
based on bottom-up and decentralised approaches to coastal management; and 5) ICZM
does not displace sectoral management; rather it harmonizes the different sectoral efforts
in a web to produce a more holistic response.
Before proceeding further, as seen in chapter three in relation to the Indus and the
Ganges-Brahmaputra delta, rivers play a major role in maintaining coastal health.27 There
is in fact growing clamour to link ICZM with river basin or catchment management,
christened as “Integrated Coastal Area and River Basin Management.”28 Similarly,
activities further off-shore, for example fisheries exploitation, offshore oil and sediment
extraction, shipping, oil and other toxic chemical spillage, etc. can severely impact the
coastal environment and therefore there is also a tendency to approach ICZM as part of a
broader “Integrated Maritime Policy,” particularly to fit this management process “with
newer (and better funded) oceans-based initiatives, such as maritime or marine spatial
planning.”29 While drawing linkages with other process has relevance and can contribute
to sustainable development, all these tools are unique processes by themselves and are
independent of each other.
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Ibid.
For more information regarding the role played by rivers in maintaining the health of deltas, see Ch
3, Parts 3.2.2 & 3.2.3.
See Ramsar, Resolution VIII.4: Principles and guidelines for incorporating wetland issues into
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), prin 8, online: Ramsar <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/e
n/ramsar-documents-resol-resolution-viii-4/main/ramsar/1-31-107%5E21494_4000_0__>.
Aldo Chircop & Ryan O’Leary, "Legal Frameworks for Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management
in Canada and the European Union: Some Insights from Comparative Analysis" 13:3 (2012) Vt J
Envtl L 425 at 442 (HeinOnline); see also EC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council Establishing a Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal
Management [2013] 0074 (COD) at 8 [EC, Proposal for a Directive].
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6.3 DECODING ICZM: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS
Being dynamic and nebulous, ICZM can take various forms, depending on the
circumstances and issues that confront a country’s coastline, the nature of its coastal
resources and biodiversity, and its developmental priorities. This picture is complicated
by an absence of a dedicated and binding international legal instrument on ICZM to
provide the fundamental rules of the practice.30 Still, certain common traits unique to it
can be discerned from guidance documents, academic writings, regional protocols and
other instruments, in addition to national ICZM action plans and strategies. A few of
these are relayed here in order to develop a structure for an ICZM process in the
succeeding paragraphs.
A unique feature of the ICZM is that it primarily envisages a partnership between
various stakeholders for effective coastal management. As noted above, it is the general
despondency over the perceived inability of the convention-based approaches to realize
sustainable development goals that led to the emergence of Type-II partnerships at the
international level, which has as its central feature the confluence and co-ordination of
actions by multiple actors.31 Akin to this approach, ICZM reflects current thinking on
how SCD is to be achieved by providing a platform for a range of players to come
together and pool their resources and management efforts to plan strategically and
holistically for coastal zones.32 The central feature of the ICZM process is that its
conceptual foundations are based on sustainability principles, which guides its
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For a discussion on ICZM and its recognition in international environmental law, see Ch 7, Part 7.2.
For more discussion on the partnership approach to sustainable development, see Ch 4, Part 4.2.1.
Significantly, out of the nearly 349 partnerships several under the Commission for Sustainable
Development are relevant to coastal management and to coastal environmental protection. A few
are: the Adriatic Sea Integrated Coastal Areas and River Basin Management System Pilot Project;
African Process for the Development and Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment in SubSaharan Africa; Application of Nuclear and Non-nuclear Techniques for the Monitoring and
Management of Harmful Algal Blooms in the Benguela Coastal Region; Asian-Pacific Coastal Zone
Environment Assessment; Coastal Community Environmental Education Program (White Water to
Blue Water); Community Development for Sustainable Water and Environmental Management in
Coastal Populations of the Caribbean Sea (White Water to Blue Water); International Network of
Practitioners and Academics to Support Implementation of Coastal and Ocean Management
Programs; Partnerships in the local implementation of coastal strategies and integrated coastal
management programs in East Asia; and Seawater Forest Initiative. For further information, see
Partnerships for Sustainable Development - CSD Partnerships Database, online: UN Division for
Sustainable Development <http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/partnerships/title_al
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development and implementation. Before proceeding further, the following observation
on “principles” is noteworthy:
Principles are derived from our fundamental
values and beliefs about how humans should
behave. They are an attempt to encode how
values and norms can be expressed in decisionmaking and some actions. It is useful to divide
principles into two categories – those that are
substantial, i.e., based on deep beliefs that guide
our vision for the future and thus the way that
we approach governance; and those that are
procedural, i.e., that guide the way we interact,
make decisions and do business on a daily
basis.33
Usually, an ICZM programme provides the design for the management of multifarious
issues, and these are built around core sustainability principles. Some illustrations that
demonstrate the importance of sustainability principles in working an ICZM process will
follow.
In their treatise, Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert W. Knecht trace these principles to
two primary sources. The first are those collectively identified in the Earth Summit, and
the second source emanates from key international agreements that are specifically
related to the special character of the coasts and the oceans. 34 Chua Thia-Eng locates
four fundamental, 23 substantive, and seven procedural principles.35 Based on UNCED’s
Agenda 21, the World Bank identifies the following primary principles for ICZM:
precautionary, polluter pays, proper resource accounting, transboundary responsibility,
and intergenerational equity.36 The European Union emphasizes the following: the
33
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Robin Mahon, Lucia Fanning & Patrick McConney, “Principled Ocean Governance for the Wider
Caribbean Region” in Lucia Fanning, Robin Mahon & Patrick McConney, eds, Towards Marine
Ecosystem-based Management in the Wider Caribbean, MARE Publication Series No 6
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011) 27 at 30; Philippe Sands, “International Law in
the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles” in Winfried Lang,
ed, Sustainable Development and International Law, International Environmental Law and Policy
Series (London: Graham & Trotman/ Martinus NIjhoff, 1995) 53 at 54-55 (drawing out the
distinctions between principles and rules).
Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W Knecht, Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: Concepts and
Practices (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1998) at 52; Biliana Cicin-Sain, “Sustainable
Development and Integrated Coastal Management” (1993) 21 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 11 at 32-34
[Cicin-Sain, “Sustainable Development"].
Thia-Eng, Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management, supra note 1 at 90.
Post & Lundin, eds, supra note 20 at 6.
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precautionary principle, inter- and intra-generational equity, adaptive management and
reliance on sound science, respecting the carrying capacity of ecosystems, and widestakeholder involvement.37 The Mediterranean ICZM protocol also identifies certain
general principles of ICZM, namely, preventing damage to the coastal environment,
formulation of land use strategies, plans and programmes, utilising ecosystems approach
to coastal planning and management, the principle of spatial integration, respect to the
carrying capacity, preventing the negative effects of natural disasters and of development,
transparency in the decision-making process, participation by stakeholders, and
avoidance of urban sprawl.38
The recent publication, “A Handbook for Measuring the Progress and Outcomes of
Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management”39 identifies the environment and
development principles, such as the right to develop; inter-generational equity;
environmental assessments; precautionary approach; polluter-pays principle; and
openness and transparency in decision-making as being central to this process.40 The
Integrated Coastal Zone Management Action Plan for Guyana, 2000, presupposes the
involvement of government at all levels, along with conservation of common property
resources, planning and managing land and sea uses in combination, the importance of
multi-use management and traditional management, and the need for environmental
impact assessment (EIA).41 In its framing of ICZM, the Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Action Plan for Kenya, 2010-2014, proposes the ecosystem-based
approach, participatory and inclusive approaches, application of the precautionary and
polluter pays principles, use of the best available science and adaptive management,
promotion of stewardship, and balancing development and conservation objectives as
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See EC, Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2002
concerning the implementation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Europe, (2002/413/EC)
[2002] OJ L 148/24 at 25, ch 2.
ICZM Protocol, supra note 23, art 6.
Sherry Heileman, ed, A Handbook for Measuring the Progress and Outcomes of Integrated Coastal
and Ocean Management. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Manuals and Guides, 46,
ICAM Dossier, 2 (Paris: UNESCO, 2006) (English).
Ibid at 7.
Guyana, Environmental Protection Agency, Integrated Coastal Zone Management Action Plan
(Guyana: EPA, 2000).
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essential guiding principles.42 The Canada’s Ocean Strategy recognises ecosystem-based
management, sustainable development, precautionary approach, conservation, duty and
shared responsibility for supporting the sustainable development of marine resources,
flexibility, and inclusiveness as principles that guide the integrated management
approach.43
From the above, it emerges that in opening the ICZM toolbox, a repertoire of
sustainability principles are available to support and provide guidance to work the ICZM
process. State parties that wish to implement ICZM must commit themselves to these
principles; however, they still have freedom to develop and tailor their actions according
to local conditions, needs, concerns, and aspirations.44 These principles can be arranged
in three tiers, two of which can be further divided (see Figure 3 below).
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Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources & NEMA, Integrated Coastal Zone Management
(ICZM) Action Plan for Kenya, 2010-2014: Towards Integrated Management of Kenya’s Coastal
and Marine Resources [nd] at 48-49.
Canada, Canada's Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans
Canada, 2002) at 9-10. Even though these principles have been articulated as essential to integration
in an ocean management context, many of these hold relevance to integration as understood for
coastal zone management.
Integrated coastal management is not nation specific. Sorensen, “National and International Efforts”,
supra note 3 at 4.
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Figure 3: A Principled Approach to ICZM
In the first layer, we have the substantive principles, followed by the procedural
principles and other tools.45 The first and second layers lead to the overarching goal of
SCD in the third tier. All of these principles and tools are inter-linked and complement
each other to form the building blocks of the ICZM process. No one principle is superior
to the other and the sidelining of one can derail the march towards SCD.46 This being
45
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Chua Thia-Eng identifies four fundamental principles, namely, inter- and intra- generational equity,
integration, eco-system based management and adaptive management. In addition, there are 23
substantive and seven procedural principles and they include environment protection, right to a
healthy environment, polluter pays principle, prevention of environmental harm, precautionary
principle, biodiversity conservation, protected areas, protection of species at risk, ecological scale,
right to develop, right to exploit natural resources, customary rights, good governance, principles of
transparency, accountability, participation, subsidiarity, principle of international partnership and
cooperation, duty to cooperate in the spirit of global partnership, principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, poverty eradication, food security and public health and sanitation.
The procedural principles are EIA, resource valuation, decentralization, conflict resolution, full
disclosure, information, conflict resolution, liability and compensation. Thia-Eng, Dynamics of
Integrated Coastal Management, supra note 1 at 89.
Ibid at 89-90.
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said, for greater clarity and purpose, certain principles can be prioritized over others and
some can be grouped together to create a specific hierarchy of norms. The most important
feature of this matrix is that all of these principles are linked together by integration,
which emerges as the cornerstone of ICZM.47 These aspects are explained next.
As can be discerned from Figure 3, integration emerges as the fundamental axiom
of ICZM.48 To understand the need for integration and its role in this scheme, it is
necessary to examine its background. For a long time, the contours of natural resources
governance regimes, including that of coastal and ocean management, were based on the
basic principle that resources were plentifully available and that they presented a vast
source which could support free use and universal exploitation. As well, it was believed
that natural systems had an almost absolute capacity to assimilate and cleanse the wastes
that were produced. Since the technology for intense utilization had not been developed
then, there was nothing inconsistent in this principle, and this in turn led to the “single
resource or single sector approach” to management.49
Accordingly, the different activities in the coastal landscape were considered in
isolation from one another and sectoral regulatory regimes began to develop
independently along these lines.50 Under these conventional prototypes, coastal
governance fell to several government departments that operated largely on sectoral lines,
each conferred with a limited range of responsibilities in a particular geographical area. 51
However, as ocean uses began to multiply and the number of people depending on
coastal and marine resources began to burgeon, it became evident that the silo-based
47
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Post & Lundin, eds, supra note 20 at 6.
Integration is “the central defining concept” in ICZM. Jean Poitras, Robert Bowen & Jack Wiggin,
“Challenges to the Use of Consensus Building in Integrated Coastal Management” (2003) 46 Ocean
& Coast Mgmt 391 (ScienceDirect).
Cicin-Sain et al, “Education and Training”, supra note 15 at 293.
See Matthew Heemskerk, “National Efforts at Integrated Coastal Zone Management: The Canadian,
Australian and New Zealand Experiences”, Notes, (2001) 10 Dal J Leg Stud 158 at 163
(HeinOnline).
For instance, in Mozambique different agencies are involved in coastal management. The most
important ones are the Ministry of the Co-ordination of Environmental Affairs (coastal/marine
environments), the Ministry of Transports and Communications (coastal shipping), the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries (fisheries, coastal parks and coastal agriculture), the Ministry of Industry,
Commerce and Tourism (industrial effluents and tourism), the Ministry of Public Works and
Housing (coastal construction), the cities and local municipalities (multiple powers and
responsibilities). Their mandates are unclear, conflicting and overlapping. Mozambique, Ministry
for Co-ordination of Environmental Affairs, Mozambique Initial National Communication under UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Ministry for Co-ordination of Environmental Affairs,
2003) at 76-77.
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sectoral approach was untenable and fell far short of desired outcomes. 52 By their very
nature, sectoral, single-sector management approaches do not consider the unique
characteristics of the coastal area or that actions initiated by one sector may deleteriously
impact other sectors.53 In sum, it was clear that sectoral management was incapable of
reversing the negative forces at play in coastal zones. This failure called for an entirely
new approach, which ultimately led to integration.54
Basically, integration refers to the integration of aims, goals, objectives and all
management-related efforts across different sectors, disciplines, agencies, and
stakeholders to produce a holistic response to the ills that plague our coasts. There are
five main dimensions to integration in ICZM: (1) intersectoral integration (involving
integration among the various agencies that manage different coastal and marine sectors,
like fisheries, oil and gas development, ports and harbours); (2) intergovernmental
integration (integration between the national, provincial and local levels of government);
(3) spatial integration (integration between the land and ocean components of the coastal
zone); (4) science-management integration (integration between different disciplines
particularly management and science); and, (5) international integration (especially in
cases such as nation-sharing maritime borders or international disputes, like
transboundary marine pollution).55
However, it must be noted that integration does not completely preclude sectoral
management. Certain issues are best handled when carried out on a sectoral basis, like
those relating to fisheries, water pollution, marine protection, wetlands and mangrove
conservation, and estuary protection.56 In recognizing this aspect, ICZM seeks to
strengthen the sectoral management regimes and ensure that they function under an
overarching framework that views the coast as a system that links the different sectoral
52
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Cicin-Sain et al, “Education and Training", supra note 15 at 293; see also Yoshifumi Tanaka,
“Zonal and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: Reflections on a Dual
Approach in International Law of the Sea” (2005) 19:4 Int’l J Mar & Coast L 483 (HeinOnline).
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See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, 11:6
ILM 1416 [Stockholm Declaration], prin 13. “In order to achieve sustainable development,
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be
considered in isolation from it.” United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, 31:4 ILM 874 [Rio Declaration], prin
4; Robinson, ed, supra note 5, ch 17, ¶17.5(a).
Cicin-Sain et al, “Education and Training”, supra note 15 at 292.
Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 34 at 2.
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management regimes and decision-making apparatus to produce consistent decisions and
greater efficiency. By doing so, it fosters dialogue, cooperation and coordination between
and among the various agencies and departments. As has been pointed out,
[i]ntegration presupposes a multi-dimensional approach,
a search for all the cogs in the wheel so that the
management decision is ostensibly relevant, efficient,
and hopefully equitable and effective in result.
Integration has reinforced the problem-oriented
approach, i.e., in the sense of an approach that looks at a
problem with all its component issues, in context.57
Multi-sectoral management does have importance and can play an important role in
ensuring the intelligent and sustainable use of the coast, if the diverse actions are linked
in a common seamless web to eliminate duplication of work, provide for optimal use of
scarce resources, and ensure economies of scale.58 ICZM balances the need for
integration and sectoral management by not breaking down the silos completely. The
attempt is rather to harmonize sectoral programmes and provide for greater co-ordination
between government departments and agencies that have jurisdiction over various aspects
of the coastal zone.59 In doing so, it steers towards SCD and produces an atmosphere that
encourages optimal interaction between the different players to produce sustainable and
rational cross-sectoral responses.60
This brings us now to the first tier, which comprises the substantive principles
essential to work the ICZM process. There are two types of substantive principles: those
that foster the right to a clean coastal environment, and those than promote the right to
development.61 The procedural principles, which constitute the second layer, support the
operation of the substantive ones. The substantive right to environmental protection
(more precisely, the right to a healthy and clean coastal environment) is often treated as a
human right. It was first articulated in the Stockholm Declaration at the Stockholm
57
58
59
60

61

Aldo Chircop, “Teaching Integrated Coastal Management: Lessons from the Learning Arena”
(2000) 43:4-5 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 343 at 352 (ScienceDirect).
For instance, see FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Rome: FAO, 1995) art 10
(advocating integration of fisheries into coastal area management).
Cicin-Sain, “Sustainable Development", supra note 34 at 31.
While fishery managers will be concerned about fishery allocations and related issues, for an
integrated coastal zone manager, the focus will be on the impacts of land based sources of marine
pollution on fishing grounds, the impact of unscientific fishing practices, etc on coastal biodiversity.
Ibid at 31.
Thia-Eng, Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management, supra note 1 at 90.
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Conference in 1972.62 Subsequently, the Rio Declaration, the Declaration on Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (the Banjul
Charter),63 the Additional Protocol to the American Rights,64 and a host of other
instruments also underscore the importance of the right to a clean and healthy
environment.65 Even though this right has widespread recognition at the international
level, its development and drawing connections with other human rights is still imprecise
and it remains doubtful whether this right is part of customary international law.66
At the same time, recognizing the centrality of this human right in effectuating the
right to life has led certain countries to incorporate it into their national constitutions.67
In others, national judiciaries have broken new ground by reading this right into their
constitutional scheme, such as their Bill of Rights. 68 Coastal communities may be able to
rely on this right to further the overall objective of protecting their coastal environment.69
However, it must be emphasized that this right is not an abstraction; the polluter pays and
precautionary principles, as well as the inter- and intra-generational equity, all play vital
roles in securing a clean and healthy environment.
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For an overview of how the constitutional and human rights to a protected environment can
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In economic terms, pollution is improper cost allocation, where the impacts of the
costs of production on resources such as water, air, and marine life are not accounted for
in the product price.70 The earlier view was that, since these resources were not scarce, all
had rights to utilize them freely, and producers could discharge wastes into these
resources without accounting for their use, the costs of which would be transferred to
future users.71
With time, most societies began to realize that using air or water not only involves
a cost but that this needs to be adequately reflected in the product price. Failure to do so
was a distortion that could lead to overproduction, market failure, and ultimately, the
destruction of the resource.72 The only way to rectify this market failure is to ensure an
internalization of external costs so that the full environmental and social costs are
reflected in the product price. The idea here is that environmentally harmful products will
cost more and therefore consumers will prefer less polluting goods and services,
ultimately creating incentives for efficient and sustainable resource utilization and
management.73
The above summarizes the underlying theme of the polluter pays principle, which is
now widely accepted as a means to impose liability on the wrongdoer or the polluter, who
is now under an obligation to remedy the damage caused to the environment by
internalizing the pollution costs.74 In line with what has been stated, this principle
demands that the financial costs of preventing and remedying the damage caused by
70
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pollution should lie with the undertaking that has caused the pollution and that the state
should not bear the costs involved in preventing or in carrying out remedial action, as this
would practically shift the negative externality to the taxpayer.75 The next key principle is
that of precaution, followed by inter- and intra-generational equity, all of which have
been explained earlier.76
This now brings us to the procedural principles that work the substantive ones.
Ecosystem-based management has been defined as “structuring societal behavior in
ocean and coastal systems [to] promote ecosystem health and resilience while allowing
sustainable uses of goods and services.”77 The underlying idea behind this unique
management paradigm has widespread recognition and application in various resource
management sectors like the “sustainable forest management”78 and “responsible
fisheries" approaches.79 It is premised on the basic idea that the ecosystem is treated as
the primary unit for management.80 This replaces traditional modes of natural resources
management that are organized around particular uses and resources, which also fails to
address the interdependence and complex interactions between and among humans,
animal and plant communities and their physical environments.81 This approach gained
recognition under the Rio Declaration, which called upon states “to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem.”82
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As well, Agenda 21 observes that oceans and adjacent coasts form “an integrated
whole that is an essential component of the global life-support system.” These ideals
require new techniques for marine and coastal area management and development –
techniques that are “integrated in content and are precautionary and anticipatory in ambit
. . . ”83 It is in this context that the COP to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
(CBD) identified 12 principles to operationalize the ecosystem approach, which can be
applied to work the ICZM process.84
Due to the complex and highly dynamic nature of coastal ecosystems and the
absence of adequate scientific knowledge to decipher these complex non-linear processes
and interactions, ICZM programmes have to be embedded in adaptive management,
which is essentially a process of learning-by-doing.85 In its simplest form, it is expressed
as continuing cycles of action and reflection. At the fundamental level, it involves the use
of “reversible management interventions, careful monitoring of impacts, and continual
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Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD Technical Series No 14 (Montreal:
Secretariat of the CBD, 2004). Decision V/6 identifies 12 complementary and inter-linked principles
and others as operational guidance to reflect upon the common level of understanding of the
ecosystem approach. For the text of the COP 5 Decision V/6: Ecosystem Approach, see Annex III:
Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its
Fifth Meeting, Nairobi, 15-26 May 2000, UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, 66 at 103. For the text of the
Decision VI/12, see Annex I: Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity at its Sixth Meeting The Hague, 7-19 April 2002, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, 70
at 180. It recognizes “the necessity to apply the ecosystem approach in national policies and
legislation” and emphasizes the need to develop regional guidelines for its application. See ibid.
UNEP & CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity at its Seventh Meeting VII/11. Ecosystem Approach, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/11, 13
April 2004, online: Convention on Biological Diversity <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop07/cop-07-dec-11-en.pdf>. UNEP & CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity at its Ninth Meeting IX/7. Ecosystem Approach,
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/7, 9 October 2008, online: Convention on Biological Diversity <http:
//www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-09/cop-09-dec-07-en.pdf> at 1 (reiterated the need to apply the
ecosystem approach and “should be regarded as a process where learning by doing is the priority
need”).
Stephen Olsen, James Tobey & Meg Kerr, “A Common Framework for Learning from ICM
Experience” (1997) 37:2 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 155 at 158 (ScienceDirect); see also Kay & Alder,
supra note 77 at 65.
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assessment and refinement of management practice as information increases.” 86 Often
treated as supportive of the precautionary approach,87 it effectively combats issues of
uncertainty88 and is recognized in several international environmental law instruments.89
Another

important

procedural

principle

that

works

towards

balancing

environmental and developmental considerations is environment impact assessment. This
is a process that draws together expert qualitative assessment regarding a project’s
predicted environmental and societal consequences in scientific form and outlines
measures for modifying or mitigating them. The ex-ante consideration of these relevant
factors is also based on public hearings, where relevant inputs are obtained from various
actors, such as those directly affected by the project, environmental NGOs, and experts.
All of these opinions then have to be properly evaluated by the relevant decision-making
body before the final decision.90
Several international environmental law treaties emphasize the need for EIAs.
Prominent examples include the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
(LOSC),91 UNFCCC,92 CBD,93 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational

Uses

of

International

Watercourses,94

and

the

Convention

on

Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.95 National laws and

86

87
88
89

90

91
92
93

94
95

Minna Pyhälä, Anne Christine Brusendorff & Hanna Paulomäki, “The Precautionary Principle” in
Malosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong & Panos Makouris, eds, Research Handbook on International
Environmental Law (Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2010) 203 at 220.
Ibid.
Ibid.
For instance, see UNGA, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, A/CONF
164/37, 8 September 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (entered into force 11 December 2001) [Straddling Fish
Stocks Agreement], art 6(3).
Neil Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment Process, Substance and
Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 4; Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 25 February 1991, 30 ILM 802 (entered into force
10 September 1997) [Espoo Convention].
See LOSC, supra note 9, arts 204 -206.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York 9 May 1992) [UNFCCC], art 4(1).
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
1993, 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993) [CBD] art 14; Convention on
Biological Diversity, online: CBD Home <http://www.cbd.int/>.
UN: Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May
1997, 36 ILM 700 [UN Watercourses Convention], art 12.
See generally Espoo Convention, supra note 90.
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judicial opinions have also outlined the importance of carrying out EIAs.96 Given the
economic potential of coastlines, EIA becomes an important instrument for ensuring that
development proceeds in an orderly manner without jeopardizing the resilience of natural
ecosystems.
As coastal waters and their surrounding environs harbor marine habitats that are
rich in biodiversity, protecting and conserving these areas is essential. Marine protected
areas (MPAs)97 is an important tool that helps to protect the resilience of the ecosystems
as well as reduce the vulnerability of biodiversity and ecosystem services in light of SLR,
climate change impacts, and other anthropogenic activities.98 There are several legal
instruments at the international level that encourage MPA creation and management.
Specifically, article 194(5) of the LOSC calls on states to adopt measures “to protect and
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or
endangered species and other forms of marine life.” This provision can be interpreted as
conferring powers on states for MPA creation.99 Agenda 21, one of the major products of
the Rio Conference, also articulates the importance of constituting MPAs.100
96

97

98

99
100

For instance, at the international level, the ICJ has observed
[i]t may now be considered a requirement under general
international law to undertake an environmental impact
assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial
activity may have a significant adverse impact in a
transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.
Moreover, due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and
prevention which it implies, would not be considered to have
been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect the
régime of the river or the quality of its waters did not
undertake an environmental impact assessment on the
potential effects of such works.
Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, ¶204.
“Marine and coastal protected area' means any defined area within or adjacent to the marine
environment, together with its overlying waters and associated flora, fauna and historical and
cultural features, which has been reserved by legislation or other effective means, including custom,
. . .” See UNEP & CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at its Seventh Meeting: VII/5: Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity,
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/5, 13 April 2004, at 2; Decision 1/CP.10: Buenos Aires Programme of
Work on Adaptation and Response Measures, FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1, 17-18 December 2004,
¶¶5-14, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resourc e/docs/cop10/10a01.pdf> .
Kristina M Gjerde & Anna Rulska-Domino, “Marine Protected Areas beyond National Jurisdiction:
Some Practical Perspectives for Moving Ahead” (2012) 27 Int’l J Mar & Coast L 351 at 354
(HeinOnline).
There are also other provisions that are relevant to the process.
Robinson, ed, supra note 5, ch 15, ¶15.5(g) (promotes conservation of biological diversity in
general, including “in situ conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats”). Chapter 17 emerges as
the “international basis upon which to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the
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Perhaps even more pertinent to the issue is the CBD, which provides for the
establishment of “protected areas or areas where special measures need to be undertaken
to conserve biological diversity.”101 In addition, the Ramsar Convention,102 the
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,103 the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),104 and
the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage105
also fortify MPA creation.
Two notable trends are the network approach and the linking of MPA management
with an ICZM process. In giving effect to the traditional saying that “the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts,” in a marine environment protection context, an ecological
network of MPAs seeks to connect individual pieces of the larger ecosystem either
ecologically or functionally, but not necessarily physically, so as to achieve a set of
broader network objectives.106 In so doing, greater resilience is built to deal with external
threats; particularly those relating to climate change, thereby providing for more
sustainable coastal and marine environment management. Despite the call from the

101
102
103

104

105

106

marine and coastal environment and its resources” (¶17.1). It specifically promotes integrated
management of marine areas (¶17.5) and the “[c]onservation and restoration of altered critical
habitats” (¶17.6(h)). Most explicitly, Chapter 17 encourages signatories to “undertake measures to
maintain biological diversity and productivity of marine species and habitats under national
jurisdiction,” including the “establishment and management of protected areas” (¶17.7).
CBD, supra note 93, art 8(a). “Protected area” is defined as “a geographically defined area, which is
designated or regulated and managed to achieve specific conservation objectives” (art 2).
It supports the establishment of MPAs in coastal wetlands with mangroves, coral reefs, and sea grass
beds.
The CMS calls upon parties to provide immediate protection for migratory species included in
Appendix I; and conclude agreements for the conservation and management of migratory species
included in Appendix II. See Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals
(Bonn), 23 June 1979,19 ILM 15 (entered into force 1 November 1983) art 2.
See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340
UNTS 184, 12 ILM 1319 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973, 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61,
17 ILM 546 (entered into force 2 October 1983) annexes I, II & V (provides for the designation of
‘‘special areas’’ by the International Maritime Organization for the prevention of sea pollution); see
also IMO, Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas under Marpol 73/78, IMO Doc A 22/Res
927 (IMO, 15 January 2002).
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 November
1972, 1037 UNTS 151, 11 ILM 1358 (entered into force 17 December 1975). A number of MPAs
are world heritage sites, including the Great Barrier Reef in Australia, the Galapagos Islands in
Ecuador, the Sunderbans in India and in Bangladesh. UNESCO & WHC, World Heritage Marine
Programme, online: UNESCO World Heritage Convention <http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/activit
ies/documents /activity-13-20.pdf>.
See generally Gov’t of Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, National Framework for Canada’s
Network of Marine Protected Areas (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2011).
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World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002, for the “establishment of marine
protected areas consistent with international law and based on scientific information,
including representative networks by 2012,” progress has been dismal.107
The wisdom behind linking MPAs with ICZM is based on the finding that MPAs
are greatly affected by the spill-over effects of human activities that take place well
beyond the physical boundaries that demarcate the MPA. Moreover, “these exogenous
activities often have greater impact on the resources of the MPA than those carried out
within the protected area,”108 and there is an increasing tendency to work an MPA
management scheme within an ICZM process.109 This latter endeavor is no easy feat,
since the management mechanisms for both sets of tasks may be vastly different.
Nevertheless, creating linkages is an important step towards SCD.
In addition there are several other principles and tools that can foster the right to
clean and healthy environment like the use of best science,110 land use planning and
zoning,111 full cost allocation,112 etc.
The second prong of SCD is the right to develop. Even though traces of this right
can be seen in numerous international instruments,113 its precise connotations remain
controversial.114 As noted earlier, one primary reason for this is the changing conception
107

108
109

110
111
112
113

114

IUCN, Establishing Marine Protected Area Networks: Making it Happen, A Guide for Developing
National and Regional Capacity for Building MPA Networks: Non-Technical Summary Report
(WCPA/IUCN, 2007).
Thia-Eng, Dynamics of Integrated Coastal Management, supra note 1 at 252.
Biliana Cicin-Sain & Stefano Belfiore, “Linking Marine Protected Areas to Integrated Coastal and
Ocean Management: A Review of Theory and Practice” (2005) 48 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 847
(ScienceDirect) (identifying nine principles to link MPAs to integrated coastal and ocean
management).
Mahon, Fanning & McConney, supra note 33 at 36.
For instance, see ICZM Protocol, supra note 23, art 20.
Mahon, Fanning & McConney, supra note 33 at 35.
For further details, see the Charter of United Nations, 1945, the International Bill of Human Rights,
the Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986, the Rio Declaration, the Vienna Declaration on
Human Rights, the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, 1995, the Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action, 1995 and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981.
But see Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International
on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, 276 / 2003, online: Human Rights Watch <http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010_africa_commission_ruling_0.pdf> [Centre
for Minority Rights Development (Kenya)]. It was alleged that in 1973 the Government of Kenya
forcibly removed the Endorois from their ancestral lands around the Lake Bogoria and that promises
for rehabilitation remained on paper. One of the core issues before African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights related to the right to development. The Commission held that the state had
violated the right to development of the Endorois as there was no empowerment of this community.
“It is not sufficient for the Kenyan Authorities merely to give food aid to the Endorois. The

298

of “development,” which is now understood as enhancement of human capabilities.115
An essential condition to enhancing human development is that environmental pollution
and degradation should be addressed in particular as they relate to the poor.116
Yet the poor also contribute significantly to environmental degradation. Indeed,
India’s former Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, declared at the Stockholm Conference
“poverty is the biggest polluter.”117 Poverty exacerbates environmental degradation,
which in turn contributes to poverty, creating a vicious cycle.118 Thus, for development to
be sustainable, it is essential that poverty alleviation become focal to the discourse of
coastal development.
In most developing nations, particularly, in coastal South Asia, coastal resources
are treated as part of common property regimes over which the community members
have usufructuary rights.119 Since many coastal communities depend on fishing for their
dietary, livelihood, and leisure requirements, the right of public access to beaches and
other coastal areas is undeniably critical. However, due to increasing demands on coastal
space for developmental activities, the importance of this right is often overlooked and
coastal communities are fast losing physical and visual access to coastal zones they
previously enjoyed, affecting both their right to livelihood and their well-being.120
It is in this scenario that one has to appreciate the need to protect common property
resources and its importance in poverty reduction and in increasing the adaptive
capacities of coastal communities. And here the ancient Roman law doctrine of public
trust, which is based on the idea that certain common properties are held by the state in

115
116
117
118
119

120

capabilities and choices of the Endorois must improve in order for the right to development to be
realized” (¶283). It was affirmed that the “... state bears the burden for creating conditions favorable
to a people’s development ... The ... State ... is obligated to ensure that the Endorois are not left out
of the development process or benefits” (¶298).
For more on this topic, see Ch 4, Part 4.2.1.
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya), supra note 114.
Akash Kapur, “Letter from India: Pollution as Another Form of Poverty”, The New York Times (8
October 2009) online: <http://www.nytimes.com/>.
Rajendra Ramlogan, Sustainable Development: Towards a Judicial Interpretation, David Freestone,
ed, 9 Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) at 14.
See Daniel W Bromley & Michael M Cernea, The Management of Common Property Natural
Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies (Washington, DC: World Bank
Publications, 1989) at 16.
See Fomento Resorts & Hotels v Minguel Martins (2009) CA No 4154 of 2000 (India) ¶¶36, 4041online: Indian Kanoon <http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1238478/>. Relying on the doctrine of
public trust, it was held that Fomento Resorts and Hotels was under a statutory obligation to
maintain access to the beach without obstruction of any kind. Ibid.
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trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public has great value.121 Under
Roman law, these resources were either owned by none (res nullius) or owned by all in
common (res communis).122 In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the
untapped potential of this doctrine as an important tool for coastal resource management.
Specifically, it can play significant roles in poverty alleviation by securing community
rights over common property resources.123 The doctrine of public trust found acceptance
in English common law. A sovereign could own these resources but the ownership was
limited in nature, as the Crown could not grant these properties to private owners if it
interfered with public interests in navigation or fishing.124 Interestingly, these restrictions
did not hinder the government, which could, by virtue of the police power, enlarge or
diminish public rights for a legitimate public purpose.125 Public trust found fertile legal
ground in the United States where, in addition to state legislatures, state courts have gone
to great lengths to expand and entrench it.126 This doctrine also has recognition in several
other national legal systems.127
121

122

123
124

125
126

“Quaedam enim naturali jure communia sunt omnuim, quaedam publica, quaedam universitatis,
quaedam nullius.” Some things are in common by the law of nature; some are public; some
universal; and some there are, to which no man can have a right. Justinian further observes, “Things
common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the
shores of the sea; no man therefore is prohibited from approaching any part of the seashore, whilst
he abstains from damaging farms, monuments, edifices, etc. which are not in common as the sea is."
Inst Divi Justiniani D.1.T.8. C.xIi.T.1. §1. (Thomas Cooper ed, translated by George Harris, 1812).
Douglas M Johnston & David L VanderZwaag, “The Ocean and International Environmental Law:
Swimming, Sinking, and Treading Water at the Millennium” (2000) 43 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 141 at
142 (ScienceDirect).
Ralph W Johnson et al, “The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington
State” (1992) 67 Wash L Rev 521 (QL).
Paul A Barresi, “Mobilizing the Public Trust Doctrine in Support of Publicly Owned Forests as
Carbon Dioxide Sinks in India and the United States” (2012) 23 Colo J Int’l Envtl L & Pol’y 39 at
48 (HeinOnline).
Joseph L Sax, “Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention”
(1970) 68 Mich L Rev 471 at 476 (HeinOnline).
Illinois Central Railroad Co v People of the State of Illinois, 146 US 387 (1892). In 1869, the
Illinois legislature made a substantial grant of submerged lands along the shores of Lake Michigan
to the Illinois Central Railroad. Subsequently, the Legislature repealed the grant. The state of Illinois
sued to quit title. The court held that the title of the state in the land in dispute was a title different in
character from that which it held in lands intended for sale, for it was a title held in trust - for the
people of the state that they may enjoy the navigation of the water, carry on commerce over them
and have liberty of fishing therein free from obstruction or interference of private parties. The
abdication of the general control of the state over lands in dispute was not consistent with the
exercise of the trust, which required the government to preserve such waters for public use. Ibid.
National Audubon Society v Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal 3d 419. Mono Lake, the
second largest lake in California, is saline containing no fish but it supports a large population of
brine shrimp, which feed vast numbers of nesting and migrating birds. In 1940, the Division of
Water Resources granted the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angles a permit to
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Basically, the doctrine of public trust rests on the assumption that certain resources
like air, sea, waters, the coasts, and the forests have great importance to the people as a
whole and that it would be unjustified to convert them into a subject of private
ownership. Accordingly, to benefit the people at large, the implication is that the
government holds these resources in trust and that they should be made freely available to
all, irrespective of “their economic status or circumstance.”128 The doctrine enjoins upon
the government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather
than to permit their use for private ownership or for commercial purposes.129 While
public trust confers a wide mandate upon the government to secure the management and
protection of natural resources, it also has considerable potential to act as a bulwark
against unbridled sovereign power enjoyed by the state in respect of natural resource
management, particularly to prevent the government from transferring public trust
resources to private entities in violation of the trust.130 National courts have often relied
on public trust to ensure that the state performs its trustee functions in good faith.131
Public trust doctrine has greater recognition at the national level than at the international
level.
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128
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130

131

appropriate virtually the entire flow of four of the five streams flowing into the lake. As a result of
these diversions, the level of the lake dropped, its surface area diminished, gulls abandoned the lake
and the scenic beauty and the ecological values were imperiled. The plaintiffs relying on the public
trust doctrine filed a lawsuit against the water diversions. The California supreme court explained
the concept of public trust doctrine in the following words: “The public trust is . . . an affirmation of
the duty of the State to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right
is consistent with the purposes of the trust . .” Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
could rely on the public trust doctrine to seek reconsideration of the allocation of the waters of the
Mono basin. Ibid.
For instance, see National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act, (S
Afr), No 24 of 2008, s 12 (state is the public trustee of all coastal property).
James M Olson, “Navigating the Great Lakes Compact: Water, Public Trust, and International Trade
Agreements” [2006] MS L Rev 1103 at 1113 (HeinOnline).
Joseph L Sax, “Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention”
(1970) 68 Mich L Rev 471 at 473 (HeinOnline).
For an understanding of how the public trust doctrine is applied in 12 different countries as a
doctrine of ecological protection incorporating the principles of precaution, sustainable
development, and intergenerational equity, see Michael C Blumm & Rachel D Guthrie,
“Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory
Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision” (2012) 45 UC Davis L Rev 741 at 807 (HeinOnline).
Ibid at 760-807 (an overview of public trust doctrine judicial decisions in various countries).
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An effective way of managing the coastal zone is by strengthening good coastal
governance, which lies at the heart of SCD.132 Good coastal governance is “the process in
which public, private and civil society actors organize themselves and coordinate with
each other to make decisions and distribute rights, obligations and authority for the use of
shared coastal resources.”133 It commits states to transparent decision-making procedures,
accessibility to information, ensures due process and respect for the rule of law, protects
human rights, and secures participatory decision-making, strengthens empowerment,
representativeness, inclusivity, comprehensiveness, decentralization, cooperation and
greater accountability.134
Under traditional modes of coastal governance, the management is often
constrained by fiat issued by external forces, with little or no stakeholder consultation and
participation.135 ICZM seeks to rectify this asymmetry by providing a platform to secure
meaningful public participation and consultation in all stages of decision-making.136 The
involvement of coastal communities in a programme that affects their lives and
livelihoods via co-management and greater participation is a sine qua non that enhances
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Kofi Annan former UN Secretary-General notes, “[g]ood governance is perhaps the single most
important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” UNDP, Human Development
Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (New York: UNDP, 2002) at 51. In the
context of sustainable development, good governance means respecting the Rio Principles. Kamal
Hossain, “Evolving Principles of Sustainable Development and Good Governance” in Konard
Ginther, Erik Denters & Paul JIM de Waart, eds, Sustainable Development and Good Governance
(Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 15 at 21.
USAID & University of Rhode Island Coastal Resources Center, A World of Learning in Coastal
Management: A Portfolio of Coastal Resources Management Program Experience and Products
(Rhode Island: Coastal Resources Center, 2002) at 3.
Mahon, Fanning & McConney, supra note 33 at 31; see also ILA New Delhi Declaration of
Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, Resolution 3/2002 adopted at
the 70th Conference of the International Law Association (New Delhi 2-6 April 2002), UN Doc
A/CONF.199/8, (9 August 2002), prin 6. See Gunaratne v The Homagama Pradeshiya Sabha (3
April 1998), App No 210/97(FR) of 4 March 1998 (Sri Lanka SC) (Amerasinghe, J holding that
“Publicity, transparency and fairness are essential if the goal of sustainable development is to be
achieved”).
In Spain, for long, particularly in the Cantabria region, coastal management was in the hands of a
single stakeholder, namely the national government. J Areizaga et al, “Improving Public
Engagement in ICZM: A Practical Approach” (2012) 109 J Envtl Mgmt 123 at 123 (ScienceDirect).
Under authoritarian regimes, ICZM is an oxymoron as its basic principles namely, integration,
reform and genuine participation, are absent in the overall governance arrangements. Laura Tabet &
Lucia Fanning, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management under Authoritarian Rule: An Evaluation
Framework of Coastal Governance in Egypt” (2012) 61 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 1 at 2
(ScienceDirect).
EC, Alan Pickaver et al, eds, Our Coast: ICZM in Europe, Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Participation Practices in Europe (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU, 2010) at 10.

302

its legitimacy and contributes significantly to its long-term success and sustainability.137
Moreover, by empowering local coastal communities that have the greatest stake in
maintaining the health of coastal areas and resources, ICZM helps to build human and
institutional capacity at all levels.
Another aspect of the traditional CZM prototype is that the initiative is based on a
top-down, centralized, and bureaucratically heavy approach. Often, the bureaucracy is
found to be too slow, fraught with red-tape, and unable to efficiently manage the
resource.138 In line with the need for better coastal governance, ICZM seeks to provide
for greater and more effective coordination between the different sectors across multiple
scales, in line with the principle of decentralized decision-making and subsidiarity,
ensuring compatibility between the national and local levels of government. In effect,
ICZM facilitates decentralized multi-stakeholder, consensus-based decision-making by
providing a framework and a process for realizing grass-roots level democracy in coastal
zones.139
The above discussion reveals that ICZM coalesces around a cluster of fundamental
sustainability principles that must work together to move coastal management towards
the ultimate goal of SCD. And here the attempt has been to identify some of the more
relevant principles to an ICZM process. It must be noted that the lists are not exhaustive
of all the principles and strict compartmentalization of the same is also not possible.
There is bound to be overlaps and these principles can straddle from one end of the
spectrum (the right to clean and healthy coastal environment) to the other (the right to
development and good coastal governance) and vice versa. This task is easier said than
done, as there can be numerous roadblocks that restrict the maturing of an ICZM
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Ibid.
See Sanju Panda (Advocate) v Orissa, (2002) [2002] 2 OLR 189 (Orissa HC) (highlighting the
blatant violation of the coastal law and the criminal negligence by the authorities who failed to
perform their statutory duties).
See generally Jason M Patlis, Maurice Knight & Jeff Benoit, “Integrated Coastal Management in
Developing, Decentralizing Countries: The General Paradigm, the U.S. Model and the Indonesian
Example” in Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Aldo Chircop & Moria McConnell, eds, Ocean Yearbook, vol
17 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 380. The authors sound a word of caution
regarding decentralization, which can create more problems due to budgetary constraints, lack of
capacity at local levels, etc. Accordingly, the paper forwards a voluntary, incentive-based
programme for decentralization. Ibid.
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programme. Prior to detailing these obstructions, we will first examine the general steps
in an ICZM process.
In its most primary and essential form, an ICZM programme consists of five
phases. The first is the programme initiation, which is an exercise that involves the
identification and analysis of critical issues that affect the coastal environment and set the
demand for an ICZM programme.140 The second phase is programme preparation, which
involves the development of the objectives and the preparation of the plan, policies and
actions.141 Phase three relates to formalization and adoption of the programme, which can
be via a law, a decree or an interagency agreement. It also includes the securing of
funds.142 Implementation forms the focus in phase four, and phase five is dedicated to a
formal evaluation.143 However, the five-step programme does not always proceed in a
linear sequence. At times, certain phases may have to be addressed before others.144
Indeed, for the programme to work without compromising its effectiveness, it may be
necessary to revisit stages and make appropriate changes to ensure compliance with the
identified stages.145
Typically, an ICZM programme matures through the successive completion of
management cycles, which is a time-consuming process. An initial cycle contemplated at
the national scale may take somewhere between eight to 15 years, while a demonstration
project that is targeted at a single bay or an urban area will take half this time.146 Each of
these cycles is called a “generation” of an ICZM project or programme. Typically, the
first cycle deals with a few urgent issues that are restricted to a specific geographic area.
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Olsen, Tobey & Kerr, supra note 85 at 155; Heileman, ed, supra note 39 at 9. Priority actions
include assessing socio-environmental, and institutional issues; identifying stakeholders and their
interests; inviting review and response; selecting issues; and defining goals. See Stephen B Olsen,
Kem Lowry & James Tobey, The Common Methodology for Learning: A Manual for Assessing
Progress in Coastal Management, Coastal Management Report #2211 (Narragansett, USA: Coastal
Resources Center, 1999) at 15 [Olsen, Lowry & Tobey, The Common Methodology].
Olsen, Tobey & Kerr, ibid at 160. Heileman, ed, ibid at 9. Priority actions include, documenting
baseline conditions, conducting scientific research on selected management questions, public
awareness programmes, involving stakeholders in the planning process, developing the management
plan, the institutional framework, and testing implementation strategies on a pilot scale. See Olsen,
Lowry & Tobey, The Common Methodology, ibid at 23.
Olsen, Tobey & Kerr, ibid at 8.
Ibid at 160.
Olsen, Lowry & Tobey, The Common Methodology, supra note 140 at 8.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Subsequently, through adaptive learning, the geographic dimensions may expand to
include new and more complex elements.147
ICZM is a process that helps to secure the more efficient use of coastal resources
for economic development, reconciling short-term economic forces with long-term
environmental concerns. However, an ICZM process may involve several dimensions,
making it highly specialized and difficult to grasp, let alone implement. Specificity and
intricacy require that coastal countries have sufficient capacity to develop an ICZM
programme based on sustainability principles and unique contexts. Unfortunately, this is
rarely the case, particularly in developing countries, which often find themselves
hamstrung by capacity and institutional constraints.148 As alluded to earlier, a major
reason for this situation is the absence of an international overarching treaty on this
subject and an international agency to oversee and support national ICZM
implementation. The much-needed consistency and guidance could have been achieved
had there been an international treaty and an international body to consolidate and
standardize the various practice rules.149

6.4 ICZM: A BALANCING ACT
As laudable as it appears, ICZM cannot be considered the ultimate solution to the coastal
management quagmire. While the intention in this sub-part is not to disparage the
usefulness of this methodology, a closer look at this paradigm is nonetheless merited. As
Jens Sorensen points out, “[i]ntegrated coastal management is now practiced all over the
globe and it is part of the rhetoric for sustainable development. For many who have been
following the ICM star for decades, the optimism is now guarded because they have
found out that ICM is a long swim against the current.”150 Another commentator states:
[t]he continued iteration of an integrated
147
148

149
150

Ibid.
Due to the paucity of material and human resources in the northwest African region, it is difficult to
implement coastal management. The problem is compounded by lack of adequate support and
assistance from international institutions. See generally Maria Snoussia & El Hafid Tabet Aoul,
“Integrated Coastal Zone Management Programme Northwest African Region Case” (2000) 43
Ocean & Coast Mgmt 1033 (ScienceDirect).
For a discussion on the role of international environmental law in facilitating ICZM, see Ch 7, Part
7.2.
Sorensen, “National and International Efforts”, supra note 3 at 3.
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approach as a ‘general good’ is infrequently
challenged. Indeed, any such challenge might
be considered to be heretical. However, such
an uncritical approach may lull us into a false
security that integration provides a panacea
for our ill-managed oceans. This is simply
not true.151
The most trenchant criticism of ICZM lies in its nebulous character, which, like its
objective (sustainable development), “makes it difficult to nail down precisely.”152
Certainly, a major allure of ICZM is that there are no right or wrong approaches, a
condition which affords each country substantial freedom to design an ICZM programme
that best reflects its needs and interests.153
Some countries seek rehabilitation of beleaguered coastal environments, while
others focus on terrestrial sources of marine pollution.154 Apart from this malleability due
to contextual variations, an ICZM programme can also be delivered in a wide variety of
ways. However, the advantages held out by its protean nature can also turn into an
Achilles heel.
ICZM remains vaguely defined at the operational level of management. As referred
to earlier, there are five dimensions to ICZM integration, and putting these into practice is
not easy.155 As Biliana Cicin-Sain states
[b]ringing together and harmonizing the perspectives
of divergent sectoral government agencies, of
different levels of government (each with their own
interests, mandates, and perspectives), and of different
disciplines (each with different outlooks, language,
and methodologies) represents a most challenging set
151
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Richard A Barnes, “Some Cautions about Integrated Oceans and Coastal Management” (2006) 8
Envtl L Rev 247 at 247-48 (HeinOnline).
Chircop, supra note 57 at 345.
Selina M Stead & Derek J McGlashan, “A Coastal and Marine National Park for Scotland in
Partnership with Integrated Coastal Zone Management” (2006) 49 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 22 at 38
(ScienceDirect).
For instance “Integrated Protection and Management of Coastal Zones” is NAPA priority project no
3, which seeks to increase the resistance capacity of coastal zones “to climate change, through
integrated management of the coastal resources.” This project, has four components, namely,
reinforcement of stakeholder capacity; protection activities; research on utilization of inert materials
in the coastal zone; and, finally, mobilization, information and sensitization. Cape Verde, Ministry
of Environment and Agriculture, National Meteorology and Geophysics Institute & UNFCCC,
National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change 2008-2012 (Executive Version,
December 2007) at iii.
Cicin-Sain et al, “Education and Training”, supra note 15 at 292.
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of tasks.156
Attaining integration requires that personnel appointed to the task be adequately trained.
This calls for capacity building, political support, and constant monitoring and
evaluation.157 A major critique is that, in most coastal countries, particularly those in the
developing world, ICZM programmes are constrained by the lack of sustained political
support, finance and capacity, systemic failures, and institutional obstacles.158
A nation’s political instability and lack of public awareness are other factors that
can derail a programme. Complicating matters further are constitutional constraints (i.e.,
constitutional amendments may be to operationalize decentralized management or
provide for spatial integration) that may hamper integration between sectors of human
activity at different spatial scales.159 For instance, there is a division of responsibility
between the various levels of government at the land-sea divide, making this aspect of
integration difficult to implement in practice. Again, in unitary systems of governance, it
is comparatively difficult to decentralize management authority to local governments that
function in coastal zones.
Notwithstanding their drawbacks, ICZM programmes can nevertheless improve the
quality of life of coastal communities.160 Rather than replace sectoral responsibilities, the
programmes link up and coordinate actions among different sectors, and also fill in the
gaps to ensure that decision-makers do not work at cross purposes. By envisaging wide
stakeholder participation, decentralized decision-making, and good science and
management practices, ICZM smoothes the process by clarifying and providing guidance
on resource use and allocation.
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See generally Brian R Crawford, J Stanley Cobb & Abigail Friedman, “Building Capacity for
Integrated Coastal Management in Developing Countries” (1993) 21 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 311 at
337.
See Robin McCall & Talia Choy, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Guyana:
Development Barriers, Opportunities and Recommendations” in Erlend Moksness, Einar Dahl &
Josianne Støttrup, eds, Integrated Coastal Zone Management (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 219
at 229-33 (outlining some of the major barriers in the implementation of ICZM in Guyana).
In this context, the success of ICZM programmes will depend greatly upon the constitutional
framework of a country. ICZM presupposes greater public participation. In unitary/federal systems,
it will be difficult to implement an ICZM programme, if the constitution or the legal system does not
formally provide recognition to public participation and community based institutions.
Chua Thia-Eng, Danilo Bonga & Nancy Bermas-Atrigenio, “Dynamics of Integrated Coastal
Management: PEMSEA’s Experience” (2006) 34 Coastal Mgmt 303 at 304.
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Additionally, by empowering local communities and providing them with increased
access and decision-making power over resources management, ICZM provides an
opportunity to attain all of these aspirations by maximizing benefits of current and future
development through careful and rational planning. Competing demands over land and
natural resources are balanced, potential conflicts among users are resolved, development
is promoted in areas away from sensitive locations, and the impacts of existing activities
that may be harmful to the environment are mitigated.
Moreover, the adaptive capacities of coastal communities are augmented, placing
them in a better position to adjust to climatic impacts. Thus, despite its weaknesses,
ICZM emerges as the master plan for SCD, and the growing international recognition of
this concept is a testament to this fact.

6.5 LINKING COASTAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TO ICZM: TWO SIDES OF
THE SAME COIN?
To be effective and results-oriented, adaptation strategies must be flexible with spatial
and temporal scales.161 Designing an appropriate adaptation response is a complex task
that may require a mix of different options. Inevitably, there will also be a certain
amount of overlap.162 Another important aspect is that most SLR adaptation measures are
primarily viewed as interventions that emanate as part of land-use planning and generally
are the responsibility of local governments.163 When these land-use tools are applied to
coastal zones, local governments, particularly those in the developing world, find
themselves ill equipped to work out the operational specifics of a programme with farreaching implications. For instance, Bangladesh implemented the Coastal Embankment
Project, which produced immediate benefits in terms of bringing more areas under
cultivation. But since adequate heed was not paid to proper engineering and the larger
environmental implications, within a decade, the protection structures were identified to
161
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Charles T O’Reilly, Donald L Forbes & George S Parkes, “Defining and Adapting to Coastal
Hazards in Atlantic Canada: Facing the Challenge of Rising Sea Levels, Storm Surges, and
Shoreline Erosion in a Changing Climate” in Aldo Chircop & Moira McConnell, eds, Ocean
Yearbook, vol 19 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005) 189 at 206.
J Dronkers et al, eds, Report of the Coastal Management Subgroup: Strategies for Adaption to Sea
Level Rise (Geneva: IPCC, Response Strategies Working Group, 1990) at 8.
see Jessica Grannis, Adaptation Tool Kit: Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Land Use (Georgetown
Climate Center, 2011) at 2-4 (outlining 18 different land use tools to respond to SLR).
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be a major cause for water logging and drainage congestion leading to annual economic
losses of about USD5 million, apart from other environmental impacts.164 The poor
maintenance of the embankments compounded these issues.165
Again, in certain cases, coastal populations may have to be relocated to areas that
lie outside the jurisdiction of that particular local government. Leaving such critical
decisions to local governments can lead to fragmented and uncoordinated responses that
can frustrate the larger national goals for climate change adaptation. Thus, it is necessary
that interlinkages be established and an operational command that involves governments
at all levels put in place to respond to challenges.
At the same time, it must also be pointed out that CCCA is not solely about
utilizing land-use tools. The objective of all CCCA measures is to increase resilience,
which is the most crucial element in climate change adaptation.166 In coastal adaptation
semantics, coastal resilience refers to the capacity of coastal communities and natural
systems to prevent or cope with climate change impacts and SLR. 167 Coastal resilience
can be fortified by decreasing the probability of hazard occurrence through managed
retreat, protection, accommodation, or facilitating recovery when impacts do occur.168
This is only part of the technique to increase resilience, which can of course be
rejuvenated by increasing the socio-economic capacity of coastal communities to prepare
for SLR and climate change impacts on coastal zones, while still retaining opportunities
for coastal development.169
In other words, adapting to SLR and other climate change impacts should not be
limited solely to building codes, buffer zones, and set back lines. Rather, it is an abstruse
164
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Dipak Kamal, Biodiversity Conservation in the Coastal Zone of Bangladesh (MMM Thesis,
Dalhousie University, 1999) [unpublished] at 48-49; see also Banglapedia, Embankment online:
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of Environment & Forest, Initial National Communication under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Dhaka: Ministry of Environment & Forest, 2002) at 30.
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built as per the design. This led to saline flooding, particularly in the Khulna-Jessore area. Kamal,
ibid at 55-56. Polders were constructed to protect agricultural land in the coastal zone in the 1960s.
Since there were not sufficient number of sluice gates, the polders magnify water logging. Ibid at 63.
RF McLean & Alla Tsyban, “Coastal Zones and Marine Ecosystems” in James J McCarthy et al,
eds, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001) 335 at 368.
Ibid; Sea level and coastal hazards are on the rise, placing natural and human communities at great
risk: Coastal Resilience can help, online: Coastal Resilience <http://coastalresilience.org/>.
McLean & Tsyban, ibid.
Ibid.
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task that is contingent upon an enlightened approach to CZM, and one that seeks to
improve the adaptive capacities of coastal communities by bettering residents’ lives and
helping them move towards SCD. This is in addition to the element identified earlier,
namely, decreasing the probability of hazards by employing managed retreat, protection
and accommodation. This measure can operate independently as part of land-use
planning, but it definitely has to work within the broader context of CZM. A few
illustrations are offered below to support this point.
Marine fisheries are a vital economic resource in most coastal countries. Close to
95 per cent of the world’s catch is concentrated in coastal waters and in the 200-mile
exclusive economic zone of maritime states.170 Nowadays, the fishing industry aspires to
catch more fish than at any time in the past. The paradox is that, despite their efforts, they
end up catching fewer fish due to overfishing, the use of harmful fishing practices, fish
migrations caused by rising water temperatures, destruction of marine habitats, and
widespread pollution of oceanic waters, all of which have negatively impacted the
sustainability of several fisheries. There have been dramatic fish stock collapses in
several parts of the world, a crisis that has been aggravated by severe climatic anomalies.
It is therefore imperative that sufficient numbers of commercially important fish species
be maintained, since artisanal fisheries are dependent on the stock of such species for
their livelihood and dietary requirements.
However, the primary response to these developments is to further limit access to
fishery resources, which puts disadvantaged low-income coastal communities in deeper
distress, rendering many of these fishery-based subsistence economies obsolete.171

In

the long run, these developments also impact national economic growth. All of this
necessitates a dovetailing of coastal climate adaptation measures with fisheries
management, which will produce a more holistic response to offset adverse economic
impacts, especially when managerial decisions relating to fishing are being made.172
170
171
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Ibid at 369.
In respect of fisheries management, Namibia faces the challenge of the warming of the Benguela
current and migration of fisheries. In such a situation, the question is whether Namibia should invest
in fish processing. See also UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World (New York: UNDP, 2005) at 172.
Ibid at 370. Some of the prominent adaptation measures suggested include aquaculture, modification
and improvement of technology related to the fishing industry, management of the fish trade
industry, creation of marine biosphere reserves, and protected areas for marine mammals. Ibid.
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Similarly, implementing retreat and the consequent relocation of coastal
communities is an exceptionally difficult and costly affair, particularly when alternative
land is limited due to coastal squeeze. For impoverished coastal communities, relocation
is practically impossible, as they do not have the financial wherewithal to ensure a
smooth relocation. Moreover, operationalization of retreat options produces significant
socio-economic and cultural implications, particularly in cases where there is complete
abandonment of existing coastal settlements during relocation. The loss of a traditional
environment could severely disrupt livelihoods and cultural legacies and produce social
instability.173
Migration can lead to further societal and economic tensions, particularly when
there are people already inhabiting the place of relocation. It is thus imperative that the
emphasis of CCCA should be to ensure that adaptive capacities of impoverished coastal
communities are strengthened so they can re-locate to new areas with minimal
inconvenience and disruption. Generally, the lifestyles of coastal inhabitants are
intrinsically linked to the coasts; therefore, if adaptation options are to generate
substantial results, the interests of those being relocated must be served by including
them in the preparation and implementation phases of retreat.
As explained in Part 1, maintenance of and access to freshwater supplies is a
critical requirement if coastal areas are to remain habitable. With rising seas, there is the
possibility of salinity ingress and contamination of both surface sources and ground water
aquifers. It is thus necessary that “proactive adaptation measures” be adopted, such as
regulating the commercial extraction of groundwater from coastal fossil aquifers,
adopting large-scale rainwater harvesting measures in coastal areas, and regulating point
and non-point discharges into water bodies. An integrated approach that combines water
planning and management with CZM can reduce the undesirable impacts of SLR on
water sources.
When a resource is overexploited or an ecosystem degraded, there is not only a
reduction in its principal and inherent functions, but a ripple effect significantly lowers
the performance of other subsidiary functions. For example, when a large swathe of
mangroves is cleared to make way for a thermal power plant, apart from the recycling
173
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and basic amenity functions that mangroves perform (which are lost forever), there is an
indirect impact on several other related aspects. These include the loss of a breeding
ground for fish, which can indirectly affect the food chain and livelihood prospects of
those who live and work in the area. Even though the establishment of a thermal power
plant after cutting down mangroves may result in large financial payoffs in the short
term, it will, over time, contribute to greater environmental damage, increase climate
change vulnerability, and adversely impact the local subsistence economy, thereby
reducing the capacity of local communities to adapt to the harmful consequences of
climate change. In most cases, it cannot be assumed that the short-term economic benefits
outweigh the long-term costs of such environmental disruptions.
As our climate changes, oceans rise, and wind and wave action become more
intense, coastal lands that once housed the mangroves may become inundated unless
costlier and expensive hard structures are erected. This would at once wipe out a
significant portion of the economic benefits accrued by the operation of the thermal
power plant. Moreover, erecting hard structures on the coastline is no guarantee of
foolproof protection and generally does match the natural protection afforded by the
mangroves.174 Thus, it becomes a necessary predicate to the implementation of the
thermal power project that the impact of SLR be considered and the potential of
ecosystems to keep a rising sea at bay be factored in. In short, present-day coastal
development and its ability to respond to rising sea levels and climate change will
determine the success and effectiveness of long-term adaptation options.175 Accordingly,
it is essential that adaptation concerns be integrated into the broader milieu of coastal
planning and management (see Figure 4).
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Environmental Justice Foundation, Mangroves: Nature’s Defence against Tsunamis (London:
Environmental Justice Foundation, 2006) at 7-13.
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Figure 4: Sustainable Coastal Development: Integrating Climate Change Adaptation
Into the ICZM Process
In the above figure, the 42 adaptation measures identified in the previous chapter are
grouped under eight heads. And, as can be seen, it is possible to draw linkages between
the different adaptation measures. In certain instances, the relationship between the
measures, can be very strong (as in the case of marine protected areas and wetland
protection), while in others, it can be weak (destroying insect breeding sites and
insurance). But in all cases, since these adaptation measures promote coastal environment
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protection, development and adaptation, they can be interlinked and implemented via an
ICZM web to foster the central goal of SCD.
Effective adaptation to climate change and SLR requires a flexible coastal
management strategy that incorporates and integrates short-term goals (e.g., maintenance
of all natural functions of coastal ecosystems at sustainable levels) with long-term ones
(adaptation to climate change and SLR through retreat, accommodate and protect) to
realize the primordial objective of SCD.176 Such an effort should also include the
development of sufficient capacity for disaster management.177
ICZM has international recognition as the most viable and appropriate
methodological response to deal with SLR and other climate change impacts on coastal
zones, including other short- and long-term multiple threats like rapid degradation of
coastal resources and widespread coastal pollution.178 ICZM, the IPCC observes is, “the
most appropriate process to deal with climate change, sea-level rise and other current and
long-term coastal challenges.”179 Successful adaptation to SLR essentially involves the
implementation of a judicious blend of structural and non-structural measures ("multiple
lines of defence strategy")180 with the overwhelming majority being aimed at improving
the adaptive capacities of coastal communities and coastal resilience. This can be
accomplished through ICZM, and the best possible manifestation of the ICZM approach
is through the preparation and implementation of ICZM plans.
Even though the primary objective of ICZM is to address ways to reconcile
contending claims over scarce coastal resources, with the specter of climate change and
SLR, the dimension of ICZM stands to change considerably. Rather than merely
providing ways to manage competing uses over the coastal zone and the resources
176
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Ibid at 340.
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contained therein, future coastal planning to be relevant must provide for CCCA. Being a
methodology to facilitate the attainment of SCD, ICZM will have to, in addition to
CCCA, facilitate mitigation goals where feasible, promote development in line with
social justice and equity and protect the coastal environment. In fact, so critical is the role
of ICZM in providing for CCCA, that scholars have suggested, “ICZM must become
“Adaptive” CZM (ACZM) … Since relative sea-level rise of a meter or more is predicted
during the coming century as polar glacial ice melts, nations should prioritize developing
ACZM policies and practices.”181
To bolster the success of adaptive responses, it is necessary that ICZM be a
considered factor in all ongoing and future planning and decision-making programmes
relating to coastal zones. In the same vein, any effort targeted at SCD that does not
consider the effects of climate change and SLR will also not achieve the desired results.
Overlaying CCCA measures onto ICZM programmes will enable them to reinforce each
other. Furthermore, concepts integral to ICZM (e.g., planning, adaptive management,
environmental protection, community participation, decentralized decision-making, etc.)
must be applied to CCCA processes. Both CCCA and ICZM seek to ensure that coastal
and marine ecosystems are functioning and continue to remain healthy. This is extremely
important; since functional coastal ecosystems can provide a range of amenities and
values, like storm protection, flood mitigation, shoreline stabilization, erosion control,
water storage, groundwater recharge, and nutrient and pollutant retention. In light of
these benefits, there is growing recognition of the approach, evident in the attempts by
annex-I and non-annex-I countries (including LDCs), who are developing ICZM plans as
part of their adaptation programmes.182
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Incorporating a CCCA dimension into ICZM does not radically alter its nature. In
viewing ICZM through a climate change lens, certain important factors or “needs” should
be considered. These include: (1) the need for a greater emphasis on environmental
protection and a greater reliance on nature-based coastal protection strategies and
measures; (2) the need to factor in the issue of uncertainty associated with climate
change impacts on coastal zones; (3) the need for a longer planning horizon;183 (4) the
need to augment livelihood opportunities by ensuring equitable and sustainable allocation
of coastal resources to fortify the adaptation capacities of coastal communities; (5) the
need to preserve and improve the resilience, productivity and biological diversity of
coastal ecosystems so that coastal ecosystems can absorb climate change impacts and
support greater economic and livelihood opportunities; and, (6) the need to provide for
integrated decision-making through a holistic system that links multi-purpose
management efforts and reduces conflicts associated with sectoral management.
CCCA is not solely about building sea walls, climate-proofing, and moving people
out of harm’s way. It is also about augmenting the capacities of coastal communities to
manage climate-change-related impacts, improving their quality of life, protecting coastal
resources, and ensuring that economic development proceeds in a manner that does not
jeopardize the resilience of coastal ecosystems. Thus, it is clear from the above that there
is considerable utility in linking coastal zone climate change adaptation to an ICZM
process. Having both the capacity to make decisions regarding CZM and the resources
through ICZM constitutes a firm foundational response option for addressing the
consequences of SLR.184
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6.6 CONCLUSION
In sum, it is clear that ICZM was developed as the plausible functional response to reinvigorate and re-negotiate the way in which we manage our coasts, providing substance
and form to the concept of SCD. ICZM is increasingly being proffered as the principal
proactive tool to forge the appropriate balance between competing coastal uses and
demands seeking to create synergetic and positive relationships between the myriad of
players and sub-sectors that have stakes in the coastal zone. Traditional sectoral coastal
management responses have not always provided a comprehensive package of solutions
that are sufficiently inter-linked and consequently have not been able to prevent or even
slow the trend of degradation. From a functional perspective, ICZM seeks to re-orient, rework and link the divergent multi-dimensional management efforts currently at play in
coastal zones to produce more holistic solutions that recognize the zones’ unique
features. Additionally, it seeks to create more opportunities for livelihood, to increase
productivity of existing activities, to promote equitable growth, and to improve the
resilience of coastal ecosystems. Like a “Christmas tree” with a myriad display of
decorations, several courses of action with diverse goals and objectives can all hang
together in an ICZM programme.
More importantly, ICZM offers an efficacious approach that can dovetail land-useplanning-based climate adaptation objectives with its own repertoire, addressing the
problems posed by SLR and other climate change impacts more effectively and
holistically. Adherence to such an approach is needed not merely because there is the
need to stave off coastal communities from impending catastrophes, but more importantly
because there are several low-hanging fruits that can be utilized to promote the welfare of
coastal communities.
The multiple benefits that can accrue to coastal inhabitants by following such an
approach are very high. If our coastal management efforts are not directed towards
harnessing these benefits, (which, can help alleviate a number of the adverse impacts
identified), these opportunities may be lost forever, and the problems compounded. The
Seychelles, Ministry of Environment & Transport, Initial National Communication under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Seychelles: Ministry of Environment &
Transport, 2000) at 88.

317

present approach in most countries is hard armouring, which, as pointed out earlier, is a
myopic fix. Designing adaptive responses that do not take into account the need for an
integrated approach will considerably reduce, or even negate, chances of success. As
parallel tracking adaptation and ICZM can threaten the long-term viability and
sustainability of these efforts, it is imperative that existing systems be reconfigured in
such a way that a broader scheme for ICZM implementation (i.e., one that harmonizes
and integrates coastal climate adaptation) is devised. Of course, this does not mean that
by adopting such a course of action we will be able to reign in the negative dynamic and
revert back to an ideal situation and that we can continue with a ‘business as usual’
approach of emitting more GHGs. Actions may have to be taken on a wide range of
fronts, including measures aimed at stricter mitigation. Nevertheless, the utility of linking
adaptation with ICZM, which can make perceptible changes on the ground, cannot be
discounted.
In building this enlightened and judicious architecture for CZM laws and legal
frameworks play an important role. An enabling legislative environment provides the
imprimatur to work an ICZM programme and can also help us move towards a more
sustainable pattern of coastal development by setting out the parameters for the exercise
of rights and the observance of duties by stakeholders. These aspects are dealt with in the
next part.
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PART III
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE COASTAL DEVELOPMENT
This part addresses the primary research question that this thesis seeks to address,
namely: what role can coastal laws play in facilitating ICZM implementation in South
Asia to balance coastal development with coastal environment protection and coastal
climate change adaptation? In fact, its objective is twofold: 1) to understand the
importance of dedicated coastal law statutes to facilitate ICZM implementation by
balancing the troika of interests namely, coastal development, coastal environment
protection and coastal climate change adaptation and mitigation; and 2) to provide
relevant information to help in the identification of certain essential legal principles that
can inform coastal law development and legal reform, particularly from the perspective
of coastal climate change adaptation for South Asia, which will be carried out in the next
part. Divided into two chapters, the first, namely, chapter seven, examines inter alia some
of the national experiences in legislating ICZM and adapting to sea level rise to reveal a
heterogeneous range of conceptions of how ICZM programmes and CCCA can be
implemented through the legal route. However, as prelude to this examination of national
experiences, the highpoints in the development of ICZM at the international level is set
out. The next chapter, i.e., chapter eight carries the analysis forward by proposing a
theoretical justification for coastal zone management law and through a SWOT it offers a
compelling case for a coastal management legislation to underpin and support the ICZM
process and to juxtapose CCCA onto an ICZM programme. Drawing from previous
chapters, it explores some of the salient features in ICZM law development throughout
the ages and explicates possible future trends where the core of ICZM law will be
devoted to addressing, supporting and implementing CCCA issues.
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CHAPTER 7

OPERATIONALISING INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT AND ADAPTING TO SEA LEVEL RISE
THROUGH DEDICATED COASTAL LAWS: RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND A FEW
NATIONAL EXPERIENCES

7.1 INTRODUCTION
Ever since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) has
widely been touted as a panacea to most of the problems that endanger the sustainable
development of coastal areas, resources and communities.1 Clearly, as highlighted in part
two, the uniqueness of ICZM is that it goes beyond the conventional silo-based
approaches that lead to working at cross-purposes and wastage of resources (i.e., inept
management) by providing a more solid and integrated foundation to engage and bring
together various constituencies and stakeholders for effective coastal decision-making.
The data reveals that there is an impressive growth in the number of ICZM programmes.2
In this regard, many significant gains have been achieved outside the traditional
institutional management frameworks and formal arrangements for coastal governance.3
All the same, in a majority of coastal nations and in South Asia in particular, the
degradation of coastlines, depletion of coastal resources and loss of coastal space
continue.4 Despite several well thought out ICZM plans and programmes currently in
place, most coastal areas and littoral environments are fast deteriorating.5 The raisons
d'être for the inability of ICZM in many of these coastal countries to stem the tide of
environmental degradation are many and varied.6 One important factor that can hamper
the implementation of ICZM programmes is the lack of appropriate legislative support.7
1
2

3
4
5
6
7

Nicholas A Robinson, ed, Agenda 21 & The UNCED Proceedings, vol 4, 3rd series, International
Protection of the Environment (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1993) at 307, ch 17, ¶17.3.
See Jens Sorensen, Baseline 2000 Background Report: The Status of Integrated Coastal
Management as an International Practice, Coastal Zone Canada Association, Baseline 2000 (2nd
Iteration, 2002) at 3-1 [Sorensen, Baseline 2000].
Ibid.
For an overview of the state of coastal environmental degradation in South Asia, Ch 3, Part 3.2.
See UNGA, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General: Addendum,
A/59/62/Add.1, 29 (18 August 2004) ¶97.
Despite Bangladesh recognising the utility and importance of ICZM, degradation of its coastlines
continue. For more details see, Ch 2, Part 2.2.3.
Ibid.
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However, this is not to suggest that enacting a dedicated coastal statute will per se put the
house back in order, as lawmaking only lays down a normative framework. Nevertheless,
as the subsequent discussion points out, a dedicated coastal legislation can play a vital
role in determining and sustaining an ICZM process.
The implementation of ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation brings forth in
its wake a series of legal issues for which, as the previous chapters demonstrate; no
across-the-board solutions can be applied. Likewise, the implementation of the three
broad adaptation responses in relation to SLR (accommodation, retreat, and protection)
also involves substantial legal questions. Issues can arise in relation to retreat 8 and
resettlement,9 construction of coastal protection and other structures, their subsequent
failure and liability,10 expropriation of private property,11 etc., which may require legal
8

9

10

An important legal technique used to implement retreat is rolling easements. See Severance v
Patterson, 2010 Tex LEXIS 854 (Tex, 2010); Severance v Patterson, 2011 Tex LEXIS 779 (Tex,
2011); Severance v Patterson, 2012 Tex LEXIS 260 (Tex, 2012); see also Part 7.3.1.3, below, for
more details.
Coastal communities forced to resettle may litigate to recover damages from those who have
contributed to the problem of GHG emissions. Native Village of Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corp, 663 F
Supp (2d) 863 (ND Cal, 2009). J Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, “Coastal Retreat Measures” in
Michael B Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds, The Law of Adaptation to Climate Change: U.S. and
International Aspects (Illinois: American Bar Association, 2012) 267 at 295.
Avenal v State, 2004 La LEXIS 2984 (La SC, 2004) [Avenal]. The operation of Caernarvon
freshwater diversion structures designed to abate saltwater intrusion and marine tidal invasion
altered salinity levels, which destroyed oyster grounds. The trial court awarded damages, which was
subsequently reversed. Held: The oyster fishermen are not entitled to compensation as harmless
clauses in their leases exempted state liability. Ibid.
The Army Corps of Engineers dredged the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a shipping
channel namely, between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico through virgin coastal lands. Certain
levees alongside the channel and around the city and certain floodwalls were also constructed. In the
original design there was no provision for armouring. It was only in the 1980s that armouring
carried out. But by then the channel widened considerably, enabling Hurricane Katrina to generate a
peak storm surge that breached the levees leading to flooding. Contending that it was the Corps's
negligence in maintaining the channel that led to widespread damage, the plaintiffs sued to recover
for damages. In the United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana it was found that
neither the Flood Control Act, 1928, nor the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 1948, protected the government from the suit; and therefore it was held that some of the
plaintiffs proved the government’s full liability. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol Litigation,
647 F Supp (2d) 644 (ED La, 2009). This was taken in appeal to the United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit. In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 673 F (3d) 381 (5th Cir 2012). A three-judge
bench speaking through Jerry E. Smith held that the government enjoyed immunity only from
damages caused by floodwaters released on account of flood-control activity or negligence therein.
Katrina-related flooding was caused not by flood-control activity, but by the MRGO, a navigational
channel whose design, construction, and maintenance could not be characterized as flood-control
activity. Therefore, the Flood Control Act, 1928, did not clothe the government with any immunity
against liability for the flooding. As well, the discretionary function exception under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 1948, did not apply since under the Berkovitz-Gaubert test, the government
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adjudication. Due to incompatibility between many existing laws and jurisprudence and
new situations, these may prove dysfunctional, necessitating a reevaluation of the
fundamentals.
The “anticlimactic”12 decision of the United States Supreme Court in David H.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council13 involving an interpretation of the takings
clause is demonstrative of this incompatibility.14 As well, fundamental precepts of

11

12
13
14

enjoyed immunity only where its discretionary judgments are susceptible to public-policy analysis.
In the instant case, only objective scientific principles were involved and not any public-policy
considerations. “The Corps misjudged the hydrological risk posed by the erosion of MRGO's banks.
Therefore, the government should not enjoy DFE immunity against the resultant flooding.” Ibid at
391. Against this the United States government filed a petition for rehearing and in a surprise move
the very same three-judge panel withdrew this opinion and substituted it with a new one, which
favoured the government. In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F (3d) 436 (5th Cir 2012).
Even though the court was unwilling to disturb it’s earlier holding in relation to Flood Control Act,
1928, the court found that the discretionary function exception would apply to the Corps’s actions,
holding that “the Corps’s failure to armor timely Reach 2 is shielded by the DFE.” Ibid at 451. This
was so because there was “ample record evidence indicating the public-policy character of the
Corps’s various decisions contributing to the delay in armoring Reach 2.” Ibid. And this completely
insulated the government from liability. Ibid at 454. By indulging in this U-turn within a span of six
months, the court effectively shut the doors to a large section of plaintiffs who were practically
victims of a mass tort due to the improper upkeep of the MRGO.
Byron Shire Council v Vaughan, Vaughan v Byron Shire Council, (2009), [2009] NSWLEC 88 and
(No 2) [2009] NSWLEC 110. Due to wave action and storm surge there was substantial erosion of
the beach front of the respondents and the property was unprotected. Thereafter, the respondents’
contractor deposited large rocks on the road in anticipation of moving these to the respondents’ land
to create a barrier to prevent further erosion. This work to create a rock riprap was sought to be
injuncted on the ground that development consent was not obtained and that there was no road
approval under the Roads Act. Consequently, the work was a trespass and a potential public
nuisance. Against this, the respondents argued that the riprap was protected under the development
consent granted by the council, which operated in rem to support the present works. Rejecting the
arguments, the Land and Environment Court pointed our that the work done in isolation on the
Respondents’ land will result in potentially adverse impacts on neighbouring properties in the
immediate vicinity and more generally along the Belongil spit and accordingly the work was
injuncted.
Land acquisition is an essential tool for effective management of coastal areas and should be
integrated into coastal management systems. David Ownes, “Land Acquisition and Coastal
Resource Management: A Pragmatic Perspective” (1983) 24:4 Wm & Mary L Rev 625 at 630
(HeinOnline).
See generally Richard A Epstein, “Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations” (1993) 45 Stan L Rev 1369 (QL).
David H Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992).
The factual matrix reveals that one David H. Lucas purchased two vacant oceanfront lots in a highly
unstable area to build homes in South Carolina. Because of the instability, the South Carolina
Coastal Council issued permits for two rock revetments, which were placed close to Lucas’s
property. At the time, when Lucas purchased these parcels, he was not legally obliged to obtain a
permit from the Coastal Council. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the
Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas from building any permanent habitable structure
on his lots. Lucas instituted an action, asserting that the restrictions constituted a taking of his
property without just compensation since it deprived him of all economically viable use of his
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common law detailing rights enjoyed by littoral property owners (e.g., the right to use,
access, and an unobstructed view of the water, and the right to receive accretions and
relictions to the littoral property) may require modifications, particularly to facilitate
coastal adaptation programmes like beach restoration and nourishment.15 As sea levels
rise, it may become necessary to remove and relocate people and investments from areas
that are hazard-prone to safer zones. In implementing a retreat strategy, the government
may have to acquire coastal lands and proscribe private development on a massive scale,

15

property. The lower court agreed and awarded Lucas just compensation, which was reversed by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina which held that governmental regulation of the use of property to
prevent serious public harm did not amount to a regulatory taking and therefore compensation was
not due. The Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled that when a regulation is designed to prevent
“harmful or noxious uses” of property, no compensation is payable under the takings clause,
regardless of the regulation’s effect on property value. This holding brought the matter before the
Supreme Court of United States, which ruled against this decision to hold that a regulation that
deprives a property owner of all “economically viable uses of his land” forms a regulatory taking
that requires just compensation. The United States Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the
South Carolina Supreme Court, which then directed the S.C. Coastal Council to compensate Lucas
and take title to the lots. The Lucas decision has far-reaching implications for coastal climate change
adaptation responses, raising more questions than providing answers. Ibid; see also Pat A
Cerundolo, “The Limited Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Massachusetts
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence”, Comment, (1998) 25:2 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 431 at 484
(HeinOnline); Dana Beach & Kim Diana Connolly, “A Retrospective on Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: Public Policy Implications for the 21st Century” (2003) 12:1 Se Envtl LJ 1 at 14
(HeinOnline).
The city of Destin and Walton County applied for permits to restore parts of a beach eroded by
hurricanes under the Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act, 1961. The project envisioned
depositing dredged sand. Under the Act, once a beach restoration “is determined to be undertaken,”
the concerned board can determine “an erosion control line” which is fixed to replace the fluctuating
mean high-water line (defined as the average reach of high tide over the preceding 19 years) which
was then treated as the ordinary boundary between private beach-front and state-owned land. Under
common law, accretions are basically additions that occur gradually and imperceptibly and the
littoral owner automatically take title to the dry land added to his/her property. However, once the
erosion-control line is recorded, the common law ceases to increase upland property by accretion.
This was challenged by Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., a non-profit corporation formed by
beachfront property bordering the project area. While the District Court of Appeal concluded that
the permits eliminated two of the petitioner’s littoral rights, namely, the right to receive accretions to
their property and the right to have contact of their property with the water and therefore was an
unconstitutional taking, the Florida Supreme Court faulted the court of appeal. Against this, the
matter was brought before the US Supreme Court, which while entering into a jurisprudential
analysis over the existence of judicial takings rejected a fifth and fourteenth amendment takings
claim on the ground that the Florida law did not guarantee littoral property owners water contact and
that even though the Florida law does guarantee littoral property owners an interest in accreted sand,
it was subordinate to the right of the state to fill in the submerged land and thereafter make use of
the dry land. “The right to accretions was … subordinate to the State’s right to fill.” Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc v Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection (2010) USSC 08-1151, 130 S Ct
2592 (2010) at 26. “[T]here are a plethora of unresolved legal issues that can serve to derail the
reliance on beach restoration as a sea level rise adaptation strategy.” Donna R Christie, “Sea Level
Rise and Gulf Beaches: The Specter of Judicial Takings” (2011) 26:2 J Land Use & Envtl L 313 at
327 (HeinOnline).
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or impose severe restrictions on the bundle of property rights, requiring the payment of
compensation. Since the number of claimants may run into hundreds of thousands in
South Asia, the fiscal consequences of such an exercise can be severe and may even
empty government coffers, fundamentally restricting their ability to implement retreat. As
well, landowners may approach the government for compensation in cases where their
properties are claimed by a rising sea. As the law stands in some of the South Asian
coastal countries, expropriation of private property is a highly contested legal issue and
attempts by national governments to acquire private property have generally been
frowned upon.16
Of late, in acknowledgement of the impending dangers posed by a degraded coastal
environment and rising seas, the wheels of coastal law reform have been set in motion in
several countries. New coastal law regimes are being developed and existing ones
refurbished. This serves to build the capacity to enable implementation of programmes
for sustainable coastal management in a more effective and legalistic manner. 17 Given the
universality of the problem of inexorable sea level rise (SLR) and climate change, coastal
law reform is an issue that will confront most coastal countries, particularly those that
seek to achieve sustainable coastal development and coastal climate change adaptation
through ICZM.
Although it has become fashionable to plead for law reform and enacting
legislations in the event of crises as reactive responses, these are short-term fixes,
especially in the case of coastal South Asia in the environmental law arena. Certainly, it
is necessary to enact coastal laws in order to cope with the new situations, but legislative
time and resources are limited, so existing legal regimes should be examined to determine
whether they can cover the point or not. In certain cases, an existing law with a few
minor modifications may be able to respond to the impending crisis. However, coastal
16

17

For instance, in India alone, it is reported that in the 60 years following India’s independence, 60
million have been displaced due to development projects. Kate Hoshour & Jennifer Kalafut, “A
Growing Global Crisis Development-Induced Displacement & Resettlement”, Issue Paper (San
Francisco: International Accountability Project, 2007) at 1. Relief and rehabilitation has been tardy
and to rectify this situation, for long there has been a proposal to replace the antiquated Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, via the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Bill, 2011. (No 77
of 2011, India). However, this Bill is yet to become a law.
See Part 7.3, below, for national legislative experiences on coastal law making. For coastal law
building exercises in South Asia, see also Ch 2, Part 2.2.
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management under archaic laws even if revamped may continue to be inimical to
sustainable coastal development imperatives and may even lead to irresponsible coastal
use practices.
In building a legal edifice for coastal management and coastal climate change
adaptation for South Asia, this chapter explores attempts at legislating coastal
management at national and sub-national levels in different countries and is divided into
two parts. As prelude to the examination of national efforts, section 7.2 chronicles the
corpus of international environmental law on ICZM briefly charting the development of
this concept at the international level. International environmental law plays an important
role in the development of national legislations by setting common standards, which are
often appropriately reflected, in these national legislations and programmes. The
intention here is to highlight the weaknesses in the evolving international environmental
law on ICZM, which heightens the need to strengthen the fledging international
environmental law on this subject and it also underscores the importance of national
models on ICZM legislation. In a similar vein, the vagueness in the international
environmental regime on ICZM also increases the relevance of regional approaches to
ICZM implementation. Section 7.3 presents synopsis reports describing the salience of
the prescriptive details of the national legal frameworks for coastal environment and
resources management.
While it is useful to know that attempts are currently underway in several countries
to develop a legislative basis for ICZM implementation, a comprehensive analysis of
different countries’ practices is beyond the scope of the present study. Nonetheless,
certain key examples of coastal countries will be used to illustrate the diverse and
innovative ways in which the instrumentality of law can be employed to further ICZM
implementation and CCCA. While some of these coastal countries, exhibit considerably
mature legislative models on ICZM that harmonizes and admirably incorporates CCCA
within its ambit; there are others where the linkages and the use of the legal mode leave
much to be desired. Nevertheless, all these countries have been chosen because they
exhibit different approaches, including diverse ways of using laws and legal systems to
implement ICZM programmes and promote coastal climate change adaptation in a wide
variety of settings. The discussion also analyzes the implications of the relevant
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provisions in these coastal laws for coastal climate change adaptation and how they
facilitate ICZM implementation. Each of these case studies concludes with a brief
commentary on the novelty of the legal framework, the challenges faced in putting these
into practice and the relevance of the experience to coastal South Asia.

7.2 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
MANAGEMENT

AND

INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE

The importance of the coast as an invaluable piece of real estate is now the growing focus
of international environmental law.18 In fact, the need to afford special protection to the
coastal environment received heightened recognition at the path-breaking United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment 1972, known as the Stockholm Conference. 19 To
achieve “a more rational management of resources” and “to improve the environment”,
the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan on the Human Environment calls upon states
to “adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to their development planning … .”20
In the same year, the US Congress passed the pioneering Coastal Zone Management Act,
1972, which is the first major coastal law in the world that calls upon coastal states to
develop and implement coastal zone management plans.21 Since then, ICZM has
developed apace all over the world, and there has been a proliferation of an assortment of
ICZM laws and programmes.
At the international level, seminal recognition of integration in the ocean law
context is traceable to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC).22 Though not articulated in precise terms, there are several provisions in the
LOSC that can be interpreted as providing valuable support to spur the ICZM mandate.
For instance, the preamble to the LOSC proclaims the core principle of integration and
the unity of the oceans (supportive of a related tool, namely, marine spatial planning) in
18
19
20
21
22

The focus in this part is on multilateral international agreements that have a global focus irrespective
of the hard or soft law nature.
Incidentally the United States enacted the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act in the same year.
For more discussion, see Part 7.3.1, below.
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, 11:6 ILM
1416, prin 13.
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub L No 109-58 (codified as amended at 16 USC §14511465 (2005)) [USCZMA].
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, 21 ILM
1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [LOSC].
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the following: “the problems of ocean space are closely inter-related and need to be
considered as a whole.”23 In addition, the scheme regarding demarcation of maritime
zones securing state control and responsibility over ocean areas is relevant in articulating
a state responsibility for the development of ICZM programmes. 24 Again, Part XII spells
out state responsibility for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
which is also significant from an ICZM perspective.
In the meantime, environmental protection as a fundamental objective gave way to
the broader goal of sustainable development that emphasized the integrated nature of
environmental protection and economic development with the 1987 Brundtland Report.
This marked shift in perspective found reflection in determining the ultimate objective of
ICZM programmes as well. The Brundtland report also emphasized the importance of
assisting developing countries “to strengthen their legal and institutional frameworks
needed for integrated management of coastal resources.”25 In the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio, sustainable development
became the cornerstone of the new paradigm. The UNCED also proved to be a watershed
in entrenching and energizing the operation of ICZM principles at the international level.
It introduced the concept of “principled decision-making” to ocean and coastal
governance. One of its principal outcomes, the set of 27 principles popularly known as
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, offers a beacon of light for coastal
nations by articulating environmental notions integral to an ICZM process. 26 Another
UNCED document, is Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, a
40-chapter global plan of action in which “Chapter 17 - Protection of the Oceans, All
Kinds of Seas, Including Enclosed and Development of Their Living Resources” (Chapter
23
24

25
26

Ibid.
“National responsibility for the development of ICZM programs stems from state responsibility and
control over ocean areas at international law.” Matthew Heemskerk, “National Efforts at Integrated
Coastal Zone Management: The Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Experiences”, Notes,
(2001) 10 Dal J Leg Stud 158 (HeinOnline).
World Commission on Environment & Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987) at 266 [World Commission on Environment & Development].
States are called upon to ensure sustainable development of the resource by taking a precautionary
approach to prevent environmental degradation by following an integrated ecosystem approach to
oceans governance by preventing pollution, by undertaking environmental assessments, and by
seeking public inputs and inputs from local and aboriginal populations. United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June
1992, 31:4 ILM 874.
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17) aims to advance the objective of ensuring that “[c]oastal States commit themselves to
integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas and the marine
environment under their national jurisdiction.”27 To respond to the challenges posed by
climate change and SLR, coastal states are also called upon to formulate contingency
plans.28 As well, Chapter 12 of Agenda 21, which deals with the management of fragile
ecosystems, defines the term to include wetlands, small islands and certain coastal areas
and therefore holds relevance to an ICZM process.29
The UNCED also resulted in two Conventions that exerted their influence in
highlighting the ICZM imperative. The first is the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, 1992, which, in articulating “commitments,” calls upon parties to
“develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management.”30
This is perhaps the only hard law instrument that expressly recognises ICZM and its value
as a necessary adaptive tool to meet the challenges posed by climate change and SLR.
Integrated marine and coastal area management approaches (such as Integrated Marine
and Coastal Area Management, Integrated Coastal Management and ICZM) have
recognition as the most efficient tool to implement the terms of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, 1992, (CBD) (yet another UNCED product) in relation to “the
conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity.”31 Despite its
relevance, the CBD text does not specifically address ICZM. Nevertheless, it spurred the
Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biodiversity, which is essentially a programme of
action that seeks to address issues concerning coastal and marine environments. It further
commits state parties to marine and coastal biodiversity conservation and “[e]ncourages
the use of integrated marine and coastal area management as the most suitable framework
27
28
29
30

31

It identifies 14 specific management related activities for the coastal areas. Robinson, ed, supra note
1 at 310-11, ch 17, ¶17.6(a)-(n).
Ibid, ¶17(6)(e).
Ibid at 184, ch 12, ¶12.1
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York 9 May 1992) [UNFCCC] art 4(1)(e); see
also Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean, [2009] OJ L 34/19,
pmbl.
AIDEnvironment, National Institute for Coastal and Marine Management/Rijksinstituut voor Kust
en Zee (RIKZ), Coastal Zone Management Centre, Integrated Marine and Coastal Area
Management (IMCAM) Approaches for Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD
Technical Series No 14 (Montreal: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004) at 3.
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for addressing human impacts on marine and coastal biological diversity” and for
promoting its conservation and sustainable use.32 Furthermore, it also “[e]ncourages
Parties to establish and/or strengthen, where appropriate, institutional, administrative, and
legislative arrangements for the development of integrated management of marine and
coastal areas, and their integration within national development plans.”33
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 also served as a stepping-stone for future environmental
and development policies and influenced several other global conferences that helped to
develop and entrench the concept. For instance, it invited the UNEP Governing Council
to convene an intergovernmental meeting on the protection of the marine environment
from land-based activities.34 Accordingly, the Conference in Washington (1995) led to the
Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from LandBased Activities35 and the Washington Declaration,36 both instruments affirming the
utility of ICZM. In addition, the recently adopted (2012) “Manila Declaration on
Furthering the Implementation of the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of
the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities,” emphasized “the need for
integrated watershed and coastal management in efforts to achieve the effective
sustainable management of land-based activities.”37 The parties also resolved to
“comprehensive, continuing and adaptive action within a framework of integrated coastal
management relevant to respective national and regional priorities.”38

32

33
34
35

36

37

38

COP 2 Decision II/10, Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine and Coastal Biological
Diversity, ¶2, online: Convention on Biological Diversity, Decisions, COP 2 Decisions
<http://www.cbd.int>.
Ibid, ¶3.
Robinson, ed, supra note 1 at 317, ch 17, ¶17.26.
UNEP, Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt a Global Programme of Action for the Protection
of the Marine Environment from Landbased Activities, Global Programme of Action for the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, UNEP(OCA)/LBA/IG.2/7 (5
December 1995).
The Washington Declaration recognized “the importance of integrated coastal area management …
as means of coordinating programmes aimed at preventing marine degradation from land-based
activities with economic and social development programmes.” See Declaration on the Protection
of the Marine Environment from Landbased Activities (Washington), 23 Ocotber-3 November 1995,
6 RECIEL, 883.
UNEPGC, Manila Declaration on Furthering the Implementation of the Global Programme of
Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities: Note by the
Executive Director, UNEP/GCSS.XII/INF/10 (9 February 2012).
Ibid at 3.
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The Global Conference on Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States at Barbados (influenced by Chapter 17) in 1994 resulted in a comprehensive
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States, emphasizing the importance of ICZM in several of its articles. 39 ICZM has been
identified in numerous other international agreements as being key to the agenda for the
sustainable development of coastal areas and resources. The FAO Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries, 1995, in article 10 emphasizes the need to integrate fisheries into
coastal area management through the use of ICZM.40
As well, other instruments expressly recognize the utility of the ICZM
methodology. First in line is the Ramsar Convention, since most coastal zones fall under
the definition of the term “wetland,”41 and coastal wetlands will play major roles in
dealing with the problems posed to coastal areas by SLR.42 The different conferences of
parties to the Ramsar Convention have articulated the relationship between the
convention and ICZM.43 The goal of the Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009-2015 is the “wise
use of all wetlands,” calling upon parties to increase recognition of the significance of
wetlands in coastal protection and in ICZM.44 The “Principles and guidelines for
incorporating wetland issues into Integrated Coastal Zone Management” is definitely the

39

40
41

42

43
44

“Annex II: Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States” in UN, Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island
Developing States, Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing
States, A/CONF.167/9 (6 May 1994).
FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Rome: FAO, 1995) art 10; see also ibid, art 6.9.
Wetlands include areas “… with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including
areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six metres.” Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 2 February 1971, 996
UNTS 245, 11 ILM 963 (entered into force 21 December 1975) [Ramsar Convention], art 1.
Conference of the Contracting Parties, The Changwon Declaration on Human Well-being and
Wetlands, Res X.3, Ramsar, 10th Mtg, (2008) at 4; see generally Conference of the Contracting
Parties, Res VIII.3: Climate Change and Wetlands: Impacts, Adaptation, and Mitigation, Res VIII.3,
Ramsar, 8th Mtg, (2002).
Even though the Ramsar Convention text does not directly refer to ICZM, some of the COP
decisions provide guidance to parties for ICZM implementation.
See Ramsar Convention Secretariat, The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009-2015: Goals, Strategies, and
Expectations for the Ramsar Convention’s Implementation for the Period 2009 to 2015, 4th ed,
Ramsar Handbooks for the Wise Use of Wetlands, vol 21 (Gland: Ramsar Convention Secretariat,
2010) at 14, strategy 1.4.
330

most pertinent acknowledgement of ICZM by the Ramsar regime. 45 Other key
instruments pertinent to ICZM development and implementation are the Convention on
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997,46 the Bonn
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 1979,47 the
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995,48 the Convention for
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972.49 Even the marine
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"Annex: Principles and Guidelines for Incorporating Wetland Issues into Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM)" in Conference of the Contracting Parties, Wetland Issues in Integrated
Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), Res VIII.4, Ramsar, 8th Mtg, (2002) 5.
21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700, arts 20 (calling upon states to individually or jointly protect and preserve
the ecosystems of international watercourses), 23 (calling upon watercourse states to take
individually or jointly measures to protect and preserve the marine environment, including
estuaries). Both these articles can be interpreted to impose obligations upon watercourse states to
protect the coastal ecosystems such as deltas and estuaries.
See generally Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn), 23
June 1979, 19 ILM 15 (entered into force 1 November 1983).
Avoidance of adverse impacts on the marine environment, preservation of biodiversity, maintaining
the integrity of marine ecosystems and minimizing the risks of long-term or irreversible effects of
fishing operations are recurring themes. See UNGA, Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4
August 1995, A/CONF 164/37, 8 September 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (entered into force 11 December
2001).
It seeks to protect natural heritage, defined to consist of “physical and biological formations, which
are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view.” It also includes,
“geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the
habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of
view of science or conservation.” Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, 16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151, 11 ILM 1358 (entered into force 17
December 1975), [World Heritage Convention] art 2. It calls upon parties to the utmost of its own
resources and, where appropriate, with international assistance and co-operation, to identify, protect,
conserve, present and transmit to future generations cultural and natural heritage that belongs to it.
Ibid, art 4. An important feature of the World Heritage Convention is that it sets up an
Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstanding
Universal Value. Ibid, art 8. This body maintains a ‘World Heritage List’ of properties of cultural
and natural heritage. Ibid, arts 3, 11(2). Presently, the List includes 962 properties. World Heritage
List, online: UNESCO <http://whc.unesco.org/>. Several coral reefs, mangroves, and other coastal
wetlands find place in the World Heritage List. Ibid. The practical implications that ensue
inscription of a property in the List is that a variety of technical and financial assistance for its
maintenance and upkeep is made available. World Heritage Convention, ibid, arts 13(1), 22.
Another important feature of this convention is that it provides for the creation of a List of World
Heritage in Danger (Danger List). Ibid, art 11(4). Once a property finds place in the Danger List
then it is given priority in securing international assistance. UNESCO World Heritage Centre,
Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, WHC.12/01,
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environmental protection instruments that emanate from the International Maritime
Organisation can indirectly support objectives central to ICZM implementation.50
There are several other soft law instruments that stress the importance of the
integrated approach. In its Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, the World Summit on
Sustainable Development emphasized the integrated nature of problems posed by ocean
space. It points out:
Oceans, seas, islands and coastal areas form an
integrated and essential component of the Earth’s
ecosystem and are critical for global food security
and for sustaining economic prosperity and the
well-being of many national economies,
particularly in developing countries.51

50
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(Paris: Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
2012) ¶236.
Some of the prominent ones are: International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage 1969; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971; London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, 1972; International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/78 (MARPOL); International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974; International Convention on Salvage, 1989; International Convention on Oil
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990; International Convention on Liability
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious
Substances by Sea, 1996.
The International Maritime Organization plays a role in conserving these ecosystems through
designations like sensitive areas and particularly sensitive sea areas. Under the MARPOL Annexes,
certain sea areas have been designated as special areas. For more details, see Special Areas under
MARPOL, online: IMO, Our Work, Marine Environment, Pollution Prevention, Special Areas
Under MARPOL <http://www.imo.org/Pages/home.a spx>; IMO, Resolution A.982(24) Adopted on
1 December 2005(Agenda item 11) Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, 24th Sess, A 24/Res 982 (6 February 2006). A Particularly
Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) is an area that needs special protection through action by IMO because
of its significance for recognized ecological, socio-economic, or scientific attributes where such
attributes may be vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities. To be identified as a
PSSA, the area should meet at least one of the following criteria, namely, ecological; social,
cultural, and economic; and scientific and educational. As far as ecological criteria is concerned, the
following are the elements: uniqueness or rarity, critical habitat, dependency, representativeness,
diversity, productivity, spawning or breeding grounds, naturalness, integrity, fragility, and biogeographic importance. Ibid, ¶¶4.4.1-4.11. Once an area is designated as PSSA, then specific
measures are employed to regulate maritime activities in that area such as routeing, installation of
vessel traffic services, and strict application of MARPOL discharge and equipment requirements for
ships. Some PPA’s identified include the Great Barrier Reef, Australia (designated as a PSSA in
1990); the Sabana-Camagüey Archipelago in Cuba (1997); Paracas National Reserve, Peru (2003),
and the Galapagos Archipelago, Ecuador (2005). For further details, see Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas, online: IMO <http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/pssas/Pages/
Default.a spx>.
“Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development” in UN, Report of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development at 22, ¶30.
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Accordingly, to ensure the sustainable development of the oceans, the need to implement
“integrated coastal management” and “integrated coastal area management plans” is
imperative.52 The Ministers and heads of delegations who met at the World Ocean
Conference at Manado in 2009 to deliberate the effects of climate change on the ocean
and related threats negotiated the Manado Ocean Declaration, which re-affirmed the
importance of integrated coastal and ocean management in promoting resilience and
fundamental to climate change adaptation.53 The Parties also affirmed the need to
implement integrated coastal and ocean management54 and develop environmentally
sound policies for the same based on reliable scientific assessments and internationally
agreed goals, particularly for the most vulnerable communities that fully depend on
marine resources for their livelihood.”55 Again, at the recently concluded Rio+20 held 20
years after the Rio Earth Summit, the importance of integrated approaches was
reiterated.56
Even though Chapter 17 offered a compelling case on the need for ICZM, it was
silent on its necessary elements, methodology, and range of forms that an ICZM process
should take to address the various socio-economic, environmental and political concerns
that determine a nation’s coastal management strategy. Moreover, it did not explain how
such a process should be implemented, i.e., the formulation, adoption and actual
operation of an ICZM programme.57 Consequently, a number of international bodies
spent their energies to further define, interpret, clarify and refine the ICZM concept.
Prominent are the guidelines on ICZM issued by the Food and Agriculture Organisation,
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Ibid, ¶30(e), (g).
Manado Ocean Declaration, 14 May 2009, online: NOAA Office of General Counsel <http://www.
gc.noaa.gov/>.
Ibid, ¶3.
Ibid, ¶7.
It calls for “holistic and integrated approaches to sustainable development which will guide
humanity to live in harmony with nature and lead to efforts to restore the health and integrity of the
Earth’s ecosystem.” UN RIO+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, The
Future We Want, A/CONF.216/L.1*, 19 June 2012, ¶40.
Biliana Cicin-Sain, Robert W Knecht & Gregory W Fisk, “Growth in Capacity for Integrated
Coastal Management Since UNCED: An International Perspective” (1995) 29:1-3 Ocean & Coast
Mgmt 93 at 102 (ScienceDirect).
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the World Coast Conference, the World Bank, IUCN, OECD, and the UNEP, which sets
standards and principles to guide ICZM development, which countries can then adopt.58

7.2.1 Remarks
Two decades have elapsed since the Rio Earth Summit ushered ICZM to the centre stage
of coastal zone management efforts. Since its official inauguration, ICZM has been
emphasized and recognized in innumerable multilateral instruments that deal with marine
environment protection and conservation. Despite these successive iterations, and the
coastal countries of South Asia being parties to most of these international environmental
law instruments,59 ICZM remains largely rooted in the countries of this region as a set of
diverse pilot and demonstration projects.60 There is tardiness and the national
governments in South Asia have floundered in translating the growing body of
international environmental law that can trigger obligations in respect of implementing
ICZM.
A primary reason for this situation is that, international environmental law relevant
to ICZM is set at two levels. The first are the core legal instruments directly relevant to
ICZM implementation like the UNFCCC, the CBD, the Ramsar Convention, the
Watercourses Convention, while the remaining ones like the LOSC, the Bonn
Convention, the World Heritage Convention and the marine environment protection
58
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See generally John R Clark, Integrated Management of Coastal Zones, FAO Fisheries Technical
Paper, No 327 (Rome: FAO, 1992) at 581; Jan C Post & Carl G Lundin , eds, Guidelines for
Integrated Coastal Zone Management, Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and
Monographs Series No 9 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1996); OECD, Recommendation of
the Council on Integrated Coastal Zone Management , C(92)114/FINAL (23 July 1992). Acclaimed
ICZM practitioners Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert W. Knecht in analysing these five sets of
guidelines have distilled what they term as “consensus guidelines” which provide “a reasonable
characterization of the ICM concept as it is understood today.” Cicin-Sain, Knecht & Fisk, ibid at
103.
The coastal countries of South Asia are parties to most of these international agreements that are
relevant to ICZM implementation. In fact all the South Asian coastal countries are parties to the
LOSC, the Ramsar Convention, the World Heritage Convention, the UNFCCC and the CBD.
Even in other coastal regions, the situation is more or less similar. For instance, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.
In identifying constraints that hamper effective implementation of the ICZM Protocol for the
Mediterranean, the Action Plan points out that ICZM still remains localised and is relatively shortterm and project based. Consequently, there has to be major ‘up scaling’. Priority Actions
Programme, Action Plan for the Implementation of the ICZM Protocol for the Mediterranean 2012–
2019, PAP/NFP/2011/2, Draft (2011) at 9 [Action Plan for ICZM Protocol]; Brian Shipman & Tim
Stojanovic, “Facts, Fictions, and Failures of Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Europe”
(2007) 35 Coastal Mgmt 375 at 376.
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instruments of the IMO have only peripheral value. In the case of the latter, these
instruments prescribe a range of tools that are not necessarily ICZM intended, but these
can play supportive roles in triggering obligations for coastal management.
Again, while there have been frequent evocations to transcend sectoral policies and
move towards a more integrated format for the management of oceans and related land
space, the preponderance of ICZM prescriptions at the international environmental level
remains within the realm of soft-law instruments that are hortatory in nature and entail no
obligation of adherence; therefore, their normative scope is limited, since implementation
is voluntary.61 Regardless of these shortcomings, soft-law instruments and non-binding
statements on ICZM provide several opportunities62 in terms of guidance and to focus the
spotlight on the need to develop national-level ICZM legal frameworks, policies and
programmes.63 Often treated as a precursor to the development of hard-law instruments,
soft-law instruments are now emerging as a preferred tool, due to their innately flexible
nature and easy utility.64 Many of the coastal countries in South Asia are favorably
disposed to adopting such instruments. To translate some of these prescriptions into
action, most of the coastal countries of South Asia and even those beyond have initiated
ICZM pilot programmes and projects, often with financial assistance from international
agencies and foreign governments. However, as chapter three demonstrates, these
countries have yet to develop mechanisms to link and coordinate their pilot programmes
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Nicholas A Robinson, “IUCN as Catalyst for a Law of the Biosphere: Acting Globally and Locally”
(2005) 35 Envtl L 249 at 288 (QL).
For more details, see Cormac Cullinan, Integrated Coastal Management Law: Establishing and
Strengthening National Legal Frameworks for Integrated Coastal Management, FAO Legislative
Study, No 93 (Rome: FAO, 2006) at 39 & 40.
Optimists view soft law as a permissive way to build hard law; a useful intermediate step to hard
law. To skeptics, hard law has greater potential than soft law. Combinations of soft and hard law
options may produce the most effective strategies in promoting international norms relating to the
environment, labour and social governance. John J Kirton & Michael J Trebilcock, “Introduction:
Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global Governance” in John J Kirton & Michael J
Trebilcock, eds, Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and
Social Governance, Global Environmental Governance (England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2004) 3
at 27-28.
Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection, Cambridge Studies in
International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 6 (noting
that states might agree to a non-binding or to imprecise standards has attractions since it does not
impose absolute fetters on state autonomy).
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and scale up these experiences to a national level, thereby hampering the programmes’
efficacy and leading to squandering of resources.65
As well, the non-binding exhortations have not furthered the development of the
ICZM agenda in the way expected, given the widespread degraded state of the coastlines,
nor has the accretion of divergent soft-law rules produced a substantial legal framework.
Moreover, most of the above-referred international instruments were developed at a time
when climate change and SLR were not issues of concern and therefore the stipulations
that they prescribe are incapable of responding to these new challenges.
There is as yet no global convention or international body on ICZM that lays down
binding and specific rules of the practice. In other words, there is an absence of an
exclusive hard-law treaty on ICZM that offers a template to guide its implementation.
The lack of such a specific hard-law instrument poses considerable challenges in
integrating the different resource management sectors and in implementing ecosystembased approaches to coastal management at national levels. This has led to considerable
tension and conflicting claims among resource users. In this regard, one of the primary
suggestions of the Coastal Zone Management Subgroup of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change in its “Suggested Ten-Year Timeline for the Implementation of
Comprehensive Coastal Zone Management Plans”66 was a recommendation calling for
the adoption of a protocol by 1992 to “provide a framework for international and
multinational cooperation in dealing with the full range of concerns related to impacts of
sea level rise and climate change impacts on the coastal zone.”67 However, thus far,
nothing has been achieved in this regard.
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For more details, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change: The IPCC Response Strategies
(Washington DC: Island Press, 1991) at 141.
Ibid at 139. As far as the possible elements of such a protocol are concerned, it has been suggested
that signatories endeavor to develop a comprehensive coastal management programme before the year
2000. While affording priority to vulnerable areas, parties were to provide support to be given to
institutions that conduct research on sea level rise and other impacts of climate change on the coastal
zone; foster international cooperation in efforts to monitor sea level rise and other impacts of climate
change on the coastal zone; contribute to systematic mapping and resource assessment of coastal
zones to identify functions and critical areas at risk; support international initiatives to provide
information and technical assistance to cooperating countries for the preparation of coastal
management programmes; contribute to the exchange of information, expertise and technology
between countries pertaining to sea level rise responses and other impacts of climate change on the
coastal zone; promote public and political awareness of the implications of sea level rise and other
336

Irrespective of the fact that that even without a global hard law instrument on
ICZM, large sums of money have been expended and ICZM enjoys widespread
popularity. Still, a hard law on ICZM can offer new vigour and leverage in terms of its
binding nature, the range of tools it can prescribe, and can provide for incentives like
technical and resource support for ICZM implementation, etc. As well, given the weak
adaptive capacities available with developing countries to manage the problems posed by
climate change (particularly SLR), a hard-law instrument can help in numerous ways to,
for instance: secure funding for ICZM projects; encourage sharing of data and resources;
facilitate technology transfer; and help build capacity by promoting adaptive
management. A hard law treaty can also provide for the monitoring and evaluation of
various ICZM models and programmes, collation of information, and the building upon
the knowledge and experience gained. As well, it can establish reporting systems and lay
down explicit targets, timetables on key issues of implementation, and create new
structures to monitor implementation. Overall, enacting an international treaty on ICZM
can help develop the least common denominator set of rules on ICZM that can help bring
consistency in the practice.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence to prove that hard-law international agreements
are more effective in securing compliance at national levels, given the long drawn-out
process of negotiations that precedes the conclusion of a hard-law treaty and the
oftentimes indeterminate nature of its text, reservations and flexible clauses. 68 An
international treaty is not a self-implementing instrument; it can only fill in the normative
gaps and support the development of national laws and programmes that will facilitate
on-the-ground implementation. Work has to be carried out at the national levels to

68

impacts of climate change on the coastal zone; manage the coastal zone so that environmental values
are preserved whenever possible; avoid taking measures that are detrimental to the coastal zones of
adjoining states; provide emergency relief to coastal nations struck by storm surge disasters; establish
a secretariat supported by a small advisory group to facilitate the implementation of the protocol
agreements. Ibid at 140.
Mar Campins-Eritja & Joyeeta Gupta, “The Role of “Sustainability Labelling” in the International
Law of Sustainable Development” in Nico Schrijver & Friedl Weiss, eds, International Law and
Sustainable Development: Principles and Practices, Developments in International Law, vol 51
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) 251 at 260. For instance, see United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM
849 (adopted at New York 9 May 1992) [UNFCCC], art 15 (rules relating to amendment of the
convention), art 22 (dealing with ratification and accession), art 23 (entry into force) & art 25
(withdrawal from the convention).
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facilitate implementation. Under international law, a basic rule is that a treaty is not
binding on a country unless that country accedes to it and ratifies that instrument.69
Consequently, many hard-law treaties have been unable to muster the requisite support to
convert them into a potent legal force at the national and international levels.70
Furthermore, implementation in several instances has been jeopardized by states
pursuing their own interests and paying only lip service to their international
commitments. In certain international treaties (for instance, the LOSC), there has also
been a lack of an enforcement mechanism to monitor and ensure compliance. It must be
pointed out in the spirit of fairness that in many cases, even though states may be
favorably disposed towards a treaty, they may, for practical and economic considerations
(e.g., countries may resist signing new agreements that call upon states to assume
responsibilities that may apply breaks on their economic growth) be reluctant to assume
new responsibilities and instead shield themselves behind a veil of state sovereignty. 71 In
fact, in many pressing areas (e.g., land-based sources of pollution), we have yet to
witness the development of hard rules at the global level. Consequently, a hard law
international treaty on ICZM seems to be far-fetched for the moment. With these broad
observations on the state of the international environmental law on ICZM and prospects
for its future evolution, the succeeding discussion examines a few national approaches on
legislating ICZM.

7.3 OPERATIONALISING INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AND
ADAPTING TO SEA LEVEL RISE THROUGH DEDICATED COASTAL LAWS: SELECTED
NATIONAL EXPERIENCES
Even though the concept of ICZM is embedded in several international environmental
law instruments, and is supported by considerable sustainable development texts, the
69
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27
January 1980) arts 11, 14 & 15.
For instance, see International Conference on the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of
Ships: Agenda Item 8, Adoption of the Final Act and Any Instruments, Recommendations and
Resolutions Resulting from the Work of the Conference: Hong Kong International Convention for the
Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009, Text Adopted by the Conference,
IMO/SR/CONF/45, 19 May 2009 (opened for signature 1 September 2009).
For instance, see Oliver K Jull, “Canada Withdraws from Kyoto Protocol to Avoid Non-Compliance
Penalties” Bulletin – CBA National International Law Section Newsletter (April 2012).
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majority of these instruments as seen are exhortative in nature and they primarily serve to
highlight the need and importance of ICZM. International environmental law relating to
ICZM has yet to move beyond its open-ended and amorphous nature to lay down the
specific legal rules of the practice. Beyond any international law treaty, each state has the
sovereign right to design and enact its own coastal laws to manage and reconcile
conflicts. Transforming ICZM from rhetorical statements into actual practice and in
effectuating CCCA is the key challenge. Several coastal states have responded to these
problems by implementing ICZM through their coastal laws. And these national laws
relating to coastal management are essentially rooted in national circumstances. It must
be noted that there are a large number of coastal countries with federal/unitary systems of
government that have cast legal cloaks over their coastal management programmes as
well as adaptation to SLR and coastal climate change. The salience of a few of these
legislative experiences are explained below to demonstrate the growing importance of
law in supporting ICZM; and second, to show how coastal laws can be utilised to respond
to SLR and other climate change impacts. More importantly, by fleshing out the
experiences of certain countries in legislating for the coastal zone, the intention is to
synthesize from these national reports certain principles on coastal law making that can
serve as guideposts for the coastal law reform agenda suggested for South Asia in the
next part.
In essence, a federal state is one where a constitution (usually a written one) divides
sovereignty (in terms of powers, jurisdiction, and revenue) between two or more
autonomous sets of governments, namely, at the national and subnational (state and
sometimes even at the municipal or village) levels. Depending on the constitutional
legislative scheme, potentially both the national and subnational levels of government
may be able to exercise jurisdiction over different aspects that deal with the narrow band
of land and water at the coast. This aspect will be evident from the following national
case studies: United States, Australia, Canada and South Africa. On the other hand, in a
unitary state, the entire country is treated as one unit for governance purposes and
generally governance is entrusted to only one monolithic centralised entity. Even in cases
where there could be subnational units in a unitary setup, these could exercise only such
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powers, which the central government chooses to delegate as in the case of New Zealand,
Belize, Barbados, Cuba, Kenya, and United Kingdom.
The discussion here is divided into two sub-sections: the legislative experiences of
coastal countries, namely, United States (considerable experience on ICZM and its
federal nature),72 Australia (federal nature and protection of aboriginal rights),73 South
Africa (a comparatively new coastal law and the integrated nature of the law) 74 and New
Zealand (a unique approach where coastal management is viewed as a sub-set of a larger
sustainable resources management process, and a unitary system),75(three federal states
and a unitary state); will be closely scrutinised. Thereafter, a broad brush will be utilised
to provide a synoptic overview on the ICZM and CCCA legislative experiences of
Canada, Cuba, Kenya, Belize, Barbados, Israel, and United Kingdom (one federal and
rest unitary states). All these high-, medium-, and low-income countries represent unique
coastal features and circumstances, and exhibit diverse and innovative approaches in the
use of legal mechanisms to facilitate ICZM and CCCA implementation.
It must be noted that coastal law reform in a country, as in other areas where laws
have not developed sufficiently, may rely on the comparative law methodology, where
coastal states would do well to learn from the experiences of other states.76 Generally, the
emphasis is on borrowing lessons learned from more mature jurisdictions that have close
legal affinity in terms of legal systems and legal culture with the country concerned, for
example, India borrowing from the experience of the United Kingdom through the
umbilical cord of the common law lineage. However, in the environmental law arena, the
notion that legal transplants have to take place within a group of countries that share a
common legal system is fast becoming redundant. This is due to the profound influence
and transcendental nature of sustainable development and its principles. Accordingly,
jurisdictional, cultural and other differences in legal systems are fast losing relevance and
the emphasis is fast shifting to understanding how different countries operationalise the
72
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USCZMA, supra note 21.
See generally Rachel Baird & Donald R Rothwell, eds, Australian Coastal and Marine Law
(Sydney: The Federation Press, 2011).
National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act, (S Afr), No 24 of 2008
[SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act].
See generally Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ), 1991/69 [NZRMA].
Robinson, ed, supra note 1 at 286-92 (highlighting the importance of comparative methodology in
ICZM).
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amorphous concept of sustainable development. This implies that a common law country
like India may have lessons to learn from a civil law country and vice versa.77
7.3.1 Coastal Zone Management and Coastal Climate Change Adaptation in the
United States

Coastal zones and resources are critically important to the United States, as they support
a large percentage of the American population and economy. The NOAA points out that,
in 2010, over 123 million people, or 39 per cent of the US population, lived in coastal
shoreline communities.78 The coasts also provide a number of other valuable services,
like storm protection, the annual worth of these services being around USD23 billion.79
In addition, it is reported that in 2011 alone, the coastal counties accounted for nearly half
of this country's gross domestic product, generating 51 million jobs.80
Nevertheless, and despite the presence of strong laws, management systems and
progressive institutions, US coastlines are showing clear signs of increasing degradation
and nearly 166 dead zones have been identified.81 While the annual net benefit to the U.S.
economy from goods and services provided by coral reefs is USD1 billion, 75 per cent of
the coral resources in the Atlantic, Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico are in poor or fair

77

78

79

80

81

To carry out a review of the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991, the central government in
India constituted a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. M.S. Swaminathan. In developing the
reform agenda and the concept of ICZM, this committee referred to the best practices in United
States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, The Netherlands, Australia, Spain, Brazil,
Thailand, Malaysia, China, and Sri Lanka and to those developed by international agencies like the
OECD, World Bank, etc. India, Report of the Committee to Review the Coastal Regulation Zone
Notification 1991 (Chairman: MS Swaminathan, New Delhi: Ministry of Environment & Forests,
2005) at 19-29.
US, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration& U.S. Census Bureau, National Coastal
Population Report: Population Trends from 1970 to 2020, NOAA State of the Coast Report Series
(np: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2013) at 4.
US, NOAA Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, Adapting to Climate Change: A
Planning Guide for State Coastal Managers (Silver Spring, MD: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, 2010) at 6.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Economy: The Coast – Our Nation's Economic
Engine, online: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Coastal Economy <http://sta
teofthecoast.noaa.gov/>.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ecosystems: Nutrient Pollution and Hypoxia Everything is Upstream of the Coast, online: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
Ecosystems <http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/>.
341

health.82 Invasive species continue to spread,83 wetlands are under threat from coastal
development,84 and oil spills wreak havoc on the coastal and marine environments.85
These management challenges are now compounded by climate change and rising sea
levels.86
As mentioned in chapter five, coastal climate change adaptation responses can be
classified into the three broad categories of retreat, accommodate and protect. In
implementing these measures, a raft of legislations, executive orders and coastal
management programmes that emanate at the local, state, and federal levels of
government are relevant.87 For instance, the Army Corps of Engineers play important
roles in carrying out coastal adaptation. Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act,
1899 are relevant in facilitating hard armouring.88 In addition, the Clean Water Act, 1972
the National Flood Insurance Act, 1968, and the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 1982 are
also pertinent to coastal climate change adaptation.89 More importantly, an assortment of
tools such as land-use planning, property takings, rolling easements and public trust
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ecosystems: Coral Reef Ecosystems - Critical
Coastal Habitat, online: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ecosystems, Cora Reef
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In The Great Lakes, nearly 185 non-native aquatic species have been established. From 2000-2010,
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ecosystems: Invasive Species Disrupt Coastal
Ecosystems and Economies, online: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ecosystems
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ecosystems: Wetlands – Critical Coastal
Habitat, online: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ecosystems, Wetlands
<http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/>.
For the chronology of the accident, see BP (Firm), Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation
Report (Houston: BP, 2010) at 21-29.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Climate: Vulnerability of Our Nation's Coasts
to Sea Level Rise, online: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Climate, Coastal
Vulnerability <http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/>; see also James E Neumann et al, Sea-level Rise &
Global Climate Change: A Review of Impacts to U.S. Coasts (np: Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, 2000).
For instance, see South Carolina Beachfront Management Act, 1988, SCC tit 48-39 §§250-360;
Shoreline Management Act, 1971, Wash RC §90.58 (1971).
See also David Lawrence Hankey, “Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The
Erosion of Administrative Control by Environmental Suits” [1980] Duke LJ (HeinOnline) 170; see
also Robert RM Verchick & Joel D Scheraga, “Protecting The Coast” in Michael B Gerrard &
Katrina Fischer Kuh eds, The Law of Adaptation to Climate Change: U.S. and International Aspects
(Illinois: American Bar Association, 2012) 235 at 242.
For more details, see generally Kristen M Fletcher, “Managing Coastal Development” in Donald C
Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton, eds, Ocean and Coastal Law and Policy, 1st ed (Chicago:
American Bar Association, 2008) 147 [Fletcher, “Managing”].
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doctrines have been refashioned to regulate coastal development and facilitate coastal
climate change adaptation.90
The cornerstone in this assortment of laws, executive orders, tools and strategies
that promote coastal climate change adaptation is the coastal law regime, which has at its
apex the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 1972 (CZMA). This law provides a
legal foundation for the development of coastal management and for coastal climate
change adaptation. Before delving into its nuances, it must be pointed out that conflicts
have emanated between the federal and state governments in US regarding jurisdiction
over offshore waters since her infancy.91 The discovery of offshore mineral resources
accentuated the acrimony, leading to several rounds of litigation and legislative battles
that finally culminated in the Submerged Lands Act, 1953.92 This law granted the states
jurisdiction over activities up to three nautical miles offshore,93 which was an extremely
important legal development from the perspective of ICZM implementation. States that
had jurisdiction over the dry segment of the coastal zone were no longer handicapped in
exercising jurisdiction over the wet side of the coastal zone, and could thereby facilitate
and implement spatial integration.
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For instance, in the Avenal decision, the public trust doctrine was relied upon for support. It was
held that
[w]e find … the implementation of the Caernarvon coastal
diversion project fits precisely within the public trust doctrine.
The public resource at issue is our very coastline, the loss of
which is occurring at an alarming rate. The risks involved are not
just environmental, but involve the health, safety, and welfare of
our people, as coastal erosion removes an important barrier
between large populations and ever- threatening hurricanes and
storms. Left unchecked, it will result in the loss of the very land
on which louisianians reside and work, not to mention the loss of
businesses that rely on the coastal region as a transportation
infrastructure vital to the region’s industry and commerce. The
state simply cannot allow coastal erosion to continue; the
redistribution of existing productive oyster beds to other areas
must be tolerated under the public trust doctrine in furtherance of
this goal.
Avenal, supra note 10 at 23; see also Verchick & Scheraga, supra note 88 at 254-55.
Fletcher, “Managing”, supra note 89 at 150.
Submerged Lands Act, 1953, 43 USC §§1301-15 (1952).
Ibid, §1312 (the seaward boundary of the coastal state is a line three geographical miles distant from
its coast line). However, the seaward boundaries of Florida (in the Gulf of Mexico coast), Texas and
Puerto Rico extend to nine nautical miles from the coastline. NOAA, Maritime Zones and
Boundaries, online: NOAA <http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_maritime.html>
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The first part of this section on the US legislative position is devoted to analyzing
the salience of the prescriptive rules of the CZMA, examining how this law provides a
basis for coastal zone management programmes and gauging how far this legislation
supports coastal climate change adaptation. The second part examines the coastal
management programmes of California and Texas, and the third part sums up some of the
important lessons the US experience offers which can facilitate the development of the
omnibus coastal law in the next chapter.

7.3.1.1 Coastal Zone Management Act, 1972: A Classical Example of Cooperative Coastal Federalism
The 1969 Stratton Commission report, Our Nation and the Sea, emphasized the need to
protect the coastal zones – the “[n]ation’s most valuable geographic feature”94 – thereby
setting the stage for subsequent coastal zone management efforts. Three years later
(October 12, 1972), the US Congress passed the CZMA, which was signed into law by
President Nixon (October 27, 1972). The primary purpose of this legislation was to
ensure proper “coordination and cooperation”95 between the federal government and
coastal states by encouraging them to prepare and implement coastal zone management
programmes (CZMP). In line with the principles of US federalism, coastal zone
management in the United States operates at the federal and state levels, with states
forming the principal implementing agency.96 In fact, the CZMP envisages “a unique
federal/state partnership” that provides a strong foundation for preserving, protecting,
developing and, whenever possible, restoring the coastal environment.97 Even though
participation in the programme is voluntary, there are “important cultural, economic,
political, and environmental differences among the participating states and territories”,
and consequently “variety in the scope, focus, structure, and authorities states use to
94
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US, Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, Our Nation and the Sea: A Plan
for National Action: Report (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969) at 49.
USCZMA, supra note 21, §1452 (entitled, “Congressional declaration of policy (Section 303)”).
The major reason as to why the states were chosen as the principal implementing body was because
historically and constitutionally in the US it was the states that had primary jurisdiction over land.
“Review of U.S. Ocean and Coastal Law: The Evolution of Ocean Governance Over Three Decades,
Appendix 6 to the Final Report” in U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the
21st Century: Final Report (Washington, DC, 2004) at 20 [“Review of U.S. Ocean and Coastal
Law”].
US Dep’t of Commerce, Coastal Zone Management Program Strategic Plan: Improving
Management of the Nation’s Coastal Areas FY 2007–2012, at 1 online: US Dep't of Commerce,
Ocean & Coastal Resource Management <http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/>.
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achieve the national goals of the CZMA.”98 The CZMA outlines nine areas of national
concern that must be addressed in the programmes, including SLR impacts.99 In fact, the
CZMA specifically recognizes that “global warming may result in a substantial sea level
rise with serious adverse effects in the coastal zone,” and that “coastal states must
[therefore] anticipate and plan for such an occurrence.”100 Accordingly, an important
aspect which the coastal management programme must provide for is “the management
of coastal development to minimize the loss of life and property caused by improper
development in flood-prone, storm surge, geological hazard, and erosion-prone areas and
in areas likely to be affected by or vulnerable to sea level rise, land subsidence, and
saltwater intrusion.”101
The Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) in the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a branch of the US Department of Commerce, has
to review and approve these state-sponsored programmes.102 In doing so, the attempt is
not to undermine state authority but rather to fortify it by encouraging and assisting states
to assume greater planning and regulatory powers and roles in respect of coastal zones
and resources that fall within their jurisdiction. Section 1454 authorizes the Secretary of
Commerce to provide grants to states to assist them in developing their management
programmes. These grants are available as long as the state incorporates the various
enumerated requirements that are found in the statute. In addition, there are other funds,
like the Coastal Zone Management Fund and the Coastal Zone Enhancement Grants,
which states can access for enumerated coastal zone-related matters.103 It is reported that
nearly 34 states have approved coastal management programmes that address a wide
range of issues, including coastal hazards and climate change.104
Once the NOAA certifies a state programme, the second level is set it in motion.
The CZMA requires that activities carried out or approved by the federal government
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Ibid.
USCZMA, supra note 21, §1456b(2).
Ibid, §1451(l).
Ibid, §1452(2)(B).
Ibid, §§1454-55.
Ibid, §§1456a, 1456b.
US, Dep’t of Commerce, Coastal Programs: Partnering with States to Manage Our Coastline
online: Dep’t of Commerce, Our Programs, Coastal Management Program <http://coastalmanage
ment.noaa.gov/>.
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have to be consistent with the state’s approved programme. The federal consistency
provisions based on an “effects test” broadly apply to two categories of federal activities.
First, it requires that actions by the federal agencies be consistent “to the maximum
extent practicable” with “enforceable policies” of the state’s CMP and second, it requires
that activities by third parties who receive federal permits or licenses for activities that
affect a state’s coastal zone obtain state certification that their activities are consistent
with a state’s coastal management programme.105 The federal consistency provisions are
often hailed as the “cornerstone of the CZMA program and a primary incentive for states’
participation,” as it provides “states with an important tool to manage coastal uses and
resources and to facilitate cooperation and coordination with Federal agencies.”106 Apart
from the coastal zone management programme, the CZMA also provides for the National
Estuarine Research Reserve System.107

7.3.1.1.1 Comments
A product of the “environmental decade” (the period between the late 1960s to the mid
1970s) in the United States, the Coastal Zone Management Act, 1972 (CZMA) was one
of the major legislations, the key in a package of environmental laws designed to
introduce a national focus into natural resources management. In several respects, the
CZMA was unique, as it sought to streamline implementation by coastal states through a
voluntary programme rather than establishing mandatory compliance standards.
Moreover, unlike other federal environmental laws that espoused a top-down approach to
coastal management, the focus of the CZMA is primarily on a bottom-up and voluntary
approach.108 In the subsequent discussion, some of the features of the Californian and
Texas model on coastal management that draws sustenance from the CZMA are set forth.

7.3.1.2 California
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USCZMA, supra note 21, §1456; see also Joseph Romero, “Uncharted Waters: The Expansion of
State Regulatory Authority Over Federal Activities and Migratory Resources under the Coastal
Zone Management Act” (2008) 56 Naval L Rev 137 at 144 (HeinOnline); “Review of U.S. Ocean
and Coastal Law”, supra note 96 at 21-25.
US, Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, Federal Consistency Overview (Maryland:
United States Department of Commerce, 2009) at 3-4.
USCZMA, supra note 21, §1461.
Byrne & Grannis, supra note 9 at 290.
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California boasts one of United States’s longest coastlines, on which nearly 85 per cent of
the state’s population live and work.109 The annual value of the ocean-dependent
economy is estimated to be about USD46 billion.110 However, studies predict that, by the
end of this century,111 the sea level will rise by about 20-55 inches,112 resulting in
considerable flooding, inundation and destruction of infrastructure.113 Apart from this
phenomenon, rising ocean water temperatures are putting aquatic species in great stress,
leading to their migration114 and the possible eventual collapse of the fishing industry.115
In response to these present and looming crisis scenarios, California has legislated
separate legal frameworks and attendant institutional mechanisms to plan for and manage
its ocean coastline. The California Coastal Program, which was approved by NOAA in
1978, has three segments: the California Coastal Commission manages development
along the California coast; in the San Francisco Bay, the responsibility is placed on the
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission; and a third agency, the
California Coastal Conservancy, purchases, protects, restores and enhances coastal
resources and provides access to the shore. Legislative support for the programme flows
from the California Coastal Act, 1976 [California Coastal Act], the McAteer-Petris Act,
1965 and the Suisan Marsh Preservation Act, 1977.116 In this sub-section, analysis is
devoted to an examination of the California Coastal Act.
Under this Act, the term ‘coastal zone’ includes land and water segments where
the seaward area extends to the outer limit of the state’s jurisdiction. On the landward
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US, California Natural Resources Agency, 2009 California Climate Adaptation Strategy: A Report
to the Governor of the State of California in Response to Executive Order S-13-2008 (California
Natural Resources Agency, [nd]) at 65. Between 1980 and 2003, California’s coastal population
increased by 1,179 persons every day to touch a total of 9.9 million people. Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 3.
The levee system protects large parts of the low-lying areas in the City of Santa Cruz against a 100year flood. If the sea levels were to rise by one foot, the anticipated 100-year flood event in Santa
Cruz would occur every 10 years, placing the system under considerable stress. Ibid at 68.
The Humboldt squid, which used to be an occasional visitor is now a permanent resident in central
California’s coastal waters. Ibid at 66.
Squid landings decreased from 110,000 metric tons in 1996-1997 to just 1,000 metric tons during
the course of the El Niño season. Ibid.
US, Dep’t of Commerce, Ocean and Coastal Management in California: California’s Coastal
Program online: Dep’t of Commerce, My State, California <http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/>.
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side, it is generally 1,000 yards inland from the mean high tide line.117 A dexterous piece
of coastal legislation, the Act details several normative prescriptions that capture the
essence of sustainable coastal development. Accordingly, the law seeks to secure
maximum public access and provide for recreational opportunities.118 There are also
detailed provisions on protecting the marine environment, the idea being that “[u]ses of
the marine environment shall be carried out in a manner that will sustain the biological
productivity of coastal waters.”119 The California Coastal Act incorporates provisions to
deal with the problems posed by climate change and SLR. In particular, the mandate of
section 30253 is that
[n]ew development shall...[a]ssure stability and
structural integrity, and neither create nor
contribute significantly to erosion, geologic
instability, or destruction of the site or surrounding
area or in any way require the construction of
protective devices that would substantially alter
natural landforms along bluffs and cliffs.120
From the legislative language, it is clear that new developments must not proceed in a
manner that can interfere with coastal processes or create or magnify coastal hazards. The
inference here is that new development must be sufficiently set back from the shoreline
such that hard armouring may not be required in the future. However, coastal landowners
continue to build in the close vicinity of the shoreline, subverting the legislative intent
behind the provision.121 In this context, section 30235 is relevant, as it provides for the
construction of hard armouring structures (like revetments, breakwaters, groins, harbor
channels, seawalls, cliff retaining walls) to protect existing structures and public beaches
from erosion, to eliminate or mitigate the adverse impacts on local shoreline sand supply,
and to serve coastal-dependent uses, even if it alters the natural shoreline processes.
Another important feature of the California model is the integral nature of land-use

117
118
119
120
121

California Coastal Act of 1976, 20 PRC §30103 [Cal CA, 2013].
Cal Const art X, §4; ibid, §§30210-14, 30220-24.
Cal CA, 2013, ibid, §30230.
Ibid, §30253(b); see also ibid, §30233.
Todd T Cardiff, “Conflict in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls” (2001) 38 Cal WL Rev
225 at 226-27 (HeinOnline).
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planning in this process. Land-use planning, as mentioned in earlier chapters, is an
extremely important tool to respond to the problems posed by SLR.
The California Coastal Commission is the primary regulatory body envisaged under
the law entrusted with the power to implement the Act in all areas except those that are
reserved to the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission.122 It
exercises oversight functions over federal activities that affect the coastal zone. Chapter 5
of the Coastal Act explains how the Coastal Commission’s jurisdiction relates to and
integrates with its sister state agencies.123 The highlight of the Coastal Act is that it
provides a decentralized format and envisages that the functions in relation to the coast
are divided between a state and local government partnership (15 counties and 60 cities)
for coastal management. Accordingly, the commission is also tasked with the duty to
make decisions regarding coastal development permit decisions and review the local
coastal programmes (LCPs) prepared by local governments.124
As a first step, the Act charges localities with the responsibility to submit “local
coastal programs” (LCP), including a detailed land use plan (LUP), to the Commission
describing how they will comply with the overall stipulations.125 The Commission
reviews each of the LCPs and the LUPs for consistency with the Act, and a public hearing
is held. Subsequently, the documents are either accepted or rejected (zoning ordinances,
zoning district maps, and any other required implementing actions). Should the LCP be
accepted, it is then treated as certified126 and the Coastal Commission functions as an
appellate authority for the coastal zone management decisions made by these local
bodies. Notwithstanding LCP certification status, the Commission retains original
jurisdiction over activities that take place in areas like tidelands, submerged lands, and
public trust lands, as the jurisdiction of local bodies ends at the mean high tide line. The
certified LCPs and zoning provisions apply primarily to the terrestrial segment of the
coastal zone.127
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Cal CA, 2013, supra note 117, §30330.
Ibid, §§30410-20.
For more details, see Margaret Elizabeth Peloso, Adapting to Rising Sea Levels (PhD Dissertation,
Department of Environment, Duke University, 2010) [unpublished] at 140-42.
Cal CA, 2013, supra note 117, §§30500, 30510 & 30512.
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In sum, rather than pass special regulations to address sea level rise, California, like
most other states in the US, have modified or adapted current regulatory mechanisms to
deal with this problem.128 This, however, is the primary weakness of the approach.
Margaret Peloso points out that in the absence of an overarching policy to deal with SLR
and coastal armoring in California, the Commissioners are forced to inevitably,
piggyback these larger issues on to individual permit
applications. Such an approach leads to frustration
because the Commission continues to have the same
debate each time an armoring permit comes up
because there is currently no other forum in which to
have this discussion. The repeated analysis of largescale sea level rise issues in individual permits wastes
the time and resources of both the Commission and its
Staff, and it has not proven effective in slowing the
pace of armoring along the coast.129
The murky and oftentimes conflicting division of management responsibilities between
the state coastal commission and local governments has led to tensions. Local coastal
governments are strongly predisposed to permit extensive local development for more
revenue and political support.130 As well, local coastal governments resent the coastal
commission’s original jurisdiction over seawalls, as they feel that it can lead to the
bypassing of the local permitting process.131 Moreover, left to their own devices, local
governments are constrained from implementing planned retreat at the local level, since
the practical dimensions of this process are too large, complex, and expensive.132
Concerted action to respond to SLR is fast emerging. One major step in this regard
is the Governor’s Executive Order, which directs state agencies to consider a range of
SLR scenarios for the years 2050 and 2100 “to assess project vulnerability, reduce
expected risks, and increase resiliency to sea‐level rise.”133 Guidance documents have
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Comprehensive Ecosystem-Based Marine Zoning” (2008) 27 Stan Envtl LJ 209 at 231
(HeinOnline).
See generally US, California Coastal Commission, Overview of Sea Level Rise and Some
Implications for Coastal California (2011).
Peloso, supra note 124 at 156.
Ibid at 158.
Ibid.
Ibid at 159.
US, Office of the Governor of the State of California, Executive Order S-13-08 (14 November 2008)
¶5.
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been developed to inform and assist coastal communities and state agencies in crafting
responses to SLR.134 More recently, the Resolution of the California Ocean Protection
Council on Sea‐Level Rise, 2011 calls upon state agencies and non‐state entities
implementing projects or programmes based on state funds or on state property to follow
the science‐based recommendations developed by the Coastal and Ocean Resources
Working Group for the Climate Action Team.135

7.3.1.3 Texas
With 367 miles of Gulf beaches and more than 3,300 miles of bays and estuaries, Texas
has one of the longest coastlines in the United Sates.136 Nearly 25 per cent of Texans (5.7
million people) live in the 18 coastal counties137 and more than one-third of the state’s
population and a major chunk of its economic activity (including the petrochemical
industry and refining capacity) are situated in the coastal zone.138 Texas also suffers a high
rate of coastal erosion, with 64 per cent of its coastline eroding at an average rate of about
six feet per year.139 The primary reason for this erosion is the reduced flow of sediments
due to damming of rivers and the construction of structures such as seawalls and
groins.140 A series of legislations are directly applicable to coastal management, a few of
which are discussed below.
The Texas legislature responded to the federal CZMA 1972 with the Coastal Public
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See generally US, California Emergency Management Agency & California Natural Resources
Agency, California Adaptation Planning Guide: Planning for Adaptive Communities (np: 2012); see
also US, State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance Document (March 2013), online: State of
California: Ocean Protection Council <http://www.opc.ca.gov/>.
See generally California Ocean Protection Council, Resolution of the California Ocean Protection
Council on Sea‐ Level Rise (11 March 2011), online: California State Lands Commission <http://w
ww.slc.ca.gov/>.
US, Coastal Erosion Planning & Response Act (CEPRA): Report to the 80th Texas Legislature
(Austin: Texas General Land Office, 2007) at I [CEPRA Report 2007].
Ibid at I-1.
The coastal zone supports 40 per cent of the national petrochemical industry, 25 per cent of the
national petroleum-refining capacity, two liquefied natural gas facilities and three of the 10 busiest
seaports in the United States. US, A Report to the 82nd Legislature: Coastal Erosion Planning &
Response Act (Austin: Texas General Land Office, 2011) at 1.
For more details, see generally Texas General Land Office, Coastal Erosion, online: Texas General
Land Office, What We Do, Caring for the Coast, Coastal Erosion <http://www.glo.texas.gov/>
[TGLO, Coastal Erosion].
CEPRA Report 2007, supra note 136 at I-4.
351

Lands Management Act, 1973 (TCPLMA)141 The TCPLMA calls upon the Commissioner
of the General Land Office142 to “develop a continuing comprehensive coastal
management program”143 and to act as the lead agency to “coordinate and implement”
these programmes in cooperation with other state agencies that have duties over coastal
matters.144 The TCPLMA also specifies the elements of the coastal management
programme, which includes an assessment of the effects of shoreline erosion, evaluating
ways to control erosion, and restoring areas detrimentally affected by shoreline
erosion.145 The importance of public hearings in developing coastal management
programmes and the need to review and amend them in light of new information or
changed circumstances (adaptive management) is stressed.146
Another important coastal law is the Texas Coastal Coordination Act, 1991
(TCCA),147 which calls upon the commissioner to adopt goals and policies of the coastal
management programme148 and establishes a coastal coordination advisory committee.149
In unison with its implementation regulations, the TCCA creates a foundational frame for
coastal zone management.150 Accordingly, the Texas Coastal Management Program
(TCMP) has been developed, whose purpose is to:
improve the management of the state’s coastal
resources and to ensure the long-term ecological and
economic productivity of the coast, all within the
framework of the federal Coastal Zone Management
Program. The TCMP is a ‘networked’ program
linking the regulations, programs, and expertise of
state, federal, and local entities that manage various
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NRC §§33.003-33.176 (1973) [TCPLMA].
Ibid, §33.004 (2). A major portion of coastal property in Texas is privately owned and as steward of
the coastal zone, it is the Texas General Land Office that administers the coastal management
regime. In doing so, it deals with diverse subjects like oil spills, environmental protection, permit
assistance, coastal erosion, open beaches, coastal construction, hurricanes, education and outreach,
and grants and funding. Texas General Land Office, Caring for the Coast, online: Texas General
Land Office, What We Do, Caring for the Coast <http://www.glo.texas.gov/>.
33 TCPLMA, ibid, §33.052(a).
Ibid, §33.052(b).
Ibid, §33.053.
Ibid, §§33.055 & 33.054.
33 NRC §201 (1973).
Ibid, §33.204 (a).
Ibid, §33.2041.
See 31 TAC §§501, 503-506.
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aspects of coastal resource use.151
The TCMP identifies the main areas for enhancing management152 as developing beach
and dune systems and coastal hazard areas along the Gulf shoreline, and identifies two
“encouragement policies” to address SLR: getting local governments to incorporate sealevel rise into new development, and “sediment bypassing.”153 The NOAA approved the
Texas Coastal Management Program in 1996, and its management falls with the GLO
Coastal Division.154
In addition to the acts outlined above, other statutes like the Dune Protection Act,
1973, the Open Beaches Act, 1959, and the Coastal Erosion Planning and Response Act,
1999,155 are also relevant here. Historically, a system of vegetated and unvegetated sand
dunes provided a protective barrier against the action of sand, wind, and water.156
However, the modification of the dunes destroyed their effectiveness and posed “a real
danger to natural resources and to the health, safety and welfare of persons living,
visiting, or sojourning in the area.”157 Given this situation, the Dune Protection Act
(Dunes Act) was enacted to protect them158 by providing for a dune protection line159 and
prohibiting damaging, destroying, or removing160 “a sand dune or portion of a sand
dune…within a critical dune area.”161 In cases where it is necessary to carry out these
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US, Office of Ocean & Coastal Resource Management, Dep't of Commerce & State of Texas,
Combined Coastal Management Program and Final Environmental Impact Statement for the State
of Texas (Office of Ocean & Coastal Resource Management, State of Texas, 1996) at part II I-2.
These areas are “(1) government accountability, responsiveness, and coordination; (2) dredging in
bays and estuaries; (3) development on beach and dune systems and coastal hazard areas along Gulf
shorelines; and (4) development in coastal wetlands and other aquatic sites.” Ibid at part I-10.
This is to be envisaged in the construction and retrofitting of dams on rivers that flow into the
coastal zone, and in structures like jetties, groins, etc. which can disrupt sediment transport to the
coast. Ibid at part II 6-20.
Ibid at part II 3-6.
This law seeks to provide funding to coastal communities for projects that arrest or slow down the
deleterious effects of coastal and shoreline erosion. Generally, beach nourishment, shoreline
stabilization, habitat restoration and protection, and dune restoration are some of the areas that are
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63 NRC §63.001(2) (1973).
Ibid, §63.001(5).
Ibid, §63.001(6).
Ibid, §63.012.
Ibid, §63.014.
Ibid, §63.091.
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prohibited acts, a permit had to be obtained.162
As far as responding to SLR is concerned, a unique feature of the Texas approach is
the concept of “rolling easements.”163 The Texas beaches have a long history of

supporting public use.164 In 1958, the Texas Supreme Court in JW Luttes v The State of
Texas165 found that the state owned only the wet sand portion of the beach and that
private landowners had ownership rights over the dry sand portion above the mean high
tide line. In other words, Luttes established the common law landward boundary of stateowned beaches at the mean high tide line. There was public opposition against the
holding and the Legislature feared that Luttes might encourage “overanxious developers
to fence the seashore”, since a few private landowners had already “erected barricades
upon many beaches, some of these barricades extending into the water.”166
It was to assuage such fears that, in 1959, the Texas Legislature enacted the Open
Beaches Act, 1959 (TOBA).167 The TOBA, which applies to the beaches that border the
Gulf of Mexico, codifies the common law on the subject and affords indirect recognition
to the concept of rolling easement. In outlining the public policy that guides its operation,
TOBA provided that the public (individually and collectively) has the “free and
unrestricted right of ingress and egress” over state-owned beaches. The public can
exercise this right over a larger area (includes private property) from the mean low tide
line to the line of vegetation, if it has acquired this right by way of customary usage or by
easement through prescription and dedication.168 The vegetation line is the “the extreme
seaward boundary of natural vegetation which spreads continuously inland.”169 Beaches
were also classified into “wet” and “dry”, where a “wet beach” is the area from mean low
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390 (HeinOnline).
Ibid at 369.
324 SW 2d 167 (Tex Sup Ct 1958).
US, Joint Beach Development Committee, The Beaches and Islands of Texas: A Report to the 57th
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61 NRC §61 (1959) [TOBA].
Ibid, §61.011(a). Due to the liberal interpretation of TOBA, the public has acquired easements by
prescription or dedication along large segments of the state’s gulf-facing beaches. McLaughlin,
supra note 163 at 371.
Ibid, §61.001(5).
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tide to mean high tide and is under the tidal waters for some time during the day. 170 The
area from mean high tide to the vegetation line is the “dry beach.” 171 Since wet beaches
are all owned by the state of Texas and held by the state in public trust, there was no
dispute regarding the public’s right of use.172 Although dry beaches can be privately
owned, they can still be treated as part of the “public beach” if a right to public use is
established.173
In short, it is clear that “[p]ublic beaches include Gulf-front wet beaches, stateowned dry beaches and private property in the dry beaches on which a public easement
has been established.”174 The Act protects public access by prohibiting construction of
any obstruction, barrier, or restraint that interferes with public’s right to access the
beach.175 Further, the Act codified a policy of a rolling beach easement: any structure that
encroaches upon the public beach as the result of a natural event is subject to removal.176
Depending on ebb and flow of the tides and other movements, the mean low tide,
mean high tide, and vegetation line can oscillate. The recent decision by the Texas
Supreme Court in Carol Severance v. Jerry Patterson, Commissioner of The Texas
General Land Office177 has practically capped the evolution of the concept of rolling
easements in the state. As will be seen, the decision has wide ramifications to coastal
climate change adaption efforts as well. Carol Severance purchased the property at issue,
which was subsequently devastated by heavy winds following Hurricane Rita. At the
time of the purchase, Severance received a TOBA-mandated disclosure explaining that
due to natural factors such as shoreline erosion the property could in due course be
located on a public beach and if that happened, the state could sue to forcibly remove the
structure. No easement was ever established on the disputed property, Kennedy Drive,
even though a public easement for the use of a privately owned parcel seaward of the
Kennedy Drive preexisted the purchase. The hurricane winds pushed the vegetation line
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Severance v Patterson, 370 SW 3d 705 (Tex Sup Ct 2012) [Severance (2012)].
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TOBA, supra note 167, §61.001(8).
Ibid; see also Severance (2012), supra note 170.
TOBA, ibid, §61.013(a).
Ibid, §61.0183; see also McLaughlin, supra note 163 at 374.
Severance v Patterson, 345 SW 3d 18 (Tex Sup Ct 2010) [Severance (2010)]. This opinion was
withdrawn and substituted subsequently. Severance (2012), supra note 170 at 712.
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landward with the consequence that the house now stood completely seaward of the
vegetation line. In such circumstances, as the house was now located on the “public
beach”, the state sought an enforcement action to remove it. Severance sued officials on
the ground that in attempting to enforce a public easement without proving its existence,
infringed her constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and her
substantive due process rights.178 Here, the primary legal issue was whether the public’s
easement in the beach rolled further inland onto Severance’s parcel of land.179
In deciding this “game of semantics,”180 Justice Wainwright for the majority
distinguished movements by accretion and erosion from movements by avulsion, finding
that while gradual movements can shift the easement’s boundaries, sudden movements do
not.181 However, the ratio was severely criticized, leading to a rehearing and a subsequent
decision, which practically reiterated the earlier position. At the time of the rehearing, it
was once again contended that the legal distinction between avulsion and erosion was
immaterial. The court tossed this argument out once again and emphasized that the Texas
law recognized the distinction between avulsion and erosion and that the “[g]radual
movement of the vegetation line and mean high tide line due to erosion or accretion, as
opposed to avulsion, has very different practical implications.”182 In other words, what
this meant was that
when a beachfront vegetation line is suddenly
and dramatically pushed landward by acts of
nature, an existing public easement on the
public beach does not “roll” inland to other
parts of the parcel or onto a new parcel of land.
Instead, when land and the attached easement
are swallowed by the Gulf of Mexico in an
avulsive event, a new easement must be
established by sufficient proof to encumber the
newly created dry beach bordering the ocean.183
In short, the ratio is that in the event of avulsion, the easements do not “roll” onto
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356

previously unencumbered private beachfront parcels and therefore the state is not
relieved from the legal requirement of proving or purchasing an easement nor from the
constitutional requirement of compensation since a taking had occurred. So also, advising
in a disclosure that the state can enforce an easement on privately owned beachfront
property does not dispose of the owner’s rights.
Severance holds far-reaching ramifications even for coastal climate change
adaptation. With SLR and extreme weather events and storm surges expected to batter the
coastlines, it is moot whether the decision of the Texas Supreme Court is right in law and
in fact and is sufficiently precautionary. Those who purchase beachfront properties
generally have knowledge that there is an implied risk (caveat emptor) that their property
may eventually, or suddenly, recede into the seas and when this does happen, the
property can lose its private character to become public. As well, in the context of climate
change and SLR, what rolling easement accomplishes is not merely providing an
opportunity to the public the right to use and enjoy the beach; but rather, it actually seeks
to protect the littoral private property owner from undesirable risks posed by water and
the winds. By holding that the easement does not roll with avulsion the court has
introduced uncertainty into the law. The fact that the state now has to compensate the
owner, if it decides to burden the land with an easement fundamentally restricts the
government’s ability to effectively respond to the crisis wrought by rising sea levels. 184
Even though rolling easements are associated with public access, they also
frequently crop up as a valuable tool to address some of the problems posed by SLR.
They encourage the removal of hazardous structures, thereby ensuring public safety and
eliminating the possibility of coastal squeeze to prevent the inland migration of coastal
ecosystems. However, as part of a strategy for coastal climate change adaptation, it must
be pointed out that rolling easements have inherent limitations, as they can only be used
in areas where there is plentiful land (like rural areas) to facilitate inland migration.185

7.3.1.4 Remarks
Through this brief overview of the US approach on coastal zone management law making
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and implementation and its capacity to further coastal climate change adaptation, certain
noteworthy points, relevant to coastal South Asia, particularly to the federal states of
India and Pakistan are apparent. And this is so because in both these countries it is the
national governments that has jurisdiction and sovereign rights over the different
maritime zones measured seaward of the baselines, except in matters relating to fishing
over the territorial seas belt.186 The absence of state jurisdiction (to any extent) over
maritime waters seaward of the baseline (the wet side of the coastal zone) is a significant
legal handicap that prevents the state governments in India and in Pakistan (the states
incidentally has jurisdiction over the dry side of the coastal zone) from carrying out
spatial integration (land-sea integration). In contrast, first and foremost, the states in the
United States generally have jurisdiction out to three nautical miles offshore, and this has
considerably facilitated spatial integration implementation. A related feature is that even
though state jurisdiction ends at the three-mile limit, the requirement of federal
consistency practically enables the states to influence actions that take place even beyond
its jurisdictional remit.187 Secondly, the US legislative model on coastal management is a
classic example of coastal cooperative federalism in action where coastal management
operates as multilayered process, which has at its apex the federal Coastal Zone
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See article 297 of the Constitution of India which states that all lands, minerals and other things of
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Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976. This law by virtue of section 3 (1) secures sovereignty of
India over the territorial waters and to the seabed and subsoil underlying, and the airspace over, such
waters. As far as Pakistan is concerned, section 2(1) of the Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones
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government jurisdiction over Fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters.
USCZMA, supra note 21, §1456 (entitled, “Coordination and cooperation (Section 307)”).
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Management Act, 1972. Here, the flagship provisions are the requirement on the part of
the states to prepare coastal management programmes, the provision of federal funding
for the development of these programmes and the federal consistency provision which
ensures that the federal agencies adhere to a state’s approved coastal plan. This two-tier
process practically implements the concept of cooperative federalism in coastal
management by envisaging federal/state partnership based on a decentralized format. In
fact the CZMA operates between two continuums – at one end, it is all about sustainable
coastal development, and on the other, it is federal consistency and overall the legal
gravitational force exerted by the CZMA ensures that the different state coastal
management programmes while operating in their individual spheres move in their
assigned legal orbits to collectively address “the broad spectrum of coastal issues
identified by the Congress.”188
An important proposition that emerges from the case studies of California and
Texas is that California’s decentralized approach to coastal management strengthens the
stewardship roles shared by the state and local government entities. The striking feature
of the California model is the development and operation of two separate legal and
management regimes within the same state for the bay-shore and ocean shoreline. This is
recognition that it is imprudent to prescribe one common management framework, as in
Sri Lanka, ignoring diversity of the coastal environment. The Texas model shares
similarities with California and reveals considerable potential in utilizing the concept of
rolling easements. Despite the dictum in Severance, the utility of rolling easements in
ensuring that coastal ecosystems are not lost due to coastal squeeze must be not ignored.
Even though the concept of rolling easements is yet to find roots in coastal South Asia, it
may prove useful for these coastal states to implement the concept of rolling easements
via their coastal laws as a possible strategy to respond to SLR impacts and to ensure
continued public access to coastal areas. And in doing so, it is necessary that an
appropriate balance is struck between privately owned coastal realty interests and the
larger public good.

7.3.2 Australia
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Being the world’s largest island but smallest continent, Australia’s ocean coast extends
about 36,000 kilometers through a broad range of climatic zones.189 Its coastal areas are
home to a diverse array of sensitive ecosystems and more than eighty-five per cent of its
population, related infrastructure, and economic activities.190 All the state capitals are
located within the coastal zone.191 It is no exaggeration to say that Australia has
metamorphosized into a “coastal society.”192 Like most other coastal countries, marine
pollution, introduction of invasive species and increasing urbanisation are pressing
problems along the Australian coastline.
Climate change impacts and SLR are issues of growing concern in Australia.
Already seawater intrusion has been reported in several coastal locations in Queensland,
South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, and there is growing reliance on
desalination to offset the water woes that confront these regions.193 Out of an existing
711,000 residential buildings situated close to the water, between 157,000 and 247,600
properties risk potential inundation in the event of a 1.1 meter rise in sea level.194 Further,
residential buildings estimated at AUSD41-63 billion (2008 replacement value) risk
inundation.195 Other climate change issues facing coastal areas include reduced
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Australia, Dep’t of Climate Change, Australia’s Fifth National Communication on Climate Change:
A Report Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Australia: Dep't of
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Management” (2003) 26 Dalhousie LJ 85 at 91 (HeinOnline).
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Australia, State of the Environment 2011 Committee, Australia State of the Environment 2011:
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precipitation and reduced run-off to coastal rivers and streams resulting in higher salinity
concentrations in estuaries.196 Climate change is also adversely affecting migratory bird
species (e.g., heat stress),197 coral reefs (increased sea surface temperatures),198 and
mangroves (inundation).199

7.3.2.1 Federalism and Distribution of Powers in the Coastal Zone
Politically, Australia is a combination of a constitutional monarchy, a federal state, and a
parliamentary democracy. As a federal state, legislative powers in Australia are divided
between the Commonwealth and the state or territory governments,200 with residuary
powers of legislation granted to the states. If a matter is not listed under either sections 51
and 52 of the Australian Constitution, it generally falls within the legislative competence
of the state, enhancing their power to legislate in respect of ICZM and coastal climate
change adaptation.201 Further, states have enacted legislation creating and empowering
councils (decentralization).
Initially, the Commonwealth adopted a passive posture in terms of coastal and
ocean management, particularly within the three nautical mile territorial sea, where it was
generally considered that the states had jurisdiction.202 This afforded the states leeway in
respect of coastal environmental management.203 In responding to changes in the
international law of the sea and growing interest in offshore hydrocarbon development at
the domestic level, the Commonwealth began to take a more active stance in ocean and
coastal matters. This culminated in the enactment of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act,
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Since 1985, 23 of the 27 most common species of water bird have declined in the Coorong coastal
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the Great Barrier Reef. Ibid at 58.
Ibid at 62.
See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth).
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1973.204 The Act affirmed the sovereignty of the Commonwealth over the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf.205 The
validity of this legislation was impugned by six states in New South Wales v.
Commonwealth (“Seas and Submerged Lands Act case”),206 inter alia, on the ground that
the states had ownership or legislative power over the marginal seas adjacent to their
coasts to the extent seaward of three miles.207 However, the Australian High Court upheld
the vires of the law as a “valid exercise of legislative power with respect to external
affairs.”208
It was affirmed that the jurisdiction of the states ended with the boundary of each of
the states.209 It was also clarified that the Crown had jurisdiction and dominion over the
territorial sea, and that it had never surrendered the same to the colonies. In the
alternative, it was held that even if the colonies possessed sovereign and proprietary
rights over the territorial sea, they relinquished these rights upon the establishment of the
Australian Commonwealth.210
[T]he colonies in 1900 had neither proprietary rights in,
nor legislative power over, the territorial waters which
washed their shores, nor in or over the subjacent soil or
superjacent airspace except in so far as they had legislative
power to enact extra-territorially operating laws. Nor did
they have any rights in the continental shelf and incline.211
Rather than settling the law, this decision led to a period of uncertainty. 212 The stalemate
was resolved in 1979 when the Commonwealth and the states entered into an agreement
to strengthen co-operative federalism by settling contentious and complex offshore
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constitutional issues.213 The Offshore Constitutional Settlement provided that the
Commonwealth Parliament will pass legislation to give each state the same powers with
respect to the adjacent territorial sea (including the seabed) as it would have if the waters
were within the limits of the state.214 It was implemented with the following
Commonwealth legislation: the Coastal Waters (State Title) Act, 1980,215 and the Coastal
Waters (State Powers) Act, 1980.216 These laws give the states property in the seabed
and legislative powers over coastal waters up to three nautical miles, thereby setting a
stage for cooperative federalism in Australian coastal and ocean management. State
government control over the three nautical mile territorial sea and the landward side of
the coast practically facilitates ICZM implementation.217 Each states’ coastal zone
management statute defines the term coastal zone to recognize the land-sea continuum.218

7.3.2.2 Aboriginal Rights and Coastal Management
Coastlines and oceans have considerably shaped indigenous culture in Australia,
particularly the Torres Strait Islanders,219 and attempts are ongoing to protect their
traditional ways of life and livelihood, which in a large measure depends on the sea and
on coastal resources.220 For long, terra nullius was a central tenet of Australian law that
determined the relationship between the indigenous peoples and the Australian
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government. The doctrine arose from the “great voyages of European discovery” which
opened to European nations the prospect of occupying new and valuable territories
already inhabited by “backward peoples.”221 It basically implied that the indigenous
peoples had no legal title to the land at the time of the colonial settlement and that title to
all land as well as territorial sovereignty was vested with the British Crown which had the
discretion to do what it pleased under its prerogative powers.222 Terra nullius received a
virtual deathblow in Mabo v Queensland (No 2),223 a landmark decision224 even beyond
Australia.225 Mabo introduced into common law the concept of native title. As Brennan J
expounds:
[w]hat the Crown acquired was a radical title to land
and a sovereign political power over land, the sum of
which is not tantamount to absolute ownership of
land. Until recent times, the political power to dispose
of land in disregard of native title was exercised so as
to expand the radical title of the Crown to absolute
ownership but, where that has not occurred, there is
no reason to deny the law’s protection to the
descendants of indigenous citizens who can establish
their entitlement to rights and interests which survived
the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty.226
In other words, what this implies is that "following the colonization of Australia, the
Crown acquired territorial sovereignty but not absolute ownership over the land. … [T]he
ownership that the Crown retained over the land was a radial title which could be
burdened by the native title encumbrance where native title had not been
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Mabo, supra note 221, ¶55.
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extinguished.”227 Subsequently, native title was statutorily incorporated into the Native
Title Act, 1993.228 The Act is superior to the common law doctrine as propounded in
Mabo, which primarily dealt with land rights, and casts doubts on whether native title
could lie against internal and coastal waters.229 The Native Title Act statutorily extends
this concept to include rights and interests over both land and to waters. In sum, it is clear
that a coastal law cannot remain impervious to the larger general legal framework.
Recognition of the rights of the indigenous peoples, their traditions and customs, is an
important aspect, which the coastal laws of South Asia will have to take note of and
provide effect to.

7.3.2.3 Legislating ICZM and Promoting Coastal Climate Change Adaptation
While state, territory and local governments propel ICZM and coastal climate change
adaptation (through coastal legislation, building codes and land use planning regulations),
as stewards of the national economy, the Commonwealth also has an important role in
facilitating ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation. This may take the form of direct
action or by playing the role of a facilitator by providing leadership and coordinating
national reform efforts. Among the coastal states, New South Wales, Victoria,
Queensland and South Australia have coastal management legislation. The following
analysis examines the coastal legislation of Queensland and New South Wales to
understand how these laws provide for ICZM implementation and coastal climate change
adaptation.

7.3.2.3.1 New South Wales
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The basic objective of the New South Wales Coastal Protection Act, 1979 (NSW Coastal
Act) is to protect the coastal environment to ensure intra-and inter-generational equity.230
The Act empowers councils to create coastal zone management plans231 to protect and
preserve beach environments and beach amenity; promote undiminished public access to
beaches, headlands and waterways; manage estuaries; and provide for emergency actions
in the event of beach erosion.232 The plans also provide for risk management from
general coastal hazards as well as related climate change impacts. 233 In cases where the
plans propose the construction of coastal protection works (funded by the council or by
private landowners), arrangements must be made for their maintenance and for managing
their associated impacts.234 As noted in chapter five, armouring, while protecting coastal
property, can lead to increased erosion elsewhere and can adversely impair public access.
The Act sets out detailed procedures for drawing up of coastal zone management plans235
and encourages public consultation.236 The Minister for Climate Change and the
Environment has issued “Guidelines for Preparing Coastal Zone Management Plans,”
including measures to deal with coastal risk management.237
The NSW Coastal Act also sets out rules concerning the granting of development
consent for coastal protection works.238 To reduce the “red tape” that has restricted the
ability of landowners to place temporary coastal protection works around their properties,
the Coast Protection Amendment Act, 2012, has engrafted liberal provisions into the
coastal law allowing owners to place sandbags as temporary coastal protection works239
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and dispenses with, requirements for planning and associated approvals in placing these
works.240 However, landowners have a duty to maintain temporary coastal protection
works.241 Temporary coastal protection works can also be erected upon public lands for a
period not exceeding two years.242 However, if the temporary coastal protection work
increases erosion in the beach or in its adjacent properties, unreasonably limits public
access, or threatens public safety or ceases to be a temporary coastal protection work, it
can be ordered to be altered, repaired or removed.243 Similarly, owners or occupiers of
land can be ordered to remove materials and structures unlawfully placed on beaches.244
New South Wales has also adopted a coastal policy framework that balances and
coordinates coastal management efforts.245 Goal 2 of the Policy deals with climate
change and emphasizes the need to consider physical and ecological processes and
hazards when assessing development applications.246 The NSW Coastal Planning
Guideline: Adapting to Sea Level Rise, 2010, promotes ecologically sustainable
development and a precautionary approach on accommodating SLR into land use
planning and development assessment.247 The Guideline is based around six coastal
planning principles for SLR adaptation in three broad areas: identifying coastal areas at
risk,248 strategic and land use planning in coastal areas,249 and development assessment
(for both proponents and planning authorities) in coastal areas.250

240
241
242
243
244
245

246
247
248

Practice under the Coastal Protection Act 1979 (Sydney South: Dep't of Envt, Climate Change &
Water, NSW, 2011).
NSWCPA, supra note 218, s 55O.
Ibid, s 55R.
Ibid, ss 55T(1), 55U, 55VA.
Ibid, s 55ZC.
Ibid, s 55ZA.
See generally Australia, NSW Coastal Policy 1997: A Sustainable Future for the New South Wales
Coast (NSW: 1997) (entitled “Part A: The Policy”) [NSW Coastal Policy 1997]. It must be noted
that the Coastal Policy has considerable legal force. The minister for planning has issued a direction
under section 117 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 which states that in
preparing local environmental plans relating to the coastal zone, local councils are to give effect to
the coastal policy. See “Direction No.6 – Coastal Protection” in Australia, NSW: Dep’t of Planning,
Section 117 Ministerial Directions Issued Under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979, New South Wales Planning Reforms (2005) at 7.
NSW Coastal Policy 1997, ibid at 46, ¶2.1.3 (entitled “Part B: Implementation”).
Australia, NSW Coastal Planning Guideline: Adapting to Sea Level Rise (NSW: Dep’t of Planning,
2010) at 1.
The following two principles guide this section: principle 1- assessing and evaluating coastal risks
taking into account NSW sea level rise planning benchmarks; principle 2 - advising public on
coastal risks to ensure that there is informed land use planning and development decision-making.
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The NSW Sea Level Rise Policy Statement, 2009 was prepared to support
consistent adaptation to projected SLR impacts. It prescribed SLR planning benchmarks,
relative to the 1990 mean sea level, of 0.4 meters by 2050 and 0.9 meters by 2100.251
However, uncertainty associated with climate change has hampered the ability of local
councils to consider local conditions when determining the impact of future climate
change related hazards.252 In a marked departure from established policy, the NSW
Government has begun to re-write the rules of coastal engagement. A series of farreaching coastal reforms (stages I and II) are being introduced, including the
establishment of a Coastal Ministerial Taskforce “to ensure that NSW has the most
appropriate plans, legislation and other arrangements in place to manage coastal erosion
and other coastal hazards, both now and into the future.”253 One of the most important
changes adopted is to do away with the statewide SLR planning benchmarks, rendering
the NSW Sea Level Rise Policy Statement redundant. Local councils are now empowered
to determine SLR projections to meet local conditions.254 Together with the Coastal
Protection Amendment Act, 2012, these are the major changes introduced by stage I
reforms.255 In stage II, a review of the Coastal Protection Act, 1979 and additional
measures to improve support to councils and landowners is expected.256

7.3.2.3.2 Queensland
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Principle 3 - through appropriate strategic and land use planning avoid intensifying land use in
coastal risk areas; principle 4 - consider options to reduce land use intensity in coastal risk areas
where feasible. Ibid at 8-12.
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appropriate management responses and adaptation strategies, taking into account environmental,
social and economic impacts of each option. Ibid at 3.
Australia, NSW Sea Level Rise Policy Statement (Sydney South: Dep’t of Envt, Climate Change &
Water, NSW, 2009) at 4.
For more details on coastal reforms, see NSW, Environment & Heritage, Stage 1 Coastal Reforms
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Blessed with 9,500 kilometers of coastline, and with more than 80 per cent of
Queenslanders living on the coast, the coastal areas play a vital role in the well-being of
this state.257 Rapid population growth and SLR pose the greatest challenges to the coastal
environment of Queensland, home of the Great Barrier Reef. The Coastal Protection and
Management Act, 1995,258 includes within its ambit mitigation of SLR and climate
change impacts by providing for the broader issue of coastal hazards. One of its
objectives is to ensure that land use and development decisions protect life and property
from coastal hazards.259 It achieves its diverse objectives through preparing of the coastal
plan; declaring coastal management districts and erosion prone areas, and providing for
monitoring, reporting and review requirements.260 It empowers the minister to prepare a
coastal plan, which is a statutory instrument261 describing how the coastal zone is to be
managed.262 Generally, the plan identifies coastal resources, the policies for coastal
management, and is to have regard to aboriginal traditions and island customs of Torres
Strait Islanders.263 The minister is required to consider the effects of climate change on
coastal management when preparing the state coastal management plan.264 The coastal
plan generally has a lifespan of 10 years265 and is to be developed with public input.266 In
preparing the coastal plan, the minister is to take into account public access to the
foreshore.267
Several requirements in this coastal law indirectly further coastal climate change
adaptation. The Act empowers the minister to constitute any area within the coastal zone
as a coastal management district if it requires protection or management.268 In these
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See generally Australia, Dep’t of Environment and Resource Management, Queensland Coastal
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Ibid, s 35.
Ibid, ss 20-21(1).
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Ibid, s 54. Before an area is declared as a coastal management district, the following factors has to
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area should be kept in an undeveloped state to maintain or enhance the coast or coastal resources,
public access to a foreshore, existing land tenure, aboriginal traditions and island customs, the need
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coastal management districts, the chief executive is empowered to approve coastal
protection269 and tidal protection270 notices. Similarly, the chief executive can also
declare areas that are subject to erosion or tidal inundation within the coastal zone to be
an “erosion prone area” depicted on a map or plan.271 The Act proscribes the damaging of
coastal vegetation and dunes272 and subjects the quarrying of materials to a permit
system.273 Additional rules assist in the assessment of development applications in the
coastal zone.274 Factors such as public access to the foreshore, water quality of wetlands,
integrity of dune systems, littoral drift, tidal inundation, estuarine processes, and natural
surface runoff must be considered.275
Pursuant to the Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995, the Queensland
Coastal Plan has been prepared and is in effect from February 2012. The Plan has two
parts: the State Policy for Coastal Management and the State Planning Policy 3/11:
Coastal Protection (which has been replaced by the Draft Coastal Protection State
Planning Regulatory Provision: Protecting the Coastal Environment (8 October 2012),
under the Sustainable Planning Act, 2009).276 The State Policy for Coastal Management
applies to coastal land and the resources therein and provides direction on coastal land
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To protect public safety or to prevent adverse consequences on coastal resources, a tidal works
notice can be issued to repair the relevant works or remove the relevant works or structure and to
restore the site as nearly as practicable to its former condition. Ibid, s 60.
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Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) (seeks to promote ecological sustainability by managing the
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2012) or until repealed earlier. See generally Australia, Draft Coastal Protection State Planning
Regulatory Provision: Protecting the Coastal Environment October 2012 (Brisbane Qld: Dep't of
State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, 2012) [Draft SPRP].
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management to meet the objectives set out by the coastal law. 277 Implemented by
managers of state and local government controlled coastal land and private coastal
landowners, it also applies to community groups, research organisations, and
businesses.278 Policy outcomes in erosion prone areas include ensuring that natural
coastal processes are able to transpire without interruption279 and that infrastructure
avoids or minimizes erosion.280 Only essential infrastructure providing a public service
can be located on state coastal land.281
The Draft Coastal Protection State Planning Regulatory Provision refocuses coastal
management to maximize economic growth282 and applies to the development of
planning documents (local planning schemes, regional plans, etc.) and in the assessment
of development applications.283 Evaluation of planning documents is to be based on
mapped coastal hazard areas that identify the level of potential risk to life and property
(including SLR impacts).284 Coastal hazard maps allow for a SLR of 0.8 meter and a ten
per cent increase in the maximum potential intensity of cyclones by 2100. 285 A hierarchy
of approaches has been identified to address the impact of coastal hazards: avoidance,
planned retreat, accommodation, and finally, protection.286
Emphasis is placed on retaining undeveloped areas for high risk coastal areas. In
developed areas vulnerable to storm tide inundation, or areas where there is a
development commitment, future development must address vulnerability of the area to
SLR and storm tide inundation.287 Local governments must put in place counter-disaster
plans to address these coastal hazards, and secure access to and protect evacuation
routes.288 Similar guidance rules have been provided in relation to locating development
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Australia, Dep't of Environment and Resource Management, Queensland Coastal Plan (Brisbane:
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Ibid at 7.
Ibid at 14.
See generally Draft SPRP, supra note 276.
Ibid at 6.
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in erosion prone areas.289 In such areas, primacy is afforded to a retreat strategy;
however, if the area is developed such that this option is no longer feasible, then property
protection works can be utilised to defend land uses and infrastructure. 290In developed
areas, structural engineering and stabilisation works (e.g., artificial reefs, banks, wrecks,
breakwaters and groynes) are to be initiated only as a last resort when erosion presents an
immediate threat to public safety or property and to infrastructure that is not
expendable.291 However, such works should not impact the natural cycles of erosion and
accretion of beaches.292

Rules have also been laid down regarding land-based

aquaculture,293 dredging activities within coastal waters,294 nature conservation,295 and
the management of areas of high ecological significance.296

7.3.2.4 Leadership Role of the Commonwealth Government
While the overall strategic direction for coastal management in Australia is determined
by the principles of ecologically sustainable development, as mentioned earlier, being a
federal state, coastal management is diffused between the national, state and in certain
cases the local governments. As has been stated, “coastal management in Australia is
fractured by commonwealth, state, regional and local government responsibilities and
there is no coordinated coastal legislation or coastal policy but rather a complex mix of
legislation, plans and policies.”297 The practical realities of implementing ICZM and
coastal climate change adaptation is illuminating the need for greater uniformity and coordination in state practice. As is clear from the above discussion, there is divergence in
the way in which ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation is conceived and
implemented in Australia’s coastal states. For instance, in Queensland, coastal climate
change adaptation emanates primarily as part of planning law; in NSW it has its
grounding in the coastal law. While divergence in approach is to be respected, coastal
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Ibid at 10-11.
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ecosystems and climate change impacts can span jurisdictional boundaries. Any such
divergence has to be accommodated within the framework of certain common
parameters. It falls to the Commonwealth government to ensure that there is consistency
in ICZM practice and coastal climate change adaptation implementation throughout the
continent. This can be secured through the development of common frameworks and
guidance documents to provide advice and support to activities that contribute to
responses at the state level. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Government, in conjunction
with the state and territory jurisdictions, has developed a Framework for a National
Cooperative Approach to Integrated Coastal Zone Management, 2003. This is “a high
level strategic instrument” that sets the stage for “national cooperation” for coastal
management and seeks to accomplish ecologically sustainable outcomes over the next
decade.298 This national cooperative approach stands to benefit all Australians (socially,
economically, and environmentally). The Framework identifies six priority areas and
focuses on “national collaboration” in meeting the challenges posed by climate change.299
Two specific responses top this agenda: developing the science of climate change in
relation to the coastal zone300 and “managing and adapting to impacts and
opportunities.”301 In this regard, the Framework identifies the importance of integrating
climate change adaptation initiatives “with existing coastal zone conservation, planning
and management processes.”302 Furthermore, it also calls upon the Natural Resources
Policies and Programs Committee and the Marine and Coastal Committee to develop
information, guidelines and tools for coastal zone managers and planners on climate
change risks, liability and adaptation options and to share these outcomes.303
Climate change adaptation is a core pillar in the Australian government’s climate
change strategy. The coast is a national priority area for action. 304 The choice of the most
appropriate coastal climate change adaptation measure depends largely upon data for an
enhanced understanding of coastal vulnerability. Accordingly, the National Climate
298
299
300
301
302
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Change Adaptation Framework highlights the need for more information to fill-in critical
gaps in current understandings and knowledge about possible impacts that inhibit
effective adaptation. In building adaptive capacity, the framework identifies potential
measures, including developing a climate change and fisheries action plan, and
developing a national web-based “Oz Coasts Portal” of information, maps, tools and
other products relating to the coast and climate change.305 Additional coastal climate
change adaptation initiatives have been undertaken including a national coastal risk
assessment,306 coastal adaptation decision pathways projects,307 establishment of the
Coasts and Climate Change Council with the mandate to advise “the Government on
coastal adaptation issues and reform priorities.”308 The Council’s recommendations to
date include integrating climate change into national agendas such as managing natural
disaster risks, the insurance and banking sectors, identifying nationally significant
hotspots, and creating government and private sector partnerships for adaptation planning
in nominated hot spots.309 There is also a growing jurisprudence highlighting the need to
take into account the risks posed by climate change and SLR in line with the
precautionary approach when deciding on whether or not to situate development in
coastal areas or note.310

7.3.2.5 Discussion
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Like the United States, Australia also offers compelling lessons to coastal South Asia in
terms of operationalising ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation. In part due to the
Offshore Constitutional Settlement, and subsequent legislative developments, the states
have secured jurisdiction over a significant belt of the coastal waters. Apart from the
residuary powers of legislation, this facet of the Australian model has helped in the
entrenchment and implementation of ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation at the
state level. Under both the NSW Coastal Protection Act, 1979, and the Queensland
Coastal Protection and Management Act, 1995, ICZM is practiced through a principled
approach and implemented through the preparation of coastal zone management plans.
From the experiences of the two states, it is clear that there can be great divergence in
coastal management and adaption rules and the overall approaches adopted to work them.
While variance is to be respected, there is the need for their greater harmonization and for
more integrated management responses rooted in sustainable coastal development.
Overarching common frameworks to facilitate the development of national cooperative
approaches for both ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation are critical in this
regard.
The recent reforms to the Australian coastal law model, in particular those related
climate change adaptation are particularly useful. Since it is not possible for any state to
fortify large stretches of coastline and moreover large segments of the coastline can be in
private hands, the NSW Coastal Act has adopted a pragmatic approach by empowering
individual property owners to set up environmentally friendly temporary coastal
protection works. However, these may not be of much help in the event of a large storm
surge, or intense flooding. The Australian model also highlights the uncertainties of
climate change and its broader implications for policy development for coastal climate
change adaptation. In this regard, while the Australian states reviewed here had
developed state-wide applicable benchmarks in relation to SLR as the basis for future
coastal development, they have both abandoned the statewide approach. NSW has gone
to the extent of empowering local councils to develop their benchmarks based on local
conditions. Given the considerable uncertainty and variability in projections of future
SLR, this provides local councils with greater flexibility to respond to future coastal
hazards. While there is merit is such an approach, there is a danger that this policy will
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contribute to a diversity of sea-level rise benchmarks across the different local
jurisdictions and complicate a precautionary response to protect critical coastal processes
that might be better met at the statewide or even national level. In a South Asian context,
due to the inadequacies in the nature of the data available in relation to SLR, and the
limited jurisdiction and resources available with the local bodies, it may be practically
counter-productive to entrust determination of sea-level rise benchmarks to the different
local bodies.
The centrality afforded to the interests of aboriginal groups in coastal management is
another notable feature of the Australian model. It must be pointed out that even though
the problems of the indigenous peoples in Australia vary vastly from that of those in
South Asia, an important lesson deducible is that a coastal law can be a potent instrument
in securing the rights of indigenous coastal communities, in particular their longstanding
relationship to the oceans, coastal spaces and other coastal and marine resources.

7.3.3 South Africa
South Africa is an acclaimed leader in advocating and popularising ICZM law on the
African continent.311 Surrounded by the waters of the Atlantic, the Indian and the
Southern oceans, the South African coastline extends 3,650 kilometers.312 The coastline
has a diverse landscape, and climate sensitive natural resources. Nearly 40 per cent of
South Africa’s population lives within 100 kilometers of the coast,313 with over seven
million living in the coastal cities of Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, and East
London. These four cities are experiencing rapid population growth and their populations
are likely to double in the next 25 to 30 years.
Like most other coastal regions, climate predictions and projections are not
sanguine for South Africa. Tide gauge measurements show that the sea level has risen by
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approximately 1.2 millimeters annually over the last three decades. It is predicted that by
2020 there could be a 12.3 centimeter rise, increasing to 24.5 centimeters by 2050 and 41
centimeters by 2080.314 Sea-surface temperatures have increased by about 0.25 degree
Celsius per decade over the past four decades.315 Erratic precipitation patterns have
reduced freshwater flows into estuaries, which has increased the concentration of
pollutants in the coastal zone and limited their ability to support natural biota, particularly
the prawn trawl fishery.316 The National Climate Change Response White Paper, 2011
notes that geographically, as there is very little natural shelter in coastal areas, the South
African coastline is exposed to strong wave action and to storms that erode the coastlines
and increase flooding.317
During the apartheid period, South Africa was basically a unitary state with
centralized powers.318 As in South Asia, a primary legacy of colonial rule and the
apartheid regime was a skewed system of benefit sharing of common pool resources. The
rights to benefit and use coastal resources were prerogatives that could be enjoyed only
by a privileged few.319 The Sea Shore Act, 1935, declared “the State President to be the
owner of the sea-shore and the sea within the territorial waters of the Republic ….”320
Coastal zone management during that period was resource-centric, top-down in approach,
and fragmented. As a result, “the value of coastal ecosystems as a cornerstone for
development was not sufficiently acknowledged in decision-making.”321
With the fall of apartheid and the inauguration of a new constitution in 1996,
“command and control” gave way to “co-operative government”322 based on a quasi-
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federal system of government.323 The South African Constitution324 re-wrote the rules on
environmental justice by securing for all the right “to an environment … not harmful to
their health or well-being” and “to have the environment protected, for the benefit of
present and future generations.”325 The National Environmental Management Act, 1998,
entrenched the environmental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Growing recognition
of the economic value of coastal ecosystems as a cornerstone for national economic
development propelled calls for a new coastal law imbued in equity with emphasis on
sustainable coastal development.326
The series of reforms that led to the re-writing of the coastal law regime and a new
era for coastal management can be traced to the 2000 White Paper for Sustainable
Coastal Development in South Africa.327 The White Paper set out four cornerstones for
coastal management efforts: 1) recognise the economic value of coastal ecosystems for
economic development; 2) adopt a people-centric approach to sustainable coastal
development; 3) promote a holistic way of thinking that involves co-ordinated and
integrated coastal management; and 4) implement a facilitatory style of management
involving co-operation, encourages participation, and shared responsibility of those with
an interest in the coastal zone.328 The White Paper called for the drafting of a new coastal
management act based on these principles.329
The National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act,
2008,330 (ICM Act), as its title suggests, is a statute within the framework of the National
Environmental Management Act, 1998. It is based on an understanding that there is the
need for “a new co-operative and participatory approach to managing the coast.”331 And,
in broad terms, this cooperative approach is to be achieved through ICZM, which is
viewed as “an evolving process that learns from past experiences,” taking into “account
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the functioning of the coastal zone as a whole” and seeking “to co-ordinate and regulate
the various human activities that take place in the coastal zone … to achieve its
conservation and sustainable use.”332 Integrated management of the coastal zone is
essential to achieving the constitutional commitment to improve the quality of life of all
citizens and to protect the natural environment for the benefit of the present and future
generations.333
The ICM Act is based on principles integral to sustainability. 334 In a marked
departure with the past and to set right the inequitable state-centric and resource intensive
approach to coastal management, the law incorporates the concept of trusteeship. The
state is treated only as a trustee of the coastal zone,335 not the owner of all coastal
resources.336 Moreover, the Minister is to provide sufficient information on matters
relating to the protection and management of the coastal zone to the general public to
enable them to make an informed decision as to the extent to which the state has fulfilled
its trusteeship duties.337
The ICM Act has four dimensions: a comprehensive definition of the coastal zone;
institutional administrative mechanisms; tools for coastal conservation and for the
sustainable use of coastal resources; and measures to adapt to a rising sea. These aspects
are detailed below.

7.3.3.1 Defining the Coastal Zone
Since the ICM Act focuses on regulating human activities that take place within the
coastal zone,338 an understanding of what constitutes the coastal zone is vital. Generally,
the definition of the coastal zone depends largely upon what a particular country
considers as being essential elements. The ICM Act defines the “coastal zone” 339 as “the
area comprising coastal public properly, the coastal protection zone, coastal access land

332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339

Ibid.
Ibid.
Some of the major principles are co-operative governance, integration and participation. Ibid, s 2.
Ibid, s 3(a).
For the earlier contrary legal position, see supra notes 318-21 and accompanying text.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, s 93(1).
Ibid, s 2(c).
Ibid at ch 2.
379

and coastal protected areas, the seashore, coastal waters and the exclusive economic zone
and includes any aspect of the environment on, in, under and above such area.”340
Of all the enumerated elements, coastal public property341 is perhaps the most
important as it reflects a people-centric approach to coastal management. Ownership over
coastal public property is vested with the citizens, which in its turn is held by the state in
trust for them.342 As public trustee, the state has to ensure that coastal public property is
“used, managed, protected, conserved and enhanced” in a way that promotes the interests
of the community as a whole and therefore there are limits on the rights which a state can
exercise vis-à-vis coastal public property.343 The state must also adopt reasonable
legislative and other measures to conserve and protect this property for the benefit of the
present and future generations. The ICM Act goes a step further and accords right of
access and the right to use and enjoy coastal public property to all natural persons (over
and above citizens). However, the state can restrict access or use of any part of the coastal
public property. Generally, no fees can be charged for the enjoyment of these rights.344
Even though the management of coastal public property is imbued by the concept of
public trust, the Minister can grant leases (for buildings, roads, barriers or structures) or
concessions (for coastal resources) over coastal public property.345
To ensure that the public can gain access to coastal public property via “public
access servitudes”, municipalities can make by-laws designating strips of land as coastal
access land. Notably, the environmental impact must first be assessed in consultation
with interested and affected parties. There are rules concerning the terms of public
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access346 and the Minister retains the right to prohibit a person from carrying out (or even
intending to do) an activity that can adversely impair the rights of natural persons to gain
access to or use coastal public property.347
The coastal protection zone348 includes land adjacent to coastal public property or
that plays a significant role in coastal ecosystems measured from the ‘high water mark’
(HWM) and extending 100 meters inland (developed urban areas zoned as residential,
commercial, or public open space), or 1,000 meters inland (undeveloped or rural
areas).349 The goal in this zone is to protect ecological integrity; natural character;
economic, social and aesthetic value; and people, property and economic activities from
the risks and threats which may arise from coastal hazards.350

7.3.3.2 Institutional Mechanisms to Administer the Law and Public Participation
Successful ICZM implementation is predicated upon the presence of effective
institutional mechanisms. In line with the federal system of governance, the ICM Act
provides a three-tier institutional framework based on “co-operative coastal
governance.”351 The primary authorities under the ICM Act are Minister for
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (national level) and the MEC (Member of the
Executive Council of a coastal province, responsible for the designated provincial lead
agency).352 Both have wide powers including the hearing of appeals and making of
regulations.353 The Act also provides for the creation of coastal committees, which are
treated as the “embodiment of co-operative coastal governance.”354 At the national level,
the National Coastal Committee355 “promote[s] integrated coastal management … and
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Ibid, ss 29 & 20.
Ibid, s 59(5).
Ibid, s 16.
L Celliers et al, A User-friendly Guide to South Africa’s Integrated Coastal Management Act (Cape
Town: Dep’t of Environmental Affairs and SSI Engineers and Environmental Consultants, 2009) at
23.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, s 17.
Constitution of South Africa, supra note 322.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, s 1.
Ibid, ss 83-84, 90 & 94.
Celliers et al, supra note 349 at 36.
For the composition, see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, ss 26 & 35(1).
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effective co-operative governance.”356The MEC establishes provincial coastal committees
to promote ICZM and to coordinate and implement the provincial coastal management
programme.357 There is also provision for municipal coastal committees, which would
implement the ICM Act and their municipal coastal management programme.358 Any
member of the public having appropriate expertise can be appointed as voluntary coastal
officers to perform such duties and exercise such powers as is assigned to it by the MEC
for the conservation and protection of coastal public property.359
Public participation, an essential cog in the ICZM process, is contemplated at
several stages: the formulation of the estuarine management plan,360 the imposition of
fees for accessing coastal public property,361 and prior to the adoption of the national,362
provincial,363 and municipal coastal management programmes,364 and even post
adoption.365 Section 53 of the ICM Act mandates certain obligations in relation to
“consultation and public participation.”366

7.3.3.3 Tools for Coastal Conservation and Ensuring the Sustainable Use of
Coastal Resources
The ICM Act envisages five strategies for coastal conservation and sustainable use of
coastal resources: 1) coastal management; 2) protection of coastal environment; 3) marine
and coastal pollution control; 4) protection to estuaries; and 5) public access to coastal
resources. These are elaborated below:
The ICM Act identifies two practical tools to achieve coastal management, namely,
the coastal management programme (CMP) and coastal planning schemes.367 The Act
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Ibid, s 35(3).
Ibid, s 39.
Ibid, s 42.
Ibid, s 43.
Ibid, s 34.
Ibid, s 13.
Ibid, s 44(2).
Ibid, s 46(2).
Ibid, s 48(2).
Ibid, s 44(3).
Following three steps are contemplated, namely, consultation with the appropriate government
officials, reasonably accessible publication or broadcasting of intent, and notification in the
government gazette providing sufficient information, so that the public can submit written
representation or objection to proposed actions within a period of 30 days.
Celliers et al, supra note 349 at 42.
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envisages a cascading hierarchical system of CMPs: a national CMP368 (developed by the
Minister369) at the apex that provides strategic and overarching direction on integrated
coastal management370; provincial CMPs (developed by the MEC371) consistent with the
national CMP;372 and individual municipal CMPs

373

consistent with both the provincial

and national CMPs.374 Roughly corresponding to the federal nature of the South African
polity, this system accommodates and harmonizes local development imperatives with
national objectives and, more importantly, craft “management responses” that are
sensitive to the “natural, social and economic differences along the … coastline.”375
The Act called for the system of CMPs to be in place by the end of 2013 and
includes provisions for regular review.376
Coastal planning schemes377 define areas within the coastal zone or coastal
management area that can be used exclusively for a specific purpose or activity378 or can
restrict or prohibit certain activities or uses.379 Coastal planning schemes are to be
developed in tandem with the ICM Act, national and coastal management programmes,
and estuarine management plans. Generally, the minister, the manager of a coastal
protected area, the MEC, the municipality, and the management authority of a special
management area can establish coastal planning schemes in this hierarchical order.380
The ICM Act provisions on the coastal environment include the duty to avoid
causing adverse effects to the coastal environment and to remediate environmental
damage.381 To secure this interest, there are provisions for coastal protection,382 repair or
368
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SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, ss 44-45.
Ibid, s 44
Ibid, s 45(1)(a).
Ibid, s 46.
Ibid, s 47(1)(c)(i).
Ibid, s 48.
Ibid, s 49(1)(b)(i).
Celliers et al, supra note 349 at 42.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, ss 44(1)(b), 54(1), (5), (5)(b) & 55(1).
Ibid, s 56(1).
Ibid, s 56(1)(a)(i).
Ibid, s 56(1)(b).
Ibid, ss 56-57.
Ibid, s 58; see also National Environmental Management Act, (S Afr), No 1540 of 1998, s 28.
Coastal protection notice is issued by the Minister (or a delegate) if there is reason to believe that a
person is carrying out, or intends to carry out, an activity that may negatively affect the coastal zone.
Specifically, such a notice can instruct measures to build, maintain or demolish any works, close off
access to coastal public property, protect indigenous fauna, etc. Ibid, s 59.
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removal notices,383 and detailed rules concerning environmental authorization for coastal
activities.384 There are also provisions for special management areas for areas with
unique environmental, cultural or socio-economic conditions.385
Land-based sources of marine and coastal pollution are a significant problem in
South Africa. An estimated 63 ocean outfalls discharge daily about 800,000 cubic meters
of sewage and industrial effluents into the sea seriously affecting marine environmental
quality.386 The ICM Act regulates the discharge of effluents into coastal waters and
controls ocean dumping and incineration of wastes at sea.387
The South African coastline is dotted with 343 estuaries.388 The ICM Act calls for
the establishment of “a system of integrated coastal and estuarine management” on the
basis of a national estuarine management protocol (which establishes the minimum
requirements for estuarine management plans). This protocol is to be developed by the
Minister in concurrence with the Minister of Water Affairs.389

7.3.3.4 Coastal Climate Change Adaptation
Section 62 of the ICM Act superimposes additional regulatory requirements on the three
levels of government in respect of their land use laws as applied to the coastal zones to
give effect to provisions in Section 17 to protect “people, property and economic
activities from risks arising from dynamic coastal processes, including the risk of sealevel rise.” Several provisions of the Act directly and indirectly enumerate ways to deal
with SLR. These provisions can grouped under three broad adaption strategies: setback
lines, rolling easements, and overlay zones.
One of the most important tools for SLR adaptation is setback lines. To ensure
public safety and to protect the coastal zone and property and to preserve aesthetic
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SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, ibid, s 60.
Ibid, ss 63-64.
Ibid, s 23(1)-(2).
See generally UNEP & UN Habitat, Coastal Area Pollution the Role of Cities: Involvement,
Influence, Implementation (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 2005).
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, ss 69-70.
Burghard W Flemming, “Geographic Distribution of Muddy Coasts” in Terry R Healy, Ying Wang
& Judy-Ann Healy, eds, Muddy Coasts of the World: Processes, Deposits and Functions, 1st ed
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science BV, 2002) 99 at 145.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, s 33(2).
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values, the MEC is empowered to establish or change coastal setback lines, which are set
out in municipal zoning maps. These regulations can prohibit or restrict the construction
of buildings wholly or partially seaward of the coastal setback line.390 Municipal CMPs
must address coastal erosion and accretion.391
The ICM Act provides that in cases where the HWM (dynamic HWM) moves
inland due to coastal erosion, sea level rise, etc. and remains so for three years, the owner
loses ownership of any land situated below the HWM, and is not entitled to compensation
from the state.392 Essentially, these are rolling easements. The Minister (or delegate) can
issue a coastal protection notice if an activity is deemed to harm the coastal zone, thereby
prohibiting environmentally damaging activity and providing instructions to protect the
environment.393 In a similar vein, the repair or removal notice can be issued for a
structure that has been unlawfully erected, constructed or upgraded or has the potential to
adversely impact the coastal environment.394

In certain situations, the Minister can

temporarily occupy land (even private property) within the coastal zone to respond to
emergency situations.

7.3.3.5 Discussion
Although it is early to draw conclusive lessons from the South African experience in
ICZM, its coastal law is one of the first attempts that captures the broad parameters of
ICZM and sets out one of the most modern and forward-looking ICZM laws in existence.
A worthy precedent,395 it should influence similar legislative initiatives and is particularly
relevant to the South Asian context due to the inequities in accessing coastal resources in
that region. As well, from a function-oriented perspective, the South African coastal law
sets out an integrated, decentralised, ecosystem-based, adaptive and precautionary
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Ibid, s 25(1)(b).
Ibid, s 49(2)(c)(v).
Ibid, s 14(5)(b).
Ibid, s 59.
Ibid, s 60.
South Africa, Dep’t of Environmental Affairs, Media Release, “South Africa’s Integrated Coastal
Management Act shortlisted for the 2012 World Future Policy Award for exemplary coastal and
ocean policies” (5 September 2012), online: Dep’t of Environmental Affairs, Media Releases <https
://www.environment.gov.za/>.
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approach. It integrates sustainable development principles into a legislative format
relevant to the coastal context. Another important feature of the South African legislative
approach is that it incorporates coastal climate change adaptation responses to SLR. The
approach is based on the fundamental principle that through efficient and integrated
management, it is possible to manage and reduce the impacts of non-climate stressors
(such as habitat destruction, haphazard development, and land-based sources of pollution)
on the coastal environment. This increases the resilience of the coastal environment in
coping with climate change impacts. The recent proposal to amend the ICM Act is a
reminder that coastal law making is a complex endeavour that requires constant finetuning.396 In sum, there are several notable lessons for other coastal states to learn from
the South African legislative ICZM model.

7.3.4 New Zealand
Urban development and related infrastructure in New Zealand is located primarily in its
coastal areas.397 With rising sea levels, this infrastructure is vulnerable to coastal erosion
and inundation. As elsewhere, climate change will also affect New Zealand’s coastal
margins.398 Adapting to these risks is a significant challenge to the government and
authorities with jurisdiction over the coastal zone.
New Zealand’s comprehensive legally-mandated ICZM program is facilitated by its
constitutional dynamic and, more importantly, it holistic approach to resource
management. Authority for ICZM flows primarily from the Resource Management Act,
1991 (RMA),399 which promotes “the sustainable management of natural and physical
resources.”400 This path-breaking legislation was the product of one of the largest law
reform exercises in this country.401 The Act has three striking features: 1) while the
general legislative approach towards natural resources management is to provide separate
396
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For the text see, National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Amendment Bill, 2013,
Notice 1046 of 2012, online: South Africa Gov’t Online <http://www.info.gov.za/view/Dow
nloadFileAction?id=180951>.
New Zealand, Ministry for the Envt, Coastal Hazards and Climate Change: A Guidance Manual for
Local Government in New Zealand, 2d ed (Wellington: Ministry for the Envt, 2008) at 1.
For more details on impacts, see ibid at 28-40.
NZRMA, supra note 75.
Ibid, s 5(1).
New Zealand, Ministry of the Envt, Your Guide to the Resource Management Act (2006), at 5,
online: Ministry of the Envt <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/>.
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legal rules for the management of critical natural resources like land, air and water, the
RMA lays down an overarching framework for the management of all resources; 2) even
though the country follows a unitary system of government, 402 where the national
government exercises control over natural resources, this statute devolves some control to
local communities, viewing them as “the best judges of their own environmental
problems, and how to go about dealing with them;” and 3) rather than laying down “hard
and fast rules” regarding which activities are permissible or not, the RMA adopts an
“effects based” approach, that is, environmental effects of a proposed activity will be
used to determine whether or not it is approved.403
The RMA defines the “coastal marine area” as “the foreshore, seabed, and coastal
water, and the air space above the water,” where the seaward boundary is the outer limits
of the territorial sea and the landward boundary is the line of mean high water springs,404
integrating the land-sea boundary. New Zealand’s decentralised government system is
reflected in the RMA405 through a partnership involving the Crown and the regional and
district councils.406 The law also includes provisions for both mitigation (e.g., discharge
of greenhouse gases407) and adaptation408 to climate change impacts. SLR is treated as a
‘natural hazard’ and falls within the ambit of the rules to respond to natural hazards.409
The Act also prohibits the dumping and incineration of wastes in the coastal marine area
402
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See generally New Zealand is a unitary state, and does not have a written constitution. New
Zealand, Constitutional Advisory Panel, New Zealand’s Constitution: The Conversation So Far
(Wellington: Secretariat, Constitutional Advisory Panel, 2012).
NZRMA, supra note 75.
Ibid, s 2.
The Local Government Act, 1989, rationalized the governance structure, to provide for a central
government, followed by regional councils with primary responsibility for the management of
common property resources and territorial local authorities responsible for land use. Robert A
Makgill & Hamish G Rennie, “A Model for Integrated Coastal Management Legislation: A
Principled Analysis of New Zealand’s Resource Management Act 1991” (2012) 27 Int'l J Mar &
Coast L 135 at 147 [Makgill & Rennie, “A Model for ICM Legislation”].
Cullinan, supra note 62 at 116.
NZRMA, supra note 75, s 70A.
Ibid, s 7(i).
Natural hazard is defined as “any atmospheric or earth or water related occurrence (including
earthquake, tsunami, erosion, volcanic and geothermal activity, landslip, subsidence, sedimentation,
wind, drought, fire, or flooding) the action of which adversely affects or may adversely affect
human life, property, or other aspects of the environment.” Ibid, s 2; see also ibid, ss 30(1)(c)(iv)
(stating that the regional councils can control the use of land for the purpose of avoiding or
mitigating natural hazards) & 31(1)(b)(i) (territorial authorities can control the use, development, or
protection of land, for the purpose inter alia of the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards).
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(unless permitted by a resource consent),410 imposes a duty to avoid unreasonable
noise,411 and restricts certain uses in the coastal marine area, including prohibiting the
depositing “in, on, or under any foreshore or seabed any substance in a manner that has or
is likely to have an adverse effect on the foreshore or seabed”412 unless permitted by a
national environmental standard, or by the regional or proposed regional coastal plan or
by a resource consent. This provision could restrict individual property owners from
armouring their property. The RMA embodies the ecosystem-based413 and precautionary
approaches,414 seeks to maintain and enhance public access to the coastal marine area,415
protects customary rights416 and indigenous vegetation,417 secures public participation,418
and promotes a catchment-based approach.419
Importantly, the RMA calls for a New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement.420 To be
issued by the Minister of Conversation in accordance with the broad principles provided
in the RMA, the Statement will guide local authorities in their day-to-day management of
the coastal environment.421 It will include “objectives and policies” on a diverse range of
issues, from implementing New Zealand’s international obligations relating to the coastal
environment, to securing public access and protecting protected customary rights. 422 The
Act also includes provisions for regional coastal plans.423
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Ibid, s 15A, B (discharge of harmful substances from ships or offshore installations) & C
(prohibiting dumping or storing of radioactive wastes, radioactive matter and toxic or hazardous
waste in coastal marine area).
Ibid, s 16.
Ibid, s 12(1)(d).
Ibid, s 5(2)(b)-(c); see also Makgill & Rennie, “A Model for ICM Legislation”, supra note 405 at
148.
NZRMA, ibid, s 12(1).
Ibid, s 229(b) (provides for an esplanade reserve or an esplanade strip to facilitate public access).
For instance, see ibid, ss 6(e) & 85A.
Ibid, s 86B(3)(b).
For instance, see ibid s 39 (public hearings without unnecessary formality).
Under section 30(1)(a), the regional councils have responsibility for the integrated management of
the natural and physical resources of the region. And this includes land and the coastal and marine
area in the region. Makgill & Rennie, “A Model for ICM Legislation”, supra note 405 at 148-49.
NZRMA, supra note 75, s 56.
Ibid, s 57.
Ibid, s 58.
Ibid, s 64. The purpose of the regional coastal plan is to assist a regional council, in conjunction with
the Minister of Conservation, to achieve the purposes espoused by the RMA in relation to the
coastal marine area of that region. Ibid, s 63(2).
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The first NZCPS was issued in 1994 and was subsequently revised and updated in
2010 following an elaborate process of consultation and review. 424 Most importantly
with regard to coastal climate change adaptation, the NZCPS calls for coastal hazard risk
management measures to taking climate change impacts into account.425 The NZCPS
underscores the need to adopt the precautionary approach for the “use and management
of coastal resources potentially vulnerable” to climate change effects.” 426 A range of
response options to SLR are identified and grouped under two heads. The first options
seek to protect existing development and include relocation or removal of existing
development or structures at risk, identifying the consequences of pursuing a do-nothing
option, and risk management.427 While emphasizing the role that natural defences can
play in protecting the coastal environment,428 the NZCPS recognises the utility of hard
protection structures where necessary to protect existing infrastructure. 429 In such cases,
shoreline hard armouring must minimise adverse effects on the coastal environment.430
The second options deal with future impacts. As a first step, the policy calls for
identification and prioritisation of areas likely to be affected by coastal hazards, including
SLR over at next 100 years.431 The policy suggests risk reduction methods, including
abandonment and managed retreat.432 Where land reclamation is necessary, the policy
provides detailed rules on how it is to be carried out.433

7.3.4.1 Discussion
The New Zealand experience on ICZM is comprehensive and the RMA propels this
country onto a “sustainable management”434 trajectory. Core features that enhance
424
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See generally Johanna Rosier, Independent Review of the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement: A
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Dep't of Conservation, 2010) objective 5.
Ibid, policy 3.
Ibid, policy 27.
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Ibid, policy 27(c).
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Ibid, policy 25.
Ibid, policy 10.
NZRMA, supra note 75, s 5(2); see also Makgill & Rennie, “A Model for ICM Legislation”, supra
note 405 at 144 (explaining reasons as to why the focus is on sustainable management and not on
sustainable development).
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sustainability and relevant to coastal law reform agenda for South Asia include
recognition of customary rights, a catchment-based approach, and decentralised coastal
management. This legislation is based on the philosophy that all elements of the
environment are interrelated and that natural resource management should be
integrated.435 In addition, several prescriptions in the law support coastal climate change
adaptation. While there is considerable merit in such an approach and it is workable in
New Zealand, it may be difficult to transplant certain aspects of this legal model to other
coastal countries that have poor governance systems like those in the South Asian region.
There is the danger that coastal zone management and coastal climate change adaptation
can get lost in a subterfuge of rules. Already there have been amendments to the RMA
and, in a South Asian context (as the Indian experience discussed previously reveals);
frequent amendments can introduce an element of uncertainty in the long-run.
Furthermore, the New Zealand coastal management regime draws on other legislations as
well.436
In sum, while the RMA is definitely a comprehensive code on resources
management, subsuming coastal management, it may be difficult to develop such a
435

436

NZRMA, ibid, s 30(1)(a) (providing that one of the functions of the regional council is to achieve the
integrated management of the natural and physical resources), s 31(1)(a) (territorial authorities to
achieve integrated management of the effects of the use, development, or protection of land and
associated natural and physical resources); see also Makgill & Rennie, “A Model for ICM
Legislation”, supra note 405 at 154.
For instance, see generally Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ), 2011/3. The
Court of Appeal in 2003 held in Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643, that the Māori
land court had jurisdiction to determine claims of customary ownership over the foreshore and
seabed areas. In response, the Foreshore and Seabed Act, 2004, was enacted. It was widely
perceived that the policy underlying this act violated the Treaty of Waitangi, and severely
discriminated the whānau, hapū, and iwi. Accordingly, the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai
Moana) Act, 2011 was enacted which repealed the Foreshore and Seabed Act, 2004 and restored
customary interests. This law radically alters the position by removing Crown ownership, and it
declares the coastal marine area as commons incapable of ownership, and protects public use rights
(access, recreation, navigation and fishing) and re-establishes the right of Maori to claim customary
marine use rights and title. See Robert A Makgill & Hamish Rennie, “The Marine and Coastal Area
Act 2011” [2011] Resource Mgmt J 1; Makgill & Rennie, “A Model for ICM Legislation”, ibid at
135, n 51.
The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, 2002, Local Government Act, 2002, Public Works
Act, 1981, Building Act, 2004 are also relevant. Building Act, 2004, states that a building consent
authority can refuse to grant a building consent for construction of a building, or major alterations to
a building, if the land on which the building work is situated is subject to one or more natural
hazards or the building work is likely to accelerate, worsen, or result in a natural hazard on that land
or any other property. Here, natural hazard includes erosion and inundation. Building Act 2004
(NZ), 2004/72, s 71.
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comprehensive approach in other countries like those in South Asia where an RMA-like
legislation may not necessarily lead to effective coastal management. In contrast, South
Africa has developed an overarching integrative legal framework under the National
Environmental Management Act, 1998. Several independent legal codes elaborate the
rules relating to the different facets of resources management, including the ICM Act,
2008,437 under this overarching frame. Rather than clumping different aspects of resource
management under a single piece of legislation (which, as mentioned above may work in
countries with developed systems of governance and need not necessarily do so in
others), the intricate and complex management issues for each resource need to be
legislated separately while being harmonized under an integrated common framework.
This will help ICZM law to respond more positively to coastal climate change related
crises.

7.3.5 Other Legislative Experiences on Coastal Management and Coastal
Climate Change Adaptation
Surrounded by the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific oceans, and the shores of the Great Lakes,
Canada has more coastal area than any other country in the world. 438 Nearly seven
million Canadians live in coastal areas and many depend on ocean resources and services
for their livelihood.439
Studies show that nearly 7,000 kilometers of the Canadian coastline are highly
sensitive to SLR and other climate change impacts.440 Eighty per cent of the coastline of
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island are moderate to highly sensitive
437
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As is evident from the title, the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Act, 2008, is a “specific environmental management Act” brought out under the
overarching umbrella legislation - the National Environmental Management Act 1998. Accordingly,
the ICM Act has to be “read, interpreted and applied” in conjunction with the NEMA 1998.
Furthermore, in case of any conflicts relating to its implementation, the same has to be determined
as per NEMA 1998. SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 74, s 5; see also National
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004, (S Afr), No 10 of 2004, ss 6, 7; National
Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008, (S Afr), No 59 of 2008, s 5; National Environmental
Management: Protected Areas Act, 2003, (S Afr), No 57 of 2003, s 5.
Canada has the longest coastline in the world of 240,000 kilometers. Donald S Lemmen & Fiona J
Warren, eds, Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: A Canadian Perspective (Ottawa: Climate
Change Impacts and Adaptation Directorate, 2004) at 115.
Ibid.
This includes much of the Maritime Provinces, a large part of the Beaufort Sea coast and the Fraser
Delta region of British Columbia. Ibid.
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to SLR.441 In Charlottetown, since 1911, the sea level has risen about 32 centimeters,
posing risks to urban infrastructure.442 In Newfoundland and Labrador, climate change
has increased the potential of landslides in coastal communities at the base of steep
slopes.443 SLR is predicted to overwhelm the 243 kilometers of dykes that protect an
estimated 17,500 hectares of land in the Bay of Fundy region in Nova Scotia. 444 In the
Arctic coastal regions, the changes wrought by climate change and SLR will be more
intense.445 Under the Canadian Constitution (the Constitution Act, 1867), the provinces
and territories have jurisdiction over land (through their power over property and civil
rights);446 and the federal government exercises jurisdiction over the ocean space that
generally begins from the ordinary low water mark stretching seaward to the end of the
exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles).447 The division of legislative powers over
the dry and wet segments of the coastal zone exerts tremendous influence in shaping
ICZM development in Canada. However, still, the exact demarcation of jurisdiction in
terms of the distribution of powers and the boundary in terms of low and high water mark
between the federal and provincial governments remains controversial.448
Coastal climate change adaptation in Canada is part of a larger approach to
integrated management as espoused by the Oceans Act, 1996 (Oceans Act).449 Pioneering
legislation on oceans management, the Oceans Act is comprehensive and targeted to
sustainable development of oceans and their resources and to this end; it gives effect to
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Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(13), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
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& Coastal LJ 195 at 198-01 (QL).
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Envtl L 425 at 432, n 30 (HeinOnline).
Lemmen & Warren, eds, supra note 438 at 124; Oceans Act, SC 1996, c 31 [Oceans Act].
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an ecosystem and precautionary approach. From the perspective of coastal management,
the law calls upon the minister to take the “lead and facilitate the development and
implementation” of a national strategy and integrated management plans for estuaries,
coastal and marine waters, and coastal ecosystems.450 In developing these documents, the
minister has to collaborate with the provincial and territorial governments, other
agencies, ministries and departments and more importantly with affected Aboriginal
peoples and coastal communities.451 The Oceans Act also provides for marine protected
areas in the internal and territorial waters and in the exclusive economic zone.452
Pursuant to this legislative mandate, Canada has adopted an oceans strategy,453
which sets out “the overall strategic framework” for ocean-related programmes and
policies, and is guided by the principles of sustainable development, integrated
management, and the precautionary approach.454 The strategy will inform the
development and implementation of integrated management plans. Apart from
identifying and explaining the essential elements,455 and the principles that guide
integrated management,456 the strategy underscores the need for collaboration.457 In
recognising that “ecosystems nest within other ecosystems”, the integrated managementplanning framework as contemplated by the strategy extends from large ocean
management areas (LOMAs)458 to small coastal management areas (CMAs).459 The
primary intent of CMAs is to help communities play a stronger role in issues that affect
their future “by matching local capabilities and development priorities to the
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Oceans Act, ibid, ss 29, 31.
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Ibid, s 35.
See generally Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future:
Policy and Operational Framework for Integrated Management of Estuarine, Coastal and Marine
Environments in Canada (Ottawa: Fisheries & Oceans Canada, 2002) [Canada’s Oceans Strategy].
Canada has also adopted an Oceans Action Plan which propounds that “[i]ntegrated [m]anagement
[p]lanning is at the heart of new, modern oceans governance and management.” Canada, Canada's
Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future Generations (Ottawa: Communications Branch, 2005)
at 13.
Canada’s Oceans Strategy, ibid at i.
Ibid at 7-8.
Ibid at 9-10.
“Collaboration is the governance model proposed for Integrated Management.” Ibid at 11.
Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Area covers more than 325,000 square kilometers off
the coast of Nova Scotia; the Gulf of St. Lawrence would comprise another Large Ocean
Management Area, as would the Beaufort Sea in the Arctic. Ibid at 16.
Ibid at 19-20.
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opportunities and carrying capacities of the local ecosystem.”460 While most of these
management issues fall within provincial, territorial or community jurisdiction, the
federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans is the facilitator.461 Some of the provinces
have taken the lead in coastal management and coastal climate change adaptation. Some
of these efforts may mature into coastal legislations. For instance, Nova Scotia has
gathered baseline data and developed a report that provides an overview of the province’s
coastal areas and resources and its overall state.462 Based on this, a coastal strategy has
been developed that identifies six critical issues concerning coastal management
including, SLR and storm events.463 Further, it spells out six actions to ensure that people
and property are protected from coastal hazards.464 Local governments are also taking the
lead in implementing coastal climate change adaptation. For instance, the Halifax
Regional Municipality (HRM), Nova Scotia, has developed a Regional Municipal
Planning Strategy, 2006 that recognises the problem of rising sea levels and storm surges
and, as interim measure, prohibits all residential development on the coast within a 2.5meter elevation above the ordinary high water mark through the applicable land use bylaw.465
If one were to remove the veneer of the Oceans Act, it is clear that essentially this
law provides a framework for modern oceans management.466 As good as it is as an
oceans law, when viewed from a coastal law prism, its shortcomings are glaring. Some of
its most striking limitations from this perspective are that 1) it does not define the term
coastal zone; 2) measures to tackle SLR are conspicuous by their absence; 3) it offers
limited means to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between the federal and provincial levels
of government on coastal management issues; and 4) even though there is provision for
460
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Ibid at 19.
Ibid at 20.
See generally Nova Scotia’s Coastal Report, supra note 444.
See generally ibid at 160, ch 7.
These actions include establishment of coastal development standards, setbacks, increasing
awareness about coastal hazards, and assessing the vulnerability of communities to coastal hazards.
Ibid at 14-15.
Halifax Regional Municipality, Regional Municipal Planning Strategy (2006) at 29.
Canada’s Oceans Strategy, supra note 453 at i-iv; see also Tim Hall et al, “Advancing Objectivesbased, Integrated Ocean Management Through Marine Spatial Planning: Current and Future
Directions on the Scotian Shelf off Nova Scotia, Canada” (2011) 15:2 J Coast Conservation 24755.
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marine protected areas, these are mainly contemplated in ocean space with no connection
to the coast or land. Thus, the Oceans Act, as is presently cast, at best provides a
foundation for the management of the wet side of the coastal zone or the ocean space. A
primary reason for this emphasis on integrated oceans management is the dynamic
exerted by Canadian federalism, and it can even be argued that this law is inadequate to
promote ICZM objectives and may not stricto sensu qualify as a coastal law. However,
this is not to suggest that the law is totally dismissive of ICZM objectives. Despite
challenges and shortcomings, the Oceans Act has several notable elements that can
facilitate ICZM implementation in coastal South Asia: emphasis on integration, estuarine
management, creation of marine protected areas, and their network, adoption of a
principled approach to ocean management, creation of national strategy, enhanced
government coordination and stakeholder engagement, and the development of integrated
management plans. This law clearly supports marine spatial planning, even though this
term is not specifically mentioned.467 More importantly, as will be seen in the following
chapter, there is now increasing focus on moving efforts towards linking ICZM with
marine spatial planning to secure the sustainable use and management of ocean and
coastal spaces. Even though this aspect finds no express mention in the Oceans Act, the
tools and approaches that this law provides is essentially geared towards attaining this
objective.468 Another interesting facet of the Canadian approach is that even though the
federal government has not indulged in creeping jurisdiction, there is a clear attempt by
the federal government to influence the management agenda for the dry side as well. For
example, under Canada’s Oceans Strategy, the framework for integrated management
extends from LOMAs to CMAs and memorandum of understandings between the federal
and provincial governments.469 However, coastal zone management and coastal climate
467
468
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Email from Scott Coffen-Smout (19 August 2013) [on file with the author].
Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning in the
Gulf of Maine, online: Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment <http://www.gulfof
maine.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/CMSP-Fact-Sheet-FINAL.pdf>; see also Gulf of Maine
Council on the Marine Environment, Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning: Committees and
Programs, online: Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, Coastal and Marine Spatial
Planning: Committees and Programs <http://www.gulfofmaine.org/2/>.
Already, the federal government and some of the provincial governments like British Columbia
have entered into memorandum of understandings (MOU) to overcome jurisdictional barriers that
hamper implementation. In 2011, an MOU was entered into with Nova Scotia. Chircop & O’Leary,
supra note 448.
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change adaptation are provincial domains. Nevertheless, the jurisdictional impediments
that Canada faces and its attempt to circumvent the same through its nested approach to
integrated management offers useful lessons to other coastal countries (particularly to the
federations in coastal South Asia) that seek to implement ICZM and are constitutionally
constrained because of the split jurisdiction over the land-sea divide.
SLR is already taking a toll on the 600 kilometer Kenyan coastline. In many areas,
coastal fisheries have collapsed and life in fishing villages is increasingly difficult;
villages with poor adaptive capacity rely on garbage to build sea walls to keep the rising
sea at bay. Breeding havens for mosquitoes and contributing to the outbreak of diseases
like dysentery, villagers believe that they are “better off taking medicine[s] than losing
[their] houses to the sea.”470 ICZM initiatives in Kenya emerged from the 1993
Workshop and Policy Conference on Integrated Coastal Area Management in Eastern
Africa, which recommended the establishment and development of ICZM to manage the
multiple and complex issues facing the coastal zones of the region. Since then, Kenya has
made rapid strides in operationalising ICZM.471 Prior to this, Kenya had enacted the
Coast Development Authority Act, 1990. It provided for the establishment of the Coast
Development Authority (CDA) “to plan and co-ordinate the implementation of
development projects in [the] whole of the Coast Province and the exclusive economic
zone and for connected purposes.”472 The CDA has far-reaching authority including,
acquisition of land,473 development of long-range development plans,474 and construction
of works for the protection and utilization of the water and the soil.475 This provision
could be interpreted as empowering the CDA to carry out armouring works to protect the
coastal zone from SLR. The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, 1999
(EMCA) provides the foundation for ICZM in Kenya. Section 55 obliges the authority
“in consultation with the relevant lead agencies” to prepare a survey of the coastal zone
and thereafter, based on the results, “an integrated national coastal zone management
470
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Odhiambo Joseph, “Kenyan village battered by rising tides”, BBC News (6 February 2007) online:
BBC News < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/>.
UNEP & NEPAD, Kenya, State of the Coast Report 2007: Towards An Integrated Management of
Kenya’s Coastal And Marine Resources, Draft 1 (np, [nd]) at 90.
Coastal Development Authority Act, 1990, (Kenya), No 20 of 1990, pmbl.
Ibid, s 16.
Ibid, s 8(b).
Ibid, s 8(g).
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plan.”476 The national coastal zone management plan is to be reviewed at least

every

two years.477 Pursuant to this mandate, Kenya developed its first ICZM Action Plan for
the period 2011–2015. The Action Plan identifies priority themes and activities that
encompass coastal climate change adaptation, including “Environmental Risks and
Management of Shoreline Changes.”478 Two strategic objectives have been proposed in
this regard: minimizing shoreline change impacts and mainstreaming climate change
mitigation and adaptation measures into coastal development plans and programmes.479
The document indentifies strategies to effectuate these objectives. 480 The Kenyan
experience may led to gridlock since its ICZM plan, which includes coastal adaptation
measures, is based not on the coastal management legislation but rather it draws its
legislative support from the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, 1999.
The incongruity of this disconnect between the coastal law and the coastal management
plan, may become more evident once Kenya begins to implement its ICZM plan. Issues
contemplated under the plan may require legal support that a general environmental
statute may be unable to provide for and lead to gridlock.
Seventy per cent of Israel’s population lives within 15 kilometers of the
Mediterranean coastline, the economic nerve center of Israel. By 2050, the sea level
along the Israeli coast is expected to rise by some 0.5 meter, and by 2100 it is expected to
reach a meter.481 Apart from inundation and destruction of coastal property,482 there is
also the possibility of increased cliff slumping483 and coastal aquifer contamination.484
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See Environmental Management and Co-Ordination Act, 1999, (Kenya), No 8 of 1999, s 55(2), (4).
Ibid, s 55(3).
Kenya, National Environment Management Authority, Integrated Coastal Zone Management Action
Plan for Kenya, 2011-2015 (Nairobi: NEMA, [nd]) at 41.
Ibid at 42.
For instance, to minimize the impacts of shoreline change, the plan calls for the development and
implementation of a shoreline management plan for the entire coast. Again to mainstream climate
change mitigation and adaptation measures into coastal development plans and programmes, the
document calls for the development of early warning systems, sharing and dissemination of
knowledge and technology, etc. Ibid at 42-43.
Israel, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Israel’s Second National Communication on Climate
Change Submitted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Jerusalem: Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2010) at 80.
Ibid.
Ibid at 82.
Ibid.
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Increasing sea surface temperatures are expected to spread invasive species.485 Israel has
introduced measures to adapt to these impacts.486 Coastal management, as well as
measures to adapt to climate change impacts, in the have evolved primarily through the
land use planning system. Early initiatives include setting up of the Coastal Waters
Committee under the 1965 Planning and Building Law, the establishment of interministerial committees, creation of the Marine Pollution Prevention Fund, environmental
impact assessment regulations under the 1982 Planning and Building Law, and
preparation of the 1983 Mediterranean Coast Masterplan.487 In 2004, Israel promulgated
the Law for the Protection of the Coastal Environment, which defines “coastal
environment” as the area that extends 300 meters inland and seaward to the limit of the
territorial waters, including natural and landscape resources, cultural assets, and
antiquities.488 Essential features of this coastal law include prohibiting and reducing
damage to the coastal environment;489 securing a public right of way over the entire
length of the shore area;490 imposition of fees for coastal environment protection;491
powers to remediate environmental damage;492 and appointment of inspectors to
supervise compliance.493 The Israeli coastal law offers very little to facilitate coastal
climate change adaptation apart from its emphasis on reducing or prohibiting damage to
the coastal environment. However, the Israeli model is an excellent example of how a
coastal law can focus on protecting cultural heritage, in particular antiquities, in the
coastal zone. In other parts of the world, particularly in South Asia, coastal areas house
archeologically important monuments and other structures that are rarely protected (many
archeological monuments and sites are under threat due to rising sea levels) despite these
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Ibid at 84.
Ibid at 93.
See generally Valerie Brachya, “Integrated Coastal Management in Israel” in Biliana Cicin Sain,
Igor Pavlin & Stefano Belfiore, eds, Sustainable Coastal Management: A Transatlantic and EuroMediterranean Perspective (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) 113; see also Stephen
Fletcher, “The Evolution of Coastal Management Policy in the State of Israel” (2000) 24 Mar Pol'y
395 (ScienceDirect).
Law for the Protection of the Coastal Environment Law 2004 (No 5764 of 2004, Israel), s 2.
Ibid, ss 3-4.
However, fencing is permissible if done in accordance with a plan or permit. Ibid, s 5.
Ibid, s 6.
Ibid, s 9.
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countries being parties to the World Heritage Convention.494 The emphasis in Israeli law
on cliff protection is also noteworthy as eroding wave and wind action can be expected to
intensify due to SLR and other climate change processes. The South Asian coastal
countries can benefit considerably from the Israeli experience on both these counts. It is
important that coastal nations as part of their ICZM plans develop measures to protect
their coastal heritage as well.
The small island state of Barbados is one of the world’s most densely populated
countries. As in other island states, the impacts of SLR that are of concern are coastal
erosion, inundation, and saltwater intrusion into the coastal aquifers.495 Coastal erosion
triggered interest in coastal management in the mid-1970s.496 The Barbados Coastal Zone
Management Act, 1998 (Barbados CZMA), provides for more effective management,
conservation and enhancement of coastal resources. It calls for the development of a
coastal zone management plan and delimitation of coastal zone management areas.497
Drafted under the authority of the Director of the Coastal Zone Management Unit, these
measures are subject to public enquiry and revision prior to implementation. In cases
where a person is aggrieved by the management plan, an appeal can be made to the
Coastal Management Appeal Tribunal.498 The management plan is subject to review
every five years,499 and all Authorities are to have regard to this plan while exercising
functions under the coastal zone management related function.500 Section 8 of the
Barbados CZMA requires that all authorities exercising any coastal related functions
have regard for the coastal management plan. The Act also contains provisions for the
preservation and enhancement of marine areas, and the Minister is empowered to protect
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For instance, see Kem Lowry & HJM Wickremeratne, “Coastal Area Management in Sri Lanka” in
EM Borgese, N Ginsburg & JR Morgan, eds, Ocean Yearbook 7 (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1988) 263 at 275.
Christine Wellington & Rawleston Moore, eds, Barbados’ First National Communications to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Barbados: Ministry of
Physical Development Environment, 2001) at 26.
For more details, see Barbados, Coastal Zone Management Unit, History of the Coastal Zone
Management Unit and the Development of the Process of Integrated Coastal Zone Management in
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Coastal Zone Management Act 1998 ( No 39 of 1998) part II.
Ibid, s 13(3).
Ibid, s 11.
Ibid, s 8.
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marine areas.501 In these restricted areas, underwater parks can be set up.502 The Act
includes measures for coral reef and beach protection; prohibits the use of explosives,
poisons or noxious substances for harvesting coral or fish; prohibits the fouling of
foreshore; and offers a scheme for offences and penalties.503 The primary weakness of the
Barbados Coastal Zone Management Act, 1998, is that it is a very simple legislation, and
may not suffice as a model for countries that have more complex systems of governance.
Moreover, this coastal law does not provide any specific and direct measures for coastal
climate change adaptation. However, its provisions for beach and coral reef protection
indirectly contribute to the cause. Notable and relevant to coastal South Asia are also the
provisions on public enquiry.
With a coastline of 5,746 kilometers, including more than 4,000 keys and islets and
unique coastal biodiversity, SLR will also affect Cuba,504 and more frequent natural
disasters like hurricanes.505 Decree-Law 212, “Coastal Zone Management,”506 (currently
under review) establishes the boundaries of the coastal zone and the zone of protection on
the basis of coastal typology507 and emphasizes “protection and sustainable use of the
coastal zone” in accordance with ICZM principles.508 The Ministry of Science,
Technology and Environment is the primary authority that administers the coastal law,509
the Ministry of Economics and Planning is responsible for the national land use policy
and establishes the coastal zone boundaries and controls land use and urbanization in the
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Ibid, s 17.
Ibid, ss 18 & 19.
Ibid, ss 22-29.
Nearly six per cent of the surface area of the main Island will be completely submerged and
furthermore and out of a total of 245 coastal settlements, 87 will be partially or completely affected
with 34 completely inundated, displacing about 18,500 persons. As well, 84 per cent of the total
number of beaches (291) will also be affected. See generally Daniel Whittle & Daylin MuñozNuñez, “Sea Level Rise Policies in Cuba” (PowerPoint presented to the International Conference on
Sea Level Rise in the Gulf of Mexico, Corpus Christi, Texas, 1-3 March 2010).
Ibid. Cuba has in place an excellent system for disaster risk reduction and disaster management. In
2008, despite hurricanes Gustav, Ike and Paloma causing substantial damages to the tune of 10
billion dollars the death toll was only seven. Oxfam, The Climate Changes, Threatens and Demands
Adaptation: A Look at the Cuban Experience of Protection against Climate Change, Oxfam
Research Report (np, Oxfam International, 2010) at 14.
See generally Decree-Law Number 212: Coastal Zone Management, 8 August 2000 (Cuba).
See generally ibid, sections two & three.
Ibid, art 1.
Ibid, art 7; see also Ibid, art 8.
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coastal zone.510 The Decree secures the public the right to unrestricted use of the coastal
zone for common purposes free of charge,511 envisages a special environmental
regulatory regimen for keys and peninsulas, and establishes a system of land-based and
marine signals prior to the execution of any construction project of activity that affects
the coastal zone or the zone of protection.512 Article 15.1 states “[t]he coastal zone shall
preferably remain unoccupied, authorization given only for the development or the
execution of activities or facilities that due to their own nature do not allow any other
location …”513 Article 16 prohibits certain activities in the coastal zone like extraction of
aggregates and final disposal of solid and liquid wastes; the construction of new facilities
is subject to certain conditions and permissions.514 Further, protective works against SLR
should not damage the coastal zone or affect beaches 515 or pollute the marine
environment or alter the water flow.516 Cuban coastal law recognises the dynamic nature
of the coastal environment. Accordingly, boundary determination of the coastal zone is
not static; it fluctuates and is determined with reference to the typology of the coastal
feature (beaches, river mouths, cliffs, etc.). The law prescribes varying distances from
each particular feature to fix the coastal boundary, for example, in the case of river
mouths, the coastal zone extends 300 meters inland from the mouth of the river, and for
coastal cliffs, only 20 meters inland from its summit not exceeded by tides or penetration
by the sea.517 As the sea level rises, coastal zones will move inland and baselines may
also recede leading to a curious situation of the maritime zones of Cuba shrinking in
size.518 As it stands, the international law of the sea does not provide guidance on how to
deal with these far-reaching changes in a nation’s maritime estate. Despite these issues, it
is commendable that Barbados and Cuba, both small island developing states, despite
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Ibid, ch III.
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their comparatively poor land to coast ratio have dedicated coastal laws to predicate their
coastal management efforts. The experiences of both these SIDS in relation to coastal law
making and implementation offers lessons (in particular, the strategies in these coastal
laws to deal with coral reef protection, SLR) to the small island developing state in South
Asia, namely, the Maldives, and to the island nation of Sri Lanka.
With 50 per cent of its population settled along its 220 long kilometer coastline,519
the coastal regions and the resources therein are crucial to the development of Belize.
This coast is predominantly low-lying, increasing the vulnerability of coastal
communities520 and the economy to SLR and other climate change impacts. 521 Tropical
cyclones are hitting land with increasing frequency and their intensity in degree is
expected to increase.522 Rising sea surface temperatures have led to large-scale coral
bleaching events, reducing the presence of commercial fish spawning aggregations.523
The Belize barrier reef reserve system, a renowned world heritage site, is under
considerable stress from climate change, overfishing, unsustainable development
practices, disease, and pollution.524 The 1999 Coastal Zone Management Act525 defines
the coastal zone as “the area bounded by the shoreline up to the mean high-water mark on
its landward side and by the outer limit of the territorial sea on its seaward side, including
all coastal waters”526 and provides for the creation of a Belize Coastal Zone Management
Authority (Belize CZMA).527 Key functions of this Authority are the preparation and
review of the coastal zone management plan, guideline development, and advisory
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Belize, Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries, & Sustainable Development Belize Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Plan (Coastal Zone Management Authority & Institute, 2013) at 119 [Belize ICZM
Plan].
Belize, Second National Communication to the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Belmopan, 2009) at 59.
Belize ICZM Plan, supra note 519 at 118. Climate change is adversely affecting the economic
prospects held out by coastal tourism. Snorkeling and diving and other activities will be impacted
due to heat stress, erosion and declining reef health. Ibid at 118, 199.
Ibid at 114.
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See generally Climate Justice, Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of
Belize Barrier Reef Reserve System, in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate
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functions.528 The law created the Coastal Zone Management Institute, which supports the
University of Belize in developing educational programmes on coastal zone
management.529 The 2013 Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan, the heart of the
Act,530 was developed through incremental steps, beginning with a strategy outlining
over-arching national objectives. The Plan envisions a “sustainable future where healthy
ecosystems support and is supported by thriving local communities and a vibrant
economy.”531 Coastal climate change adaptation is an essential component of the plan.
Climate change adaptation measures are to be included in strategic management plans by
all sectors and it is encouraged through inter-agency cooperation, public awareness
campaigns, and developing the capacity of the Belize CZMA and the Institute.532 The
experience from Belize reveals that developing an ICZM plan is no easy task with a
hiatus of almost 15 years before the plan was released. The Belize coastal law has several
interesting features, the most important being the linkage between the coastal law and the
ICZM plan, which has coastal climate change adaptation as a prime area of focus. More
importantly, for coastal South Asia, the emphasis on developing capacity ordained by the
coastal law of Belize, including academic university level educational programmes on
coastal management will be an important pathway for capacity building and to spread the
message of coastal management and conservation.
Presently, the sovereign state of the United Kingdom comprises four countries,
namely, England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Since 1991, powers have been
devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and significant strides have been
made in decentralizing power to local governments.533 In addition, the overarching frame
of the European Union also has a perceptible impact on the evolving constitutionalism in
this country. These constitutional changes, has significantly diluted the unitary character
of United Kingdom even though it is not quite federal and these have impacted ICZM
implementation in the United Kingdom. Adoption of the EU Recommendation on
Integrated Coastal Zone Management in 2002 popularized ICZM efforts in the UK,
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especially the requirement that member states develop national strategies and report on
progress to the European Commission by 2006.534 Since then ICZM efforts have matured
and each of the four constituent countries have tailored solutions to deal with problems in
their coastal zones.535 One ICZM initiative has been the development of “A strategy for
promoting an integrated approach to the management of coastal areas in England,”536
which seeks to integrate coastal policies and provide a clear strategic direction to coastal
managers. The enactment of the Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009,537 which
indirectly supports ICZM and climate change adaptation in the marine area is one of the
most important legal developments in this regard. This Act provides for the preparation
of the marine policy statement and marine plans,538 marine licensing,539 designation of
marine conservation zones and networks,540 and coastal access.541 The provisions on
marine nature conservation and fisheries help to ensure that marine ecosystems are
resilient to climate change impacts and the focus on developing renewable energy
projects enhances mitigation of climate change effects. 542 A plethora of other legislation
supports coastal climate change adaptation including the Climate Change Act, 2008,543
which calls upon the Secretary of State to develop programmes on climate change
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adaptation.544 With the completion of a UK Climate Change Risk Assessment,545 a
national adaptation programme is presently under development.546 Other unique UK
coastal climate change adaptation measures include a flood management programme and
coastal erosion risk management strategy under the Flood and Water Management Act,
2010.547 The Strategy calls for the development of shoreline management plans.548 To
date twenty-two plans have been developed that incorporate SLR projections and longterm plans for coastal defences.549 In areas where it is unviable to build community
protection, individual property owners can protect their homes by utilising “propertylevel protection.”550 The UK has adopted a comprehensive approach to ICZM
implementation via the Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009. Even though it does not
deal directly with ICZM, it envisages the holistic and integrated management of the UK
coast through novel legislative tools like marine spatial plans and creation of networks of
marine protected areas. This law also indirectly addresses coastal climate change
adaptation. Even though the potential for ICZM to manage coastal climate change
adaptation has not been fully realized, flood management in the coastal zone is an option
that is worthy of exploration by other coastal states, and in coastal South Asia, this is
particularly useful for a country like Bangladesh which finds large parts of its landmass
submerged under the water, almost every year.

7.3.5.1 Discussion
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From the above tour d’horizon on the legislative experiences on coastal zone
management, it is amply clear that states differ in their legislative approaches to ICZM
and coastal climate change adaptation. While some of these coastal laws are mundane in
nature, couched with a high degree of generality, others are more detailed legal codes that
offer comprehensive guidance for coastal zone management. Several problems, the least
of which relates to the lack of compatibility to respond to new challenges, persist in these
approaches. In fact, many of the laws discussed here are outdated and do not reflect
current realities.551
While some specifically deal with SLR and coastal climate change adaptation,
others are more indirect. And from the perspective of ICZM implementation, both federal
and unitary states exhibit certain difficulties in implementing ICZM. As seen, in federal
states due to the split jurisdiction over the land-sea continuum federal states generally
find themselves jurisdictionally handicapped in implementing land-sea integration.552
While this may not be an issue in unitary states, here the primary difficulty is
centralization of authority (this is also a problem in some of the federal states). Apart
from New Zealand and the UK, the decentralization dimension of ICZM is weak in the
unitary coastal states studied here. Even in small states there can be diversity of coastal
ecosystems, geographical features, development and urbanisation levels, and coastal
community interests, and coastal resource uses that would benefit from decentralized
management. While there is merit in developing a unified approach on how the coastline
is to be managed, coastal diversity must be respected. Accordingly, there should be
provision for a national framework in unitary states that sets out broad national objectives
under which there can be minor plans for local areas and regions. Public participation and
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has entered into memorandum of understanding (MoU) to promote ICZM with British Columbia
and Nova Scotia. Similar arrangements with other provinces are expected to follow. See also
Chircop & O’Leary, supra note 448.
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involvement of local communities is sine qua non for the success of ICZM programmes
and for augmenting adaptive capacities. Coastal laws, irrespective of unitary or federal
character must work to ensure public participation, stakeholder involvement and
decentralize coastal management. This is necessary because advocating public
participation, and stakeholder involvement for coastal zone management without
ensuring concomitant decentralization of powers defeats the very intent of this exercise.
Again the various case studies of the coastal countries identified in the pervious and
present chapters, reveal that while there can be a sophisticated array of legislative
instruments to work coastal management, certain legislative approaches to ICZM are
discernable. These are: 1) a national legislative approach to coastal zone management,
which can be sub-classified into three – a unified national legislation and usually a single
ICZM plan based on that legislation for the whole country,553 a more co-operative
approach where the federal and provincial governments legislate on coastal management
and where the provinces pattern their coastal law on the national legislation,554 where the
states/provinces have enacted coastal legislations and the national government assumes a
more active555 or passive role;556 2) where ICZM is part of a more comprehensive scheme
for natural resources management;557 3) where the coastal law is geared primarily
towards land use planning/zoning;558 4) where the accent is more on resources
utilization;559 5) where the emphasis is towards a people oriented approach to coastal
management and decentralization of coastal governance.560 However, these are not
exhaustive of all models and it may be practically impossible to pigeonhole the different
legislative approaches due to the diversity of issues that a coastal law deals with.
553
554
555
556
557
558
559

560

As seen this is usually the case in unitary systems like Sri Lanka, New Zealand, Barbados. Despite
being a federation, India and South Africa also have unified coastal laws.
See Part 7.3.1.1, above, for more on the cooperative approach as followed in the US.
For instance, in Australia, the Commonwealth has developed guidelines on ICZM implementation to
work a unified vision. See Part 7.3.2, above.
For instance, in Pakistan, the states of Sindh and Balochistan have enacted their own coastal laws
and role of the federal government is more passive. For more details, see Ch, 3, Part 3.2.2.
For instance, the sustainable development oriented approach is evident in the NZRMA. The United
Kingdom Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, reflects marine spatial planning approach.
For instance, see generally Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO19(E), 2011, India).
Coast Conservation Act 1981 (No 57 of 1981, Sri Lanka), as amended by Coast Conservation
(Amendment) Act 1988 (No 64 of 1988, Sri Lanka) and Coast Conservation (Amendment) Act 2011
(No 49 of 2011, Sri Lanka).
See the experiences of South Africa and New Zealand above, for more on this point.
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Nevertheless, the coastal laws examined above and in the previous chapters exhibit
certain definite defining features, captured by the table below.
Table 2: Selected Coastal Laws and Their Defining Features
Coastal Law

Defining Features

Australia

Framework for a National Cooperative
Approach to Integrated Coastal Zone
Management, 2003
Regard to aboriginal traditions & island
customs in preparing coastal plan;
Protecting life & property from coastal
hazards; Climate change to be considered
in preparing the state coastal management
plan; Constitution of coastal management
districts; Queensland Coastal Plan 2012

Queensland Coastal Protection and
Management Act, 1995

Preparation of coastal zone management
plans; Risk management from coastal
hazards and climate change impacts;
Temporary coastal protection works
Barbados Coastal Zone Management Act, 1998 Coastal zone management plan, Coral reef
& beach protection, Prevents fouling of
foreshore
Belize Coastal Zone Management Act, 2000
Establishment of Coastal Zone
Management Institute to carry out research
& support academic programmes on
coastal management
Integrated approach on oceans
Canada Oceans Act, 1996
management; Network of marine protected
areas; Oceans strategy; Nested approach
Public access; Variable definition to the
Cuba Decree-Law Number 212-2000
coastal zone; Environmental regulatory
regimen for keys & peninsulas; Protective
works against SLR not to damage the
coastal zone
EU Recommendation on ICZM, 2002
Eight ICZM principles, National
stocktaking & development of national
strategies
European Union Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Linking marine spatial planning with
Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning and ICZM; Integrated coastal management
New South Wales Coastal Protection Act, 1979
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Integrated Coastal Management, 2013
(proposed)

strategies to account for mitigation &
adaptation to climate change; Public
participation; Cooperation with member
states & other countries

Coastal Law

Defining Features

India Coastal Regulation Zone Notification,
2011

Zoning; Marine pollution control, Public
access; Critically vulnerable coastal areas;
Hazard Lines
Protection to antiquities; Cliff protection

Israel Law for the Protection of the Coastal
Environment, 2004

Kenya
Coast Development Authority
Coast Development Authority Act, 1990
Environmental Management and Coordination Act, 1999
Mediterranean Protocol on ICZM, 2008

New Zealand Resource Management Act, 1991

Survey & an integrated national coastal
zone management plan (ICZM Action Plan
for the period 2011–2015)
Island management; Setback lines, noconstruction zones; Public participation;
Transboundary envtl. Assessments;
Development & implementation of a
common regional ICZM framework
Sustainable management; Controls on
incineration & dumping & on noise;
Climate change mitigation; Restrictions on
the use of the coastal marine area;
Provision for Coastal Policy Statement, &
regional coastal plans

Pakistan
Sindh Coastal Development Authority Act,
1994

Preparation of Master Plan; Acquisition of
property

Balochistan Coastal Development Authority
Act, 1998

South Africa National Environmental
Management: Integrated Coastal Management
Act, 2008
409

Balochistan Coastal Development
Authority; the Chief Minister of the
Province plays an imp. role; Applies to 30
kms. inland from the tide line
Sustainable coastal development; Public
access; Marine pollution; Zoning overlay;
Setback lines; Decentralised coastal
management; Estuarine management

Coastal Law

Defining Features

Sri Lanka
Coast Conservation and Coastal Resource

Coastal zone vests in the Republic; Permit
system; New tools like Coastal access
plan,

Management Act 1981 (as amended in 2011)

United Kingdom Marine and Coastal Access
Act, 2009
United States Coastal Zone Management Act,
1972
California Coastal Act, 1976

Affected areas, Beach park, Special
management areas, prohibition on coral
mining & filling up of land & water
bodies; Spatial integration
Marine policy statement & marine plans;
Marine licensing, Marine conservation
zones & networks, & Coastal access
Cooperative coastal federalism; Federal
consistency; Coastal zone management
programs
Decentralized format; Local coastal
programmes; Protection of the marine
environment; Hard armouring in certain
cases

Texas (Coastal Coordination Act 1991 Dune
Protection Act, Open Beaches Act, and Coastal
Erosion Planning and Response Act, 1999)

Several
legislations
on
coastal
management; Rolling easements; Texas
Coastal Management Program; Dune
Protection; Public Access

Another point in our discussions is that there is a persistent large disjoint between the
different national approaches in applying ICZM principles and also in the degree to
which ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation has been set in terms of coastal
legislation. This chapter and the previous ones clearly reveal that nations have their own
understanding of what coastal zone management and coastal climate change adaptation
are, depending on their needs and development imperatives. Accordingly, there can be a
pluralism of approaches in legislating ICZM (to include coastal climate change
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adaptation) despite the danger that, in certain cases, these national approaches need not
necessarily reflect ICZM objectives in their true sense.561 In short, the diversity of
national situations renders it hard to effectuate legal transplants and cross pollination of
some of the legislative models (examined in this chapter) on ICZM implementation into
South Asia or into other regions as well. What this implies is that while there is a core set
of principles and elements that represent the skeletal frame of an ICZM-friendly coastal
law (also promotive of coastal climate change adaptation) that can be applied across the
board irrespective of jurisdictional differences, the various national approaches adopted
by these countries cannot necessarily be the subject of a legal transplant. In other words,
in giving effect to these principles/elements (to be identified in the next part for the
coastal South Asian nations), states in their own coastal legislations will have to temper
them depending on their national context.

7.4 CONCLUSION
In sum, two points clearly emerge from the above analysis. The first is that even though
we have countless conventions and soft-law instruments that underscore the importance
of ICZM, these conventional instruments are confined primarily to the realm of soft law
to engender and promote an integrated approach to coastal zone management. The diktats
in these soft-law instruments are primarily exhortative in nature and may not be adequate
to compel nations to move in the direction of sustainable coastal development through
ICZM. Since ICZM is dynamic and highly contextual, there are no off-the-rack legal
models that can be applied across the board and furthermore, there is no specific ICZM
template that provides direction to coastal states. While this increases the need for an
international instrument that identifies basic principles of ICZM law setting out a
template that helps to harmonize coastal climate change adaptation with an ICZM
process, an exclusive international instrument on ICZM seems far-fetched for the
moment, which increases the relevancy of national and even regional level approaches on
ICZM.
561

Even though Sri Lanka has a pioneering coastal legislation, the fact that it does very little to further
decentralization considerably waters down its effectiveness as an ICZM law. For more details on
this topic, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.4.
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Second, from these different legislative reports, it is clear that laws and legislative
frameworks play an important role in promoting and facilitating ICZM implementation
and CCCA and that there is untapped potential for law to leverage ICZM and coastal
CCCA. Optimally, a coastal law emerges as a potential antidote against unsustainable
coastal development and protects resiliency of coastal ecosystems. Accordingly, mooring
an ICZM process onto a dedicated legal framework, particularly in the South Asian
context, makes preeminently good sense as it can help to rectify the dystopian
management scenario that characterizes the South Asian coastline at present. While some
of these case studies broadly suggest how South Asian countries should move forward in
utilizing legal instruments, others offer practical methods for coastal states that are
looking for ways to protect coastal resources before they are lost forever to the rising
seas. These national reports will be relied upon in the subsequent chapters, to
progressively build the elements of a regional regime on ICZM implementation in coastal
South Asia, one that implements CCCA via the ICZM methodology. And it must be
noted that the intention is not to effectuate legal transplants (emphasised earlier), but
rather, based on this survey and synthesis, a common vocabulary and certain legal
principles central to ICZM implementation and CCCA will be distilled, to initiate coastal
law reform at a regional level in South Asia.
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CHAPTER 8

ANALYSING THE ROLE OF LAW IN
OPERATIONALISING ICZM AND
COASTAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION

8.1 INTRODUCTION
In several of the earlier ICZM initiatives, the importance of law and legal frameworks
were not appreciated and the propping up of ICZM was left to technocrats, resource
managers, scientists, and so on, who believed that ICZM was more of a scientific or a
management tool.1 While science and management are definitely two core pillars of an
ICZM programme, there is a third one as well – law.2 Consequently, even in cases where
the most brilliant coastal management programmes and plans were produced, nonrecognition of the legal dimension has hampered progress.3
The primary objective of this chapter is to explain the role of law in
operationalising ICZM and CCCA. Divided into three sections, section 8.2, which
appears next, offers a theoretical rationale for law and dedicated coastal law statutes in
supporting the management of coastal areas and resources. In achieving this objective,
reference will made among others, to Garrett Hardin’s tragedy of the commons and
Elinor Ostrom’s polycentrism to articulate the centrality of law in coastal management.
Utilising the discussions in this and in the preceding chapter, in section 8.3, a Strength,
Weakness, Opportunity and Threats (SWOT) analysis is carried out to assess the prospect
of implementing ICZM and in securing the more important objective of coastal climate
change adaptation for sustainable coastal development thorough the instrumentality of
law. Section 8.4 analyzes some of the trends in coastal law-making and will assess the
prospects of the future of coastal law-making. The study concludes by reiterating the
importance of a dedicated legal instrument to support ICZM implementation and CCCA.

1
2

3

Robert Beckman & Brady Coleman, “Integrated Coastal Management: The Role of Law and
Lawyers” (1999) 14:4 Int’l J Mar & Coast L 491 (HeinOnline).
See generally Cormac Cullinan, Integrated Coastal Management Law: Establishing and
Strengthening National Legal Frameworks for Integrated Coastal Management, FAO Legislative
Study, No 93 (Rome: FAO, 2006).
A classical example is the situation of Bangladesh. For more details, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.3.
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8.2 UNDERSTANDING
MANAGEMENT

A

THEORETICAL BASIS

OF

LAW

FOR

COASTAL ZONE

In articulating a theoretical foundation to underscore the importance of law for
coastal commons management, particularly fom a coastal South Asian perspective, this
section draws support from one of the most influential academic writings on common
property resources (res communis) management -- Garrett Hardin’s, the tragedy of the
commons. To a certain extent, it will also rely on welfarist theories to justify a legal
frame and it examines the need for a coastal law from the perspective of sustainable
coastal development and good coastal governance.
Though traceable to Aristotle’s observation that whatever “is common to the
greatest number has the least care bestowed on it,” where “[e]veryone thinks chiefly of
his own, hardly at all of the common interest,”4 Hardin’s thesis revolutionalized ideas
relating to common property resources management. He believed that individuals acting
in self-interest in seeking to maximize profits emanating from the maximum use of a
common resource would destroy collective wealth, since they have no incentive to
conserve and protect the resource.5 The tragedy of the commons envisages a situation that
teaches us that individuals in their self-interest will consume, deplete and degrade a
common resource that belongs to all, right up to the point of its disintegration. In other
words, all share the cost of the exploitative actions of the appropriator who indulges in
over-exploitation to the detriment of others. In the process, externalities are imposed
upon each other while the benefit goes entirely to the appropriator.6 Hardin’s commons
fable has been applied to explain the degradation of a wide variety of common property
resources such as fish,7 forest,8 water resources,9 and even to spectrum10 and knowledge11
– resources that are used by all yet which no-one can truly claim as his or her own.
4
5
6
7
8

Aristotle, Politics, HWC, Davis, ed, translated by Benjamin Jowett (New York: Cosimo Classics,
2008) at 57.
Shi-Ling Hsu, “What is a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign Spending
Problem” (2005) 69 Alb L Rev 75 at 78-79 (QL).
Ibid at 77.
Ibid.
See generally Kirsten Westerland, “Nepal's Community Forestry Program: Another Example of the
Tragedy of the Commons or a Realistic Means of Balancing Indigenous Needs with Forestry
Conservation” (2007) 18 Colo J Int’l Envtl L & Pol'y 189 (HeinOnline).
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Hardin illustrates the tragedy by forwarding a pastoral setting of cattle grazing. To
draw maximum advantage of the free-grazing opportunity, cattle owners have an
incentive to increase the size of their herds.12 At some point, the aggregate effect of such
individual decisions is that the grazing will exceed the capacity of the commons and
degradation will set in.13 By continuing to increase the number of animals which graze on
the commons, the benefit derived from the grass eaten by each additional animal goes
entirely to the animal’s owner (the appropriator), but the ‘externalized costs’ (or, to put it
simply, ‘the burden’ which ensues) will be shared by all persons who use the commons. 14
Thus, allowing people unlimited use of common resources can lead to imminent
degradation and destruction of the resource. To quote Hardin:
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a
system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit -- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each
pursuing his own best interest in a society that
believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in
a commons brings ruin to all.15
Experiences with natural resources management, particularly in South Asia, have borne
out Hardin’s theory.16 If natural resources are held in common, costs and benefits get
externalized, leading to wastage.17 Hardin does not believe that such a tragedy can be
avoided solely through the efforts of a few conscientious and responsible citizens; thus, to
avert and overcome the depletion of the commons, Hardin advocates the need to put in
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17

Tony George Puthucherril, “Riparianism in Indian Water Jurisprudence” in Ramaswamy R Iyer,
Water and the Laws in India (New Delhi: SAGE Publications Pvt Ltd, 2009) 97 at 116.
See generally Philip J Weiser & Dale N Hatfield, “Policing the Spectrum Commons” (2005) 74
Fordham L Rev 663 (HeinOnline).
For more details, see generally Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, eds, Understanding Knowledge as
a Commons: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge: MIT, 2007).
Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162:3859 Sci 1243 at 1244 (JSTOR).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Tony George Puthucherril & Lekshmi Vijayabalan, “The Law and Practice on Ground Water
Conservation and Management – A Case Study with Specific Reference to the State of Kerala”
(Paper delivered at the National Workshop on Water Quality Management and Conservation: Role
of the Legal System, National Law School of India University, Bangalore, 16 August 2002)
[unpublished]. For more details on the over-exploitation of groundwater commons, see also Ch 2,
Part 2.5.1.
Richard J Pierce, “State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated Market: The Tragedy
of the Commons Revisited” (1987) 73 Cornell L Rev 15 at 16 (QL).
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place coercive laws and taxing devices to ensure protection of common property. 18 To
quote, “if ruin is to be avoided in a crowded world, people must be responsive to a
coercive force outside their individual psyches, a ‘Leviathan,’ to use Hobbes’s term.”19 In
fact, Hardin offered two options to correct the tragedy -- privatization or government
intervention.20 The underlying idea behind his argument is that open access need not
necessarily result in overexploitation and degradation; rather, it is only when measures
are not put in place to regulate access that overexploitation sets in. In other words,
unregulated open access is a potential factor that may lead to resource exploitation and
abuse. Accordingly, it has been suggested that a more appropriate euphemism for
Hardin’s thesis is the “tragedy of a mismanaged commons.”21
While law has traditionally been vigorous in affording protection to secure bodily
integrity and private property rights, it has been slow in securing the commons.
Nevertheless, government regulation through the instrumentality of law (Leviathan as a
possible way) is an important pathway to prevent the tragedy of rapacious exploitation
and degradation of the common pool.22 Law is an essential tool to regulate human
activities, to prevent competition, free-riding, over-harvesting and ultimately the
degradation of the commons. This is the rationale behind the enactment of wildlife
protection laws, forest conservation laws, fisheries legislations, water laws, etc. and
coastal law is no exception to this.

18

19

20

21
22

Kirsten Westerland, “Nepal's Community Forestry Program: Another Example of the Tragedy of the
Commons or a Realistic Means of Balancing Indigenous Needs with Forestry Conservation?”, Note
& Comment, (2007) 18 Colo J Int’l Envtl L & Pol’y 189 at 195 (QL).
G Hardin, “Political Requirements for Preserving our Common Heritage” in HP Brokaw, ed,
Wildlife and America: Contributions to an Understanding of American Wildlife and its
Conservation (Washington DC: Council on Environmental Quality, 1978) 310.
Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, “Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons” in
Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, eds, Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to
Practice (Cambridge: MIT, 2007) 3 at 11 [Hess & Ostrom, “Introduction"].
Bonnie J McCay, Oyster Wars and the Public Trust: Property, Law, and Ecology in New Jersey
History (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998) at 189.
See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at
8-9 (providing an overview of opinions by different authors on the need for greater government
control on natural resource systems); see also Amy Sinden, “The Tragedy of the Commons and the
Myth of a Private Property Solution” (2007) 78 U Colo L Rev 533 at 553 (HeinOnline).
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Apart from legal regulation of the commons, Hardin also advocated privatization of
common property as a tool to overcome the tragedy.23 It has been suggested “the only
way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in natural resources and wildlife is to end the
common-property system by creating a system of private property rights.”24 However,
privatization of common property resources is not akin to privatizing a utility like a stateowned airline company, for such a step can accentuate economic and social inequities
and throw life out of gear for millions particularly, in South Asia. Already the coastal
communities in this region are struggling to ensure that they continue to enjoy public
access to coastal spaces.25 As well, to ensure sustainable coastal development, it is
necessary that the commons, which in many countries is increasingly passing on to
private hands, be managed in a manner that furthers “the greatest happiness of the
greatest number.”26
While benefit-maximization lies at the heart of the utilitarian principle, and despite
being a theory of welfare, there is an element of injustice implicit, particularly in the
context of distribution of scarce resources. Between two claimants for a resource,
utilitarianism informs us to prefer the one who stands to draw maximum benefit from the

23

24
25

26

This seems to be the pattern for coastal development in the province of Nova Scotia in Canada,
where private owners own nearly 80 per cent of the coast. Nova Scotia, Coastal Development: The
2009 State of Nova Scotia’s Coast Report, online: Nova Scotia Canada <http://www.gov.ns.c
a/coast/documents/st ate-of-the-coast/WEB_CD.pdf>.
Ostrom, supra note 22 at 12 (quoting Robert J Smith who states that the only way to avoid the
tragedy of the commons in natural resources is to create private property rights).
Ibid at 22. In India, since time immemorial, common lands have inhered in village communities.
Known by different names like grama sabha land, gram panchayat land, poramboke land, etc. these
public utility lands were used for the common benefit of the villagers for centuries. Even when
states passed legislations that expressly vested such lands in the state, the implied understanding was
that this did not per se divest the common rights of villagers over the land. This was the legal
position for long and subsequently states through local laws handed over the management of these
lands to the gram sabhas/gram panchayats. These lands are generally treated as inalienable to
preserve their status as community land. However, in exceptional cases, the gram sabhas/gram
panchayats could lease these lands to landless labourers and to the members of scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes. However, in large parts of the country common village lands are being grabbed by
unscrupulous elements and in many cases it is done with the active connivance of the state. In many
states there is not an inch of land left for the common use of village communities, even though the
same may exist on paper. Jagpal Singh v Punjab, (2011) [2011] (11) SCC 396 (India SC). In this
case the order of the collector and the gram panchayat who illegally regularized unauthorized
constructions on a village pond that was forcefully occupied by unscrupulous elements was set
aside. Ibid.
Jeremy Bentham, JH Burns & HLA Hart, A Fragment on Government (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988) at xiv.
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resource.27 It is in this context that we have to approach egalitarian welfarist theories,
which give “absolute priority … to improving the welfare of someone who is worse off,
as opposed to improving the welfare of someone who is better off.”28 Here,
“prioritarianism,” which seeks to mix the benefit-maximizing principle of utilitarianism
with the equalizing principle of welfare egalitarianism, assumes relevance. 29 In seeking to
secure “prioritarianism,” legal intervention in the form of a coastal law may be necessary
to iron out inequitable creases to ensure maximization of benefits, giving equal weight to
the welfare of all, particularly to the welfare of impoverished coastal communities.
Coastal law exists for the promotion of the common good of the coastal community and
therefore has the trappings of social welfare legislation as well.
In contrast to what was advocated by Hardin, Elinor Ostrom, a leading scholar on
common property resources, contends that individuals naturally organize themselves on
the basis of internally agreed-upon rules.30 In so doing, they resolve common-pool
resource problems without the dominance of a central government or reliance on private
property rights to ensure sustainable management of resources. 31 Based on this premise,
Ostrom advocated a third solution to ensure the sustainable utilization of commonly held
resources without degrading them – management by the community, or “polycentrism.”32
27

28
29
30
31
32

Mark S Stein, “Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique” (2009) 50:2 BCL Rev 489 at 490, 493
(HeinOnline) (referring to utilitarianism as the unweighted maximization principle); see also Selene
Brett, “Rawls Theory of Justice and His Criticism of Utilitarianism” (1994) UCL Jurisprudence Rev
59 at 65-66 (HeinOnline).
Stein, ibid at 492.
Ibid at 493.
Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner & James Walker, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources (US:
University of Michigan Press, 1994) at 5.
Ibid.
See Escotet Foundation, Interview with Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, online: ESCOTET
FOUNDATION, Blog, Foundation News <http://escotet.org/>. It is
the idea that there should be multiple centers of management
authority for resources because the rule-sets for different
governance systems (say, the federal government, local
government, and participatory commons) can each play
important, differentiated roles. In a polycentric system, the
principle of subsidiarity holds that governance should occur at
the lowest, most decentralized level possible in order to be
locally adaptive; one-size-fits-all governance structures tend to
be less effective, less flexible, and more coercive.
David Bollier, “The Future of International Environmental Law: A Law of the Ecological
Commons?” in Jonathan C Carlson, Geoffrey WR Palmer & Burns H Weston, eds, International
Environment Law and World Order: A Problem-Oriented Coursebook 3d ed (Minnesota: West
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By utilizing the “institutional analysis and development framework,”33 she identified
eight design principles that underlined successful commons self-governance, namely: 1) a
clearly demarcated CPR; 2) the necessity for congruence between governance structure
and attendant rules with local needs and conditions; 3) the participation of most resource
appropriators in decisions made through collective-choice arrangements; 4) a system for
self-monitoring the behavior of members; 5) punishment of violations with graduated
sanctions; 6) low-cost and easy-to-access conflict resolution mechanisms to address
issues; 7) the acknowledgement by external authorities of resource appropriators’ right to
self-govern; and 8) the organization and enforcement of rules through multiple layers of
nested enterprises in the case of larger common-pool resources.34
Prior to colonization, most non-Western societies, like those in South Asia, were
grounded on the concept of communal rather than individualistic rights, and activities
were regulated primarily by informal rather than the formal laws and diktats (non-state
law). Religion, customs, usages, traditions, and kinship played an important role in
determining the tenor of common property management.35 This aspect could be seen in
ancient Indian jurisprudence, where certain rudimentary elements of the concept of public
trust were predominant.36 Kings were often regarded as trustees of resources like land,
water, forests, etc., and it was their dharma to promote and foster communal ownership
and utilization of resources.37

33
34
35

36

37

Group, 2012) I-Ch 14-p 1 at 12-13.
Bollier, ibid at 12.
Hess & Ostrom, “Introduction”, supra note 20 at 7.
Ostrom, supra note 22 (referring to the rules developed in the fishing village of Mawelle in Sri
Lanka relating to the use of beach seines). Even though outside the formal legal process, villages
still continue to play an important role in regulating artisanal fishing. See generally Maarten
Bavinck, “Caste Panchayats and the Regulation of Fisheries along Tamil Nadu’s Coromandel
Coast” (2001) 36:13 Economic & Political Weekly 1088 (JSTOR).
Participatory natural resources management where the community managed and preserved sacred
groves, village tanks, and pasture lands was a major feature of ancient Indian society. Even though it
was the temples or the kings that generally owned tanks, their management was left to the users.
Arabinda Mishra et al, Common Property Water Resources: Dependence and Institutions in India’s
Villages (New Delhi: TERI Press, 2008) at 14.
In ancient India, kings were more than a trustee; since the king had to sacrifice his own personal
comforts and interests for the welfare of his subjects. AS Altekar, State and the Government in
Ancient India (Delhi: 2001) at 379. The principle of trusteeship of earth resources is evident from
the following sermon delivered by Mahinda, son of Emperor Asoka to the Sri Lankan king
Devanampiya Tissa, while was on a hunting trip. The sermon eventually led to the Sri Lankan king
embracing Buddhism. Mahinda sermonized: “O great King, the birds of the air and the beasts have
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With colonialism, there was a sea change in the legal position. Driven by the
necessity to exploit natural resources in its colonies, new legal doctrines like the act of
state were developed by English courts.38 Under this principle, any inhabitant could make
good in the municipal courts established by the new sovereign only those rights which the
new sovereign recognised through his/her officers. Rights guaranteed and enjoyed under
the predecessor rulers held no legal sanctity.39 Even if in a treaty of cession it was
stipulated that certain rights could be enjoyed, this could not per se confer a valid and
sound title, which could be enforced in the new ruler’s municipal courts.40 As a result,
customary rights hitherto enjoyed by local communities over resources management
could continue only if these were not anachronistic to the economic interests and designs
of the new sovereign and that of the market.41 Legislative initiatives have also lent a hand
to fortify state monopoly. Soon, the British began to exercise a stranglehold control over
natural resources in its colonies in South Asia not as a proprietor but as a sovereign.42

38

39
40
41

42

as equal a right to live and move about in any part of the land as thou. The land belongs to the
people and all living beings; thou art only the guardian of it.” Justice Weeramantry identifies this as
the first principle of modern environmental law. Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 101-02 (separate opinion of vice-president Weeramantry).
Applying these principles the claim of the appellants that they were proprietors of certain lands,
which in 1860 was ceded to the British government by the Peshwa under a treaty was dismissed.
Vajesingji Joravarsingji v Secty of State for India in Council, (1924), [1924] LR 51, Ind App 357.
Ibid.
Ibid.
For instance, see AM Bhattarai, “Developing Decentralised Institutions: Towards a Legal
Framework” in Anil Agarwal, Indira Khurana & Sunita Narain, Making Water Everybody’s
Business (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 2001) 333 at 333-35. In Bangladesh, it
is reported that there were 13,000 public inland fisheries known as Jalmohals. During the British
colonial rule, in 1793, the 'permanent settlement' was affected to settle these fisheries with a view to
maximize state revenue from feudal lords. In turn, the feudal lords could impose nominal fees from
the fishers for fishing rights and access to common pool resources. This system continued till the
enactment of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, which is “[a]n Act to provide for the
acquisition by the State of the interests of rent-receivers and certain other interests in land in
Bangladesh and to define the law relating to tenancies to be held under the State after such
acquisition and other matters ….” Accordingly, the Zamindar (feudal lord system) was abolished
and these fisheries became government property under the administrative control of the ministry of
land. Naisruddin Md Humayun, Can Community-Based Participation of Coastal Fishers Contribute
to Sustainable Management and Development of Coastal and Marine Fisheries Resources of
Bangladesh? (MMM Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2004) [unpublished] at 23-24.
For instance, in the water law context, beginning with the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act,
1873, numerous enactments have established public ownership of surface waters and government
control of their use, development and distribution. This fundamental principle is incorporated in all
irrigation statutes. Further, under Indian Law as groundwater is treated as a chattel attached to land,
the government in exercise of its sovereign powers of eminent domain could acquire a land laden
with groundwater. See also Alice Jacob, “Modernisation of Indian Water Laws” (1977) 1 Academy
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Another important development that virtually re-wrote the rules of societal engagement
was the introduction of European feudal ideas into these societies.43
Even after de-colonization, this major paradigm shift in natural resources
management still continues to hold roots in South Asia.44 The constructive role essayed
by individuals and local communities in natural resources management for thousands of
years witnessed steady erosion due to pervasive state management. Consequently, the
traditional wisdom accumulated over this long period is slowly being lost.45 In fact, the
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L Rev 154 at 157. These far reaching legal changes are not limited to South Asia alone. In Africa,
for instance, pastoral land is held in trust by the living for future generations and pastoralists are
considered as custodians of the commons. However, this concept is now little understood in Africa
by national governments and by funding agencies. Customary pastoral land tenure systems have
been replaced and lands, which were, once managed sustainably, are being alienated and degraded
and the root cause of many of these changes can be traced to colonialism. For instance, in Uganda,
the Crown Lands Ordinance, 1903, transformed land tenure by empowering British colonial
authorities to alienate customary lands and issue freehold and leasehold titles. Even after decolonization, African states continue to utilise legislative instruments to further disempower pastoral
communities by taking over their lands. Charles R Lane, ed, Custodians of the Commons: Pastoral
Land Tenure in East and West Africa (London: Earthscan, Publications Ltd, 1998) at 1-19.
Even before the British rule, feudalism was prevalent in Indian society. However, it underwent a
radical transformation during the British rule and by the time of India’s independence there were
nearly three well established land revenue systems, namely, the Zamindari, the Rywotari and
Mahalwari. The cumulative effect of this societal restructuring tainted with inequity was that local
communities were alienated from their land and natural resources. For more details, see Urmila
Sharma & Sanjeev Kumar Sharma, Indian Political Thought (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and
Distributors, 1996) at 66; MH Qureshi & S Aparna, “Quest for Land Reforms in Kerala” in Noor
Mohammad, ed, Socio-Economic Dimensions of Agriculture, New Dimensions in Agricultural
Geography, vol 3 (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co, 1992) 109 at 109-10.
The Constitution of India provides for the continuance of laws in force in the territory of India
immediately before its commencement unless the same has been altered, amended or repealed by a
competent legislature or other competent authority. Constitution of India 1950, art 372 [Constitution
of India]. Accordingly, several colonial legislations that fortify state monopoly over natural
resources to the exclusion of communities continue to operate to this day. The Northern India Canal
and Drainage Act, 1873, states that “the state government is entitled to use and control for public
purposes the waters of all rivers and streams flowing in natural channels, and of all lakes and other
natural collections of still water ….” (No 8 of 1873, India), pmbl.
The State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, abolished the feudal system in respect of public inland
fisheries in Bangladesh. However, for more revenue the government continued to lease the
Jalmohals by leasing fishing rights to the elite and influential persons through open tender. To
increase profits, the lease-holders encouraged overexploitation, and the fishers were treated as mere
labourers working on low wages at the mercy of the leaseholders. Humayun, note 47 at 24.
Aarthi Sridhar, “Eminent domain, absolute doubt: Crusade for Goa's comunidades” Infochange
(December 2010), online: Infochange, News & Features <http://infochangeindia.org/>. In the
coastal state of Goa, India, there are nearly 223 comunidades covering nearly 70 per cent of the
state. The term comunidade was given by the Portuguese to village communities, which prior to this
contact were known as gaunkars .The Portuguese entered into a treaty with the gaunkars to protect
their lands and also guaranteed continuation of their customary laws. All through these periods, the
records state that the sovereignty of the comunidade was recognised and their absolute ownership
over their lands was unquestioned. The Portuguese, also codified these customary laws - Codigo
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tragedy of the loss of the commons mindset in such societies has resulted in the dilution
of communal rights, the intrusion of the idea of private property, the reliance on marketbased economic systems for resources management, the pursuit of more intensive models
for economic development and, more recently, attempts to reconfigure and integrate
subsistence economies into a so-called globalised economy.46 While a legalistic,
adversarial and formal approach to resources management definitely has merits, in terms
of prescribing a legal frame for resources management and in securing entitlements over
the same, in certain cases, these formal legalistic regimes can inadvertently exclude local
communities from enjoying entitlements over resources. Often, local and traditional
coastal communities in South Asia find themselves as having limited de facto control
over resources and rarely do they have any de jure rights over these resources, as these
are generally controlled by the state under its sovereign powers. 47 Consequently,
autochthonous communities find themselves dangerously perched from a legal point of
view, as whatever usufructuary rights they enjoy over resources can easily be trampled

46
47

Das Comunidades. Even though this system was primarily concerned with agricultural protection, it
also afforded protection to the ramponkars – the traditional shore seine fisherfolk of Goa. Despite its
patriarchal, this system had several positives. However, these systems have been pushed to the
periphery by new formal systems. For more details, see ibid.
Similarly, in the water management context, the constructive role-played by individuals and local
communities for thousands of years is steadily eroding due to pervasive state management. A
controversy of far-reaching consequence erupted in the Indian state of Rajasthan, over the
ownership of rainwater. The villagers of Lava ka Baas, initiated a scheme to harvest rain. They build
a johad (traditional check dam) with technical support from Tarun Bharat Sangh, a nongovernmental organisation. The structure was built on the community grazing lands of Lava ka
Baas. Trouble erupted when the gram panchayat invited the chief minister of the state to inaugurate
the structure. The water bureaucracy found that the structure violated a 1910 Agreement between
princely states of Alwar and Bharatpur, both of which were now part of the state of Rajasthan.
Furthermore, as the villagers did not seek permission from the Irrigation Department before
construction of the dam, it was found that there was violation of the Rajasthan Irrigation and
Drainage Act, 1954. Tarun Bharat Sangh was given 15 days to remove the structure, failing which
action was to be taken. Timely intervention by the then Chief Minister of Rajasthan stopped the
demolition. Appalling was the attitude of the then Rajasthan irrigation minister Ms. Kamla Beniwal
who went out of her way to lay claim for the irrigation department over every drop of water received
through rain. She has been reported as saying that, “Water resources do not belong to people or to
the society. They belong to the government.” Report, "Who owns the river?" Down To Earth (31
July 2001), online: Down To Earth <http://www.downtoearth.org.in/>; Tony George Puthucherril,
Water Resources Management Law: A Case Study with Reference to the State of Kerala (M Phil
Thesis, WB National University of Juridical Sciences, India, 2003) [unpublished).
The evils of unbridled capitalism and socio-economic deprivation are the root cause of insurgency in
India. Nandini Sundar v Chattisgarh, (2011) [2011] AIR SC 2839 (India SC).
A classical example of such an approach is evident in the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972; see also
Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill, 2005 (No 158 of 2005, India), statement of
objects and reasons.
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upon by the state and extinguished.48
While the right to access resources is an overwhelming necessity determined by the
need to survive and progress, community rights are often viewed as anathema to
conservation objectives.49 There is now a growing realization that this approach has
several flaws, and there is a tendency to revert back to more community-based and
decentralized management systems and afford recognition to non-state law.50 Such
measures can definitely secure livelihood opportunities, augment adaptive capacities and,
more importantly, contribute to sustainable coastal development.51 As alluded to in
48

49

50

51

It has been reported from India that large developmental activities – from housing to ports – have
encroached the habitats of fisherfolk and affected their livelihoods in Versova in Mumbai city,
Machlipattnam on the Andhra Pradesh coast and Mundra in Gujarat. India, Ministry of Environment
& Forests, Final Frontier: Agenda to Protect the Ecosystem and Habitat of India’s Coast for
Conservation and Livelihood Security, Report of the Expert Committee on the Draft Coastal
Management Zone (CMZ) Notification, Constituted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests,
Under the Chairmanship of Prof. MS Swaminathan (New Delhi: Ministry of Environment & Forests,
2009) at 18 [India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Final Frontier].
For instance, Jambudwip is a small island declared as a reserved forest that lies in the estuary of the
Hooghly river along the Bay of Bengal coast. This island belongs to India and was used since 1960s
by fishers as a convenient transit point to dry the fish. Satellite imagery showed that despite over
these long years of use, the island lost only 200 hectares of mangrove forest, out of its 2,000
hectares. Despite pleas by the fishing community (since nearly 10,000 fishers used to use this island)
that they be permitted to continue to use the island, the Supreme Court of India based on the report
of the Central Empowered Committee disallowed fishers from using the island, ostensibly to protect
the mangroves. See generally MK Jiwrajka for Central Empowered Committee, Report on
Jambudwip (New Delhi: CEC, 2002) see also India, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Final
Frontier, ibid at 23.
For instance in Bangladesh, to manage the Jalmohals, community‐ based fisheries management
project was developed as a participatory fisheries management programme implemented in two
phases (1996-2001 and 2001-2006). This project has the overall objective to sustainably improve the
livelihoods of poor people dependent on aquatic resources. Iqbal Kabir & S Rizwana Hassan, Legal
Issues Pertaining to Community Based Fisheries Management, Conference Paper 05, (Bangladesh:
Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers’ Association, [nd]) at 6. The need for community based
management approaches is gaining currency in other parts of the world as well. For instance, see
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (S Afr), No 108 of 1996, s 152 (outlining the
objectives of local government).
For instance, when India decided to revamp its coastal law, the Coastal Regulation Zone
Notification, 1991, and in light of the strong opposition to the draft Coastal Management Zone
Notification, (SO No1070(E), of 2008), the national government appointed an expert committee
under the chairmanship of M.S. Swaminathan to advise on the policy and legal framework for the
ICZM. Considering the fact that fisherfolk in India are fast loosing control over coastal resources,
this committee recommended the enactment of a special legislation to protect the rights of
traditional fisherfolk. This is perhaps the primary reason that has led to the present impasse as far as
securing the rights of the fisherfolk are concerned. Had the principles of this law also been
incorporated into the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 2011, the approach could have been
more holistic. The draft Traditional Coastal and Marine Fisherfolk (Protection of Rights) Act, 2009,
recognises the following as the rights of fisherfolk: right of ownership and access to areas,
traditional rights customarily enjoyed by the traditional fisherfolk, right of access to biodiversity and
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chapter six, decentralized community-based management is an integral component of
ICZM programmes and offers an interesting paradigm to the management of commonpool coastal resources, which entails fewer conflicts and is more sustainable in the long
run.52 While there is merit in empowering local communities and giving them a larger say
in natural resources management, and in affording recognition to non-state law
(customary law), due to the peculiar social milieu in South Asia (where the undercurrents
of the caste system and patriarchal norms, though proscribed at a normative level, still
persist),53 it is possible that women and communities belonging to lower castes can be
excluded from decision-making processes and from enjoying their rightful share of
coastal resources. Consequently, to ensure that all communities are adequately
represented and the management process is more inclusive, reliance has to be placed on
social engineering role of law to correct inequities in societal relations.54

52
53

54

community right to intellectual property and traditional knowledge, etc. The draft law calls upon the
state governments to provide for schools, hospitals, net mending yards, disaster warning centres,
roads, etc. For the text of the draft document, see Traditional Coastal and Marine Fisherfolk
(Protection of Rights) Act, 2009, s 3, online: Ministry of Environment & Forests
<http://moef.nic.in/>. Another vital provision provides that the panchayat can determine the nature
and extent of individual or community rights or both that are enjoyed by traditional fisherfolk. They
are to prepare a map delineating the area along with a list of attendant rights accruing to the
fisherfolk and are also to pass a resolution to that effect. The concerned state government constitutes
an Executive Committee to examine the resolution passed by the panchayat and thereafter it
prepares a record of the rights accorded to traditional fisherfolk. Ibid, s 5.
Laurent Mermet & Raphaël Billé, “Integrated Coastal Management at the Regional Level: Lessons
from Toliary, Madagascar” (2002) 45 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 41 (ScienceDirect).
Low caste Hindus were traditionally involved in full time fishing and developed institutions to
protect and conserve fisheries but with the entry of landless, marginal and unemployed Muslim
farmers, the fishing dynamics is changing. Humayun, supra note 41 at 24. The Indian Constitution
abolishes untouchability and its practice in any form. Constitution of India, supra note 44, art 17;
see also the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 (No 33
of 1989, India); Bavinck, supra note 35 (pointing out that sea fishing is primarily a caste based
occupation); see also Arumugam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 6 SCC 405 (decrying and
declaring illegal Khaap Panchayats which encourages the honour killings of those who indulge in
inter-caste marriages).
The social engineering role of law can be utilised to support measures aimed at affirmative action. In
the present case, this can take the form of reservations in local bodies to women and to minorities
and other lower castes. The experience of India in this regard is illustrative. Even though Mahatma
Gandhi described villages as being the heart and soul of India, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the father of
India’s Constitution was of the opinion that village republics were the primary reason for its
ruination. The village according to him was “… a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow
mindedness and communalism.” Consequently, the Constitution of India as it originally stood
provided no recognition to villages in the scheme of governance, except as an unenforceable
directive in article 40. Almost four decades later, in 1993, the Constitution was amended via the
Constitutional (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992 to introduce Part IX into the Constitution
providing recognition to local self-government institutions (panchayati raj institutions) in the
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Laws and related institutional mechanisms play important roles in facilitating
sustainable development. As chapter 8 of Agenda 21 states:
8.13. Laws and regulations suited to country-specific
conditions are among the most important instruments
for transforming environment and development
policies into action, not only through “command and
control” methods, but also as a normative framework
for economic planning and market instruments. Yet,
although the volume of legal texts in this field is
steadily increasing, much of the lawmaking in many
countries seems to be ad hoc and piecemeal, or has
not been endowed with the necessary institutional
machinery and authority for enforcement and timely
adjustment.
8.14. While there is continuous need for law
improvement in all countries, many developing
countries have been affected by shortcomings of laws
and regulations. To effectively integrate environment
and development in the policies and practices of each
country, it is essential to develop and implement
integrated, enforceable and effective laws and
regulations that are based upon sound social,
ecological, economic and scientific principles. It is
equally critical to develop workable programs to
review and enforce compliance with the laws,
regulations and standards that are adopted. Technical
support may be needed for many countries to
accomplish these goals. Technical cooperation
requirements in this field include legal information,
advisory services and specialized training and
institutional capacity-building.
8.15 The enactment and enforcement of laws and
regulations (at the regional, national, state/provincial
governance scheme. The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act 1992, (India), online: India
Code: Legislative Department <http://indiacode.nic.in>. Taking into account caste realities, this
amendment introduced article 243D which reserves seats to Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribe members and to their women. Similarly, offices of the chairpersons in the panchayats are to
be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the state
legislatures may by law determine. The amendment also introduced eleventh schedule (article
243G), which confers substantial law making powers on these bodies some of which are relevant to
coastal management (e.g., fisheries, soil conservation, social forestry and farm forestry, minor
irrigation, water management and watershed development, poverty alleviation programmes,
maintenance of community assets). See also The Constitution (One Hundred and Eighth)
Amendment Bill, 2008 proposes to amend the Constitution to reserve 33 per cent of all seats in the
Lok Sabha (House of the People), and in all state legislative assemblies for women. There is strong
opposition to this amendment and it is still hanging in the air. (No XXX-C of 2008, India).
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or local/municipal level) are also essential for the
implementation of most international agreements in
the field of environment and development, as
illustrated by the frequent treaty obligation to report
on legislative measures.
In fact the role of law in facilitating development can be assessed on the basis of the
following five models. The first is the idea of law as an instrument to secure social
control. Here law is viewed from a minimalist perspective and is treated as a “precondition for security and stability rather than a salient feature of development
strategies.”55 Secondly, the idea of rule of law as formal legality requires limitations on
state power and accountability on the part of governments. Moreover, formal legality
“requires that law should be general, prospective, public, clear, and certain.”56 In the third
model, law is regarded as a facilitator of laissez faire and free markets. Even though the
core idea is that least state intervention is the sole pathway to wealth creation, since the
1990’s, even in free market societies, the instrumentality of law in facilitating
development is gaining greater importance, particularly in protecting property rights,
securing enforcement of contracts, facilitating commerce, and promoting foreign direct
investment. This new role received an entirely new dimension with the emergence of the
idea that market reform has to be in consonance with human rights, good governance and
democracy. In other words, liberalism stands “chastened.”57 As far as the fourth model is
concerned, law is treated as multifunctional phenomenon, i.e., it is “… relevant to
development in various ways at a number of levels.”58 Finally, in the rights-based
approach, certain human rights such as right to life, the right to live in a clean
environment, are treated as enforceable legal rights in contra-distinction to these being
classified as unenforceable moral rights.59
A coastal law comports to nearly all the above the identified models. On the one
hand, it can provide necessary pre-conditions for security and stability in the coastal
zone, while on the other; it can be multifunctional catering to and harmonizing a wide
55
56
57
58
59

William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 330-32.
Ibid at 332-36.
Ibid at 336-40.
Ibid at 340-46.
Ibid at 346-48.
426

range of interests. It can promote rule of law by ensuring that coastal governance is
subject to rules and there is accountability. In a similar vein, it can promote the operation
of free markets in line with chastened liberalism, and more importantly, it can facilitate a
rights based approach to coastal management, seeking to secure inter alia, the rights of
coastal communities to live in a clean coastal environment and the right to livelihood.60
In short, coastal law plays a pivotal role in facilitating development. As well, a legal
framework can facilitate the implementation of several of the core principles of
sustainable development, like the precautionary principle, the polluter pays and intergenerational equity.61
Theoretical justification for a coastal law can also be drawn from “good
environmental governance,” which has universal recognition as being sine qua non for
sustainable development.62 This implies the need for nurturing democratic institutions
responsive to people’s needs, affording respect to the rule of law, implementation of anticorruption measures, promotion of gender equality, ensuring decentralization, balancing
economic development, with sound environmental management and social justice. When
viewed from the perspective of the coastal zones, “good coastal governance” essentially
conveys an identical message63 and it is in this context that one has to approach the
concept of ICZM. Here coastal governance sets out the agenda within which management
(ICZM) has to occur.64 In strengthening good governance, laws and legal frameworks
60
61

62

63

64

See generally chapters 3 and 7 for more on the role of law as a tool to further development.
See Federal Sustainable Development Act, SC 2008, c 33; For a coastal law that implements
sustainable development principles see National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal
Management Act, (S Afr), No 24 of 2008 [SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act].
“Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development” in UN, Report of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September
2002, A/CONF.199/20* (New York: UN, 2002) at 8, ¶4. “[E]ffective governance at the local,
subnational, national, regional and global levels representing the voices and interests of all is critical
for advancing sustainable development.” UN RIO+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development, The Future We Want, A/CONF.216/L.1*, 19 June 2012, ¶76.
See generally Stephen Bloye Olsen, “A Practitioner’s Perspective on Ecosystem Coastal
Governance” in Erlend Moksness, Einar Dahl & Josianne Støttrup, eds, Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
Ibid at 253. Olsen states that
governance probes, the fundamental goals and the institutional
processes and structures that are the basis for planning and
decision making. Governance addresses the values, policies, laws
and institutions by which a set of issues is addressed.
Management, in contrast, is the process by which human and
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play a critical role and good coastal governance is no exception to this. This is so
because, “[e]nvironmental [g]overnance comprises the rules, practices, policies and
institutions that shape how humans interact with the environment.”65

8.2.1 Remarks
One of the major points that emerge from the above analysis, is that to prevent the
tragedy of the coastal commons, recourse can be had to the regulatory and coercive
nature of law. Here, law prescribes rules for regulating the management of the coastal
commons to ensure that all users conduct themselves rationally, that free-riders are
eliminated, and that the resource is sustainably utilized not only for the present but also
for the future. A second major point is that while privatization is as yet another mode to
prevent the tragedy, in certain situations this can lead to undesirable consequences and
inequities, necessitating legal intervention. In securing the greatest happiness of the
greatest number of people in respect of coastal areas and resources, a coastal law in line
with prioritarianism has to ensure that the interests of those in the lowest rung are also
accommodated. A third point is that sustainable coastal development and good coastal
governance also mandate the need for a legal basis to translate several postulates
enshrined in a management process into specific actions (e.g., construction of a sea wall
and acquisition of private property for the same, regulating marine and coastal pollution
and related punishments).
In sum, the simplest argument for an exclusive coastal law framework, then, is that
since the ultimate objective of the state is to maximize the welfare and wellbeing of its
citizens, in consonance with pareto optimality and to eliminate rent seeking, the coastal
law has to ensure that people are made better off or at least leaving none worse off. In
such a situation, a coastal law emerges as an expression of the reasonable expectations of
a coastal community, an instrument to avoid harm while seeking to advance the rights of

65

material resources are harnessed to achieve a known goal within
a known institutional structure…. Governance … questions the
fundamental goals of human society and sets the stage within
which management occurs.…[T]he transformations underway in
our planet’s coastal regions must therefore be defined as
challenges of governance rather than the more traceable and
familiar challenges of management. Ibid at 257-58.
UNEP, Environmental Governance, Brochure, online: UNEP, Environmental Governance,
Publications <http://www.unep.org/>.
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the community residents to life, property, a clean and healthy coastal environment,
development, and overall well-being. Thus at least at a theoretical level there is sufficient
rationale that law and legal frameworks can play an important role in facilitating an
ICZM process. Based on this theoretical analysis, and on the national case studies alluded
to in the previous chapter, we proceed to further appreciate the importance of a legal
framework for coastal management via a SWOT.

8.3 THE NEED FOR AN ICZM LEGAL FRAMEWORK: SWOT ANALYSIS
Two questions that invariably crop up in discussions on coastal law reform are, firstly,
“Can any purpose be served by adding new laws onto the environmental law statute
book?” and secondly, “Why do we need a dedicated coastal law, when there is already a
potpourri of legislations and rules to govern different aspects of the coastal
environment?”66
Poor internalization of the laws, ineffective enforcement due to lack of personnel,
lax monitoring, and absence of resources are often cited as main reasons for the sorry
state of environmental and resources legislation enforcement, particularly in an
economically developing region like South Asia. In such a scenario, will a new coastal
law make any path-breaking changes or will it also be reduced to a paper tiger hamstrung
by ills that plague the system? Most South Asian countries have generally been
parsimonious in enacting environmental and natural resources laws. In India, for
example, apart from a few antiquated colonial legislations that had only indirect
application to the environment, there were no environmental protection laws per se for a
long time.67 The proverbial leap of faith occurred only after the Stockholm Conference
and later with the Bhopal gas leak tragedy (similar is the case with several other
66

67

The doctoral committee posed these two critical questions. Both these complement one of the
primary research questions that guides this thesis, namely, “Do laws and legislative frameworks play
any role in promoting and facilitating the implementation of ICZM and CCCA, thereby contributing
to SCD? And, if yes, what is that role?.” See Ch 1, Part 1.3.
The three countries in the Indian sub-continent, namely, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh due to their
common colonial past even now (subject to country based amendments) share some of the British
introduced legislations that have an environmental basis. Prominent among them are: the Forest Act,
1927 and Fisheries Act, 1897. For the text of the Forest Act, 1927, as applicable in India, Pakistan
and Bangladesh, see Indian Forest Act, 1927 (16 of 1927, India); Forest Act, 1927 (XVI of 1927,
Pakistan); Forest Act, 1927 (XVI of 1927, Bangladesh). For the text of the Fisheries Act, 1897 as
applicable in India and Pakistan, see Indian Fisheries Act, 1897 (4 of 1897, India); Fisheries Act,
1897 (IV of 1897, Pakistan).
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countries).68 Since then, the corpus has increased and there has been a growing penchant
to rely on the instrumentality of law as response to environmental problems, even though
the process of environmental law-making was not linear and steady.69
Today, India has a considerable volume of environmental legislations. However,
given the tardy nature of legal reform and the slackness exhibited by the administrative
machinery in balancing development and environmental protection, attention turned
towards the third limb of the state - the judiciary - to further the cause of environmental
justice. This has spurred some of the finest judicial law-making by one of the most
powerful constitutional courts in the world. The presence of laws in the statute book70
enabled citizens to approach law courts through the public interest litigation route for
orders even in the nature of ‘continuing mandamus’ to ensure compliance with the laws.71
68

69
70

71

Following Stockholm, the 42nd constitutional amendment, 1976, added entries 17A and 17B to List
III of the Seventh Schedule dealing with forests and protection of wild animals and birds. It also
added article 48A to the Constitution, which speaks about protection and improvement of
environment and safeguarding forests and wildlife. The ministry of environment and forests was
established at the central government level, and since then there has been a spate of legislative
activity on the environment front. One of the most prominent environmental laws, the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986 was enacted under entry 13, list I of schedule VII of article 253 of the
Constitution of India, 1950. Its preamble clearly states that it was enacted to implement the
decisions taken at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972. The Bhopal
Gas Leak tragedy also influenced the development of India’s environmental law. See generally
Bharat Desai, “The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Litigation: An Overview” in Asian Yearbook of
International Law, vol 3 (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) 163; Bano v Union
Carbide Corp, US Dist LEXIS 4097 (SD NY, 2003); Charanlal Sahu v India, (1989), [1990] 1 SCC
613 (India SC); Marc Galanter, “Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the
Bhopal Tragedy” (1985) 20 Texas Int'l LJ 273 (HeinOnline); Daniel Barstow Magraw, “The Bhopal
Disaster: Structuring a Solution” (1985) 57 U Colo L Rev 835 at 836 (HeinOnline).
Some of the major environmental laws are: Water Act, 1972, the Air Act, 1981, Hazardous Waste
Management and Handling Rules, 1989, and the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991.
Even in the absence of environmental laws covering a point, the writ courts could deal with the
matter. Two important developments to secure judiciary sponsored environmental justice has been
the demise of the strict rule of standing and the consequent expansion of the concept of locus standi.
Judicial ingenuity infused new meaning and content into article 21 of India’s constitution. Life no
longer meant mere animal existence; rather it means the right to live with human dignity and all that
goes along with it. Since enjoyment of pollution free air and water is absolutely essential for the
existence and full enjoyment of life, the right to a clean environment was also held to be a part of
article 21. The effect of this human right approach to environmental adjudication has been that if
any act impinges the right to a clean and healthy environment, it affords the common man a swift
and efficacious remedy under articles 32 and 226 (recourse to the writ courts). State and non-state
actors also began to be hauled up in the courts to redress environmental wrongs. Maneka Gandhi v
India, (1978), [1978] AIR 597 (India SC); Francis Coraile Mullin v Administrator, Delhi, (1981),
[1981] 1 SCC 608 (India SC); MC Mehta v India, (1986), [1987] AIR 1086 (India SC) (Oleum Gas
Leak Case).
Generally, once a judgment is delivered it is left to the executive to implement it. However, many a
time, the executive ignores the judgement and does not initiate steps rendering it a dead letter. This
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Moreover, since the right to a clean environment is treated as a fundamental human right,
citizens are better protected in matters relating to environmental degradation.72 Public
interest litigation allows standing to anyone who has an arguable interest even in
environmental protection matters. The net effect is that there is considerable awareness
amongst the general public about the need to protect the environment. Most people do
believe that, despite the imperative of economic development, a cleaner environment
improves the quality of their lives, and these beliefs have been firmly entrenched as
environmental values in Indian society. Even in Pakistan and in Bangladesh, public
interest litigation has emerged as an important tool to secure environment justice.73
Nonetheless, corruption, bureaucratic apathy, poorly drafted laws that provides
more routes to escape the legal dragnet,74 ambivalence by the state in providing necessary
resources and capacity to the state pollution control boards (tasked with the duty to
implement most of the pollution laws) are primary factors that have reduced the efficacy
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has forced aggrieved parties to bring the matter again before the courts. It was in such a situation
that the court came up with the innovation of continuing mandamus to ensure implementation of its
orders. The technique adopted is simple: rather than concluding the matter, the court keeps it alive
by issuing a series of directions from time to time and monitors compliance of its orders by the
executive. Continuing mandamus ensures that agencies perform their statutory functions.
Practically, the court takes over the role of the executive. One of the landmark cases in this regard is
T N Godavarman Thirumulkpad v India. Way back in 1995, a writ petition was filed in the Supreme
Court of India to protect a part of the Nilgiris Forest from deforestation. This matter was clubbed
with several other petitions expanding its scope from deforestation to one that dealt with the overall
forest governance in the country. The first major order was handed down in 1996, and even though
the Supreme Court has been criticized for overreach, more than 2,000 interlocutory applications
have been admitted and several hundred orders (some in the nature of judicial legislations) have
been issued and a central empowered committee has been created, which virtually manages India’s
forests. For more details, see TN Godavarman Thirumulpad v India, (1996), [1997] 2 SCC 267
(India SC) (defining the term forest); TN Godavarman Thirumulpad v India, (1997), [1997] 3 SCC
312 (India SC) (appointment of High Power Committee); TN Godavarman Thirumulpad v Ashok
Khot, (2006), [2006] 5 SCC 1 (India SC) (sentencing to imprisonment the Principal Secretary of the
Forest Department, Maharashtra state and the minister in-charge for committing willful contempt of
court orders that directed closure of un-licensed saw mills, veneer and plywood industries); TN
Godavarman Thirumulpad v India, [2012] Writ Petition (C) N0 202 (India SC) (protection of wild
boar); see generally Armin Rosencranz & Sharachchandra Lélé, “Supreme Court and India’s
Forests”, Commentary, (2008) 43:5 Economic & Political Weekly 11 (JSTOR).
See supra note 70.
See generally Jona Razzaque, “Linking Human Rights, Development, and Environment:
Experiences from Litigation in South Asia” (2007) 18 Fordham Envtl L Rev 587 (HeinOnline).
India has had a dismal record in implementing its coastal law. For more details, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.1;
see also Tony George Puthucherril, “Operationalising Integrated Coastal Zone Management and
Adapting to Sea Level Rise through Coastal Law: Where Does India Stand?” (2011) 26 Int'l J Mar
& Coast L 569 (SwetsWise).
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of environmental laws in India and in the South Asian region.75 Merely because
implementation concerns exist, using this as a ruse to prevent the adding of new laws on
resources management on the statute book is fallacious. In fact this problem can be
viewed at two levels: the first is the lack of laws to address a particular issue and the
second is poor implementation. This study is concerned only with the former case, and
clearly, lawmaking is necessary to fill-in the gaps in national legal systems, to strengthen
institutions in place or those that are emerging, and to rationalize and streamline efforts
towards sustainable coastal development.
As for the second question (regarding the need for a dedicated coastal law), it must
be pointed out that to operationalize ICZM, via, the legal route, two options are available.
The first is the non-legislative model (Bangladesh is a classical example of such an
approach), where implementation is based on an ICZM plan or policy/strategy. 76 Here,
integration between the different sectoral approaches to coastal management are affected
through these policy guidelines and related prescriptions. On the face of it, even though
this can be termed as a non-legislative approach, recourse to existing laws and regulations
is still available to steer the policy. Implementation is primarily cooperative and voluntary
and is considered to be more economical, as it entails utilizing existing tools to kick-start
the programme. However, in most cases the policy or plan of action is a statement of lofty
ideals and therefore its implementation may prove difficult. As well, there could be an
assortment of legal statutes governing different aspects of coastal areas and resources, like
laws relating to fishing and aquaculture, land-use planning and development, marine
pollution, water use, protection of the environment, forestry, biodiversity conservation,
etc.77 While these sectoral laws may impinge upon different aspects of coastal zone
management, they may not necessarily form a composite code that can further integration.
In fact, they may even entrench sectoral management by failing to take into account that
the coastal environment requires an altogether different and a distinctive legal response.78
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MC Mehta, “The Accountability Principle: Legal Solutions to Break Corruption’s Impact on India’s
Environment”, Book Excerpt, (2006) 21 J Envtl L & Litig 141 at 142-43 (HeinOnline).
See Ch 3, Part 3.2.3. For details regarding the non-legislative approach to coastal management in the
Maldives, see also Part 3.2.5.
Ibid.
Ibid. Even though the Coastal Zone Policy, 2005 of Bangladesh was a significant step in
implementing ICZM, it could not avert a large number of management-related problems that
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The complexity posed by this wide array of laws applicable to coastal areas does
not end here. Depending on the nature of the governance structure a country follows
(countries are generally categorized into federal or unitary), laws could flow from either a
single tier or from two tiers, i.e., from both the federal and provincial levels of
government (and in certain cases, even from a third tier, if there is a robust system of
local-self government).79 Again, it may be not practicable to implement an ICZM plan in
cases where it warrants restrictions on the freedom of fishers to fish or restrictions on
developing coastal land by owners. Similarly, controls in the matter of situating industries
on coastal properties are untenable unless and until these measures have adequate
statutory backing, since it may affect several basic rights, like the right to livelihood,
property, community rights, resources, etc.80 In sum, utilizing an existing and diffused
legal framework to support ICZM is fraught with dangers, and there is even the
possibility that the programme can collapse under its own weight, since conflicting
interests may pull the legal patchwork in different directions.
While it is clear that laws and legal frameworks play a central role in
operationalizing the ICZM process, a related question is whether we should repeal or
amend existing coastal legislation to attune it to ICZM objectives or enact an entirely new
law. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, rather than making extensive
amendments to existing laws, it would be advisable for a country to enact a specific
ICZM-friendly statute, setting out the fundamentals required for the development and
operation of an ICZM process. Coastal management under archaic and disparate laws,
however re-engineered, may generally be inimical to sustainable coastal development and
lead to irresponsible coastal use practices. Ultimately, however, the choice depends upon
the nation concerned.
The discussion in the preceding chapter provides ample background to underline
the importance of a coastal law to implement an ICZM process and to build necessary
linkages between coastal environment protection, development and coastal climate
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affected the coastal zone; a major one, being the inability to harmonize sectoral policies, plans and
laws. See also Kazi Shakila Islam, Xiong-Zhi Xue & Mohammed Mahabubur Rahman, "Successful
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) Program Model of a Developing Country (Xiamen,
China) – Implementation in Bangladesh Perspective" (2009) 2 J Wetlands Ecology 35-41.
For instance, see generally SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61.
Ibid, s 9 (power to acquire land).
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change adaptation. By utilising a SWOT analysis, the importance of basing ICZM
practice in terms of legislation is elucidated further.

8.3.1 Strengths
The most important strength held out by a coastal law is that it helps to reduce the rhetoric
of sustainable coastal development into precise practice, even in light of the constantly
changing coastal environment. Coastal legislation ensures that the various coastal
management efforts do not detract from the central path of sustainable development, and
thereby sets sustainable coastal development in motion. In short, a coastal law emerges as
an expression of a long-term commitment by the state to sustainable development
imperatives.81 Through specific provisions in the law, it provides an enabling
environment to help balance environmental protection, coastal development and coastal
climate change adaptation and mitigation.82 In this regard, a coastal law helps to
implement a principled approach to resource management by engrafting several of the
principles integral to sustainable development, e.g., the polluter pays principles, the
precautionary approach, the public trust doctrine, inter and intra-generational equity,
public participation, environmental impact assessments (all of which have significant
legal connotations) onto an ICZM process.83
Another advantage of a coastal statute is that it ensures clarity, consistency and
efficiency in terms of express legal parameters to work towards sustainable coastal
development. The predominant situation in most coastal countries is that coastal
management (or, for that matter, environmental management) emerges as a reactive
response to specific crises and issues. In absence of these triggers, a sustained
engagement to coastal planning and management involving a broader range of actors and
stakeholders is rarely accomplished. This ad hoc approach can be eliminated through a
coastal law. As the Latin maxim says: ignorantia juris non excusat, or ignorance of law is
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For instance see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61. For more on sustainable
coastal development, see also Ch 4, Part 4.3.
For instance, see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, ibid; see also New Coastal Zone
Management Act 1988 (No 39 of 1998, Barbados) [Barbados CZMA 1998]. Parties are to endeavour
to ensure that their national legal instruments include criteria for sustainable use of the coastal zone.
Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean, [2009] OJ L 34/19, art
8(3) [ICZM Protocol].
For instance, see ICZM Protocol, ibid, art 6.
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no excuse, implying that people ought to know the law. 84 Laying down the norms of
coastal zone management in black and white legal terms helps multi-level stakeholders
plan appropriate activities and avoid conflict.
A related forte is that the instrumentality of law helps to view coastal management
from the prism of rights and duties, as it can guarantee formal rights and duties and
addresses a wider geographical area. The coastal ecosystem is a dynamic whole
composed of several subsets of ecosystems. Hence, to effectively regulate a portion of a
system, it is necessary to understand and respect its role and function within the whole.85
An ICZM law can help secure both the micro- and macro-management of coastal
resources.86
Implementation of ICZM requires the involvement of a series of government
departments and statutory agencies among others. As mentioned earlier, ICZM does not
seek to displace sectoral management; rather, the emphasis is to link the different sectoral
management initiatives to ensure that decisions in respect of the coastal zone are holistic.
Although the need for integration between different agencies can be worked out even in
the absence of a law, it may not be possible to secure integration in the long-run, since
most government departments zealously guard their turf and strive to maintain the status
quo ante, all the more so in the absence of an express and compelling legal requirement.
The idea is not that one level of government displaces another, but that an atmosphere for
co-operative coastal management is created, and here coastal legislation can play an
important role. In fact, a coastal law can create an umbrella agency to implement ICZM
and assign roles to the heads of major departments that have stakes in the coastal zone to
sit on the body as members.87 Such an approach can help achieve integration and, by
providing for multi-stakeholder participation, can also foster representativeness.
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James A Ballentine, A Law Dictionary (New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange, Ltd, 2005) sub verbo
“ignorantia juris non excusat.”
Cullinan, supra note 2 at 10.
Ibid at 8.
For instance, the Belize CZMA, establishes a Coastal Zone Management Authority, an Advisory
Council and a Coastal Zone Management Institute. See Coastal Zone Management Act, (Belize), No
5 of 1998 [Belize CZMA]. The Barbados New Coastal Zone Management Act, 1998, provides that
the National Conservation Commission has to prepare a draft coastal zone management plan and a
draft order delimiting a coastal zone management area. Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 82.
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Additionally, a coastal law can help secure increasing roles for the government by
streamlining and coordinating the management process. In fact, a coastal law would
emerge as the expression of a resolute commitment by the state to protect and preserve
life and property in line with the principle, that salus populi est suprema lex (public
welfare is the highest law) and to protect, preserve and restore, degraded coastal
ecosystems and marine habitats as part of good stewardship. However, coastal
management is no longer the exclusive prerogative of the government. A variety of
private players, corporate houses, tourist operators, right down to the artisanal fisher have
stakes in the coastal zone. In several coastal countries, like those in South Asia, there is
asymmetry in power relations between these players, and this factor cannot simply be
ignored in coastal management. By providing an environment for effective coordination
between all stakeholders avoids attrition, a legal framework prioritizes the divergent
interests at play in the coastal zone, sets right asymmetries in power relations, and
eliminates rent-seeking opportunities.
All too often have decisions been pushed down the throats of local communities by
external managers and coastal bureaucracies who have no understanding of the ground
realities. A coastal law can provide for local participation and engagement and help tap a
vast reservoir of knowledge and practical experience into ICZM programmes, which can
then become community-oriented. Public participation in ICZM affords greater
legitimacy and will produce more tangible on-the-ground results. In fact, it must not be
forgotten that many significant gains in natural resources management and conservation
have been achieved by empowering local communities, instilling in them a sense of
ownership and providing them with considerable decision-making powers and
opportunities. These do, nonetheless, run a threat of non-inclusiveness, as is the case in
South Asia, where certain communities (due to caste dynamics) and women may be
excluded from management. In this regard, a coastal law can serve as an instrument of
empowerment (promoting affirmative action) due to the inclusive nature of its mandate
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by securing the involvement of coastal communities and residents in the management
process in terms of their guaranteed rights.88
At its core, coastal management is all about regulating human behaviour in relation
to the coastal environment, and the absence of a dedicated legislative framework can lead
to a situation of ineffective regulation. Coastal residents may indulge in unsustainable
activities that can damage the coastal ecosystem, reducing its resiliency and thereby
affecting the larger community. For instance, harmful chemicals may be dumped into the
coastal waters or people may overharvest fish stocks or carry out other destructive
practices, like cyanide poisoning.89 Maintenance of environmental quality is critical for
coastal health and maintaining the coast’s aesthetic qualities. As well, some of the uses of
the coastal zone may have to be prioritized and restrictions imposed on development of
the coastal zones.
In all of these potential situations, it would be necessary that such actions be
rewarded with punishments, (in certain cases, incentives can be offered to goad people to
desist from acts harmful to the environment) as they affect larger societal interests. By
generating a list of prohibited acts with attendant sanctions, a coastal law can discipline
the diverse interests and ensure that they act to further sustainable coastal development.
In other words, due to the complexities of the issues raised, coastal zone management has
to be based on rule of law,90 and here a system of sufficiently punitive penalties can
ensure better compliance.
As the Indian experience discussed in chapter three points out, in the absence of a
well-drafted coastal legislation, litigation will become an increasingly common method to
resolve coastal related disputes, and many of the gains that could be secured can be
diminished due to the inability of the judicial process to appreciate the nuances of
sustainable coastal development. An important strength held out by a coastal law is that it
facilitates recourse to judicial review of executive actions in terms of the parameters
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See generally Resource Management Act, 1991(NZ), 1991/69 [NZRMA]; SA, Integrated Coastal
Management Act, supra note 61.
There are conflicts in the coastal zone between artisanal and industrial fishers, shrimp farmers and
paddy cultivators, shrimp farmers and local communities, fishers and shrimp fry collectors in
Bangladesh. See Dipak Kamal, Biodiversity Conservation in the Coastal Zone of Bangladesh
(MMM Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1999) [unpublished] at 83.
Beckman & Coleman, supra note 1 at 521.
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established by the coastal law.91 The judicial process tends to be more organized when it
is based on legislation. Coastal zone management implies that discretionary decisions by
the government be subjected to judicial scrutiny in terms of the coastal law. A legal
framework can help create synergetic relationships between the different stakeholders so
that conflicts of interest are reconciled.
8.3.2

Weaknesses

As far as the downside is concerned, when ICZM flows from a legal framework, it
generally becomes structured and less flexible. Even though it is generally the role of
ICZM plans to reflect current realities, an ICZM plan can go only thus far as what the
legislation mandates. Accordingly, a coastal law cannot remain static but must evolve and
adapt according to changes in the natural environment and in the human sphere. This
inherent inflexibility of law can be a potential barrier to hindering the realization of
adaptive management. Again, the possibility of carrying out far-reaching changes to
coastal legislation in light of new challenges and opportunities will be less, as it can
involve the lengthy process of carrying out amendments.92
Designing laws with aspirational and laudable goals does not mean that laws
actually accomplish what was intended. Merely enacting a coastal law will not per se
resolve the problem of degraded coastlines and adapt to climate change impacts.
Ultimately, it boils down to an issue of effective implementation of the legal mandate to
prevent undesirable outcomes.93 Implementation of normative prescriptions is necessary
to induce good coastal governance and to push implementation concerns onto center
stage. But effective implementation is only a part of the problem; the first step (and the
concern of this study) is the need for a sound normative foundation to engender and
promote ICZM programmes and coastal climate change adaptation.
A tangible law and its associated principles may lead to disputes and judicial
interference in the coastal zone management process. While judicial intervention has
merits, it can also prove disadvantageous and may, in certain situations, lead to
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ICZM Protocol, supra note 82, art 14(3).
For instance, only two amendments have been carried out to the Sri Lanka’s coastal management
statute in its nearly three-decade existence. In sharp contrast, India’s Coastal Regulation Zone
Notification, 1991, which is a piece of delegated legislation, in its two decade existence has seen
nearly 25 amendments. For more details, see Ch 3, Parts 3.2.1 & 3.2.4.
See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
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convoluted litigation that consumes time and resources and renders the process inchoate,
expensive and ineffective.94 Law has the potential to facilitate the ICZM process as well
as the capacity to inhibit it.95As pointed out earlier, ICZM is inter-disciplinary and multidimensional in nature, and involves the three areas of management, science, and the law.
Accordingly, coastal law drafting is a highly technical and specialised process that
requires a finely-tuned balance between these three disciplines. An inappropriately
drafted legislation will not only hamper the process of ICZM implementation but may
eventually lead to a situation where the law is used in a manner that does not conform to
the spirit, thereby derailing it.96
Perhaps the most unavoidable weakness that can disrupt ICZM implementation via
a coastal law is constitutional dynamics. Indeed, this factor has led to stagnation of ICZM
efforts in several countries.97 In federal systems, it is the constitution that determines the
nature of relations between the national and subordinate (provincial and/or local)
governments and the contours of coastal governance apparatus. In most of the federal
constitutions examined, and even in unitary systems, a daunting challenge in enacting a
coastal law relates to the constitutional division of powers and the absence of a specific
legislative head of power on coastal zone management in the enumerated lists.98 Different
facets of coastal zone management (pollution, fisheries, water sharing, property, land-use
planning in the coastal zone, oil and gas reserves, tourism, major and minor ports, etc.)
are divided between the federal and provincial governments and in certain cases some of
these may even be reserved to local self-governments.99 Consequently, there is no
coordinated coastal legislation or coastal policy. Rather, coastal zone management
appears to be sourced on a fractured legal response of a complex mix of legislation, plans
and policies administered at different levels.
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For more details on judicial process and coastal management in India's context, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.1.
See generally John Gibson, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the European Union” (2003)
31 Coast Mgmt 127.
A classical example is India’s coastal law. See Ch 3, Part 3.2.1.
For more details regarding constitutional dynamics and its impact on coastal management, see
generally Ch 7.
Ibid.
See generally NZRMA, supra note 88.
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As well, in most cases, the management of the landward component of the coastal
zone falls within the legislative competence of the states/provinces while the seaward
component is generally within the legislative competence of the federal government. The
power of the state/provincial and local governments often does not extend into the sea
areas off the coast. Even if it does, the jurisdiction of the state/provincial and local
government usually varies between a few hundred meters to three nautical miles. As seen
in the previous chapter, an essential aspect of ICZM is spatial integration, i.e., integrating
the management regimes of the land-sea continuum. Since, the jurisdiction over these two
areas falls within the competence of two or possibly even three levels of government, it
may be extremely difficult to implement spatial dimension to coastal management.

8.3.3 Opportunities
Ossifying the multi-dimensional policy agenda of ICZM in terms of a coastal law can
help offset inertia and apathy in coastal management and set an ICZM process for
sustainable coastal development in motion. An important opportunity held out by an
ICZM process is that it helps promote the development of adaptive capacities to respond
to SLR and other climate change impacts.100 This is an extremely important development,
given that coastal climate change adaptation in most developing countries is presently
restricted to the building of sea walls and placing boulders to counteract a rising sea.101 A
coastal law is not merely natural resources management or environmental legislation but
has a social welfare dimension, particularly in developing economies that depend on
coastal resources to sustain and boost their economy. Another important opportunity
afforded by a coastal law is that it can trigger conservation imperatives in relation to
specific coastal resources. For instance, it can spur the management of ground water
aquifers, coastal wetlands and mangroves.102 Since ICZM implies spatial integration, the
legislation can facilitate close interlinks with other management tools like marine spatial
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For the South African experience on the point, see Ch 7, Part 7.3.3.4.
See Ch 3, note 197 and accompanying text.
For instance, see The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO114(E) 1991, India) [CRZN,
1991]; Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO19(E), 2011, India) at 4 [CRZN, 2011]. They
contain provisions that regulate the extraction of groundwater from the coastal zone. In addition,
several of the coastal states have enacted their own groundwater management legislations. For
instance, see The Kerala Ground Water (Control and Regulation) Act 2002 (No 19 of 2002, India),
The Karnataka Ground Water (Regulation and Control of Development and Management) Act, 2011
(No 25 of 2011, India).
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planning.103 It is worth recalling some of the considerations of chapter three, where it was
shown that rivers play a major role in conserving the health of estuaries and deltas and
therefore linkages may also have to be drawn with river management. 104 A coastal law
provides an opportunity to trigger action on these fronts as well.

8.3.4 Threats
Most threats that impair the effectiveness of a coastal law are those that are germane to
an ICZM process. Change is constant in coastal zones: What is land today can become
submerged tomorrow, and therefore it is extremely difficult to lay down hard and fast
rules regarding coastal environmental management. Furthermore, as coastal laws have to
operate in the foreground of uncertain variables, such laws, along with the ICZM
process, have to be based on good science,105 yet this is rarely the case in developing
countries. The lack of sound scientific input emerges as the most threatening challenge
to the stability of an ICZM legal framework.106 Another related threat is that ICZM
implementation requires a cadre of officials knowledgeable in the ICZM process.
Embedded in adaptive management, ICZM implementation requires constant monitoring
based upon ground realities, which, as stated above, keep changing. Accordingly, the
officials who are tasked with the duty to implement the ICZM process should have the
expertise to be able to lead, monitor, and steer the process through uncertainties and over
longer time scales to produce tangible results. This requires that the pool of officials who
are deputed for the task be properly trained in the implementation aspects of ICZM,
which is rarely the case.107
In South Asia, there are no dedicated programmes on ICZM education, which has
considerably weakened the development of ICZM capacity in this region. As well,
transfer policies of government can affect the process, as trained officials may be
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EC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal Management [2013] 0074 (COD)
at 8 [Directive for MSP and ICM].
For instance, see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61, s 33 (calls for the creation
of the National Estuarine Management Protocol and estuarine management plans).
For instance, see Belize CZMA providing for the creation of the Coastal Zone Management Institute
to conduct studies on marine science and to support the University of Belize in providing courses
and educational programmes related to the coastal zone. Belize CZMA, supra note 87, ss 8, 10.
See generally Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W Knecht, Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management:
Concepts and Practices (Washington DC: Island Press, 1998) ch 7.
For instance, see ICZM Protocol, supra note 82, art 15 (emphasizing the training accept).
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transferred to other jobs, leaving programmes in the lurch midway. Other factors that can
potentially derail the ICZM process are the lack of adequate funding and sustained
political support.108 Since lawmakers require tangible results on shorter scales to keep
their constituencies in good humor, and as the ICZM process is based on longer time
scales, committed political support may wane and thus impair ICZM implementation.109
Even in coastal states that do not have dedicated coastal laws, coastal management is
embedded within existing legal structures. Accordingly, there is the danger that a coastal
law may be frowned upon as it may be seen as introducing yet another new layer of
regulatory complexity.
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Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 106 at 125-29 & 166-68.
Lucia Fanning, “Evaluating Effectiveness of ICZM: Identifying and Addressing Ongoing
Challenges” (Lecture in Integrated Coastal Zone Management, LAWS 2041.03 delivered at
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Winter Term, 2009-2010, 30 March 2010),
[unpublished].
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Table 3: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis on the
Importance of a Legal Framework to Support ICZM
This SWOT analysis served to highlight some of the strengths that can accrue to a coastal
management process by enacting a dedicated coastal statute. It is also evident that the
enactment of a coastal law opens the doors to several opportunities, the most important of
which is the development of climate change adaptation on several other fronts. At the
same time, while there are threats and weakness, these are not insurmountable. In sum,
irrespective of whether implemented by statutory or non-statutory means, it is clear that
law is integral to an ICZM process and there is a strong case to implement ICZM by
basing it upon a dedicated coastal statute.
The principal purpose of this chapter is to explain the role of law as a progressive
force to implement ICZM methodology. The discussion and the SWOT here clearly
answer the central research question that this study raises, namely whether law and legal
frameworks are essential cogs to work an ICZM programme. From the time of its design
to full implementation, ICZM involves and attracts legal questions and issues. In
responding to and resolving these questions and issues, a coastal law would balance
environmental protection, human development, coastal climate change adaptation and,
where relevant, even mitigate through the ICZM methodology to move towards more
sustainable forms of coastal development.
Coastal law-making to operationalize ICZM is by far a superior approach to help
stem the accelerating degradation of the coastal environment and help countries and
regions adapt to SLR and other climate change impacts. Indeed, a dedicated coastal law
statute is a valuable springboard that aids the establishment of a management system to
support an integrated approach to managing human uses of coastal areas, facilitate the
development of resilient coastal communities and ecosystems, and promote adaptation to
SLR and other climate change impacts to achieve the overall goal of sustainable coastal
development. In sum, a legal framework that facilitates the ICZM process is of utmost
importance if any sustained ICZM effort is to succeed. The preamble to the South African
ICM law reiterates these aspects when it observes that
the conservation and sustainable use of the coastal
zone requires the establishment of an innovative legal
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and institutional framework that clearly defines the
status of coastal land and waters and the respective
roles of the public, the State and other users of the
coastal zone … facilita[ting] … a new co-operative
and participatory approach to managing the coast.110
To recapitulate some of the important points that have emerged in terms of the need for a
coastal law, it is clear the principal rationale behind an ICZM law is to “establish a
governance system that enables, facilitates and supports an integrated approach to
managing human uses of coastal areas.”111 In playing a catalytic role in ensuring coastal
sustainability, it creates new institutions and provides a blueprint to sustain a symbiotic
relationship between humans, the coastal environment and its resources. Moreover, it
seeks to preserve a conservation ethic and sustain the myriad of interactions that take
place in the coastal environment between humans and the environment and to streamline
the predominantly sectorally organized administrations and coastal management efforts
in a seamless web to move towards sustainable coastal development. Specifically, a
coastal law offers better prospects to persist with an ICZM programme, as it helps to
implement the substantive principles and procedural rules to work an ICZM process at
different levels and scales and create synergies between multiple stakeholders and
sectoral responses through new institutions and processes and facilitates conflict
management. It also accommodates and facilitates coastal climate change adaptation,
taking into account coastal hazards and adaptive capacities of coastal communities. In
short, there is considerable scope for a coastal legislation to underpin the ICZM process,
as such a law would enable a management process to proceed on the basis of specific
legal language.

8.4 ICZM LAW THROUGH THE AGES: WHERE FROM HERE?
With its emphasis on problem solving, ICZM provides a blueprint that delineates a
framework prescribing how humans should interact with the coastal environment in an
ecologically sustainable fashion. As mentioned earlier, since governing human behaviour
in relation to the coastal zone lies at the heart of an ICZM process and law is one of the
central forces to regulate human behaviour, it is natural for coastal states to enact coastal
110
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SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61, pmbl.
Cullinan, supra note 2 at 9.
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legislations or re-engineer their coastal laws to sustain an ICZM process.112
Consequently, there has been proliferation of legislative reform initiatives in several
countries to support the implementation of ICZM programmes.113
As can be deduced from the different chapters and the national reports on the state
of the coastal management, while the catalogue of problems that affect the coastal
environment are more or less similar, differences arise in terms of the degree of these
impacts, such as the environmental problems that confront the coastline, climate change
impacts, variations in SLR, population pressures, the dependence on coastal resources for
economic development, etc. Accordingly, the legal responses vary from country to
country, both in terms of the nature and scope of the legislations and the administrative
apparatuses established to enforce the legal mandate. It is also apparent that there are
three primary phases in the development of coastal law. In the first phase, extending from
the enactment of the first coastal law, the US federal Coastal Zone Management Act,
1972, to the Sri Lankan Coast Conservation Act, 1981, right down to the Rio Earth
Summit of 1992, the emphasis was on highlighting the importance of coastal law and its
emergence as a tool distinct from environmental law to facilitate the management of a
composite area and the conservation of the environment and resources found therein.
These coastal legislations seek to implement integration by providing for the creation of a
coastal zone management authority (sometimes for more than one authority) and the
development ICZM plans.114 Recourse is also had to the punitive role of law to secure
compliance with its terms.115 More importantly, some of these coastal laws provide for
land-sea integration as well.116

112

113
114

115
116

“[I]ntegrated coastal management should be an evolving process … that seeks to co-ordinate and
regulate the various human activities that take place in the coastal zone in order to achieve its
conservation and sustainable use.” SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61, pmbl.
Penal sanctions can be imposed for those who violate the law. Ibid.
For national and regional experiences on coastal law making, see Chs 3, 7 & 9.
For an overview on how coastal laws lead to the preparation of ICZM plans, see generally Ch 7. For
more details on how Sri Lanka's coastal law prompts the development of ICZM plans, see also Ch 3,
Part 3.2.4.
For instance, see Coast Conservation Act 1981 (No 57 of 1981, Sri Lanka), s 29 [Sri Lanka CCA
1981].
For instance, see ibid, s 42 (defining coastal zone to mean “that area lying within a limit of three
hundred metres landwards of the Mean High Water line and a limit of two kilometers seawards of
the Mean Low Water line …”).
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With the Rio Earth Summit, which underscored the importance of sustainable
coastal development as the ultimate objective of all our efforts in the coastal zone and the
central role played by ICZM in its attainment, we enter the second stage of coastal law
development. In this phase (1992-2013), while continuing to build on earlier efforts, the
objectives of ICZM were re-cast as achieving sustainable development goals and
adopting a principled approach to coastal management. There are several coastal
legislations that fall into this mould and some of the coastal laws developed in the first
phase were re-engineered to reflect sustainability. A classic example of a coastal law that
advances sustainable coastal development is the South African ICM Act.
While continuing to layer and build upon earlier initiatives, the accent in the third
phase is on linking ICZM with other management initiatives like marine spatial planning,
thereby broadening the ambit considerably to facilitate Integrated Coastal and Oceans
Management or Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning. Even though rudiments of the third
phase can be seen in Canada’s Oceans Act, 1996 and the UK Marine and Coastal Access
Act 2009, and received concrete form with the establishment of the it is the proposed EU
Directive on Marine Spatial Planning117 that specifically heralds the third epoch, since
earlier initiatives had discounted the ICZM element. The overwhelming majority of
legislative approaches straddle between the first and second phases and it may take a
number of years for the majority of nations to graduate to the third phase because they
already find implementing ICZM daunting.
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EC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal Management [2013] 0074
(COD).
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Figure 5: The Three Phases of ICZM Development
Another notable aspect is that coastal climate change adaptation law is a generic term that
encompasses a raft of legislations broadly groupable under four heads, namely, climate
change legislation, planning legislation, flood management legislation and coastal
legislation and several other legal and policy instruments also come in handy.118
Some countries have specific climate change legislation.119 These mostly deal with
climate change mitigation, and they are set at a high level of generality and rarely do they
cover coastal climate change risks. Still legislations that fall into this genre do create an
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Water laws and fishing laws may have relevance to coastal climate change adaptation. An example
of a Water Law relevant to CCCA is the Andhra Pradesh Water, Land and Trees Act, 2002
incorporating mandatory provisions on rain water harvesting, groundwater management, improving
tree cover, surface water management, etc. See generally (No 10 of 2002, Andhra Pradesh, India).
For instance, see Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic); Climate Change (State Action) Act 2008 (Tas);
Climate Change and Greenhouse Emissions Reduction Act 2007 (SA); Climate Change Act 2008
(UK) [CCAUK].
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atmosphere that can spur CCCA actions.120 As far as planning legislations are concerned,
these may also not explicitly refer to climate change impacts, nevertheless, these laws
may indirectly address the point by requiring that coastal climate change risks be
considered in planning decisions.121 However, in certain situations the planning
instruments may be more explicit in providing express rules to respond to SLR and
coastal hazards.122 Again flood management legislations may also be relevant to CCCA
law as it may address the point of coastal flooding.123 Similar to climate change, flood
management and planning law, coastal legislations (evident from the case studies step out
in the previous chapter) may also not necessarily consider all possible dimensions posed
by climate change risks and provide an itinerary of all appropriate CCCA actions. Still,
coastal laws by virtue of the fact that it exclusively deals with the coastal environment
and which unlike the other branches plays a major role in enhancing the adaptive
capacities of coastal communities renders it the keystone of this broad legislative canvas
to facilitate CCCA actions. Therefore it is necessary to integrate this broad legislative
canvass for more enhanced coastal climate change adaptation actions.
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CCAUK, ibid, part 4.
For instance Australia's Draft Coastal Protection State Planning Regulatory Provision: Protecting
the Coastal Environment October 2012, contains measures to deal with SLR and coastal hazards and
traces its origin to the Sustainable Planning Act, 2009. See generally Australia, Draft Coastal
Protection State Planning Regulatory Provision: Protecting the Coastal Environment October 2012
(Brisbane Qld: Dep't of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, 2012).
Ibid.
Flood and Water Management Act, 2010 (UK), c 29, s 7 (providing for a national flood and coastal
erosion risk management strategy for England).
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Figure 6: The Elements of Coastal Climate Change Adaptation Law
In fact the most important element discernable from the US federal Coastal Zone
Management Act, 1972 to the proposed 2013 EU Directive on Marine Spatial Planning
and ICZM is the express or implied recognition that SLR is a major issue that can hamper
sustainable coastal development objectives.124 Some of the legislative initiatives
examined previously expressly recognize the problems of climate change and SLR and
provides for the development of specific tools such as zoning, 125 setback lines,126 etc. In
other initiatives, the response strategy is camouflaged by the subtleties of the text, for
example, coastal hazards,127 coastal erosion,128 coastal risk management,129 etc. which are
interpreted broadly to include SLR. While it is possible to respond to SLR by treating it
as a sub-set of coastal hazards and coastal erosion, these can also impose some significant
limitations as SLR and coastal climate change adaptation requires a composite
management strategy.
A coastal legislation need not necessarily detail all aspects relating to coastal
climate change adaptation. Specific references may be limited to only a few key
provisions. Particularly critical is the legal requirement that climate change and SLR be
taken into account when preparing coastal zone management plans.130 In addition, the
coastal legislation may place definite limitations on the ability of the state/private
property owners to indulge in concrete fortification of the coasts,131 provide preference to
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For instance, see Pub L No 109-58 (codified as amended at 16 USC §1451-1465 §1451(l) (2005))
(the congress finds that “[b]ecause global warming may result in a substantial sea level rise with
serious adverse effects in the coastal zone, coastal states must anticipate and plan for such an
occurrence.”); see also ibid, §1452(2)(B); see also Directive for MSP and ICM, supra note 103, art
8(2)(f) (adaptation to climate change) & art 8 (integrated coastal management strategies to consider
adaptation to climate change).
For instance, see generally CRZN, 1991, supra note 102; CRZN, 2011, supra note 102.
For instance, see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61, s 25 (dealing with
establishment of coastal set-back lines).
Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW), s 55C(1)(f) [NSWCPA].
Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 115, s 42 (defining coast conservation to mean the protection and
preservation of the coast from sea erosion or encroachment by the sea).
NSWCPA, supra note 127, s 55C.
For instance, see Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995 (Qld), ss 20-21(2) (calling upon the
minister to consider the effect of climate change on coastal management in preparing the coastal
plan).
For instance, see NSWCPA, supra note 127, part 4C (providing for the constitution of temporary
coastal protection works in the form of sand bags).
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soft armouring (due to the obvious environmental benefits),132 recognize a version of
rolling easements to facilitate inland migration of ecosystems, 133 impose overlay zoning
requirements,134 require that future rises in sea level be taken into account in the design
features and in the implementation of a project so that it will not be rendered unfit or
contribute to hazards during its lifespan due to SLR and other coastal hazards, 135
emphasize on sediment bypassing,136 provide for permitting requirements137 and
environmental impact assessments in situating development,138 and ensure the
maintenance of public access to the foreshore.139 As part of a holistic response to climate
change and SLR, the coastal law can also require the state to take measures to increase
natural resiliency of coastal ecosystems to ensure living and vibrant shorelines. In this
regard, the coastal law can specify protection of habitats, provide for the creation of
marine protected areas and their networks to protect stressed species,140 impose
restrictions on coastal aquaculture and fishing practices that can degrade the
environment,141 provide for the maintenance of water quality and controls on marine
pollution,142 utilise penal provisions to secure coastal environmental protection
(prohibiting the destruction of corals),143 etc. Such measures help to reduce anthropic
stresses on coastal ecosystems and provides them with more windows to respond
naturally to increasing sea surface temperatures and the lowering in the pH conditions
(ocean acidification). All these seem to be the best possible ways to counteract the crises
since, as explained earlier; climate change and SLR are steeped in uncertainty. In short,
the coastal law emerges as an enabling legislation that can facilitate ICZM
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See ICZM Protocol, supra note 82.
For more on rolling easements, see Ch 7, Part 7.3.1.3.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61, s 62.
For a discussion on this topic in relation to Australia, see Ch 7, Part 7.3.2.
US, Office of Ocean & Coastal Resource Management, Dep’t of Commerce & State of Texas,
Combined Coastal Management Program and Final Environmental Impact Statement for the State
of Texas (Office of Ocean & Coastal Resource Management, State of Texas, 1996) at part II 6-20.
Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 115, s 14.
Ibid, s 16.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61, s 18 (designating coastal access land to
secure public access to coastal public property).
Oceans Act, SC 1996, c 31, s 35 (constitution of marine protected areas).
NZRMA, supra note 88.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61, s 69; see also ibid, ss 70-72; NZRMA, ibid,
s 15.
For instance, see Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 82, s 22 (prohibition on harvesting of coral).
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implementation, and this process should be moulded to facilitate inter alia coastal climate
change adaptation as well.
Another proposition that emerges is that ICZM and its anchorage coastal law
endorses coastal climate change adaptation and sustainable coastal development in two
ways. The first is a more express and direct route, where the law may prescribe specific
tools and measures to counteract the challenges posed by climate change and SLR.144
Second, even if the law does not contain anything express and direct to deal with sea
level rise, it can promote and build the adaptive capacities of coastal communities,
increase the resiliency of coastal ecosystems, and reduce vulnerability by providing for
efficient management of coastal areas, resources and ecosystems.145 In this context, the
relevance of a coastal law as social welfare legislation assumes greater significance.
In the coming years, SLR and other climate-change-related impacts (coastal
hazards) are predicated to worsen. This portends that a large number of coastal states will
have to devote resources to ensure enhanced management of the coastal areas and
respond to coastal hazards. In fact, for many coastal countries (like those in South Asia),
the mandate of the coastal law will have to go beyond a narrower view that focus solely
on resource utilization and environmental impacts to the more boarder coastal climate
change adaptation and sustainable coastal development. Already, SLR has catapulted the
importance of ICZM as a central tool for sustainable development and coastal climate
change adaptation like never before. Definitely, this aspect will emerge as the central
focus of all management efforts, and coastal laws will have to necessarily provide for an
appropriate legal environment to operationalize these efforts.
Most coastal countries and their legal and coastal management frameworks are
perched at an interesting point in their evolution. As has been stated “[l]aws written in
and designed for the 20th century will need to be updated to reflect new ideas about
climate change in the 21st century.”146 This is particularly true about coastal laws. And in
preparing for the future, which is uncertain, it is possible that countries may loose several
144
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SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 61. For a discussion on coastal climate change
adaptation as embodied in a coastal law, see generally Ch 7.
See Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 82; Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 115.
US, California Natural Resources Agency, 2009 California Climate Adaptation Strategy: A Report
to the Governor of the State of California in Response to Executive Order S-13-2008 (California
Natural Resources Agency, [nd]) at 65.
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current economic opportunities. Unfortunately, most coastal countries even while
wanting to adapt to climate change impacts are unwilling to forsake these economic
opportunities, ignoring the fact that these can in due course have high potential to place
coastal communities, ecosystems, infrastructure and development in greater jeopardy. A
precautionary approach and the principle of inter-generational equity would entail that in
sprucing up their coastal laws, it is advisable for coastal countries to err on the side of
caution, even if this pre-supposes prioritization and forsaking of certain development
opportunities. In fact, this takes us back to one of the propositions alluded to in the part II
based on the discussions in “Our Common Future” that in certain circumstances nodevelopment can actually be a sign of development.147 Only development (short- and
long-term) that can respond to expected SLR and climate change impacts through riskmanagement minimizing future hazards, and augmenting adaptive capacities of coastal
communities and maintaining the biological productivity of the coastal environment
should be sited along the coast.

8.5 CONCLUSION
Even though ICZM has finally come of age, the coastal environments in most parts of the
world continue to deteriorate. There is continuous loss of coastal biodiversity, persistence
of poverty, loss of livelihood opportunities, and increasing pestilence. The challenges
posed by climate change on coastal zones continue to loom like a Damocles sword over
our heads to compound this negative image. It is within the context of this overall
scenario that we have to appreciate the need for a coastal law to streamline ICZM
implementation and secure coastal climate change adaptation. Moreover, if ICZM is to
make its full contribution to sustainable coastal development, it is essential that coastal
managers find practical ways to integrate gender and equity concerns, respect
inclusiveness, reduce poverty, ensure food security, provide for greater citizen
involvement in decision-making, improve coastal resilience, reduce vulnerability and
provide for coastal climate change adaptation, within the scheme of the programme. And
what better way to do so than through the instrumentality of law?
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See Ch 4, note 54 and accompanying text.
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In drawing the foregoing sections together (namely, the theoretical justification for
a coastal law, the SWOT analysis for a coastal law, and future trends in ICZM lawmaking) certain points emerge. First, a coastal law is definitely a harbinger of change for
degraded coastlines and an essential prerequisite to propel the move towards sustainable
coastal development. Legislation is key to an ICZM process, as it can help in the ordering
of priorities, provide legitimacy, introduce oversight, seek to draw benefits from
synergistic relationships that it creates between the stakeholders, level out inconsistencies
and eliminate rent-seeking, ultimately streamlining the process and helping to resolve
jurisdictional conflicts and prevent cross-sectoral decision making.
In essence, a coastal law regulates human behaviour and human interaction with the
coastal environment, with the objective of promoting the wellbeing of existing and future
generations of coastal communities. A coastal law helps to balance competing human
demands relating to the use of the coast and its resources and provides a framework to
resolve conflicts among coastal users and coastal management institutions through a cooperative and co-ordinated approach. In addition, it attempts to secure equitable access to
the coastal environment and its resources. ICZM is based on fundamental sustainability
principles, and as this chapter demonstrates, it is no exaggeration to state that an ICZM
law helps to translate these principles into practice.
While simply enacting new coastal laws is hardly a guarantee that coastal
management will be effective and sustainable in the long-run, a legislative reaction in the
form of an omnibus legal framework does provide a minimum guarantee that
contemporary coastal management decisions will start with a more integrated picture of
the coastal zone, within which coastal climate change adaptation decisions can be
predicated and implemented. Under the ICZM legal rubric, depending upon other factors
there is an increase possibility that the efficacy of coastal management programmes can
be increased considerably.
In the end, the time has come to identify and provide legal recognition to the
essential principles and elements of an ICZM-friendly law (promotive of coastal climate
change adaptation, environment protection and development) which the coastal nations in
the South Asian region can utilize to enact/re-engineer their respective national-level
coastal laws. In this regard, the national case studies (discussed in the previous chapters)
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and these broad incantations on different facets of coastal law making provide sufficient
fodder. Since the coastal countries of South Asia are each unique in terms of their
national capacities to implement ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation, a regional
level instrument that identifies the core legal principles/elements for a national coastal
law seems to be the best way forward, as the next part will attest. In sum, logic and
experience dictate that coastal South Asia and other coastal regions that face increasing
environmental degradation and SLR need to resort to legislative means as a primary
method to bolster management efforts, and that there is utility in underpinning an ICZM
programme with a dedicated legal framework. Without adequate legal backing, ICZM is
akin to a rudderless ship desperately trying to stay the course. The legal mapping in this
chapter and the preceding one demonstrates that a dedicated coastal law that addresses
coastal resources use and issues such as coastal hazards and SLR is definitely a suitable
frame to support the ICZM management process and to overlay coastal climate change
adaptation onto this process contributes to sustainable coastal development.
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PART IV
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR COASTAL MANAGEMENT REGIONAL REGIME-BUILDING IN
SOUTH ASIA
As described earlier, the coastal zone is a unique ecosystem that has distinct
characteristics primarily due to the interaction of the landmass with the surrounding seas
and oceans. Activities in one part of the coastal environment have the potential to impact
other regions and it may not be possible to parcel coastal regions, water and ocean
currents. In the process, the coastal environment of a particular country may be connected
to others in the same region and sometimes even beyond. In certain cases, the rate of
exploitation and degradation of natural resources may be so high or the impact of certain
environmental harms so grave as in the case of climate change and SLR that the
environmental damage that originates in one country can no longer be confined to its own
borders. The possibility of spillovers negatively affecting the environmental quality of
other countries is a high possibility. This increases the need and relevancy of regional
regimes grounded in the socio-economic and political realities of the entire region to
manage such issues. The objective of this part is to develop this theme further. Divided
into two chapters, the first one, namely, chapter nine examines the state of regional
coastal and marine cooperation in coastal South Asia and analyses lessons that can be
drawn from other regional coastal management regimes on ICZM. Drawing from the
previous parts of this study, chapter ten articulates a vision for a regional regime on
ICZM for South Asia. It spells out certain elements that can inform the development of a
prospective regional regime on coastal cooperation in South Asia.

CHAPTER 9

REGIONAL REGIME BUILDING ON ICZM
AND COASTAL CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION IN SOUTH ASIA

9.1 INTRODUCTION
Environmental regionalism is one of the pivotal approaches identified in the legendary
Stockholm Conference, which recommended that “… the attention of Governments be
drawn to the need to consult bilaterally or regionally whenever environmental conditions
or development plans in one country could have repercussions in one or more
neighboring countries.”1 The Stockholm Declaration emphasised that “[a] growing class
of environmental problems, because they are regional or global in extent … will require
extensive cooperation among nations … in the common interest.”2 The Brundtland
Report reiterated this with its call for “[i]n some areas … especially among developing
countries, new regional and subregional arrangements will be needed to deal with
transboundary environmental resource issues.”3 Principle 27 of the 1992 Rio Declaration,
the UNFCCC,4 CBD,5 Johannesburg Plan of Action,6 and the recently concluded Rio+20
reaffirmed the regional dimension of sustainable development and its complementary and
facilitative role in translating sustainable development policies into action at the national
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“Recommendations for Action at the International Level” in UNGA, Report of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972 (New York: United
Nations, General Assembly, 1972) at 6C, recommendation 3.
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, 11:6 ILM
1416 [Stockholm Declaration], ¶7.
World Commission on Environment & Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987) at 315.
For instance, see United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York 9 May 1992)
[UNFCCC], art 4(1)(b) (parties to implement regional programmes containing measures to mitigate
climate change).
The CBD stresses the importance of regional cooperation among states, intergovernmental
organizations and the non-governmental sector for conserving biological diversity and to ensure the
sustainable use of its components. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1993, 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29
December 1993), pmbl; see also ibid, art 20(3) (developing country parties to avail of financial
resources relating to the implementation of the CBD through regional channels).
“Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development” in UN, Report of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September
2002, A/CONF.199/20* (New York: UN, 2002) at 20, ¶4 (advocates strengthening institutional
arrangements for sustainable development at the regional level).

level.7
Regional approaches to marine environmental protection have proven to be most
useful because ocean resources and uses are inherently transboundary in nature. 8 LOSC
provides the necessary impetus to tackle marine environmental problems with a regional
focus.9 Regionalism in marine environment protection has been nurtured under the aegis
7
8

9

UN RIO+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, The Future We Want,
A/CONF.216/L.1*, 19 June 2012, ¶¶97-103.
Philip Saunders, “Maritime Regional Cooperation: Theory and Principles” in Mark J Valencia, ed,
Maritime Regime Building: Lessons Learned and Their Relevance for Northeast Asia, vol 36,
Publications on Ocean Development (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 1 at 4.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, 21 ILM
1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [LOSC], arts 61–70, 116–20, 122–23, 237, 311 & part
XII. The LOSC can accommodate regional approaches to certain problems, including protection of
the marine environment. Article 197 of the LOSC mandates cooperation between states “on a global
basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international
organizations” and this is in relation to “formulating and elaborating international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.” In
addition, if the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal can be characterised as semi-enclosed seas, Part
IX of the LOSC assumes greater relevance. This is because rather than prescribing a single regime
for the whole area, it can prompt the creation of at least two separate sub-regional regimes; one for
the Arabian Sea and the other for the Bay of Bengal. In setting the agenda for co-operation, article
123 emphasizes the need for corporation between states bordering semi-enclosed seas in exercise of
their rights and in the performance of their duties under the LOSC with regard to living resources,
the marine environment and scientific research, either directly or through an appropriate regional
organization. Even though article 123 uses the term ‘should’ and not the mandatory ‘shall’ as seen in
article 197 of the LOSC, the article still retains relevance as it is clear that article 197 relates to the
norm-making function of states, while article 123 is directed towards implementation of the norms.
For more details, see Nilufer Oral, Regional Co-operation and Protection of the Marine
Environment under International Law: The Black Sea, David Freestone, ed, 16 Legal Aspects of
Sustainable Development (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) at 39. The importance of
cooperation in protecting the marine environment has been stressed in ITLOS jurisprudence. In the
MOX plant case, Ireland argued that by failing to share information and by refusing to carry out a
proper environmental assessment with regard to the possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising
out of the commissioning of the MOX plant, the United Kingdom did not cooperate with Ireland in
protecting the marine environment of the Irish Sea and thereby was in breach of articles 123 and 197
of the LOSC. In the Dispute Concerning the Mox Plant, International Movements of Radioactive
Materials, and the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Irish Sea (Ireland v United
Kingdom), Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case of Ireland (9 November 2001)
(International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) ¶¶56-81. In its order, the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea called upon Ireland and the United Kingdom to cooperate by entering into
consultations to exchange information, monitor effects and devise appropriate measures to prevent
pollution of the marine environment which might ensue from the operation of the MOX plant. For
the text of the order, see generally The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom), 10, Order (3
December 2001) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea). Considering that the duty to
cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine environment under
Part XII of the LOSC and general international law, Malaysia and Singapore were directed to
cooperate by establishing a group of independent experts to study the effects of Singapore’s land
reclamation and to propose appropriate measures to deal with any adverse effects and to exchange
information regarding possible risks on a regular basis. See also Case Concerning Land Reclamation
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of the UNEP Regional Seas Programme.10 The first regional seas treaty was the 1976
Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution.
Since then, 13 Regional Seas Programmes involving 143 countries and a complex
network of treaties, protocols, action plans, institutional arrangements and trust funds
have been established.11
Climate change and SLR have far-reaching implications for the future development
and progress of coastal South Asia. In fact, all these developing countries in relation to
their coastal zones face the twin challenges of addressing the negative impacts of climate
change through CCCA while at the same time promoting socio-economic development.
However, as pointed out in chapter one, South Asia is one of the least integrated regions
in the world. Several long-standing disputes have soured the spirit of co-operation and
prevented concerted action to common challenges. This section explains the need for a
regional framework on ICZM to help place South Asian coastal countries on the
trajectory of SCD. In doing so, section 9.2 opens with a discussion of the history and the
purposes behind the various institutional mechanisms presently available at the
regional/sub-regional level in South Asia. It will then point out to some of the
impediments that have practically stalled the development of a spirit of regional cooperation from a coastal management perspective. Critical here is the issue of
transboundary water sharing, since the health of two of the world’s largest deltas (the
Indus and the Ganges-Brahmaputra) and consequently their respective coastal regions
depend considerably on the quantity of water available to hydrate and de-salinate these
deltas. Section 9.3 will explain the significance of a regional approach to ICZM
implementation by drawing on the experiences of the Mediterranean and the European
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by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v Singapore), 12, Order (8 October
2003) 23 (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) ¶¶92, 106; Alan Boyle, “Globalism and
Regionalism in the Protection of the Marine Environment” in Davor Vidas, ed, Protecting the Polar
Marine Environment: Law and Policy for Pollution Prevention (Norway: Cambridge University
Press, 2000) 19 at 22. Boyle also notes that the terms region or regional has not been defined in any
convention text and points out that the term can be understood in three possible ways – formal,
which focuses on the physical and geographical character, such as an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea;
functional concentrating on the patterns of use like resource exploitation, navigation, fisheries,
defence, and political based upon the decision of a group of states to cooperate, which also includes
an element of geographical propinquity. Ibid at 26.
Julien Rochette & Raphaël Billé, “ICZM Protocols to Regional Seas Conventions: What? Why?
How?” (2012) 36 Mar Pol'y 977 (ScienceDirect) [Rochette & Billé, “ICZM Protocols”].
UNEP, About, online: UNEP, Home, About <http://www.unep.org/>.
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Union. These regimes play crucial roles in influencing the development of national level
ICZM responses and in adapting to SLR in their respective areas of operation. Section 9.4
explores some of the underlying precepts of the regime theory of international relations to
explain state practice and will offers insights on why South Asia is so disaggregated and
what factors can prompt the discursive forces and divergent interests of these coastal
states to converge to further common objectives at least in terms of ICZM and CCCA
implementation. In addition, the importance of a regional approach to ICZM and CCCA
in South Asia is re-emphasised through a SWOT analysis in section 9.5.

9.2 REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS PROMOTIVE OF ICZM
COASTAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AT THE SOUTH ASIAN LEVEL
FACTORS THAT HAVE HAMPERED REGIONAL COOPERATION

AND
AND

9.2.1 Regional and Sub-Regional Frameworks on Coastal Management in South
Asia
9.2.1.1 The South Asian Seas Regional Programme
It was to address issues relating to the accelerated degradation of the world’s oceans and
coastal areas through “sustainable management and use of the marine and coastal
environment, by engaging neighboring countries in comprehensive and specific actions to
protect their shared marine environment,”12 that the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) in 1974 pursuant to the Stockholm Conference, launched the
Regional Seas Programme. Since then, the UNEP has created 13 Regional Seas
Programmes involving the participation of more than 143 countries. 13 Generally, these
different programmes function through an action plan, supported by a convention.14
In 1981, the South Asian countries established the South Asia Co-operative
Environment Programme (SACEP) as an inter-governmental organization “to promote
and support protection, management and enhancement of the environment in the

12
13
14

UNEP, Regional Seas Programme: About, online: UNEP, Regional Seas Programme, About
Regional Seas <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/>.
Ibid.
United Nations Environment Programme Mediterranean Action Plan for the Barcelona Convention,
online: UNEP/MAP <http://www.unepmap.org/>.
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region.”15 At the request of the South Asian coastal countries, in the following year, the
Governing Council of UNEP designated the South Asian Seas as an area for close
collaboration between the UNEP, the SACEP, and the concerned governments for the
formulation of an action plan for the environmental protection of this region under the
banner of the Regional Seas Programme.16 The “Action Plan for the Protection and
Management of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the South Asian Seas Region” or
the South Asian Seas Action Plan (SASAP) was adopted in March 1995, and it entered
into force in February 1997.17
All five coastal countries of South Asia participate in SASAP with SACEP serving
as the Action Plan secretariat.18 Periodic meetings of representatives of the governments
of member states review progress in the implementation of the action plan and they
decide on future priorities as well as on the financial and institutional arrangements to
support these activities.19 The primary intent of the SASAP “is to protect and manage the
marine environment and related coastal ecosystems of the region in an environmentally
sound and sustainable manner.”20 Interestingly, it focuses primarily on four core areas:
ICZM,21 oil spill contingency planning, human resource development, and the
environmental effects of land-based activities.22 The document reiterates the endorsement
that ICZM is “a priority element for environmentally sound and sustainable development
15

16
17
18
19
20

21

22

For an overview on the SACEP, see About Us: An Overview, online: SACEP, About SACEP, An
Overview <http://www.sacep.org/>. For the text of the Colombo Declaration on the South Asia CoOperative Environment Programme (SACEP), see Documents: MoUs & LoAS/ Declarations,
online: SACEP, Documents: MoUs & LoAS/ Declarations, The Colombo Declaration On the South
Asia Co-Operative Environment Programme (SACEP) <http://www.sacep.org/>. The Colombo
Declaration on SACEP of 1981 and the articles of association of the SACEP set the legal foundation
for this organisation. The organizational framework is as follows: a Governing Council,
Consultative Committee, National Focal Points, Subject Area Focal Points, and the Secretariat. The
Governing Council is constituted by Ministerial level representation.
Action Plan for the Protection and Management of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the
South Asian Seas Region, ¶1, online: SACEP <http://www.sacep.org> [SASAP].
Ibid.
Ibid, ¶18.
Ibid, ¶19.
UNEP, Regional Seas Programme: South Asian Seas – Governing Instruments, online: UNEP,
Regional Seas Programme, Non-UNEP Administered Programmes, South Asian Seas, Governing
Instruments <http://www.unep.org > [UNEP, Regional Seas Programme].
The following activities have been identified for staged implementation by South Asian member
states, namely, coastal profiling; analysis and forecasting; definition of goals and strategies;
integration of detailed plans and management policies, and finally implementation of plans.
SASAP, supra note 16 at 7-8.
Ibid at 9-11.
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of marine and coastal areas in the region” and identifies certain activities for “staged
implementation.”23 Even though there is no regional convention to guide its actions, the
SASAP follows existing global environmental and maritime conventions and considers
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 as its “umbrella
Convention.”24 Even after the adoption of the Action Plan under the SASP, only limited
progress, if any, has been achieved in operationalizing ICZM in the member countries. 25
The reasons for this are easy to find, an important one being the absence of a specific
regional convention and related protocols to lead the Action Plan.26 In contrast, 10 out of
the 13 Regional Seas programmes are guided by regional conventions. 27 For instance, the
Regional Seas Programme for the Eastern African region28 is guided by the Nairobi
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal
Environment of the Western Indian Ocean, 1985 (Nairobi Convention).29 Consisting of
23
24
25
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Ibid at 7-8.
UNEP, Regional Seas Programme: South Asian Seas, online: UNEP, Non-UNEP Administered
Programmes, South Asian Seas <http://www.unep.org>.
Even though a central pillar of the SASP, the lack of political will and commitment on the part of
concerned states, has prevented the development of a regional regime on land based sources of
marine pollution. Daud Hassan, Protecting the Marine Environment from Land-Based Sources of
Pollution: Towards Effective International Cooperation (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006)
at 162.
See ibid. The conventions provide the “key legal basis” for implementing the action plans. See
Michael A Jacobson, “The United Nations’ Regional Seas Programme: How Does it Measure Up?”
(1995) 23 Coastal Mgmt 19 at 21.
Apart from the South Asia Seas, the East Asian Seas and the Northwest Pacific have no regional
conventions. The East Asian Seas has an Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the
Marine and Coastal Areas of the East Asian Region 1981 (revised in 1994) to guide actions and the
Northwest Pacific has an Action Plan for the Protection, Management and Development of the
Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northwest Pacific Region, 1994 to guide actions. For more
details on conventions and protocols by regional seas area, see Jacobson, ibid at 22-23.
Also referred to as the Western Indian Ocean, it extends from Somalia in the north to South Africa
in the south, covering 10 states (five island states in the Western Indian Ocean and five mainland
states). The contracting parties are Comoros, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and the Republic of South Africa. Welcome to the Nairobi
Convention, online: UNEP <http://www.unep.org/nairobiconvention/>. Coastal South Asia enjoys
many similarities with the Nairobi Convention Area, which is also an economically developing area
extending to more than 5,000 kilometers of coastline, accommodating nearly 180 million people and
is home to a wide range of coastal ecosystems. See Doris Mutta, “Nairobi Convention” (PowerPoint
presented to the 1st African Regional Targeted Workshop for GEF IW Projects Rhodes University,
Grahamstown, South Africa, April 2–4 2012). The fact that the parties to the Nairobi Convention are
in the process of developing an ICZM protocol makes this regime endearing for the purposes of the
present study.
The Nairobi Convention was signed in 1985 and came into force in 1996. This convention was
amended and adopted in April, 2010. For the text, see “Final Text of the Amended Nairobi
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal
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34 articles, the primary emphasis of the Nairobi Convention is pollution control (land
based,30 vessel-source,31 dumping,32 transboundary movement of hazardous wastes,33
airborne pollution,34) and bio-diversity protection.35 In securing these interests, the
Nairobi Convention spells out the need for co-operation,36 environmental impact
assessment,37 and measures to prevent environmental damage due to engineering
activities like land reclamation and dredging.38 In addition, this convention emphasizes
the need to develop rules to fix liability and compensation “for damage resulting from
pollution of the Convention area.”39Another significant feature of the Nairobi Convention
is that it recognises the threat of climate change and SLR.40
Despite the beneficence of this treaty, as in many other marine regions, the coastal
environment of the Nairobi Convention Area is fastly degrading due to human pressures
and unsustainable development practices.41 Presently, work in ongoing to “revitalize” the
Nairobi regime and in this regard the most important provisions that enable this
convention to retain relevance and emerge as a living document are the ones that provide
for bi-annual meetings of contracting parties to review its implementation42 and the
power to adopt additional protocols.43 In other words, the Nairobi Convention follows a
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37
38
39
40
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Environment of the Western Indian Ocean, Adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 31 March 2010,
UNEP(DEPI)/EAF/CPP.6/8a/Suppl” in UNEP, Final Act of the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries
for the Adoption of the Amended Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of
the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Western Indian Ocean, Adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on
31 March 2010, UNEP(DEPI)/EAF/CPP.6/10/Suppl [“Amended Nairobi Convention”].
Ibid, art 7.
Ibid, art 5.
Ibid, art 6.
Ibid, art 9.
Ibid, art 10.
Ibid, art 11.
Ibid, arts 12 & 15.
Ibid, art 14.
Ibid, art 13.
Ibid, art 16.
“[I]mpacts of climate change on marine and coastal environment resulting in, inter alia, sea-level
rise, increase of sea water temperature, ocean acidification, weather and climate variability that
affect or are likely to affect coastal communities.” Ibid, pmbl.
See generally David M Dzidzornu, “Marine Environmental Protection Under the Nairobi and
Abidjan Regimes: Working Toward Functional Revitalization?” in Aldo Chircop, Scott CoffenSmout & Moira McConnell, eds, Ocean Yearbook, vol 26 (Leiden: The Netherlands, 2012) 381
[Dzidzornu, “Marine Environmental Protection”].
“Amended Nairobi Convention,” supra note 29, art 18; see also ibid, art 27 (dealing with
compliance and enforcement).
Ibid, art 19.
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framework approach to maintain its dynamic nature and accordingly, the parties have
adopted three protocols44 that have increased the relevancy of this regional regime. There
is also proposal to develop a new protocol on ICZM as a potential anti-dote to degraded
coastlines.45 In fact, amendments to the Nairobi Convention and the new protocols have
extended and deepened the “normative reaches,” of the regime and advanced their
“regulatory comprehensiveness.”46 In short, by providing for a robust regional legal
framework to coordinate the efforts of member states to plan and develop programmes to
sustainably protect, manage and develop the coastal and marine environment and its
resources, the Nairobi Convention has been able to enhance the functional effectiveness
of this regional regime and create an atmosphere of awareness regarding the importance
and need for sustainable coastal and marine development.

9.2.1.1.1 Discussion
As set out above, of the 13 Regional Seas Programmes, regional conventions and other
legal instruments guide 10, and apart from South Asia, the East Asian Seas and the
Northwest Pacific also have no regional conventions. Even though, the LOSC is the
overarching legal instrument that guides SASAP implementation,47 South Asian coastal
countries are hamstrung by capacity constraints and have not been able to implement the
SASAP by working out the LOSC prescriptions relevant to SASP implementation. For
instance, Part XII of the LOSC deals with the “protection and preservation of the marine
44

45

46
47

UNEP, Final Act of the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries for the Adoption of the Protocol for the
Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Western Indian Ocean from Land-Based
Sources and Activities, Adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 31 March 2010,
UNEP(DEPI)/EAF/CPP.6/11/Suppl; “Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and
Flora in the Eastern African Region” in UNEP, Convention for the Protection, Management and
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region and Related
Protocols (New York: UN, 1985) 19; “Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Marine
Pollution in Cases of Emergency in the Eastern African Region” in UNEP, Convention for the
Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern
African Region and Related Protocols (New York: UN, 1985) 33.
See generally UNEP, Proposed Fifth Draft Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol to the
Amended Nairobi Convention, UNEP(DEPI)/EAF/LTWG5/3 (3 August 2011); see also “Decision
CP7/3: Development of a Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management” in UNEP, Adopted
Decisions for COP7, UNEP(DEPI)/EAF/CP.7/5/en (14 December 2012) at 3; Rochette & Billé,
“ICZM Protocols”, supra note 10 at 977, 979.
Dzidzornu, “Marine Environmental Protection”, supra note 41 at 384.
UNEP, Regional Seas Programme, supra note 20.
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environment,” and sets out general provisions for controlling all sources of marine
pollution and specific provisions for certain types of marine pollution. In giving effect to
these provisions, the SASAP has an annex; namely, annex IV devoted to the protection of
the marine environment from land-based activities. However, the South Asian coastal
countries have not been able to make much headway in regulating and controlling
LBSMP. As has been pointed out in the Bay of Bengal sub-region, “[d]ue to institutional,
strategic and financial constraints, international recommendations policies and strategies
related to LBSMP are not implemented in this Sub-region.”48 Similarly, a study dealing
with stocktaking of marine protected areas49 points out that, in South Asia, “MPAs are far
from being fully ecologically representative …, since most were declared before the
importance of these concepts was fully understood. Some 60% of MPAs lie in the
Maldives and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, most of which are very small sites …”50
Even though Regional Seas Programmes based on the convention-protocol
approach may not have resulted in healthy oceans and coasts, 51 it has nevertheless
underscored the importance and utility of cooperation at the regional level. It has
produced greater awareness and in certain situations even led to the development of
dynamic, responsive and cooperative regimes and the use of systemic, ecosystem-based
and integrated approaches to the problems that confront the marine environment. More
importantly, the convention-protocol approach infuses new life into the regime, and helps
it to retain vitality by bringing about normative alignment with evolving environmental
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Hassan, supra note 25.
Even though marine protected areas are not per se an LOSC prescription, several provisions in the
LOSC, fortify the ability of coastal states to establish marine protected areas. Robin Kundis Craig,
“Protecting International Marine Biodiversity: International Treaties and National Systems of
Marine Protected Areas” (2005) 20 J Land Use & Envtl L 333 at 361 (HeinOnline). As well, the
SASAP as part of “environmental management” emphasises “[c]o-operation in the establishment
and management of national protected coastal and marine habitats, in the establishment of a regional
network of protected areas, in joint activities to protect coastal ecosystems …” SASAP, supra note
16, ¶10.12.
UNEP-WCMC, National and Regional Networks of Marine Protected Areas: A Review of Progress,
Regional Seas (UNEP, 2008) at 69.
“[T]here does not always exist a positive relationship between well-designed institutional
arrangements based on the Convention-Protocol approach and an effective clean-up of regions
affected by marine pollution for which the arrangements are designed.” See generally Suh-Yong
Chung, “Is the Convention-Protocol Approach Appropriate for Addressing Regional Marine
Pollution?: The Barcelona Convention System Revisited” (2004) 13 Penn St Envtl L Rev 85 at 103
(HeinOnline) [Chung, “Is the Convention-Protocol Approach”].
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principles and norms and the biannual meetings of the Conference of parties helps to
modulate the convention according to changing needs and circumstances. 52 Furthermore
parties are goaded to adopt stricter regulatory standards and controls at the national level.
As seen earlier, the first Regional Seas initiative based on the framework
convention-protocol approach was the Barcelona Convention System targeted towards
ensuring a clean up of the region’s marine pollution. Since its inauguration, the system
has evolved with the adoption of action plans and additional protocols. This format has
influenced other regional seas programs, particularly those that are sponsored by the
United Nations Environment Program, which was instrumental in the establishment of
the Barcelona Convention System. Despite these developments, the Mediterranean
regime is widely considered as a “regime of low effectiveness” due to its “low problemsolving capacity.”53 Still, this does not mean that this regime is devoid of merits. In this
regard, the following observation on the Mediterranean regime is instructive:
As a laboratory for regime-building, the
Mediterranean offers many useful insights … While it
may be true that the Mediterranean is not cleaner
today and it is true that objectives and standards have
frequently not been met or postponed, the process of
co-operation has attained value per se, whether it
produces results or not … The regime provides
principal and subsidiary fora in which regional States
can address common issues with discrete ‘armwrestling’. This might explain why regime members
continue to be active members, periodically renew
vows of regional solidarity, participate and stake their
claim to benefits generated, commit resources, and
more recently commit to a new type of governance
characterized by less dirigisme and more civil society
participation …54
52
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In contrast, the meetings of the parties of the South Asian region are more bureaucratic and are
limited to reviewing its action plan.
See Jon Birger Skjærseth, “The Effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan”, in Edward L.
Miles et al, eds. Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002) at 311; see also Chung, “Is the Convention-Protocol Approach”,
supra note 51 (referring to the system’s inability to guarantee effective implementation of its
policies, the hard-law based approach which led to the acceptance of low standards and finally the
lack of financial resources that hampered the fructification of the regime).
Aldo Chircop, “The Mediterranean: Lessons Learned” in Mark J Valencia, ed, Maritime Regime
Building: Lessons Learned and Their Relevance for Northeast Asia, vol 36, Publications on Ocean
Development (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 27 at 44.
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At least in the South Asian context, when the South Asian Seas programme is contrasted
with the framework convention-protocol approach of the Mediterranean, East Africa and
other regions, it is clear that the South Asian Regional Seas Programme is devoid of the
beneficence that accrues to parties that follow the framework convention-protocol
approach. There is thus an element of merit in advocating for the implementation of the
South Asian Regional Seas Programmes via a regional convention like instrument and
related protocols.55 When the underlying intent of the LOSC principles is juxtaposed in a
regional context via a regional convention, the implementation tends to be more
contextual, binding and relevant.56

9.2.1.2 The SAARC, ICZM and Coastal Climate Change Adaptation
The most obvious and ambitious initiative to foster regionalism in South Asia received
fillip with the establishment of the SAARC in 1985.57 Within two years, environmental
issues, including climate change and natural disaster management, emerged as potential
candidates for cooperation.58 Presently, the SAARC Environment Ministers meets
periodically to take stock of progress and to enhance regional cooperation in the areas of
environment,59 climate change60 and natural disasters.61 Another important highlight in
55
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60
61

Jacobson, supra note 26.
“States shall cooperate . . ., as appropriate, on a regional basis, . . . in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this
Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December
1982, 1833 UNTS 3, 21 ILM 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994), art 197.
For an overview of SAARC, see Lawrence Sáez, The South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC): An Emerging Collaboration Architecture (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) at 8-29.
The following countries are members of the SAARC: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bhutan, Nepal,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. The following countries have observer status: European
Union, China, United States, Japan, South Korea, Mauritius, Iran, Australia, and Myanmar. South
Asian Association for Regional Corporation, online: SAARC <http://www.saarc-sec.org/>.
SAARC, Area of Cooperation, online: SAARC, Areas of Cooperation, Environment <http://www
.saarc-sec.org> [SAARC, Area of Cooperation].
Ibid (role of SAARC in environmental cooperation).
See infra notes 75-79.
Subsequent to the Indian Ocean tsunami, a Special Session of the SAARC Environment Ministers
was held at Malé, in 2005. It adopted the Malé Declaration, which establishes a collective response
to large-scale natural disasters. Thereafter, a comprehensive framework on Disaster Management
(2006-2015) aligned with the Hyogo Framework of Action (2005-2015) was adopted to address the
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the development of the environmental agenda is the SAARC Environment Action Plan
adopted at the Third Meeting of the environment ministers at Male in 1997.62 This plan
identified key concerns and set out parameters and modalities for regional cooperation. It
also cast the primary responsibility regarding its implementation on member states
through the National Action Plans on Environment,63 along with several other
measures,64 including the creation of a regional treaty on environmental cooperation.65
Consisting of 12 articles, the primary objective of the SAARC Convention on
Cooperation on Environment (SAARC Environment Convention) is to “promote
cooperation among the Parties in the field of environment and sustainable development,
on the basis of equity; reciprocity and mutual benefit, taking into account the applicable
policies and legislation in each Member State.”66 The Convention identifies the potential
areas for cooperation, including climate change and management of coastal and coral
reefs, river-ecosystems, and seawater and freshwater quality.67 In all cases, the
cooperation extends to the exchange of best practices and knowledge, capacity-building,
and transfer of eco-friendly technologies.68 This takes the form of collaboration between
parties, academic and research institutions, the SAARC regional centers, private sector
institutions and civil society, and any other form as agreed to by the parties.69
The SAARC Environment Convention contemplates the creation of a Governing
Council comprised of the environmental ministers of Member States who are to meet
once every two years70 to provide inter alia policy directions and guidance. Additionally,
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specific needs of disaster risk reduction and management in South Asia. The SAARC has also
established a Disaster Management Centre based in New Delhi in 2006. SAARC, Area of
Cooperation, supra note 58.
OP Goel, India and SAARC Engagements, vol 1 (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2004) at 41.
Ibid at 42.
The SAARC Coastal Zone Management Center established in 2004, the SAARC Forestry Center in
2007, and the South Asia Environment Outlook, 2009, are some of the steps taken to implement the
Action plan.
Goel, supra note 62 at 42. A SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment as stipulated
under Item 17 (Legal Framework) of the Action Plan was signed during the Sixteenth SAARC
Summit (Thimphu, 28-29 April 2010). SAARC, Area of Cooperation, supra note 58.
SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 29 April 2010, art I.
Ibid, art II.
Ibid.
Ibid, art III.
Ibid, art V.
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they are to adopt recommendations, plans and programmes on the areas identified for
cooperation, commission studies and scientific data collection, and facilitate technology
transfer.71 Decisions are to be unanimous.72 To assist the Governing Council and to
ensure the “full and effective implementation of the Convention, provision is made for
yearly meetings by senior officials.73 Disputes, if any, in relation to the interpretation or
application of the Convention, are to be settled by recourse to negotiation.74 Even though
the SAARC Environment Convention has yet to enter into force, it is obvious that it
represents an important milestone, given the tenacious nature of relations between the
member states in effectuating regional cooperation on environmental matters.
The SAARC Member States affords high priority to issues related to climate
change. In “[n]oting the urgency of the immediate need for dealing with the onslaught of
climate change including sea level rise,”75 the SAARC Environment Ministers, through
the Dhaka Declaration on Climate Change 2008, agreed to initiate and implement
programmes and measures for adaptation and also called upon Annex-I parties to provide
additional resources to fulfill their commitments enshrined in the UNFCCC.76
Additionally, the SAARC developed an Action Plan on Climate Change, whose objective
is to secure regional cooperation and south-south support for technology and knowledge
transfer.77 One of the major thematic areas identified in this document is adaptation to
climate change impacts such as SLR, salinity intrusion, and coastal and soil erosion.78 In
acknowledging that the impacts of climate change transcend national boundaries, and
that, for the SAARC, developing countries climate change represents a dual challenge of
addressing its negative impacts and pursuing socio-economic development, the Thimphu
Statement on Climate Change, 2010, emphasizes the need for a regional response to
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Ibid.
Ibid, art V.3.
Ibid, art V.2.
Ibid, art VII.
SAARC Environment Ministers Dhaka Declaration on Climate Change, Dhaka, 3 July 2008, at 2,
online: SAARC Workshop, Workshop Document, SAARC Declaration on Climate Change at
Dhaka <http://www.nset.org.np/climatechange/inside_background.php>.
Ibid at 2.
SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change, ¶B, online: SAARC Workshop, Workshop Document,
SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change <http://www.nset.org.np/climatechange/inside_backgrou
nd.php> (entitled “Objectives of the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change”).
Ibid, ¶C (entitled “Thematic Areas of the Regional Action Plan on Climate Change”).
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climate change impacts.79 In this regard, it calls for the establishment of an Intergovernmental Expert Group on Climate Change to develop policy direction and guidance
for regional cooperation and this body is to meet twice a year to review the
implementation of this statement.80 Even while stressing the importance of adaptation,
the plan does not articulate specific adaptation actions.81 However, the statement suggests
the creation of two important bodies: 1) a SAARC Inter-governmental Marine Initiative
(supported by the SAARC Coastal Zone Management Center) “to strengthen the
understanding of shared oceans and water bodies in the region and the critical roles they
play in sustainable living”; and 2) a SAARC Inter-governmental Climate-related
Disasters Initiative (SAARC Disaster Management Center) to integrate Climate Change
Adaptation with disaster risk reduction.82
The SAARC nations have developed common positions on climate change, an
indication that these nations realise the usefulness of regional cooperation in this area.83
These common positions point out that South Asia’s low-lying areas, long coastlines,
island regions, and flood plains are vulnerable to climate change.84 Due to these
vulnerabilities and the inadequate means and limited capacities available to South Asian
countries, developed countries are called upon to commit to ambitious and binding GHG
emission reduction targets and to provide adequate financial resources for adaptation,
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Thimphu Statement on Climate Change, Sixteenth SAARC Summit Thimphu, 28-29 April 2010,
SAARC/SUMMIT.16/15, online: SAARC Home, Declarations, Statements <http://www.saarcsec.org> [Thimphu Statement on Climate Change]. Parties are to ensure the timely implementation
of the Thimphu Statement on Climate Change. Seventeenth SAARC Summit, ADDU Declaration,
“Building Bridges” (14 November 2011), ¶6, online: SAARC, ADDU Declaration <http://www.saa
rc-sec.org/updates/index.php?page_no=3/>.
Thimphu Statement on Climate Change, ibid, ¶¶(ii), (xvi).
Ibid, opening recital.
Ibid, ¶¶(x), (xiv).
SAARC Statement on Climate Change United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15)
Copenhagen, Denmark, 7-18 December 2009, online: SAARC, Areas of Cooperation, Environment,
COP Meetings, Related Documents, COP 15 SAARC Statement <http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcoop
eration/detail.php?activity_id=32> [SAARC Statement on Climate Change]; Common SAARC
Position: United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 16/CMP 6) Cancun, Mexico, 29
November–10 December 2010, online: online: SAARC, Areas of Cooperation, Environment, COP
Meetings, Related Documents, Common SAARC Position for COP16 <http://saarc-sec.org/are
aofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=32> [Common SAARC Position].
See generally Common SAARC Position, ibid.
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NAPA development, capacity building, and technology development and transfer in order
to combat climate change.85
Arguably, the most important development under the SAARC regional
framework86 that offers the best prospect for ICZM and CCCA development is the
establishment of the SAARC Regional Coastal Zone Management Centre in 2005, with
its head office at Malé. The primary objective of this centre is to “promote cooperation in
planning, management and sustainable development of the coastal zones, including
research, training and promotion of awareness in the region.”87 India has taken steps to
create a “National Centre for Sustainable Coastal Management.”88 Such specialised
research bodies will help in the creation of epistemic communities in the South Asian
region which can facilitate the development of the science of ICZM, its policy,
management and legal dimensions that can facilitate via regional regimes.

9.2.1.2.1 Discussion
Even though decades have passed and several discussions have been held, tangible results
have not been produced at the SAARC level. The foregoing clarifies that the regional
prescriptions on ICZM and CCCA in South Asia are still in their embryonic stage.
Presently, ICZM is embodied in a patchwork of lofty ideals and political statements that
merely underline the need and importance of the methodology, with no specific roadmaps
on how these statements are to be translated into practice. Despite having a rather broad
mandate to further regional cooperation, neither platform (i.e., the South Asian Regional
Seas Programme with its SASAP and the SAARC) has been able to make substantial
headway in spreading the message or mainstreaming coastal climate change adaptation.
Given the state of ICZM in South Asia, it is clear that the SASAP, with its emphasis on
ICZM development and implementation, has generally been ignored by the member
85
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SAARC Statement on Climate Change, supra note 83.
Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 1985, ¶1, online: SAARC
Disaster Management Centre <http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/charter.pdf>.
Objectives, online: SCZMC <http://www.sczmc.org/objectives/>.
For further information, see National Centre for Sustainable Coastal Management, online: NCSCM
<http://ncscm.org/>; see also The International Centre for Climate Change & Development, online:
ICCCAD <http://centers.iub.edu.bd/icccad/>.
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states. At the same time, the SAARC in its almost three decades of existence, has been
able to move ahead in terms of facilitating economic integration. It has succeeded as a
positive and dynamic regional institution to foster cooperation in such matters. However
there is the possibility that economic integration cannot be truly attained by remaining
oblivious to environmental and social issues. Even though the SAARC has formulated a
basic frame for the development of environmental cooperation, disputes between states
appear as stumbling blocks to cooperation and has virtually prevented it from addressing
contentious issues like transboundary water sharing. Another lacuna in the regional
regime is that, despite the South Asian region having one of the lowest carbon foot
imprints in the world (India being the sole exception), the focus of regional efforts is on
mitigation when it should be on adaptation.89 While it is definitely heartening to note that
these countries are working together to develop a common stance at climate change
negotiations vis-à-vis mitigation (and in the process underscoring the value and
importance of cooperation), very few steps have been taken in terms of augmenting
cooperation for climate change adaptation when it is amply clear that this region will bear
the brunt of climate-change-related impacts, including SLR. As discussed previously in
this study, South Asia is one of the most densely populated regions in the world and an
overwhelming majority of the population lives in poverty. Thus, even slight changes in
climate can prove particularly catastrophic due to poor adaptive capacity. Moreover,
climate change impacts fall disproportionately on the poor, the disadvantaged, women,
and traditional artisanal fishers because their subsistence economies depend primarily on
coastal resources, which are becoming scarcer. Consequently, governmental efforts are
often directed to raise the living standards of the people and since climate change
adaptation is essentially an extension of good developmental practice, it would be
apposite if these countries were to invest in mainstreaming climate change adaptation in
existing developmental efforts and here a regional regime can play a significant role in
fostering climate change adaptation, particularly, CCCA.
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With 24.6 per cent of the world population, the CO 2 emissions in South Asia is only 7.8. per cent of
the total CO2 emissions. The US with just above 4.0 per cent of the world population, contributes
21.1 per cent of the CO2 emissions. UNDP, Unequal Carbon Footprints: Shares of Emissions and
Population, online: UNDP <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/climatechange/shares/>. The
Thimphu statement emphasizes that South Asia should become a world leader in low-carbon
technologies and renewable energy. Thimphu Statement on Climate Change, supra note 79.
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As pointed out earlier, in addressing environmental, climate change and natural
disaster management issues, the SAARC has steered clear of contentious issues like
transboundary water resources sharing.90 The distrust and recalcitrant attitude of these
countries has prevented realisation of the full potential that could accrue through regional
integration. The subsequent discussion will explicate some of the key tensions that have
prevented regional cooperation from maturing in South Asia. But before proceeding in
this direction, a note on some of the other programmes and arrangements that have
relevance to the region is provided. An interesting aspect in these arrangements is that,
some of the players are from countries that fall beyond the South Asian region, and some
of the countries in the coastal South Asian region are excluded. And this is due to due to
the unique nature of the marine ecosystem to be conserved.
In effectuating large marine ecosystem (LME) management in the Bay of Bengal
region, eight countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Maldives,
Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand that practically encircle the Bay of Bengal, many of
whom lie beyond the physical borders of coastal South Asia, have joined forces for the
Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Project (BOBLME). The BOBLME involves
working together to improve regional management of the Bay of Bengal environment and
its fisheries.91 The Global Environment Facility, the Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, supports this project and the FAO is the implementing
agency. Presently, the parties are in the process of developing a Strategic Action
Programme for the Bay of Bengal to help member states to collectively address and
remediate concerns. This Strategic Action Programme will be unveiled by 2014.92 Apart
from the BOBLME, there are also other programmes relevant to the region like
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James Kraska, “Sustainable Development is Security: The Role of Transboundary River
Agreements as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in South Asia” (2003) 28 Yale J Int'l L 465
(QL).
The Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Project, online: boblme <http://www.boblme.org/ind
ex.html>; see also Philomène Verlaan, “Current Legal Developments: Bay of Bengal” (2006) 21
Int'l J Mar & Coast L 111.
See also The Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Project: The Next Steps, Brochure [nd], online:
boblme <http://www.boblme.org>.
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Mangroves for the Future initiative, which is co-chaired by the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature and the UNDP. This programme has Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam as member
countries.93 Then there is also a proposal to set up an Indo-Bangla Sundarbans Ecological
Forum, to take up joint management programmes to protect the Sundarbans mangrove
forest.94

9.2.2 Transboundary Disputes and the Scuttling of the Regimes
The coastal countries of South Asia are joined together by common historical and cultural
roots that date back thousands of years. Following de-colonization of South Asia, the
exodus of refugees from both sides of the border, protracted disputes over the future of
Kashmir,95 the strident stance by member states over common problems and the four
wars fought between the two nuclear powers of India and Pakistan have left seemingly
indelible scars, precluding regional cooperation. For instance, intractable disputes over
their un-delimited maritime boundaries between the coastal nations of India and Pakistan
in relation to the Sir Creek96 and between India and Bangladesh persist,97 with the
93
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For more details, see Mangroves for the Future: Investing in Coastal Ecosystems, online:
Mangroves for the Future <http://www.mangrovesforthefuture.org/>.
Asia-Pacific Human Development Report: One Planet to Share: Sustaining Human Progress in a
Changing Climate (New Delhi: Routledge, 2012) at 109.
“Kashmir has been referred to as the most dangerous place on earth.” See The Carter Center, The
Kashmiri Conflict: Historical and Prospective Intervention Analyses: November 19-21, 2002,
Special Conflict Report (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2003) at 2 (foreword by Jimmy Carter).
Throughout their history, India and Pakistan have had an uneasy relationship. The bone of contention
is the northern Himalayan State of Kashmir. This has spilt over to their land and maritime
boundaries in the Arabian Sea. The maritime dispute between India and Pakistan centres on Sir
Creek, a 60-mile-long fluctuating tidal channel or estuary in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch that
separates the Indian State of Gujarat from the Pakistani Province of Sindh. After the 1965 war
between India and Pakistan, Pakistan claimed that half of the Rann of Kutch along the 24th parallel
is Pakistani territory. India objected, claiming that the boundary runs roughly along the northern
edge of the Rann. The matter was referred to an international tribunal for arbitration, the IndoPakistani Western Boundary Case Tribunal. In its Award, the tribunal almost completely upheld
India’s claim to the entire Rann, conceding small sectors to Pakistan. Both countries accepted the
decision. However, the boundary of Sir Creek, from its head in the marshy lands of the Rann to its
mouth in the Arabian Sea, and the maritime boundary between India and Pakistan, are undemarcated, as they agreed not to refer this part to the tribunal for adjudication. The dispute is
ongoing. While Pakistan claims that the boundary along Sir Creek should lie along its eastern edge,
India, relying upon the ‘thalweg’ or the mid-channel principle, believes that it should be along the
middle of the creek. Pakistan’s contention is that the creek is not navigable and thus the mid-channel
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possible presence of substantial offshore hydrocarbon deposits furthering the antagonism.
As well, controversy persists regarding determination of the outer limits of the extended
continental shelf, primarily in the Bay of Bengal region. 98 All this has left maritime

97

98

principle does not apply. The non-demarcation of maritime boundaries causes immense hardship to
fishermen in both countries, as they often find themselves on the wrong side of the border. Tony
George Puthucherril, “India’s Ocean Policy” in Biliana Cicin-Sain, David VanderZwaag & Miriam
C Balgos, eds, Integrated National and Regional Ocean Policies: Comparative Practices and
Future Prospects (United Nations University Press [in press]) [Puthucherril, “India’s Ocean
Policy”].
The stability of the maritime boundary between India and Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal remains
undetermined. This is mainly due to the divergent methods of delimitation of the maritime zones
proposed by both India and Bangladesh and the conflicting claims of both countries over New
Moore (South Talpatty) island, which emerged in the estuary of the border river, Haribhanga, after a
devastating cyclone in 1970. While India wants the maritime boundary to be determined by the
equidistance method, Bangladesh prefers use of the equitable method. To mitigate the drawbacks of
a receding coastline, Bangladesh, through its Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974, has
adopted the depth method to draw its baselines from the straight lines drawn by joining certain outer
points at a depth of 60 feet. This step practically converts nearly 6,200 square nautical miles of its
potential EEZ into internal waters and has been rejected outright by its immediate neighbours, India
and Myanmar. In December 2009, Bangladesh requested that the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (ITLOS) appoint an arbitral tribunal to settle this maritime boundary dispute. In February
2010, the President of the ITLOS appointed a three-member arbitral tribunal to settle the maritime
delimitation dispute. As far as New Moore Island is concerned, India claims that since the main
channel of this river flows to the east of New Moore, the island belongs to India. On the other hand,
Bangladesh maintains that it flows to the west, rendering the island an integral part of its territory.
However, it seems that the dispute over this island has been settled by global warming as the island
has been submerged by rising waters. RC Sharma & PC Sinha, India’s Ocean Policy (New Delhi:
Khanna Publishers, 1994) at 113-19; see also ITLOS, Press Release, ITLOS/Press 198, "Arbitral
Proceedings Between Bangladesh and India New Arbitrator Appointed" (19 July 2013). For an
overview on the legal position of islands in delimiting inter-state boundaries in rivers, see generally
Hiran W Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law, Shigeru Oda, ed, 15
Publications on Ocean Development (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990) at 193;
“Disputed Bay of Bengal island ‘vanishes’ say scientists”, BBC News (24 March 2010), online:
BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk>; Puthucherril, “India’s Ocean Policy”, ibid; see also Kisei
Tanaka, "Indo-Bangladesh Maritime Border Dispute: Conflicts Over a Disappeared Island ICE Case
Studies", No 270 (December 2011), online: American University <http://www1.american.ed
u/ted/ICE/taplatti.html>.
The LOSC provides scientific and technical criteria (articles 76-85 and Annex II (Statement of
Understanding Concerning a Specific Method to be Used in Establishing the Outer Edge of the
Continental Margin)) regarding delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles from the baselines of a coastal state. Specifically, taking into the inequity that could
befall upon those states that seek to establish the outer edge of the continental margin in the southern
part of the Bay of Bengal, consequent to the application of article 76 of the LOSC, it was provided
that the outer edge of the continental margin in this area could be established by straight lines not
exceeding 60 nautical miles connecting fixed points at which the sediment thickness is not less than
one kilometer. See “Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Annex
II: Statement of Understanding Concerning a Specific Method to be Used in Establishing the Outer
Edge of the Continental Margin” in UNCLOS, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf CLCS/11/Add. 1 (3 September 1999). The Statement also addresses the special geographic
circumstances in determining the outer edge of the continental margin in the Southern part of the
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boundaries in the Indian sub-continent un-delimited, which has impeded the progress of
regional cooperation in ocean and coastal management. Similarly, the construction of the
Sethusamudram link canal,99 the commissioning of the Koodankulam nuclear reactor in

99

Bay of Bengal. India has made a submission under article 76 (8) to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf regarding the establishment of the outer limits of its continental shelf that lie
beyond the 200 nautical miles, in three regions, namely, in the eastern offshore region in the Bay of
Bengal (the outer limits are defined by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length
connecting 452 fixed points), in the western offshore region of Andaman islands and in the western
offshore region in the Arabian sea. As a coastal state in the southern part of the Bay of Bengal, India
seeks to make a separate second partial submission of information and data to support its claims
over the outer limits of continental shelf. See generally India, “The Indian Continental Shelf: Partial
Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Pursuant to Article 76,
Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Part I Executive Summary”
(np, 2009). The Union of Myanmar, Bangladesh and the Sultanate of Oman have objected to this.
For the respective submissions, see Oceans & Law of the Sea United Nations, Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical
Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Republic of India,
online: Oceans & Law of the Sea United Nations, Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, Submissions and Recommendations, India <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>. The
relevant part of the submission of Bangladesh notes as follows:
The Government of Bangladesh believes [that India’s]
assertion is not supported by morphological, geological or
tectonic evidences. Scientific research and analyses have
established that the morphology of the seabed in the Bay
of Bengal is marked by a regional slope where water
depth gradually increases in a seaward direction from
north to south. This characteristic contradicts the notion
of an eastward prolongation of India’s continental
landmass, or a westward prolongation of the landmass of
the Andaman Islands … The characteristic also
underscores the reality that the seabed in the northern and
central Bay of Bengal owes much of its shape and
composition to the high volumes of sediments that has
emerged mostly from or across the landmass of
Bangladesh over geological time. The entire central part
of the Bay is known to overlie oceanic crust … Hence for
any State that borders upon the Bay of Bengal, the only
natural prolongation that can be claimed is the one that
arises from the accumulation of sediments over this
oceanic crust in the seaward direction of its flow. In
consideration of its location and shape of the sedimentary
wedge, the accumulated sediments therefore comprise the
exclusive natural prolongation of Bangladesh.
Oceans & Law of the Sea United Nations, Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the United Nations,
No PMBNY-UNCLOS/2009, ¶2.c, online: Oceans & Law of the Sea United Nations, Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Submissions and Recommendations, India, Bangladesh
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>.
At present, India does not have a continuous navigation channel connecting its east and west coasts.
Adam’s Bridge, also called Ram Sethu, is a discontinuous chain of sandbars that connects the Indian
sub-continent to Sri Lanka. Consequently, ships from the west coast of India and other western
hemisphere countries that are headed to the east coast of India or towards East Asia must navigate
475

India,100 and the recent voices of opposition in the state of Tamil Nadu in India who
perceive the settlement over the Katchatheevu isle in the Palk Strait between the
Government of India and Sri Lanka in 1974 as a unilateral act of cession by the
Government of India, have the potential to upset India-Sri Lanka relations.101 Additional
impediments to cooperation include the diversion of the waters of the River Ganges by
India via the Farakka Barrage,102 the inability to conclude the Tessta water-sharing
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101

102

around the Sri Lankan coast. The Sethusamudram Ship Channel Project (Sethu Canal) proposes
dredging a channel through the shallows between India and Sri Lanka. This would provide ships
direct passage through India’s territorial waters, eliminate the need to circumnavigate Sri Lanka, and
save ships up to 424 nautical miles and 30 hours of sailing. However, the Sethu Canal would run
within 20 kilometers of the Gulf of Mannar Marine Biosphere Reserve. See generally Tony George
Puthucherril, “Ballast Waters and Aquatic Invasive Species: A Model for India” (2008) 19 Colo J
Int’l Envtl L & Pol’y 381 (QL); O Fernandes v Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (17 December
2004), WP No 33528 (Madras HC).
PTI, “Sri Lankan group alleges radiation leaks at Kudankulam N-plant”, The Indian Express (2
March 2013), online: The Indian Express <http://www.indianexpress.com>. Press Trust of India,
“Lanka to complain to international watchdog about India’s nuclear plants” NDTV [of India] (9
April 2012), online: NDTV <http://www.ndtv.com>.
C Raja, “Island Lost”, The New Indian Express (10 September 2013), online: The New Indian
Express <http://newindianexpress.com/cities/chennai/>; see also Agreement between Sri Lanka and
India on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related Matters, 26 & 28
June 1974, (entry into force 10 July 1974) arts 4-6.
Bangladesh and India share nearly 54 rivers. Both these countries have only one treaty, which
concerns sharing the Ganges. Disputes over the sharing of Ganges waters have a long history, one
that antecedes the founding of Bangladesh. In 1951, when Bangladesh was East Pakistan, the then
Government of Pakistan protested with the Indian government over India’s proposal to construct the
Farakka barrage. While Pakistan demanded prior consultation before India proceeded with any
scheme to divert the waters, India was averse to any negotiated settlement and even went to the
extent of not recognising the Ganges as an international river. In 1964, ignoring the opposition of
Pakistan, India proceeded with the Farakka barrage. This project which involved the construction of
a 2,245-meter-long barrage across the main channel of the Ganges and a feeder canal 38 kilometers
long, 150 meters wide, and six meters deep was designed to divert a maximum of 40,000 cusecs
from the flow of the Ganges into the Bhagirathi River, which later becomes the Hooghly. Following
Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, with India’s active military support, the Farakka
project, which was still under construction, became a bone of contention and both countries decided
to establish a joint river commission. In 1975, India sought Bangladesh’s agreement to test-run a
feeder canal that led to an agreement valid for only 41 days to allow the commissioning of the
barrage. Furthermore, this agreement also allowed India to divert 11,000 cusecs of flow into the
feeder canal in April and 16,000 cusecs in May, 1975. Even though the agreement expired after 41
days, India continued with its diversions, paving the way for yet another agreement in 1977, this one
for five years. This agreement fixed the quantum of water that India was to release to Bangladesh
during the dry season (from January 1 through May 31). The “interim” character of this arrangement
continued through the conclusion of several memorandums of understanding until 1988, when
negotiations came to a standstill. The deadlock continued for almost a decade during which time
there was no agreement between these two countries. Finally, in 1996, the two countries concluded a
more permanent and historic deal in the form of a 30-year treaty on sharing the Ganges at Farakka.
Salman MA Salman & Kishor Uprety, Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's International
Rivers: A Legal Perspective, Rudolf V Van Puymbroeck, ed, Law, Justice and Development Series
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003) at 135. Farakka remains a bone of contention between India
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agreement between India and Bangladesh,103 and the transfer of the waters of the
Kishenganga River, again by India, for a hydro-electric project, which seemingly
conflicts with this country’s obligations under the Indus treaty. 104 There is also India’s
proposal to interlink some of its major rivers to meet its ever-growing water demands,105
which will considerably shape the way in which regional cooperation for ICZM will
evolve in due course in South Asia and how lower riparian nations will be able to adapt
to a rising sea. As well, the political instability in the majority of the South Asia coastal
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and Bangladesh as Bangladesh believes that it is the water diversion at Farakka by India that
reduced the freshwater flow in the dry season increasing the salinity. Bangladesh, Ministry of
Environment & Forest, Initial National Communication under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Dhaka: Ministry of Environment & Forest, 2002) at 30.
There have been proposals to conclude another water sharing treaty in relation to the River Teesta
between India and Bangladesh. However, these remain in limbo. See PTI, “Bangladesh hopeful of
Teesta water-sharing treaty” The Hindu [of India] (29 September 2012), online: The Hindu
<http://www.thehindu.com/>.
Md Nurul Islam, Md Ashfaque Azam & QR Islam, “Teesta River Water Sharing: A Case Study in
Teesta Barrage Project” online: WaterTech <http://www.watertech.cn/english/islam.pdf>.
It calls upon India to “let flow all the waters of the Western rivers and not permit any interference
with those waters.” Indus Waters Treaty, 1960, Pakistan and India, 19 September 1960, (1961) 55:3
AJIL 797 (ratifications exchanged 12 January 1961), art III(2). In a Partial Award, the Court of
Arbitration unanimously decided that while India could divert water for the Kishenganga HydroElectric Project, India is under an obligation to maintain a minimum flow of water in the
Kishenganga/Neelum River. In The Matter of the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v
India) (2013), (Court of Arbitration), (Arbitrators: Stephen M Schwebel, Franklin Berman KCMG
QC, Howard S Wheater FREng, Lucius Caflisch, Jan Paulsson, Bruno Simma, Peter Tomka) at 201.
The inter-linking of rivers project envisages the transfer of water from surplus basins or sub-basins
to water-deficient areas, thereby providing freshwater to arid regions. Even though the genesis of
this project can be traced back to the British, it was 1994 when the Supreme Court of India took
notice of an interlocutory application filed by the amicus curiae referring to an address by the then
President of India which emphasized the need for networking of rivers. The court directed that the
interlocutory application be treated as an independent writ petition and passed in 2002, directing the
interlinking of rivers. Accordingly, the central government directed the constitution of a highpowered task force to build national consensus, work out detailed plans, and complete the entire
work of linking the rivers by 2016. However, there was no progress on the matter and it was in such
circumstances of inaction that a new petition was instituted and the supreme court breathed new life
into the proposal. In an elaborate judgement, the court spoke on the benefits that could accrue to the
country if this project was implemented in a time-bound manner. It was also pointed out that since
“[h]uge amounts of public money have been spent at the planning stage itself . . . it will be travesty
of good governance and the epitome of harm to public interest if these projects are not carried
forward with a sense of sincerity and a desire for its completion.” In Re Networking of Rivers (27
February 2012), WP Civil No 512 of 2002 (India SC), ¶59, online: Indian Kannon <http://indiankan
oon.org/doc/41857247/>. Accordingly, a mandamus was issued directing the Union of India to
constitute a “Special Committee for Inter-linking of Rivers.” The committee was directed to “take
firm steps and fix a definite timeframe to lay down the guidelines for completion of feasibility
reports or other reports and shall ensure the completion of projects so that the benefits accrue within
reasonable time and cost” (¶59(X)). Furthermore, the committee was to submit a bi-annual report to
the union cabinet with status-cum-progress reports and relevant decisions. Finally, the court also
directed the committee to take up the Ken-Betwa project for implementation and in the event of
non-compliance; the amicus curiae could move a contempt petition before the supreme court. Ibid.
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countries also casts shadows over the development of regional co-operative regimes.
Apart from India, democracy and democratic institutions are yet to mature and sink its
roots deep in the other coastal countries in South Asia. In recent years, the rise of
extremism and terrorism has produced growing instability in the region and there is an
increasing tendency in the region to hold India responsible for all of the ills that plague
these countries.106

9.3 REGIONAL APPROACHES
ELSEWHERE

TO

LEGISLATING ICZM: EMERGING REGIMES

The problems that affect the coastal and marine space are primarily nation- and regionspecific, and even though some of these are common issues (like marine pollution,
introduction of invasives, SLR, etc.), there can be differences in terms of the degree of
impact and the level of preparedness to respond. Consequently, it may be difficult for
nations to agree on a common global format for ICZM that has an across-the-board legal
force. There is also the danger that, in attempting to balance divergent interests and in the
ensuing trade-offs, an international treaty on ICZM may be set at a high degree of
generality, which will likely not further the cause. While a soft-law instrument
prescribing an ICZM template may not be farfetched, it could nonetheless raise
implementation concerns.
It is within this context that the need for regional-level binding instruments on
ICZM gains relevance. A regional-level hard-law instrument on ICZM can enable
neighbouring countries to engage in comprehensive and specific actions to protect shared
coastal and marine environments and resources by taking into account the ecology,
development, and other specificities of the region. More importantly because of its
binding nature, it can help forge forces at the regional level to respond to specific and
unique challenges that affect a particular region, pool resources, and facilitate the
exchange of information.107 Already, we have a binding Mediterranean ICZM protocol,
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Ashok Swain, “South Asia Its Environment and Regional Institutions” in Lorraine Elliott & Shaun
Breslin, eds, Comparative Environmental Regionalism (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) 76 at 87 (pointing
out that many countries in this region consider India to be a “regional bully”).
Raphaël Billé & Julien Rochette, Feasibility Assessment of an ICZM Protocol to the Nairobi
Convention to the Parties of the Nairobi Convention (IDDRI, 2010) at 7.
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the “first supra-State legal instrument”108 on ICZM that has force at the regional level of
the Mediterranean. The European Union has also made rapid strides in implementing
ICZM at the regional level. The Eastern African Region is in the process of developing a
binding protocol on ICZM as is the Baltic and the Black sea regions. 109 This section
examines certain regional level approaches to legislating ICZM and focuses on the
Mediterranean Regional Seas Programme and ICZM initiatives by the European Union.

9.3.1 The Mediterranean Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Enclosed by the continents of Africa, Europe and Asia, 21 countries apportion the
Mediterranean coastline,110 which is about 46,000 kilometers long.111 The basin has
supported great civilizations and even today the sea and its coasts form the “lifeblood of
the region.”112 The list of problems that plague the coastal and marine health are the same
as elsewhere: large concentration of populations, loss of marine habitats, marine
pollution, unsustainable fisheries, invasive species, and climate change.113
Before delving into the details of the Mediterranean experience on legislating
ICZM, it is necessary to understand the background to the Mediterranean Regional Seas
Programme. Adopted in 1975 by sixteen Mediterranean states and the European
Community, it was based on an action plan that originally targeted marine pollution
prevention and was intended to assist national governments in formulating and
implementing anti-pollution policies. In 1976, the parties adopted the legally-binding
108
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110
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112
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Julien Rochette & Raphaël Billé, Analysis of the Mediterranean ICZM Protocol: At the Crossroads
Between the Rationality of Provisions and the Logic of Negotiations (IDDRI, 2010) at 4, online:
CIRCLE-MED <http://www.circle-med.net/doc/ICZM_Med_IDDRI.pdf> [Rochette & Billé,
Analysis of the Mediterranean ICZM Protocol].
See generally Billé & Rochette, supra note 107; see Helsinki Commission, Helcom
Recommendation 24/10: Implementation of Integrated Marine and Coastal Management of Human
activities in the Baltic Sea Area, 25 June 2003, online: Helsinki Commission, Recommendations,
Valid Recommendations <http://www.helcom.fi/home/en_GB/welcome/>; see also BSC, Strategic
Action Plan for the Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation of the Black Sea, 17 April 2009,
online: The Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution: Permanent
Secretariat, Official Documents, Legal Documents <http://www.blacksea-commission.org/>.
UNEP/MAP, State of the Mediterranean Marine and Coastal Environment (Athens: 2012) at 9.
Ibid at 39.
Ibid at 17.
The population, which was 95 million in 1979, grew to 143 million in 2000 and this could reach 174
million by 2025. Ibid at 26. There are nearly thousand non-indigenous aquatic species in the
Mediterranean with a new species being introduced on average once every 10 days. Ibid at 56. The
western Mediterranean waters are experiencing a substantial warming trend and there is significant
SLR in the Eastern Mediterranean as well. Ibid at 62.
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Barcelona Convention,114 which was amended in 1995 to align it with, inter alia, the Rio
Declaration and Agenda 21,115 and significantly, a broader commitment to integrated
coastal planning and management.116 In 1995 the Action Plan for the Protection of the
Marine Environment and the Sustainable Development of the Coastal Areas of the
Mediterranean (MAP Phase II) was adopted to replace the Mediterranean Action Plan of
1975.117 Seven protocols to the convention have been adopted, including the one on
ICZM.118 Article 4.3(e) of the Barcelona Convention calls on contracting parties “to
promote the integrated management of the coastal zones, taking into account the
protection of areas of ecological and landscape interest and the rational use of natural
resources.”119 MAP Phase II identified “integrated coastal area management” as “the
standard approach for tackling the problems affecting Mediterranean coastal areas. 120 To
this end, national and sub-national legislation was to be enacted and institutional
capacities created or strengthened. The cumulative experience gained from several pilot
projects enhanced capacity and contributed to the draft text of the ICZM protocol, which
114
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Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, 16 February 1976, 15
ILM 290 (entered into force 12 February 1978, revised in Barcelona, Spain, on 10 June 1995 as the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the
Mediterranean, entered into force on 9 July 2004), pmbl.
In particular, the amendment in its preamble refers to the UNCED, 1992 and the LOSC 1982. For
the full text of the amended Barcelona Convention, see Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, online: European Environment Agency
<http://www.eea.europa.eu/> [Amended Barcelona Convention].
This is evident from the title, which now refers to “protection of the marine environment and the
coastal region of the Mediterranean.” Ibid.
“Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Sustainable Development of the
Coastal Areas of the Mediterranean (MAP Phase II)” in UNEP & MAP, Mediterranean Action Plan
and Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the
Mediterranean and its Protocols, (Informal Document) Revised (Athens: UNEP, 1997) 1 at 1-31
[“Action Plan MAP Phase II”].
Protocol on integrated coastal zone management, 2008; Protocol for the prevention and elimination
of pollution of the Mediterranean sea by dumping from ships and aircraft or incineration at sea,
1995; Protocol concerning cooperation in preventing pollution from ships and, in cases of
emergency, combating pollution of the Mediterranean sea, 2002; Protocol for the protection of the
Mediterranean sea against pollution from land-based sources and activities, 1996 ; Protocol
concerning specially protected areas and biological diversity in the Mediterranean, 1995; Protocol
for the protection of the Mediterranean sea against pollution resulting from exploration and
exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil, 1994; Protocol on the prevention
of pollution of the Mediterranean sea by transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their
disposal, 1996. For more details and the texts of these instruments, see UNEP, Mediterranean
Action Plan for the Barcelona Convention, online: UNEPMAP, About MAP, Protocols <http:
//www.unepmap.org>.
Amended Barcelona Convention, supra note 115.
“Action Plan MAP Phase II”, supra note 116, ¶¶1.4-1.5.
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after six years of negotiations and refinements, was signed on 21 January 2008. 121 The
Madrid Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (protocol) entered into force in
March 2011. To date, it is the only legal instrument at the international level that provides
a normative foundation for ICZM development.122 An Action Plan for the
Implementation of the ICZM Protocol for the Mediterranean 2012 – 2019 has been
developed to strengthen the capacity of contracting parties to implement the protocol and
promote ICZM at the regional and global levels.123 With its 40 articles arranged into
seven parts, the protocol imposes binding obligations on signatory states to operationalize
ICZM at a regional level and to strengthen regional cooperation in this regard.124 The
recognition that as “irreplaceable ecological, economic and social resource[s]” that face
increasing anthropogenic pressures and climate change risks, coastal zones and fragile
coastal ecosystems have to be managed on the basis of an integrated approach at the level
of the Mediterranean basin.125 The intention is to halt and reverse degradation trends and
to reduce biodiversity loss so as to ensure preservation of coastal resources and their
sustainable development.126 The seaward limit of the coastal zone is defined as the
external limit of the territorial waters;127 the landward limit is left to the individual parties
to determine.128 The protocol text can be grouped under three broad heads: 1) sustainable
coastal management; 2) strengthening coastal governance; and 3) facilitating the regional
approach.

9.3.1.1 Sustainable Coastal Management
121
122

123

124

125
126
127
128

See Rochette & Billé, “ICZM Protocols”, supra note 10 at 978-79.
Albania, Algeria, Croatia, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco,
Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and the European Union have signed the Protocol, and Albania,
Croatia, France, Montenegro, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, and the European Union have
ratified this instrument. For more details, see Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in
the Mediterranean: Ratification Score, online: Priority Actions Programme, ICZM Protocol,
Ratification Score <http://www.pap-thecoastcentre.org/>.
See generally Priority Actions Programme, Action Plan for the Implementation of the ICZM
Protocol for the Mediterranean 2012–2019, PAP/NFP/2011/2, Draft (2011) at 9 [Action Plan for
ICZM Protocol].
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 19 June 1993, 31 ILM 849 (adopted at New York 9 May 1992), art 4(1)(e); see also
Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean, [2009] OJ L 34/19, art 1
[ICZM Protocol].
Ibid, pmbl.
Ibid.
Ibid, art 3(1)(a).
Ibid, art 3(1)(b).
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The exceptional biodiversity and ecosystem services of the coastal regions in the
Mediterranean are threatened by socio-economic development. Accordingly, the protocol
seeks to protect specific coastal ecosystems, promote sustainable coastal resources use,
manage economic activities, and risk in the coastal zone. Mediterranean coastal zones are
“the common natural and cultural heritage” of the people and thus must be preserved and
used “judiciously for the benefit of present and future generations.”129 Specific provisions
protect coastal ecosystems like wetlands and estuaries,130 marine species and habitats,131
coastal forests,132 dunes,133 coastal landscapes,134 islands,135 and cultural heritage
including underwater cultural heritage.136 The protocol also identifies implementation
instruments and tools like environmental impact assessment,137 land policy including
planning,138 economic, financial and fiscal measures,139 codes of good practice,140 and
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139
140

Ibid, pmbl.
Parties are to take into account the environmental, economic and social function of wetlands and
estuaries in their national coastal strategies, plans and programmes; regulate and if necessary,
prohibit activities that adversely affect wetlands and estuaries, and undertake their restoration. Ibid,
art 10(1).
Parties are to adopt measures to ensure protection and conservation through legislation, planning
and management of marine and coastal areas, particularly those hosting habitats and species of high
conservation value. Ibid, art 10(2)(a).
Parties are to adopt measures to preserve or develop coastal forests and woods, particularly those
located outside specially protected areas Ibid, art 10(3).
Parties are to preserve and rehabilitate in a sustainable manner dunes and bars. Ibid, art 10(4).
In defining ICZM, it is emphasized that the fragility of coastal ecosystems and landscapes should be
considered. Ibid, art 2(f). One of the objectives of ICZM is to preserve the integrity of coastal
landscapes. Ibid, art 5(d). Parties are to ensure that the sustainable use and management of coastal
zones preserves landscapes. Ibid, art 8(1). They are also to adopt measures to ensure protection of
coastal landscapes through legislation, planning and management. Ibid, art 11(1).
Parties are to take into account the specific characteristics of the island environment, promote
environmentally friendly activities in such areas and adopt special measures to ensure participation
of inhabitants in the protection of coastal ecosystems based on local customs and knowledge. Ibid,
art 12.
Parties are to adopt individual or collective measures to preserve and protect the cultural heritage of
coastal zones including underwater cultural heritage. The emphasis in on situ conservation, and
elements of underwater cultural heritage if removed are to be preserved, not traded, sold or bartered.
Ibid, art 13.
Parties are to ensure environmental impact assessments, for public and private projects likely to
have significant environmental effects on the coastal zone. Ibid, art 19(1)(p). They are to ensure
strategic environmental assessments for plans and programmes that can affect the coastal zone. Ibid,
art 19(2).
Parties are to adopt appropriate land policy instruments and measures, including planning. Ibid, art
20(1). They can also inter alia adopt mechanisms for the acquisition, cession, donation or transfer
of land to the public domain and institute easements on properties. Ibid, art 20(2).
Ibid, art 21.
Parties are to promote codes of good practice. Ibid, art 9(1)(e).
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carrying capacity.141 Parties are to “strengthen or formulate” a national ICZM strategy142
and prepare coastal implementation plans and programmes (the primary instruments to
implement the national strategy).143 These have to be consistent with the ICZM
objectives and principles identified in the protocol and the common regional framework
for ICZM in the Mediterranean.144 The protocol also secures freedom of access to the sea
and the shore.145
In drafting the protocol, it is clear that the parties were cognizant of the impacts of
SLR. In defining the objectives of ICZM, the protocol seeks to “prevent and/or reduce the
effects of natural hazards and in particular of climate change.”146 Accordingly, there are
several provisions relating to risk management147 that are pertinent to SLR and coastal
climate change adaptation. Within their national strategy for ICZM, parties are to carry
out “vulnerability and hazard assessments of coastal zones and take prevention,
mitigation and adaptation measures to address the effects of natural disasters, in
particular of climate change.”148 As well, parties are to “anticipate the impacts of coastal
erosion through the integrated management of activities, including adoption of special
measures for coastal sediments and coastal works.”149 These provisions recognize at an
international level the importance and ability of ICZM to encompass coastal climate
change adaptation.
To prevent and mitigate the negative impacts of coastal erosion, parties are to adopt
“necessary measures to maintain or restore the natural capacity of the coast to adapt to
141

142

143

144
145
146
147
148
149

Ibid, art 6(b). Parties are to define indicators of development to ensure sustainable use of coastal
zones and reduce pressures that exceeds the carrying capacity. Ibid, art 9(1)(e). Environmental
assessments are to consider the cumulative impacts on the coastal zones, paying attention to their
carrying capacities as well article. Ibid, art 19(3).
It includes an analysis of the existing situation; objectives; priorities; identification of ecosystems
that need management; identification of relevant actors and processes; measures to be taken and
their cost; institutional instruments and legal and financial means available; and an implementation
schedule. Ibid, art 18(2). In particular, the strategy should address wetlands and estuaries (art
10(1)(a)), islands (art 12(b)), and prevention of natural hazards (art 22).
Ibid, art 18(1). Coastal plans and programmes shall implement the national strategy at the
appropriate territorial level and they may be self-standing or integrated in other plans or
programmes. Ibid, art 18(3).
Ibid, arts 17, 18(1).
Ibid, art 8(3)(d).
Ibid, art 5(e).
Ibid, part IV.
Ibid, art 22.
Ibid, art 23(3).
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changes, including those caused by the rise in sea levels” 150 while minimizing any
negative impacts of such measures (e.g., adjacent coastal damage due to hard
armouring).151 Parties are also to share scientific data on the “state, development and
impacts of coastal erosion.”152 The protocol also calls for planned retreat by providing for
setback lines and no construction in a 100 meter coastal zone.153 The protocol stipulations
on coastal protection and management are only baseline standards and do not displace
stricter ones that could be adopted under national or international instruments or
programmes.154

9.3.1.2 Strengthening Coastal Governance
Coastal governance measures in the protocol include integration, ensuring the flow of
information, and promoting public and stakeholder participation and decision-making.155
The ICZM protocol recognizes the most important dimension of integration, that is,
spatial,156 as well as inter-sectoral,157 institutional,158 inter-disciplinary,159 and
international160 facets. Recognizing that a pre-condition precedent for meaningful public
participation is access to information, the protocol calls on parties to promote
interdisciplinary scientific research on ICZM, to further knowledge and to contribute to
public information,161 and to inform the public of the geographic scope of the protocol162
and provide them with “access to the information derived from monitoring and
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Ibid, art 23(1).
Ibid, art 23(2).
Ibid, art 23(4).
Ibid, art 8(2).
Ibid, art 4(3).
Rochette & Billé, Analysis of the Mediterranean ICZM Protocol, supra note 108 at 18.
The marine part and the land part forms part of a single entity. ICZM Protocol, supra note 124, art
6(a).
Ibid, arts 5(f), 7(2).
Parties are to ensure institutional coordination through appropriate bodies or mechanisms, where
needed to avoid sectoral approaches. Ibid, art 7(1)(a). They are to organize appropriate coordination
between various authorities competent for both the marine and the land parts of coastal zones. Ibid,
art 7(1)(b).
Parties are to provide for interdisciplinary scientific research on ICZM. Ibid, art 15(3).
Ibid, art 28 (spells out transboundary cooperation); art 29 (transboundary environmental
assessment).
Ibid, art 15(3).
Ibid, art 3(3).
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observation mechanisms and networks.”163
Parties are to carry out awareness-raising activities and develop educational
programmes and training on ICZM at the national, regional or local level.164 Public
participation can, inter alia, take the form of consultative bodies, inquiries, public
hearings and partnerships.165 Notably, participation is contemplated throughout the ICZM
process.166 Since the protocol confers rights, in line with the ubi jus ibi remedium
principle (where there is a right, there ought to be a remedy), stakeholders can challenge
decisions, acts or omissions through mediation, conciliation or through administrative or
legal processes.167

9.3.1.3 Facilitating a Regional Approach
In concert with the Barcelona Convention, the protocol recognizes that inter-state
cooperation is the cornerstone of regionalism and provides that the “[p]arties shall
establish a common framework for the integrated management of the Mediterranean
coastal zone and shall take the necessary measures to strengthen regional cooperation.”168 These measures include information exchange,169 training and research,170
and scientific and technical assistance.171 The protocol emphasizes regional and
international co-operation in responding to natural disasters,172 protecting coastal
landscapes (transboundary),173 implementing common programmes on marine habitat
protection,174 and ICZM education.175 The protocol also sets out rules for transboundary
environmental assessments,176 national strategies, plans and programmes in contiguous
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Ibid, art 16(4).
Ibid, art 15(1)-15(2).
Ibid, art 14(1).
Ibid (provides for participation in the formulation and implementation of coastal strategies, plans
and programmes).
Ibid, art 14(3).
Ibid, art 1.
Exchange of information can take the form of sharing scientific data on coastal erosion, best
environmental practices, demonstration projects on ICZM, etc. Ibid, arts 23-24, 27.
Ibid, art 25 (training of scientific, technical and administrative personnel in ICZM).
This can extend to accessing environmentally sound technologies and their transfer. Ibid, art 26.
Ibid, art 24.
Ibid, art 11(2).
Ibid, art 10(2)(b).
Ibid, art 15(2).
Ibid, art 29.
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coastal zones,177 and development and implementation of a common regional ICZM
framework.178 Parties are also called on to participate in the Mediterranean coastal zone
network.179

9.3.1.4 Discussion
The Mediterranean Protocol is potentially the most important supranational legal
instrument that demonstrates integration at the regional level. The protocol breaks with
other instruments and offers a legally binding template for ICZM implementation. It
promotes collaboration and coordination, economic development, coastal climate change
adaptation to achieve sustainable coastal development. It challenges contracting party
states to manage and protect their coastal zone and deal with environmental challenges
arising from climate change. This unique legal instrument

will be of assistance to

regions seeking to develop similar legal instruments on ICZM. Perhaps the most
important recognition to this regional approach came with its ratification by the European
Commission in 2010.180 This has considerably enhanced its relevance and is recognition
of its vision for sustainable coastal development.
Innovative provisions of the protocol broaden the scope of ICZM by introducing
the need to protect coastal landscapes. By referencing inter-generational equity, the
protocol emphasizes the need for long-term utilization of coastal resources. The protocol
juxtaposes obligations under the World Heritage Convention and the Ramsar
Conservation and other international environmental law instruments into the coastal
management scenario. Island management, which is particularly relevant in the
Mediterranean Sea, and protection of coastal wetlands, estuaries, marine habitats, and
coastal forests are other ecosystems that are encompassed in the protocol. Its strategy of
linking climate change related processes with risk management in the coastal zone is a
practical response to SLR.
177
178
179
180

Ibid, art 28.
Ibid, art 17.
Ibid, art 16(2).
See generally Council Decision of 13 September 2010 concerning the conclusion, on behalf of the
European Union, of the Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean to
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the
Mediterranean (2010/631/EU), [2010] OJ, L 279/1.
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Despite the protocol, and on-going work to harmonize national legal and
institutional frameworks with the protocol,181 ICZM in the Mediterranean region still
remains “localised and relatively short-term and project based.”182 As well, “there are
only a few isolated examples of specific legislation or established institutional
frameworks in place for either the implementation of ICZM or the Protocol itself.”183
Based on these situations, there is realization of the need to scale up ICZM
implementation in the region. Second, it is also an indication as to the practical
difficulties that confronts nations while implementing and scaling up ICZM
implementation.

9.3.2 The European Union
The diverse coastal frontages of the European Union stretch to 185,000 kilometers184 and
are vital to the European economy.185 It is estimated that close to 200 million people live
in the coastal region with nearly 90 per cent situated within 50 kilometers of the coast.186
Degradation of coastal zones,187 the effects of climate change, SLR, coastal erosion and
flooding, the decline in fisheries and related avocations,188 population growth, and the
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183
184
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For more details, see Regional MedPartnership Workshop on Harmonizing the National Legal and
Institutional Framework with the ICZM Protocol, online: Priority Actions Programme
<http://www.pap-thecoastcentre.org/regional_medpartnership_workshop/>. For an understanding on
how the Croatian legal system complies with the provisions of the Protocol, see generally Julien
Rochette & Guillaume Du Puy-Montbrun, Analysis of the Croatian Legal Framework in Relation to
the Provisions of the Protocol on ICZM in the Mediterranean ([np]: PAM, 2012).
Action Plan for ICZM Protocol, supra note 123 at 9.
Ibid at 10.
European Environment Agency, 10 Messages for 2010 Coastal Ecosystems (Copenhagen: European
Environment Agency, 2010) at 2 [EEA, 10 Messages].
The economic value of assets that lie within 500 meters of Europe’s seas is somewhere between
€500-1,000 billion. EC, The Challenge of Climate Change to the European Coastal Areas: State of
Coasts in the Context of the Global Climate Change, online: European Commission, Environment,
ICZM, State Coast <http://ec.europa.eu/>.
See generally EC, Directorate-General Envt, Consultation Document: Hearing on Integrated
Coastal Zone Management (Brussels, 30 May 2011) [EC, Consultation Document].
Nearly 70 per cent of Europe’s coastline of some 90,000 kilometers is highly threatened. Peter
Burbridge & Sarah Humphrey, “Introduction to Special Issue on the European Demonstration
Programme on Integrated Coastal Zone Management” (2003) 31 Coastal Mgmt 121.
In 2006, nearly 75 per cent of the fishing sector’s annual catch (nearly five billion tones) was caught
from the north-east Atlantic waters, and 11 per cent came from the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
EEA, 10 Messages, supra note 184 at 7.
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pressures of economic development189 are all affecting the “environmental and social
equilibria” of Europe’s coastal zones.190
The European Union (EU) has adopted cross-border actions to stem the tide of
coastal degradation. Beginning with Protection of the Coastline Resolution of 1973, a
series of documents like the Model Law on Coastal Protection, the Code of Conduct for
Coastal Zones, and the European Coastal Charter were approved. 191 The 1992 Earth
Summit popularized ICZM in Europe. In the very same year, and subsequently in 1994,
resolutions acknowledging the importance of an integrated approach in coastal areas were
adopted.192 Thereafter, a demonstration programme on Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (1996-1999), which involved thirty-five projects, was implemented.193 Its
findings spurred the European Parliament and Council to adopt the Recommendation on
Integrated Coastal Zone Management in 2002.194

9.3.2.1 The EU Recommendation on Integrated Coastal Zone Management
The recommendation identifies three core principles for sound coastal planning: 1) a
broad framework for ICZM development; 2) development of national strategies; and 3)
reporting and review requirements. The Recommendation highlights the need for a

189

190

191

192

193

194

Nuclear power stations affect coastal and marine waters. In 2003, rising water temperatures affected
many estuarine species in the Gironde estuary. As well, salt-water intrusion has been reported in 10
coastal countries in Europe. Ibid at 7. Europe lost nearly 65 per cent of its coastal wetlands since
1900. Ibid at 9.
EC, Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2002 Concerning
the Implementation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Europe, (2002/413/EC) [2002] OJ L
148/24, pmbl [EC, ICZM Recommendation].
For the text, see Committee Responsible for the Activities of the Council of Europe in the Field of
Biological and Landscape Diversity, Model Law on Sustainable Management of Coastal Zones and
European Code of Conduct for Coastal Zones, Nature and Environment Series, (np: Council of
Europe Publishing, 2000); EC, EU Policy on Integrated Coastal Management, The History of EU
Integrated Coastal Management Policy, EC <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/iczm/backgro
und.htm>.
See generally EC, Council Resolution of 25 February 1992 on the Future Community Policy
Concerning the European Coastal Zone, [1992] OJ, C 59/1; see generally EC, Council Resolution of
6 May 1994 on a Community Strategy for Integrated Coastal-Zone Management, [1994] OJ, C
135/2.
For more details on the project, see EC, Coastal Zone Policy: I.C.Z.M. Demonstration Projects,
online: EC, Environment <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/iczm/projects.htm>; see also Stefano
Belfiore, “Recent Developments in Coastal Management in the European Union" (2000) 43 Ocean
& Coast Mgmt 123 (ScienceDirect).
See generally EC, ICZM Recommendation, supra note 190.
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strategic approach to coastal management195 and sets out eight ICZM principles for
effective coastal management.196 Parties will use these principles to develop their national
strategies. As first step, member states are to carry out a national stocktaking to identify
the primary actors, laws and institutions that influence coastal management.197 They will
then develop one or more, as appropriate, national strategies to implement ICZM.198
Coordination with neighbouring countries is emphasized.199 Member States are to report
to the Commission on their experience in implementing the recommendation within 45
months of adoption.200 Thereafter, the Commission reviews the recommendation (within
55 months) and submits an evaluation report accompanied by proposals for any required
changes to the European Parliament and Council.201
The first stocktaking in 2007 pointed out that while the recommendation
considerably influenced the implementation of ICZM and several countries had
developed national strategies, the process was moving at a snail’s pace. More
importantly, “coastal EU Member States regulate coastal use and development in some
form … a mature and well-functioning ICZM involving all relevant levels of governance
is still rarely observed.”202 Developed largely in 2006, most of the national strategies had
only begun to be implemented.203 The Commission concluded that greater promotion of
ICZM was needed, but no further legislation was required.204 It confirmed the validity of
ICZM principles and concluded that implementation should progress on the basis of the
recommendation.
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197
198
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203
204

The strategic approach has to recognize the threat of SLR and other climate change impacts, the
need to protect the coastal environment based on an ecosystem approach, land for the public for
their recreational purposes, etc. Ibid, ch I.
Some of the major ones are: the principles of precaution, intra- and intergenerational equity;
adaptive management; integration across sectors and levels of governance, stakeholder involvement,
participatory and knowledge-based approach; respecting the carrying capacity of ecosystems. Ibid,
ch II.
Ibid, ch III.
Ibid, ch IV.
Ibid, ch V.
Ibid, ch VI(1).
Ibid, ch VI(3).
EC, Communication From the Commission: Report to the European Parliament and the Council: An
Evaluation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Europe, COM(2007) 308 Final,
(Brussels, 2007) at 4.
Ibid at 5.
Ibid.
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Other EU instruments impinge coastal management including the Water
Framework Directive, 2000;205 the Habitats and Bird Directives, 1992; the Action Plan
“Halting Biodiversity Loss by 2010 – and Beyond”; the Strategic Environmental
Assessment Directive, 2001; and the White Paper on Adaptation to Climate Change.206
The EU also ratified the Mediterranean ICZM protocol,207 “a strong signal of
commitment from the EU to the protection and sustainable management of the
Mediterranean coast.”208 The Integrated Maritime Policy209 and the Marine Strategy
Framework Directive210 include ICZM as part of a broader integrated maritime
management and are aimed at improving marine environment quality by 2020. Such an
approach will protect the resource base of marine-related economic and social
activities.211
Following the second stocktake in 2010, the Commission proposed a follow-up
205
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See generally EC, Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
October 2000 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, [2000]
OJ, L 327/1 (emphasizing the need for a greater integration of qualitative and quantitative aspects of
both surface waters and groundwaters).
EC, Adapting to Climate Change: Towards a European Framework for Action, White Paper,
COM(2009) 147 Final (Brussels, 2009) at 12 (pointing out to the need to respect and strengthen the
ICZM recommendation).
See generally EC, Council Decision of 4 December 2008 on the signing, on behalf of the European
Community, of the Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean to the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the
Mediterranean (2009/89/EC), [2009] OJ, L 34/17.
See generally EC, Press Release, “Statement by European Environment Commissioner Janez
Poto nik following the adoption of the Council decision to ratify the Protocol on Integrated Coastal
Zone Management in the Mediterranean” (Brussels: MEMO/10/406, 13 September 2010), online:
European Commission, Press Releases Rapid <http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm>.
For more details, see generally EC, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, COM(2007) 575 Final, (Brussels,
2007).
See EC, Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine
Strategy Framework Directive), [2008] OJ, L 164/19.
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive establishes European marine regions on the basis of
geographical and environmental criteria. Member States (in cooperation with other Member States
and non-EU countries within a marine region) are required to develop strategies for their marine
waters. The first elements of marine strategies are due by 2012 and are required to be updated every
six years. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive can facilitate adaptation by ensuring that
climate change considerations are incorporated into the marine strategies and by providing a
mechanism for regular updating to take account new information. The objective to achieve ‘good
environmental status’ will help to develop actions to prevent deterioration in the quality of the
marine environment due to climate change. The directive also urges the creation of a network of
marine protected areas by 2012 and calls for the wide application of an ecosystem-based approach.
Ibid.
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with a review of the EU ICZM recommendation and possibly a new recommendation
proposal.212

9.3.2.2 Linking Marine Spatial Planning with ICZM
Maritime spatial planning is:
a public process for analysing and planning the
spatial and temporal distribution of human
activities in sea areas to achieve economic,
environmental and social objectives that usually
have been specified through a political process.
Characteristics of marine spatial planning include
ecosystem-based, area-based, integrated, adaptive,
strategic and participatory.213
In its quest to develop its “blue economy,”214 the EU has since 2007, shifted focus to
marine spatial planning (MSP) and ICZM was viewed as part of a broader strategy on
MSP. In setting out this contemporary direction for coastal zone management, planning
and conservation, an Integrated Maritime Policy was developed,215 and in March 2013,
the EU Commission launched a proposal to establish a framework that links maritime
spatial planning and ICZM to enhance the development and sustainability of maritime
and coastal based activities and use of coastal and marine resources. This proposal is
based on the idea that:
Maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal
management
are
complementary
tools.
Their
geographical scope overlaps in the coastal and territorial
waters … where maritime spatial plans will map existing
human activities and identify their most effective future
spatial
development,
while integrated
coastal
management
strategies
ensure
the
integrated
management of these human activities. Applied jointly,
they both improve sea-land interface planning and
212
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EC, Consultation Document, supra note 186.
See Why Marine Spatial Planning (MSP), online: Marine Spatial Planning Initiative, Marine Spatial
Planning (MSP) <http://www.unesco-ioc-marinesp.be/>.
EC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal Management [2013] 0074 (COD)
at 2 [EC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament].
Aldo Chircop & Ryan O’Leary, "Legal Frameworks for Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management
in Canada and the European Union: Some Insights from Comparative Analysis" (2012) 13:3 Vt J
Envtl L 425 at 442 (HeinOnline).
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management.216
This draft directive applies to “marine waters and coastal zones.”217 The draft directive
obliges Member States to establish and implement a marine spatial plan or plans (MSPs)
and an integrated coastal management strategy or strategies218 based on an ecosystembased approach.219 The MSPs and ICZM strategies have two broad objectives: secure
certain economic interests220 and protect the coastal and marine environment to “ensur[e]
climate resilient coastal and marine areas.”221 Minimum specific requirements222 and
common minimum requirements223 include public participation224 and environmental
assessments.225 Specifically, ICZM strategies are to provide for mitigation and adaptation
to climate change.226 Although, the directive provides for a common format, the intention
is not to integrate measures but rather to enhance mutual coordination.227

9.3.2.3 Discussion
The European Union has adopted a rather soft law approach to ICZM implementation
and through a series of progressive steps, it has presently cast a regional regime that has
its basis in a recommendation. It must be noted that recommendation under the EU
hierarchy of instruments enjoys no legal force and therefore it is non-binding and is
primarily advisory in nature.228 Couched in general terms, it offers very little by way of
216
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EC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament, supra note 214.
Ibid.
Ibid at 7, art 4.
The objective is to facilitate co-existence and prevent conflicts between competing sector activities
in marine waters and coastal zones. Ibid, art 5.
This includes securing energy supply; promoting maritime transport, safety and fostering the
sustainable development of fisheries, the aquaculture sector, and related employment; and reducing
pollution risks. Ibid, art 5(a)-(c).
It inter alia seeks to ensure the preservation, protection and improvement of the environment,
prudent and rational use of natural resources, prevent biodiversity loss and degradation of ecosystem
services and reduce marine pollution risks. Ibid, art 5(d)-(e).
Ibid, arts 7, 8. In establishing integrated coastal management strategies, member states are inter alia
called upon to consider mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Ibid, art 8(f).
Ibid, art 6.
Ibid, art 9.
Ibid, art 11.
Ibid, art 8(2)(f).
Ibid, art 6(2)(a).
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. See EU, Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2010] C 83/47, art 288 [EU, Consolidated
Version].
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functional guidance and operational specifics. While this has proven to be boon as it
conferred considerable discretion on Member States to develop their national strategies
based on national circumstances, there has been considerable foot-dragging by some
Member States leading to divergent outcomes. Further, given the limited compass of the
national stock take exercise, it is doubtful whether states were able to develop ICZM
strategies that reflected development priorities and environmental concerns. Nevertheless,
the recommendation has increased awareness about the need to integrate and reorient
sectoral approaches to sustainable coastal development229 and moved coastal
management in Europe beyond a project-by-project approach.230 The second stock take
reveals a more optimistic picture of future benefits from pursuing the recommendation.
If materializes, the proposal for an MSP directive will offer the EU an important
management framework that interlinks ICZM with MSP thereby recognising the nested
nature of terrestrial and marine ecosystems. This is nothing short of revolutionary in the
quest to attain sustainable coastal development. As well, the fledging regional regime
(presently supported by the non-binding recommendation) will be revitalized if the MSP
directive is implemented as it has binding legal force. Directives are “binding, as to the
result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to
the national authorities the choice of form and methods.”231 In other words, directives
sets targets and it is up to the Member States to determine how they will attain them. As
well, the proposed directive also spells out measures to adapt to SLR.
Even though linking ICZM with MSP has merits, it can compound implementation
concerns, particularly in federations where the exclusive jurisdiction at federal and
provincial/state level separates the dry and wet components of the coastal zone. Again, it
is also possible that in due course, the emphasis would shift to managing the seaward side
(as it affords the possibility of exploiting minerals like oil and gas) and there could be
less emphasis on the terrestrial components. At least in the near future, many coastal
countries like those in South Asia, may find it difficult to link ICZM with MSP as both
these tools are insufficiently developed in these countries.
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It is clear from the Mediterranean and the European Union experiences with ICZM
that a regional approach holds inherent advantages over a global approach. And coastal
South Asia as well as other coastal regions (despite differences in context) can draw
lessons from both the European Union and Mediterranean regions in terms of
operationalising a principled approach to coastal management at the regional level. In
fact both demonstrate that a regional approach provides an opportunity to respond to
specific issues in a more focused and holistic manner taking into account the special
needs and circumstances of a particular region. As well, a regional approach also
facilitates the implementation of adaptive and ecosystem based management. It is
discernible from these regional case studies that a regional approach can induce reform
(legislative, policy levels, etc.) at the national level, prompt cooperation and coordination
between countries, provide direction to coastal states to internalize appropriate
sustainable coastal management practices, enhance capacity to deal with coastal issues,
and facilitate coastal climate change adaptation.

9.4 THE REGIME THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
REGIONAL REGIME BUILDING ON ICZM IN SOUTH ASIA

AND

PROSPECTS

OF

Modern regime building began primarily in wake of the First World War, and received
impetus with the creation of the United Nations.232 And, in the environmental law arena,
the Stockholm Conference of 1972 set the foundation leading to profusion of
environmental regimes.233 Basically, regimes provide an atmosphere for collaboration
and coordination by laying out the parameters and boundaries for permissible state
behaviour. Defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations,”234 regimes help to resolve the problems posed by collective
goods (eg, a shared ecosystem) where states are goaded to avoid independent decision-
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making, to avoid “free riders.”235A more comprehensive definition states that regimes
represent “the rules agreed by two or more states, aimed at working collectively on
shared problems, even at the short-term risk of suffering relative losses, which are offset
by the expectation that all parties will benefit and realize absolute gains.”236 There are
three different schools (realists, neoliberals, and cognitivists) that explain the basic
postulates of international regime formation that are germane to the discussion below.
Realists concentrate on power relationships, and they believe that states
predominantly interact in an anarchic environment. The realist perspective on
international cooperation is reflected primarily in the power-based regime theory,
namely, “the theory of hegemonic stability,” which holds the view that strong
international regimes are established and maintained by actors who hold a preponderance
of power resources,237 which can be either economic, military or both and is used as a
leverage over other states to draw them into the regime. 238 In such cases, the hegemon
can be benevolent239 or coercive.240 However, as and when the strength of the hegemon
wanes, correspondingly the regime also weakens.241
On the other hand, the neoliberalists, or “interest based theories of regimes” argue,
“states are rational egoists, who care only for their own (absolute) gains.”242 In other
words, states are “self-interested, goal seeking actors,” seeking maximization of
individual utility.243 Despite mistrust, states cooperate to realize their objectives and the
role of regimes is to facilitate and coordinate behaviour among states to achieve their
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desired objectives in particular areas.244 Neoliberalism gives rise to the interest based
regime theory and versions like the contractualist, situational structuralist, problem
structural and institutional bargaining of which institutional bargaining emerges as most
dominant.
The cognitivists depart from the earlier mentioned theories. They emphasize that
distribution of knowledge constitutes the identities and shapes the preferences and
perceived options of states. The cognitivist theory can be sub-classified into weak
cognitivism and strong cognitivism.245 Weak cognitivism is based on three primary
assumptions, namely, that the knowledge which actors possess strongly influence their
behaviour and expectations in international relations, that policy makers demand high
quality information and expert advice in making intelligent decisions and that some
understanding of the issue at stake is necessary for expectation to converge, cooperation
to take place and for an agreement to be forged. Weak cognitivism assigns significant
roles to epistemic communities. Haas defines epistemic communities as
networks of knowledge-based communities with an
authoritative claim to policy- relevant knowledge
within their domain of expertise. Their members
share knowledge about the causation of social or
physical phenomena in an area for which they have a
reputation for competence, and a common set of
normative beliefs about what actions will benefit
human welfare in such a domain. 246
Leaders and decision-makers may not be aware of the intricacies of the scientific, social
and economic implications of problems that confront the environment (and in other
contexts as well) and consequently to make informed decisions, they depend on
experts.247 “Subsequent discussions and policy debates are . . . informed and bounded by
the advice which leaders receive.”248 As international issues become more technical,
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complex, scientific, inter-disciplinary and uncertain, the work of epistemic communities
“become the basis of new or changed international practices and institutions and the
emerging attributes of a new world order.”249 Epistemic communities play important
roles in regime creation.250
Strong cognitivism is based on the following themes, namely, the power of
legitimacy, the power of argument, and the power of identity. 251 The power of legitimacy
implies that states cooperate out of a sense of obligation. In other words, they comply
with norms and rules, which are perceived, as being legitimate, since not to do so will
undermine their own existence in international society. As far as the power of argument is
concerned, regimes are formed from the practical discourses amongst states that aim at
establishing norms of conduct, their interpretation and application in concrete situations.
Regimes are the product of communicative dynamics.252 The power of identity implies
that states acquire role-specific understandings and expectations about self by
socialization into the inter-subjective structures of the international system. The
continued socialization of states within the international system leads to a more collective
understanding of themselves in relation to other actors in the system and in the process
they become habituated to cooperate and develop collective identities even in face of the
dominant strategy of self-interested action to defect.253
In line with what has been stated above, it is clear that while certain regimes
emerge spontaneously, not requiring conscious coordination by participants,254 others are
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the product of negotiations.255 Still others can be imposed – “… fostered deliberately by
dominant powers or consortia of dominant powers.”256 These developmental sequences
are not “mutually exclusive,”257 and “… any attempt to classify actual international
regimes rigidly in terms of the three developmental sequences is … to distort reality and
to produce confusion rather than enhance understanding.”258
In sum, the different schools provide a theoretical casing to explain determinative
factors namely, power, interest, and knowledge that contribute to regime formation.
There are also certain other fundamental propositions that need mention here. Regime
formation is not entirely a state sponsored construct, in addition to epistemic
communities, other non-state actors can also play crucial roles in regime formation and
development.259 Regimes can also take different shapes and forms; some are formal while
others informal, some exhortatory, and others impose definite and concrete commitments.
Even though not necessarily dependent on treaties, at the heart of all regimes there is
necessarily “a cluster of rights and duties.”260 A related but distinct question is about
regime effectiveness given that some are effective while others are not. 261 Generally,
regime effectiveness is enhanced when its members abide by its terms, (regime strength)
and “a regime is effective to the extant that it achieves certain objectives or fulfills certain
purposes.”262 Similarly, regimes “are maintained as long as the patterns of interest that
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gave rise to them remain. When these shift, the character of the regime may change; a
regime may even dissolve entirely.”263
Even though criticised for being a “wooly notion” that produces “more confusion
than illumination,”264 regimes have been hailed as “[o]ne of the most creative innovations
of the international diplomatic community in the 20th century.”265 With this synoptic
understanding of regime dynamics, the remaining sub-sections proceed to analyse the
situation in South Asia, utilising the four propositions central to the regime theory,
namely, 1) regimes can help eliminate free riders; 2) the creation of epistemic
communities promotes regime creation and supports its sustenance; 3) a hegemon can
help establish and maintain the continued existence of an international regime; 4) despite
an atmosphere of mistrust, states may cooperate to promote their self-interests.
As far as the first proposition is concerned, I will utilise the non-cooperative
prisoners’ dilemma, to explain the need for regional cooperation on ICZM and CCCA in
South Asia to eliminate free-riders.266 As illustration, I take the example of the
Sunderbans, a transboundary coastal mangrove shared by two players, namely,
Bangladesh and India. Several fishing communities on both sides of the border depend on
the Sunderbans for their livelihood. Given the degraded state and the ongoing threats that
this ecosystem faces from SLR and other climate change impacts, if both countries cooperate to adopt measures to protect this ecosystem, the net benefits that could accrue to
both would definitely be much higher. Suppose there is no cooperation between these two
countries, and only Bangladesh implements actions to protect that part of the Sunderbans
that lie on its side of the border. In such a situation, even if India does not to put in place
any measures to protect the ecosystem on its side, given the unique nature of the
Sunderbans mangrove, India will still be able to free ride on the payoffs without having
263
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to take upon itself the burden of carrying out investments for conserving the Sunderbans.
But for Bangladesh, its unilateral actions on conservation and attendant investments will
lead to a situation where the country is saddled with costs that exceed the benefits of the
investment.267 Accordingly, Bangladesh may decide not to invest resources for
conservation efforts as a do-nothing option makes perfect economic sense. Ultimately,
both countries may decide not to adopt any measures to protect the Sunderbans, which is
definitely not in the best interests of both. To prevent such eventualities, greater cooperation in the form of a regime, which provides an opportunity for all interested parties
to converge so as to assume greater responsibilities to manage and conserve the resource,
and adopt measures in this regard makes pre-eminently good sense.
Even though the SAARC has been around for nearly three decades, these decades
basically speak about missed opportunities, misdirected efforts, lack of confidencebuilding measures in core areas, sidetracking of sensitive issues, and a lack of political
cohesion, shared vision and mutual trust.268 Still, a positive achievement from the
perspective of coastal management has been the establishment of the SAARC Regional
Coastal Zone Management Centre with its emphasis on capacity building and creation
epistemic communities. The regime theory clearly articulates the utility of epistemic
communities and their role in regime creation and its sustenance. It is possible that the
SAARC Regional Coastal Zone Management Centre may in due course provide an arena
that can bring together coastal management experts, lawyers, policy makers and the
scientific community from the South Asian coastal countries and even beyond who can
pool in resources and share knowledge which can strengthen respective national efforts in
coastal management. Given the absence of academic programmes on ICZM in South
Asia, epistemic communities can play critical roles in popularizing ICZM in the
respective countries. This can help create awareness in the region and provide an
appropriate atmosphere for regime creation on ICZM in South Asia.
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Another important factor that has hampered regional cooperation in South Asia
relates to the prospective role of India, which is viewed as a hegemon in the South Asian
region. Four key reasons can be offered to justify India’s pre-eminent position in South
Asia. First of all, India’s central geographical location in the South Asian region renders
it the common denominator vis-à-vis the other coastal countries and it has the maximum
coastline in this region. Secondly, India has enjoyed strong economic growth in recent
years.269 Thirdly, the country has aspirations to play a leadership role in world affairs and
is currently vying for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.270 And fourthly, it has
a strong military, a navy with blue water capabilities, and is a nuclear power. 271 While
there is general agreement that India has to play a critical leadership role in forging and
operationalizing regional cooperation and in taking forward any regime on CCCA and
management,272 the fact is that India has been unable to rise to expectations and has not
been able to provide necessary leadership. Rather, India views its neighbours with
suspicion and fears that these countries may forge alliances against its interests and is
also weary about the growing Chinese presence in South Asian waters. 273 The other
coastal and non-coastal countries in South Asia view the intransigence on the part of
India to deal with pressing outstanding issues and disputes (for instance, seeing the
transnational water disputes as a pure bilateral issue rather than approach the matter in a
more holistic manner on the basis of integrated basin based river management involving
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upstream as well as downstream states) on a bilateral rather than utilize regional
mechanisms and forums as a major impediment to the development of long-term
sustainable regional solutions.274 As well, India frowns upon third party assistance to
resolve some of these major disputes. In this context, it must be noted that the SAARC
charter also emphasizes that decisions at all levels are to be based on unanimity and
exclude bilateral and contentious issues from deliberations, thereby effectively
proscribing the ability of this institution to provide appropriate guidance and solutions.275
In practical terms, this has prevented issues that are bilateral in nature from being raised
in its SAARC forums. Whatever may be the case, it is extremely important that India
adopt a proactive approach to forge a regional regime and this demands that this country
step into the shoes a benevolent hegemon, one which balances its national interests with
that of the larger regional interests, willing to make concessions so as to promote regional
comity.
Given the dynamics of South Asia, if a regional regime has to germinate and
sustain itself over longer time scales, it is clear that the regime emerge spontaneously,
facilitated by the parties themselves in promotion of their self-interests, rather than it
being imposed. Proponents of regime theory argue that states, as rational actors, engage
in regime creation if expected benefits exceed expected costs. Despite having fair
knowledge about different coastal processes and the dangers in permitting reckless
development, most coastal countries in the South Asian region have generally been
unable to adopt a proactive approach towards CZM. Even though, the differences
engendered by sovereignty, territorial, maritime boundary and other disputes persist, the
bleak ecological prognosis for the region, climate change and SLR provide the impetus
for greater cooperation. Apart from this, the burgeoning growth in population, and with
more and more people migrating to the coasts for employment and economic
opportunities, will place enormous pressure on coastal ecosystems and resources. Certain
compelling reasons for greater regional cooperation between the coastal countries of
South Asia can be gathered from different the parts of this study and is set out below.
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The most obvious reason is the divergence in capacity and resources available at
present to the different coastal countries of South Asia to operationalize ICZM. Due to
this, for optimal results, it may be necessary for nations to pool together their resources,
which requires cooperation. As the SASAP points out:
The region as a whole has important assets in terms of
human and institutional capacity in relevant scientific,
economic, social and technological fields and planning
experiences. Therefore, specifically targeted regional cooperation activities could boost the exchange of
experiences, information, data and expertise in relevant
sectors; promote co-operative research programmes and
technology transfer; and support the development of
suitable planning guidelines, awareness-raising initiatives,
scientific and technological means and capacity-building
activities.276
Moreover, one of the fundamental principles in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change277 is the transfer of financial resources and
environmentally sound technologies from Annex II parties and developed country parties
to developing country parties, particularly to those that are vulnerable to the adverse
consequences of climate change to enable them to meet their requirements under the
convention.278 From the perspective of coastal climate change adaptation, already the
poorly constructed sea walls in South Asia are posing environmental problems. For
instance, the sea wall constructed around the city of Malé entraps water during storm
surges, leading to the flooding of the city. To allow the water to escape, a part of the wall
had to be dynamited.279 Such incidents highlight the need for new technology and designs
and financial assistance. Here, development of a common position by SAARC coastal
countries can facilitate the realization of this obligation.
Second, as seas rise, the number of climate refugees will also rise, raising serious
issues concerning their relocation and status. South Asia is already plagued by illegal
immigration. With Maldives slated to go under the sea and large tracts of coastal
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Bangladesh also to be badly affected, the question then is what will happen to these
climate refugees? As it is difficult for the poor in these countries to move to distant lands,
will the other coastal countries in the region be able to accommodate the refugees,
particularly when they themselves will be burdened with their own internally displaced?
The problem of climate refugees and the need for a humane response warrants regional
cooperation. Third, some of the impelling coastal problems in South Asia are
transboundary in nature. For instance, conservation of the Sunderbans mangrove
ecosystem requires at least bilateral cooperation between India and Bangladesh. Again, as
pointed out, transboundary water sharing can have implications for coastal management
and this may require cooperation between the countries in the Indian subcontinent and
even beyond280 to ensure that a minimum supply of water is available and to reduce
seawater intrusion into deltas and estuaries. Development projects that affect the stability
of coastal resources in neighboring states require greater regional cooperation if
pragmatic solutions are to be developed. In short, there is a need for greater cooperation
for facilitating knowledge sharing, developing capacity, and devising collective responses
to meet the challenges posed by climate change and SLR. It is imperative that coastal
South Asia to look beyond their disputes and differences to develop the political will and
readiness to regionally cooperate on the marine and coastal conservation imperative and
this is in the self-interests of these countries.

9.5 BUILDING A REGIONAL REGIME: SWOT ANALYSIS
It is clear that some of the propositions of the regime theory provide rationale for regional
regime building on ICZM and CCCA implementation in South Asia. In the succeeding
discussion, I will utilise a Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)
Analysis to further explicate the need for a regional regime on ICZM and CCCA for
South Asia.

9.5.1 Strengths
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Perhaps the most important strength held out by a regional regime is that it can contribute
to regional stability and peace. With resources scarce and unable to meet the
requirements of an ever-increasing population, climate change and SLR can lead to
harsher weather conditions, de-glaciation, flashfloods and reduced water input into the
major rivers. Deteriorating quality of life can lead to social instability, which may
manifest in the form of war, ethnic strife, etc., something that the countries in this region
can ill-afford. These are all issues, which the regional regime can address. As well, a
regional regime emerges as an expression of a positive political commitment towards
SCD by the countries that subscribe to it. Accordingly, the regime will be able to promote
and strengthen the establishment of normative frameworks for ICZM implementation to
arrest the ongoing deterioration of coastal ecosystems at the national level by providing
guidance and direction to coastal states to develop their own responses. In the same vein,
it can help streamline adaptation actions relevant to the coastal zone, particularly to
SLR.281 Given the unique geographical features and circumstances of coastal South Asia,
a regional regime can help integrate actors and actions and prompt the development and
use of identical scientific methods and sharing of comparable data. It can ultimately lead
to the allotment of resources, the creation of common pools and institutional structures to
monitor and facilitate compliance, and the mainstreaming of adaptation into existing
developmental efforts.282

9.5.2 Weaknesses
Even though climate change and SLR provides a trigger for South Asian nations to move
towards greater cooperation, one of the most important weakness that can undermine the
stability of the putative regional regime on ICZM is the lack of mutual trust amongst the
countries in this region. Despite sharing cultural and social homogeneity and common
political history, several factors have hampered the growth and development of
cooperation between these nations, including their inability to amicably resolve disputes
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regarding non-demarcated terrestrial and maritime boundaries and sharing of resources.
Moreover, there is nothing to suggest to the contrary that mutual distrust will not
continue to plague the regional regime on ICZM in South Asia.283
The various regional platforms presently available, namely, the South Asian Seas
Regional Seas Programme and the SAARC, have not been able to foster regional
cooperation to operationalize ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation.284 Apart from
political, and economic differences, South Asia represents a kaleidoscope of governance
systems; a few states are unitary (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Maldives), while the
remaining are federal (India and Pakistan). In some of these countries, there is a welldeveloped system of local self-government that is constitutionally ordained, while in
others the emphasis is more on centralization. Even religion exerts an important role in
determining the contours of governance in these countries.285 This divergence in systems
makes the implementation of a regional regime on ICZM, which has overwhelming
governance connotations, a difficult prospect, as it will have to cater to these varied
contexts.
Additionally, the crushing levels of poverty in the region means less commitment at
the regional level in terms of leveraging financial and other scarce resources.
Furthermore, there is general emphasis on short-term economic development and an
eagerness to reassert sovereignty over natural resources found within national borders.286
This is a serious concern that can undermine the potential of any regional regime. Good
coastal governance has to be viewed as a subset of larger governance issues, and South
Asia is generally plagued by poor institutional frames that are creaking and corrupt, a
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Bangladesh, 1972, art 2A (states that the state religion of the republic is Islam); The Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, art 2 (points out that Islam shall be the state religion of
Pakistan).
For more discussion on this issue, see generally Ch 3.
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reality that can easily derail a fledging regional regime. 287 Consequently, there is an
inability to translate many of the legal stipulations into practical policies. The success of
ICZM is dependent in large measure on the institutions available at national levels. From
a practical consideration, ICZM is challenging to enact in South Asia because of
inefficient institutional mechanisms (understaffed bureaucracies, lack of resources and
training) to monitor and ensure compliance. At present, there is also mismatch in terms of
capacity and the requirements needed to work an ICZM programme. 288 In short, coastal
South Asia needs a special cadre of officials to lead and implement the programme and
this is presently not available.
Another factor is the general poor level of law enforcement, particularly of
environmental laws at the respective national levels. Even though all of the countries in
the South Asian coastal region have widely subscribed to various international
agreements and many have domestic legal frameworks and institutions to correspond to
these obligations, national level implementation of environmental law remains poor. One
major reason for this is the lack of internalisation of these laws by the population, a large
segment of which is functionally illiterate.289 Low public awareness regarding the
importance of conserving coastal resources, top-down models, exclusion of coastal
communities, and excessive bureaucratisation are factors that can weaken the regime.

9.5.3 Opportunities
Despite threats and weaknesses, there are significant opportunities available to coastal
South Asian states to develop and mainstream ICZM via a regional-level instrument.
While there are many issues that can prevent cooperation, a regional regime on ICZM
can provide an opportunity for countries to coalesce their individual efforts in other
287

288
289

In a survey of 7,500 people (between 2010 and 2011) in Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka regarding their views of corruption levels in their respective countries, it was
found that in Bangladesh 66 per cent, in India 54 per cent and in Pakistan 49 per cent paid bribe to
access government services and that too within a period of 12 months prior to this survey. See
generally Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, Daily Lives and Corruption, Public Opinion in South
Asia (Berlin: Transparency International, 2011).
For more details on the implementation of coastal management and problems faced in South Asia,
see Ch 3.
For more details, see Ch 8, Part 8.3.
507

contexts that are relevant to ocean and coastal management like marine pollution,
creation of a network of marine protected areas, etc. In this regard, regional agencies and
institutions can act as a conduit to assist member states in building their capacity, develop
sound science, and share their resources in these related areas as well. Another important
opportunity held out by a regional regime is that the basic approaches to environmental
and coastal problems in South Asia are reactive in nature and generally associated with
specific disasters.290 Once the dust raked up in the wake of the disaster settles, there is a
return to a business-as-usual approach. A regional instrument on ICZM can stimulate the
development of well-articulated responses rather than those that are knee-jerk and shortterm quick fixes. A regional regime also provides an opportunity to implement the
stipulations enshrined in the various international law instruments, tailoring them to
regional requirements.
Already in South Asia, there is the SAARC Coastal Management Center, which can
serve as a vehicle to help promote ICZM. A regional regime can revitalize this center and
provide a platform to epistemic communities to develop and contribute to the growth of
science and technology relevant to CCCA and ICZM implementation. In addition, a
regional regime can also lead to unified action in relation to the Conference of the Parties
negotiations to the UNFCCC.291 In this regard, the coastal nations can pressure the
international community to heed the demands for more resources to combat SLR through
coastal climate change adaptation. As well, overwhelming predictions of possible climate
change impacts and SLR emphasize that South Asia will be one of the worst-hit regions
and will be saddled with climate change, internally displaced persons, and climate change
refugees numbering in the millions. Coastal South Asia has to develop a strategy to
290

291

For example, it was after the Indian Ocean tsunami that the coastal nations of South Asia enacted
disaster management statutes. Tony George Puthucherril, “Climate Change, Sea Level Rise and
Protecting Displaced Coastal Communities: Possible Solutions” (2013) 2 Global J Int’l L
[unpublished in press] [Puthucherril, “Climate Change”].
In September 2010, the Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, warned that the mass
movement of up to 30 million people in Bangladesh could lead to ‘formidable social and even crossborder problems’. She proposed a joint South Asian initiative to mobilize international support
under the UNFCCC Protocol to ensure the social, cultural and economic rehabilitation of climate
change-induced displaced people. "PM warns of climate refugee crisis", The Daily Star [of Dhaka]
(5 June 2011) online: The Daily Star <http://news.priyo.com/story/2010/sep/22/7047-pm-warnsclimate-refugee-cris is>; see also Jane McAdam, “Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate
Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer” (2011) 23:1 Int'l J Refugee L 2 at 18.
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respond to this looming humanitarian crisis and here the regional regime on ICZM and
CCCA is necessarily one of the first steps, as the emphasis is on improvement of adaptive
capacity.292
Presently, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOSC)
guides the development of actions under the South Asian Regional Seas Programme,
particularly its Action Plan. This has not contributed to the development of a regional
focus, and the absence of a specific instrument to support the SASAP has only hampered
regional initiatives. In this regard, a regional regime on ICZM can serve as a bridgehead
to rectify the disequilibria in capacity and resources and also help create solidarity among
the nations to pool resources to implement the concept and coastal climate change
adaptation. Moreover, it could provide the opportunity for the parties to come up with a
legally-binding regional instrument to support the South Asian Regional Seas
Programme, as and when they realize the utility of enhanced cooperation. A regional
regime also provides an opportunity for the coastal regions of South Asia to realize some
of the goals espoused by the Millennium Declaration, namely, ending poverty and
hunger,293 and ensuring environmental sustainability. 294 A regional instrument that is
legally binding can also help to mobilize more international funding for ICZM projects
for it can “motivate international donors to get more involved in ICZM issues.”295

9.5.4 Threats
Significant threats that can derail a nascent regional regime are the uncertainty implicit in
the science of climate change and the fact that the impacts of climate change and SLR are
not uniform on the coastal regions of South Asia. Another threat is the lack of regular
monitoring of treaty obligations and possible steps to prevent violations. Development of
an ICZM regime at the regional level may require expansion of existing institutions or the
292
293
294

295

See also Puthucherril, “Climate Change”, supra note 290.
For further information on MDGs “Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty & Hunger”, see UN, We can
End Poverty 2015, online: UN <http://Www.Un.Org/Millenniumgoals/Poverty.Shtml>.
See UN, We can End Poverty 2015: Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability, target 7.A,
online: UN <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml> (integrating the principles of
sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reversing the loss of
environmental resources); ibid, target 7.B (reducing biodiversity loss).
"Rochette & Billé, “ICZM Protocols”, supra note 10 at 980.
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creation of new ones. As this can be an expensive prospect and may involve curtailment
of national sovereignty, states in the South Asian region may not be willing to invest
resources, due to other pressing problems and demands. Moreover, there are several
outstanding disputes that need to be settled and these can jeopardize regional cooperation
on ICZM.296 As well, the absence of a specific instrument to support the implementation
of the SASAP has only hampered regional initiatives and has not contributed to the
development of a regional focus.297 This can be a potential threat that can prevent the
maturing of the regional ICZM regime. Again, there is also the possibility that an overemphasis on the legal apparatus may lead to complacency in developing other tools and
management methods. As Abraham Maslow once said, “… it is tempting, if the only tool
you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.” 298 Such an attitude to place
faith squarely on legal tools can seriously threaten the stability of the regional regime in
the long run. Finally, a general threat that can undermine the stability of a regional
regime in the long run is that while some of the Regional Seas Programmes like the
Mediterranean have covered considerable distances to protect the coastal and marine
environment,299 others like South Asia lag behind even in critical areas like land-based
sources of pollution.300 This when the international law on this subject is a patchwork of
soft law instruments and rules. Accordingly, a regional approach can lead to disparity in
terms of the protections available, contribute to fragmentation and impede the
development of international regimes in such core areas.301

296
297
298
299
300
301

See Part 9.2.2, above, for some of the outstanding issues that prevent the development of regional
level regimes in South Asia.
See Part 9.2.1.1.1, above.
Abraham H Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance, eBook ed (2002) at 15.
But see supra note 54.
See supra note 48
Alan Boyle, “Globalism and Regionalism in the Protection of the Marine Environment” in Davor
Vidas, ed, Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Law and Policy for Pollution Prevention
(Norway: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 19 at 33; see also Hassan, supra note 25 at 185.
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Table 4: SWOT Analysis: Highlighting the Need for a Regional
Regime on South Asia
In short, the strengths and opportunities afforded in adopting a regional focus to ICZM in
South Asia are immense. There are several good reasons that militate in favour of
regional-level instruments on ICZM (like protocols as adjuncts to the regional seas
conventions) and there is considerable optimism over such an approach to ICZM
implementation.302 While there are threats and weaknesses, these are not insurmountable.
As the SWOT reveals, the biggest weakness that can derail the nascent regional regime
are boundary disputes and here the Kashmir dispute emerges as the primary one. A
solution to Kashmir would change the scenario considerably and contribute to lasting
302

See generally Julien Rochette & Raphaël Billé, “ICZM Protocols to Regional Seas Conventions:
The Wonder Drug for Coastal Sustainable Development?” (PowerPoint presented to the 10th
Annual Colloquium of the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law, Baltimore, United States, July 15 2012).
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peace to South Asia in general and to the Indian sub-continent in particular. Several
solutions have been suggested; one of the most important is to declare the existing Line
of Control, which divides Kashmir into two, with one part administered by India and the
other by Pakistan as the international boundary.303

9.6 CONCLUSION
The impacts of climate change and SLR interact with existing social, economic and
environmental factors to produce catastrophic results. The challenge in South Asia is how
to foster SCD while balancing and promoting environmental, social, and economic
development objectives in mutually reinforcing ways. At the regional level, the
performance of the South Asian Regional Seas Programme and the SAARC also affirms
that the parties are more motivated by poverty eradication concerns and their need to
quickly develop their national economies than by climate change. Nevertheless, it is
necessary that national frameworks be developed and strengthened to propel the coastal
regions of South Asia towards more sustainable patterns of coastal development.
As this chapter demonstrates a regional regime on ICZM for South Asia can
provide direction to national efforts that need to be accelerated and expanded to place
ICZM at the center of the broader environmental agenda to enhance the prospects of
adaptation to climate change and SLR. From the above, it is clear that a regional
approach and related regime building not only provides an opportunity to implement
obligations aimed at domesticating the regional level instrument, but it also promotes the
development of appropriate legal and competent management structures. As well, given
the limited financial resources and pool of experts, particularly in these developing
countries, regionalism could well be an optimal path that can help utilise scarce
resources. In this regard, irrespective of differences, a regional approach can facilitate the
strengthening of epistemic communities, promote capacity development, facilitate
sustained funding, and generate scientific data, particularly in respect of SLR and other
climate change impacts. A regional approach can also help parties collaborate to deal
with transboundary issues such as pollution control, habitat destruction and even provide
303

BBC News, "The Future of Kashmir?", online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/s
pl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/>.
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for environmental impact assessments for development projects that have transboundary
impacts. The ultimate pay-off is then to further regional prosperity by building trust and
confidence among the coastal countries of this region, developing solutions to problems
that have transboundary ramifications, settling maritime boundary disputes, developing
better capacity in terms of putting into practice coastal management, strengthening
epistemic communities and promoting the sharing of technology and resources.
The overall conclusion here is that an environmental and humanitarian crisis looms
large over the destinies of all South Asian coastal countries, a crisis that calls out for
immediate attention. As the saying goes, “either we swim together or sink together.” The
problems that the countries’ coastlines face in common can best be addressed through
regional cooperation. Thus, there is a strong rationale for a regional rather than a sectoral
approach on ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation. Also of note, in a rapidly
changing world, what happens in South Asian nations will definitely reverberate
internationally. Poverty, instability, climate-related pestilence and regional conflicts in
South Asia could upset world peace and security. Therefore, rather than raking up the
past, the South Asian countries must look towards the future and reinvent the SAARC to
become a purposeful instrument for regional cooperation and change. A regional
instrument on ICZM implementation that sees augmenting the instrumentality of coastal
laws at the respective national levels as its focus is in the collective individual and longterm interests of these countries.
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CHAPTER 10

THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A PRINCIPLED
APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE COASTAL
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA

10.1 INTRODUCTION
In developing and implementing the sustainable development agenda, in many situations,
cooperation between states is considered sine qua non and this can take several forms,
including cooperation at the regional level.1 Indeed, as seen in the previous chapter,
regional cooperation is an essential construct in several international environmental law
treaties as possible pathways to problems that are sui generis to a particular region and
even to those that may be evident at the global level. Even though climate change and
SLR are global problems, certain aspects of these phenomena can have a regional focus
as well and may require cooperation between nations at the regional level to develop
mitigation and adaptation solutions which can take the form of mandatory emission cuts,
the development and sharing of clean carbon and sequestration technologies, water
management, transboundary water sharing, biodiversity conservation and coastal
management.
As the preceding chapter attests there are several reasons that point to the need for a
regional ICZM instrument in the South Asian region. The experiences of India and those
of other coastal countries in this region reveal that the situation at the national level does
not inspire confidence that these countries have the necessary capacity and resources to
operationalize ICZM on a grander scale. Given that the South Asian region will be badly
impacted by SLR and other climate change processes, in certain cases, the impacts cannot
be contained within national boundaries; there is the possibility of spillovers. This may
trigger mass migrations, halt development and aggravate conditions of poverty, and
1

See United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force
24 October 1945) [UN Charter] art 1. “States and people shall cooperate in good faith and in a spirit
of partnership in the fulfillment of the principles embodied in this Declaration and in the further
development of international law in the field of sustainable development.” United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
14 June 1992, 31:4 ILM 874, prin 27; Philip Saunders, “Maritime Regional Cooperation: Theory
and Principles” in Mark J Valencia, ed, Maritime Regime Building: Lessons Learned and Their
Relevance for Northeast Asia, vol 36, Publications on Ocean Development (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 1 at 1.

therefore it is apposite that at least in relation to coastal zones, current developments on
ICZM at the national level in the countries of this region should taken to the next stage by
enacting/reengineering coastal laws to underpin the process. And here a regional-level
instrument on ICZM can play an important role in streamlining and strengthening this
process.
In the discussion below, drawing from different parts of this study, the agenda of
regional regime building for coastal South Asia is taken forward by identifying a
minimum set of principles/elements that can inform coastal law-making at the respective
national levels in coastal South Asia, seeking to balance and create synergies between
coastal environmental protection and economic development and provide for coastal
climate change adaptation, all via the ICZM methodology. The chapter concludes by reemphasizing the utility of a regional approach to ICZM implementation and in securing
the more important objective of fastening CCCA onto an ICZM process.

10.2 THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE: WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLES/ELEMENTS
SHOULD INFORM THE REGIONAL INSTRUMENT?

THAT

Clearly, there is ample room for improving coastal management in South Asia and there
has to be a paradigm shift in the way in which coastal spaces and resources are being
managed. And as the propositions in the previous chapter and the SWOT analysis there
reveals, there is scope for a regional instrument in South Asia. The question then is: what
should the form of this instrument be?
Laws and legal instruments typically evolve incrementally. Even though identifying
and adopting the most apt mode for regional cooperation is a matter of choice, a spectrum
of options is available to the coastal states to develop a regional regime. Nevertheless, the
form and content will depend upon the countries that comprise this region.2 Despite the
fact that there is no hard-law instrument on ICZM at the international level (which
actually increases the need for a regional hard-law instrument as an ideal option, given
the unique milieu of the area and the regional dynamics involved), it may be premature
2

If ‘‘exocratically’’ developed policies are imposed, these are unlikely to be perceived as legitimate
by resource users. Saunders, ibid; see also Patrick Christie, “Is Integrated Coastal Management
Sustainable?” (2005) 48 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 208 at 221 (ScienceDirect).
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for the coastal countries to move towards a framework treaty and related institutional
arrangements for the present. While treaty-based environmental regimes generate
antagonism in this region (as these nations want to preserve their sovereignty), it is clear
that soft-law commitments are yet to produce tangible results. Still, for now, and as
things stand, it may be expecting too much for coastal South Asia to move towards a
hard-law instrument that imposes binding and detailed obligations. At the same time, as a
first step to accepting a hard-law regime, it would be ideal for these countries to agree on
a set of soft-law principles to guide the development of national legal frameworks
relating to the coastal zone, operationalize ICZM, and implement CCCA actions.
Consistent with the principles of territorial integrity and permanent sovereignty over
natural resources,3 a regional instrument can have its genesis in the good neighbour
principle,4 which requires information-sharing, notification, consultation, good-faith
negotiations, and cooperation in planning projects with potential environmental impacts
and responding to emergencies, etc.5 In this regard, the attempt should not be to hastily
cobble together a regime but to develop it steadfastly through a process of incremental
steps.
Already, the South Asian Seas Action Plan (SASAP) has ICZM as one of its central
pillars. Even though this document does not per se mention that ICZM should be
implemented via a legal route, one of the general goals of the SASAP is to “promote
3
4

5

General Assembly Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res
1803 (XVII), UNGA, 17th Sess, Supp (No 17) at 15, UN Doc A/5217 (1962).
See Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, UN
Doc A/CONF48/14/Rev 1 (1973), 11 ILM 1416, prin 21. On a theory of strict liability and the
principle of tort law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, the Trail Smelter tribunal held Canada
responsible for injury to persons and property in the state of Washington resulting from
transboundary emissions of sulfur dioxide. It was held, “no state has the right to use or permit the
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence.” Trail Smelter Case (US v Canada), 3 RIAA 1911
(1941) at 1965. The dispute between Spain and France centered on a French plan to divert boundary
waters from their natural flow into Spain thereby creating a reservoir in France. The tribunal
affirmed that states, particularly upper riparian states, to negotiate in good faith with other states
concerning any intended diversion or other changes in the use of shared water resources. The
opinion confirmed that in undertaking a project affecting transboundary resources, a state (France in
the case) must always take into consideration the interests of other potentially affected states
(Spain). Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain), 12 RIAA 281 (1957).
UNEP, Environmental Law Guidelines and Principles on Shared Natural Resources, GC Dec No
6/14, 33 GAOR, Supp No 25 at 154, UN Doc A/33/25 (1978), prins 1, 5-7, 9.
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policies and management practices for the protection and development of the marine and
coastal environment on a national and regional level, including appropriate legislation at
the national level.”6 Again, it has been pointed out that:
National legislations and regulations pertaining
to the protection and management of the marine
and coastal environment which are at various
stage of development should be reviewed, and
when necessary, expanded, updated or
strengthened … National legislations and
regulations for the protection and development
of marine and coastal resources should be
harmonised whenever international uniformity
is required to meet the obligations of such
legislation … Technical assistance and advice
on the drafting of national legislation for the
effective
implementation
of
relevant
international agreements should be provided
upon request.7
The SASAP, as presently worded, does not specify the modalities of how this technical
assistance and advice on the drafting of national legislation is to be worked out.
Accordingly, in line with a soft co-operative approach, the cluster of principles identified
in this chapter as being the nucleus of a coastal law may be embodied in the South Asian
Seas Action Plan. In due course, these principles/elements can metamorphose into a hardlaw instrument with a stronger regime with a more ambitious mandate to prescribe
detailed rules, or there can be a standalone instrument comprising a mixture of both hardand soft-law elements.
This is only one possible approach (more feasible in the circumstance) to
developing a comprehensive regional regime. The pendulum can swing from framework
conventions,8 to informal management regimes9 and intergovernmental forums.10
6

7
8

Action Plan for the Protection and Management of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the
South Asian Seas Region, ¶6.(a), online: SACEP <http://www.sacep.org/pdf/SAS%20Actio
n%20Plan.pdf>.
Ibid at 5, part C (entitled “Environmental Legislation”).
See Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, 16 February 1976,
15 ILM 290 (entered into force 12 February 1978, revised in Barcelona, Spain, on 10 June 1995 as
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the
Mediterranean) [Barcelona Convention]. “Final Text of the Amended Nairobi Convention for the
Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Western
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Whatever the form, a set of principles to operationalize ICZM via the SASAP can
influence the South Asian coastal countries to move away from their present approach to
coastal zone management that is piecemeal in nature, centralized in methodology, and
development-oriented in perspective to a more holistic system that is decentralized,
people-centric, and sustainable development-friendly. This new approach will help to
promote socio-ecological resilience and integrate a wide range of stakeholders in the
pursuit of sustainable ocean and coastal development and management. More
importantly, a national legal framework based upon these principles can also support
adaptive programmes to meet the challenges posed by the impending impacts portended
by SLR.
In the subsequent discussion, certain principles/elements have been distilled from
the analyses in the preceding chapters that can inform the regional regime on ICZM in
South Asia by incorporating them in the SASAP. These are supported by principles and
tools embodied in some of the prominent coastal legislations, some of which have been
analyzed during the course of this study. In its turn, the SASAP (as modified) can help in
designing coherent and holistic legal instruments at the respective national levels to

9

10

Indian Ocean, Adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 31 March 2010, UNEP(DEPI)/EAF/CPP.6/8a/Suppl”
in UNEP, Final Act of the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries for the Adoption of the Amended
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal
Environment of the Western Indian Ocean, Adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 31 March 2010,
UNEP(DEPI)/EAF/CPP.6/10/Suppl.
The Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment is a US-Canadian partnership of
government and non-government organizations working to maintain and enhance environmental
quality in the Gulf of Maine. In 1989, the governors and premiers of the US states of Maine,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire and the neighboring Canadian provinces of New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia adopted the non-binding Agreement on Conservation of the Marine Environment
of the Gulf of Maine Between the Governments of the Bordering States and Provinces, which led to
the establishment of this informal regime. About the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine
Environment,
online:
Gulf of Maine
Council
on the
Marine
Environment
<http://www.gulfofmaine.org/2/>; see also Lawrence P Hildebrand & Aldo Chircop, “A Gulf
United: Canada-U.S. Transboundary Marine Ecosystem-based Governance in the Gulf of Maine”
(2010) 15 Ocean & Coastal LJ 339 (QL). The authors point out that, “[a]bsence of formal legal and
institutional structures . . . enabled regime participants to conduct business with a relative degree of
informality and to adjust regime directions on the basis of consensus and with ease of flexibility.”
Ibid at 375.
Established in 1996, the Arctic Council is a high level intergovernmental forum that promotes
“cooperation, coordination and interaction” among the Arctic States, involving the indigenous
communities and other arctic inhabitants on common issues that affect the Arctic. For further
details, see Arctic Council, About the Arctic Council, The Arctic Council online: Arctic Council
<http://www.a rctic-council.org/>; see also Timo Koivurova & David L VanderZwaag, “The Arctic
Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects” (2007) 40:1 UBC L Rev 121.
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harmonize various actors and actions in the coastal zone, minimize conflicts, and mitigate
environmental problems, thereby leading to sustainable coastal development.

10.2.1 Defining Objectives and Setting out the Principles upon Which the Law is
to be Based
At the outset, the coastal law must define the objectives that it seeks to secure and the
foundational principles on which it is based. All of our efforts in the coastal zone should
be directed towards ensuring development that is sustainable without compromising on
the carrying capacity of ecosystems and their ability to cater to the requirements of future
generations. Sustainable development emerges as the central pillar of a coastal law
around which all other substantive and procedural principles are to be based.11
Thus, SCD and its panoply of related principles should guide coastal law-making.
These include: the principle of integration, coordination, the ecosystem based approach,
the precautionary approach, the doctrine of public trust, stewardship, the polluter pays
principle, community participation, inter-and intra-generational equity, social equity,
subsidiarity, sustainable use, conservation, and economic efficiency. 12 These principles
do have recognition in the legal systems of the South Asian coastal countries and these
can sustain and help work some of the best practices in resources management.
Incorporation of the same in a coastal law can help produce an ideal normative climate
that can support programmes and plans aimed at sustainable coastal development. As
well, the coastal law can serve as an instrument to provide a framework to implement

11
12

For an overview on the concept of sustainable coastal development, see Ch 4, Part 4.2.1.
Prominent principles identified include, “integrated coastal and estuarine management,”
conservation of the coastal environment and maintenance of natural attributes, inter and intra
generational equity, co-operative and participatory approach to coastal management. National
Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act, (S Afr), No 24 of 2008, pmbl, s
2 [SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act]. The Oceans Act of Canada identifies the following as
essential principles, namely, that the three oceans - the Arctic, the Pacific and the Atlantic, are the
common heritage of all Canadians, ecosystem approach, precautionary approach, integrated
management of oceans and marine resources. Oceans Act, SC 1996, c 31, pmbl [Oceans Act]. The
Coastal Zone Management Act, 1998, of Barbados seeks to secure effective management of the
coastal resources, their conservation and enhancement. Coastal Zone Management Act 1998 (No 39
of 1998) [Barbados CZMA 1998]. India's Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 2011, speaks about
ensuring livelihood security to the fisher communities, conservation and protection of coastal
stretches, its unique environment and its marine area, promoting development through sustainable
manner based on scientific principles. (N, SO19(E), 2011, India) [CRZN, 2011]; Coastal Protection
Act 1979 (NSW), s 3 [NSWCPA]; Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995 (Qld), s 3.
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obligations under international law relating to the coastal and the marine environment.13
Among the principles, one that needs special mention is precaution. As pointed out
earlier in this study, in certain circumstances, the actual effects of developmental
activities on the coastal zone may be uncertain or unknown.14 This is particularly so
given climate change impacts and SLR. Even in the face of this uncertainty, it is
necessary to ensure that development activities continue to be environmentally
sustainable. The precautionary principle requires the taking of precautionary action that
can be either preventive or anticipatory before scientific certainty of cause and effect can
be established.15 To avoid social and economic damage and harm to coastal communities,
the coastal law must further a preventive approach rather than a reactionary one. The
precautionary approach should be the guiding tenet for all developmental projects,
particularly for those that are based in the coastal zone, and here importance must be
afforded to environmental impact assessment as a necessary tool to anticipate SLR and
the impacts of coastal development on coastal zones and flood plains.16

10.2.2 Defining the Coastal Zone (Recognising the Land-Sea Continuum)
Since the coastal zone is the marine-terrestrial margin of variable length, there is no
universally accepted definition of what constitutes a coastal zone and its determination is
essentially left to individual coastal states. However, without a clear and accepted
definition of what constitutes the coastal zone, ICZM implementation is fraught with
uncertainty. Therefore, the starting point of a coastal law is that it has to define the area
of its operation – namely, the coastal zone.
Deciding on and demarcating the coastal zone is no easy task and requires careful
13

14
15
16

For instance, see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, ibid, pmbl. It states that the coastal law
seeks to give effect to the South Africa’s international obligations. Ibid; Oceans Act, ibid, part I
(gives effect to the LOSC stipulations relating to maritime territories).
For more details regarding uncertainty and the development of the principle of precaution, see Ch 5,
Part 5.3.1.
Ibid.
Coast Conservation Act 1981 (No 57 of 1981, Sri Lanka) s 16 [Sri Lanka CCA 1981] (pointing out
that those interested in engaging in developmental activities in the coastal zone are to produce
environmental impact assessments); see also EC, Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management
in the Mediterranean, [2009] OJ L 34/19 [ICZM Protocol] art 19 (environmental assessment for
public and private projects that can environmentally affect the coastal zone) & art 29 (transboundary
environmental assessment). The national strategy for the management of estuarine, coastal and
marine ecosystems is to be based on sustainable development, integrated management and the
precautionary approach. Oceans Act, supra note 12, s 30.
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planning and deliberation involving all major stakeholders. Moreover, the demarcation of
a coastline has to be consistent with relevant international law such as LOSC mandates.
While its determination may ultimately be a political decision depending on issues at
hand, the coastal zone generally comprises of coastal waters, adjacent lands and related
coastal ecosystems like wetlands, deltas, and estuaries.17 The definitions afforded to the
coastal zones under laws reviewed earlier reveal that there cannot be any uniform
characterization. Generally, the coastal zone will include coastal waters on the sea-ward
side up to three nautical miles of territorial water18 or, in certain cases, the full extent of
the territorial water limit.19 Or, depending on what the country deems appropriate, it may
be extended even further.20 And as far as the land ward side is concerned, it generally
stops at the mean high water-mark. While such demarcations are more or less fixed
distance definitions; there could also be other relevant factors like physical and biological
features, administrative boundaries, constructed landmarks, etc. that can be utilised in
determining the coastal zone.21 The final decision may be a political one, and the
definition may be “hybrid” in nature, but ideally the demarcation should be based on the
“degree of coastalness,”22 determined depending on the influence which the landward
component of the coastal zone exerts on the seaward areas, and vice versa. More
importantly, the coastal zone should be a manageable unit.

10.2.3 Creation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plans

17

18

19
20

21
22

SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, ch 2; Law for the Protection of the Coastal
Environment Law 2004 (No 5764 of 2004, Israel), s 1 [Israeli Coastal Law] (defining coastal
environment in section 2 to include seaward to the limit of the territorial waters); Decree-Law
Number 212-2000: Coastal Zone Management, 8 August 2000 (Cuba), s 2, arts 2-5 [Cuba CZM]
(dealing with boundaries of the coastal zone) & s 3 (defining the components that compromise the
coastal zone).
See Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 16, s 42; see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, ibid, s 1
(including territorial waters); Coastal Zone Management Act, (Belize), No 5 of 1998, s 2 [Belize
CZMA] (coastal zone includes the territorial waters).
CRZN, 2011, supra note 12, cl (v); Israeli Coastal Law, supra note 17, s 2.
For instance, Bangladesh includes its exclusive economic zones as part of its coast. For more details
on the experience of Bangladesh in coastal management, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.3; see also SA,
Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, s 1 (defining the coastal zone to include the
exclusive economic zone).
Robert Kay & Jacqueline Alder, Coastal Planning and Management, 2d ed (Oxon: Taylor &
Francis, 2005) at 2-8.
Ibid at 3.
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There are two important dimensions to ICZM implementation – the first is prescriptive
and the second is functional. The coastal law dons the prescriptive role by laying down
the norms of economic development and coastal environmental protection. The
functional facet, on the other hand, is secured via an ICZM plan. In fact, SCD can be
realized in large measure by designing, developing and implementing a time-bound
(implementing short-term and long-term objectives), well-thought-out ICZM plan that
dovetails development with environmental considerations and harmonizes various
interests in the coastal zone.23 ICZM plans set out specific goals and objectives, identify
the various actors, enumerate the activities that need to be implemented to help secure
these goals and objectives, identify coastal ecosystems that need urgent management,
specify measures for their upkeep, and, most importantly, spell out an implementation
schedule.24 As well, ICZM plans should be utilized to further the implementation of
coastal climate change adaptation, such as measures to prevent or mitigate the impacts of
natural hazards.25
As these plans do not operate in a vacuum, it is imperative that they be grounded in
the legal framework within which they exist, mature, and operate. In fact, a core objective
of the coastal law is that it should provide not only for its creation (involving input from
coastal communities within a specified time frame), but should also lay out the guidelines
describing what achievable actions an ICZM plan should contain and specify the method

23

24

25

For a discussion on linking coastal climate change adaptation within an ICZM process, see Ch 6,
Part 6.5; see also Coastal Development Authority Act 1994 (No XXVIII of 1994, Sindh), ss 12-13
[Sindh CDA 1994]; see Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (UK), 2009, s 44 [UKMCAA] (dealing
with the preparation of marine policy statement); Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ), 1991/69, ss
56-58 [NZRMA] (dealing with New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement) & s 64 (dealing with regional
coastal plans).
See generally Kenya, National Environment Management Authority, Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Action Plan for Kenya, 2011-2015 (Nairobi: NEMA, [nd]); Sri Lanka, Coast
Conservation Department, Coastal Zone Management Plan, Sri Lanka 2006 (Colombo: Coast
Conservation Department of the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development, 2006)
online: Coast Conservation Department <http://www.coastal.gov.lk/cz mp%20english.pdf>; see also
Belize, Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries, & Sustainable Development Belize Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Plan (Coastal Zone Management Authority & Institute, 2013) at 114-32.
The parties are to develop within the framework of national strategies for ICZM, policies for staving
off natural hazards. In particular this includes carrying out vulnerability and hazard assessments of
coastal zones and adopting measures that seek to prevent, mitigate and adapt to the effects of natural
disasters, in particular climate change. ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, art 22.
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for its implementation.26 As well, depending upon national circumstances (e.g., a
federation), the length of the coastal zone, the nature of the coastal resources and
population concentration, there could be provision for more than one coastal zone
management plan, and in certain situations, even for a hierarchy of plans, beginning with
a national plan that prescribes the strategic objectives, provincial level plans and finally
plans at the local level.27 Since the natural features, concentrations of coastal populations
and coastal resources and the problems that affect coastal areas, including SLR, are not
uniform along a coastline, a decentralized and nested format of ICZM plans can lead to
better focus and help to develop and accommodate management responses that are
sensitive to localized conditions, enabling better implementation of ICZM. As well, to
give effect to the dynamic nature of ICZM and to the principle of adaptive management,
the plan should be subject to periodical revisions and updates.28

10.2.4 Providing for the Creation of a Lead Agency Responsible for the
Implementation of the ICZM Plan and the Principles of Horizontal and
Vertical Integration
An important question that needs consideration is whether can we implement ICZM
programmes by adroitly employing existing government agencies responsible for
shoreline management or is it absolutely essential to create a new institution? Creating a
new agency for coastal management in the different South Asian coastal countries is
easier said than done. In fact, an important reason as to why several coastal countries
have not ventured to establish national-level legal frameworks for ICZM and create
institutions for their implementation is due to the jurisdictional complexities such a
programme entails and due to the possibility of bureaucratic warfare to protect their turf.
Moreover, there is also a risk that re-organizing or the creation of a new lead agency can
lead to bureaucratic warfare. Generally, it is the constitution of a country that determines
26

27

28

Oceans Act, supra note 12, s 31. The Barbados coastal law specifically provides that plan should
comprise policies, strategies and standards that provide for the management and conservation of
coastal resources. Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 12, s 4; Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 16, s
12; Belize CZMA, supra note 18, s 23.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, ss 44-52 (providing for national, provincial
and municipal coastal management programmes); see also EC, Recommendation of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2002 Concerning the Implementation of Integrated
Coastal Zone Management in Europe, (2002/413/EC) [2002] OJ L 148/24, ch IV [EC, ICZM
Recommendation] (calling upon member states to develop a national strategy or, where appropriate,
several strategies, to ICZM principles).
The plan should be revised once in four years. Belize CZMA, supra note 18, s 23(9).
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the division of powers between the different levels of government.29 As new situations
develop, new crises crop up, and the constitution can sometimes unwittingly stymie the
development of legal responses.30 Building an ICZM programme or identifying a
responsible agency within the existing institutional structure to lead the implementation
of ICZM will save administrative costs needed to create a well-functioning new
authority. Nevertheless, utilizing an existing institution may not always be sufficiently
geared to respond to the scale of the problems. In line with chapter 17 of Agenda 21,
which calls upon states to consider establishing or strengthening appropriate or
coordinating mechanisms to promote integrated management and sustainable
development of marine and coastal areas,31 it is imperative that the coastal law provide
for the creation or designation of a lead agency to act as the steward of the coast and
manage the coastal zone, the environment, its resources and communities and their
interactions. It should be the responsibility of this lead agency to ensure that the law is
enforced and the vision of coastal sustainability is achieved. As well, the lead agency
should also be tasked with the duty of preparing and implementing ICZM plans. In both
federal and unitary systems, it is necessary to identify a nodal ministry that should be
given the overall responsibility to oversee and implement the programme in consonance
with the principle of stewardship. While in unitary systems (Bangladesh, the Maldives,
and Sri Lanka), there could be scope only for a single lead agency, in federal systems
(India and Pakistan); there could be more than one.32 Whatever be the case, the entity is
to be at a higher bureaucratic level than the sectoral agencies to provide necessary
direction to harmonize sectoral actions.33 In regulating development in the coastal zone,
the lead agency should act as a one-stop shop issuing development permits and in cases
29
30
31
32

33

For various national case studies on coastal management, see generally Ch 7, Part 7.3.
For more details on effecting decentralisation in unitary systems and the difficulties in implementing
ICZM in these countries, see Ch 7, Part 7.3.5.1.
Nicholas A Robinson, ed, Agenda 21 & The UNCED Proceedings, vol 4, 3rd series, International
Protection of the Environment (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc, 1993) at 307, ch 17, ¶17.6.
See ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, art 7(1)(a) (parties to ensure institutional coordination through
appropriate bodies or mechanisms to avoid sectoral approaches). Parties to organize appropriate
coordination between various authorities competent for both the marine and the land parts of coastal
zones (art 7(1)(b)); SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, ch 5 (providing for a
national coastal committee, provincial coastal committees and municipal coastal committees).
Cormac Cullinan, Integrated Coastal Management Law: Establishing and Strengthening National
Legal Frameworks for Integrated Coastal Management, FAO Legislative Study, No 93 (Rome:
FAO, 2006) at 62.
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where this is not possible, the legislation should seek to realign existing institutional
arrangements to the extent practicable to ensure coordinated decision-making.
Additionally, and in consonance with the principle of integration, the lead agency
should be an umbrella entity that acts as a permanent coordination and management
mechanism, charged with the duty to coordinate functions of different authorities that
have jurisdiction over various aspects of coastal zone management. This agency must
also be given suitable power to develop guidelines to overcome overlapping jurisdiction
and other institutional and jurisdictional complexities. Apart from the lead agency, the
law can also provide for the creation of advisory bodies tasked with the duty to tender
advice to the lead agency on matters relating to coastal management so as to enable it to
perform its functions in the most effective and scientific manner.34
Being a framework law, it is necessary that the law provide that the authority
should also have the power to issue guidelines on a range of issues that affect the coastal
zone.35 Such guidelines can cover areas like those dealing with the development of the
coastal zone and those related to the protection of land-use planning, management of
marine protected areas (including offshore ones that fall within the wet side of the coastal
zone), conservation and restoration of degraded coastal ecosystems, creation and
management of tourism-related infrastructure, regulation of activities that seek to use
foreshore facilities like the aquaculture industry, and control of marine pollution. Such an
approach reflects the dynamism inherent in the ICZM process facilitates adaptive
management and also helps to respond to the uncertainty inherent in the climate change
phenomenon.

10.2.5 Providing for Adaptation Measures to Combat Sea Level Rise
Of all the factors impacting the coastal and oceanic environment, the most grave are
climate change and SLR. However, the complexity and uncertainty associated with
climate change impacts on coastal zones often act as barriers to effective action.
Therefore, the central mission of any coastal law must be to provide a proactive

34

35

Belize CZMA, supra note 18, ss 6-7 (dealing with the establishment, composition and functions of
the Advisory Council); Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 16, ss 6-7 (creation of the Coast
Conservation Advisory Council and its functions).
Belize CZMA, ibid, s 36; Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 12, s 39.
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framework of rules and measures that will help coastal managers to adapt to the problems
posed by climate change and SLR, factoring in the uncertainty. As mentioned in the
earlier sections of this study,36 a coastal law can promote CCCA in two ways: 1) by
providing express measures that can be broadly grouped into retreat, 37 accommodate38
and protect39 aimed at CCCA and risk management; and 2) by balancing coastal
development with coastal environmental protection imperatives thereby improving the
adaptive capacities of coastal communities and coastal ecosystem resilience.40 The
coastal law must provide avenues to implement the three broad adaptation response
strategies, namely, accommodate (prescribing minimum ground elevation for new
development), retreat, and protect (strengthening sea walls and increase their heights if
the need be). However, in doing so, the primary emphasis should always be on soft
armouring and accommodation respecting the concept of living shorelines and allowing
nature to determine the equilibrium.41 Hard armouring should be utilized only as a matter
of last resort (to protect coastal infrastructure) and, in such cases, the coastal law should
embody the fundamental principle that utilizing hard armouring protection should not be
at the expense of coastal ecosystems located elsewhere.42 The coastal law also emerges as
a social welfare legislation to support ICZM, harmonizing the actions of various actors in
the coastal zone and providing coastal communities avenues to participate in the ICZM
process from the planning stage to its implementation. In so doing, it empowers coastal
communities and recognizes their traditional knowledge; in the long-run, these actions
can augment their adaptive capacities.43

10.2.6 Land Use Planning, Zoning, and the Power of Acquisition

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43

See generally Chs 4-8.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, s 25 (providing for coastal setback lines).
Ibid, s 49 (municipal coastal management program to deal with coastal erosion).
Ibid, s 15(1) (state cannot be compelled to prevent erosion).
See NSWCPA, supra note 12, s 3(h) (encouraging and promoting plans and strategies for coastal
climate change adaptation).
US, Living Shoreline Protection Act, Md C Ann Envir §16-201 (2008).
Parties should adopt measures to minimize the effects of coastal works including coastal defence
works on coastal erosion. ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, art 23(2); California Coastal Act of 1976,
20 PRC §30235 [Cal CA, 2013]; see also Cuba CZM, supra note 17, art 20(a) (protection works are
not to cause damage to the coastal zone).
For further information on traditional knowledge in support of climate change adaptation, see Ch 5,
note 360.
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Planning for coastal development is extremely vital given increasing trends towards
coastal urbanization, as it helps to correct the abuses of unplanned development. Coastal
hazards exact huge costs in terms of lives and money. Despite this, migration to coastal
areas in South Asia continues with no signs of abatement, leading to the reshaping of
coastal landscapes through the building of new infrastructure like roads and ports, the
setting up of industries and facilities for power generation and transmission, and so on.
These features are central to the social, economic and cultural well-being of coastal
communities and cannot be withheld. However, as cities grow and populations expand in
ways that encourage sprawl, mangrove forests may be cleared, wetlands and salt marshes
drained, coral reefs destroyed, beaches encroached upon, and rivers and lakes channeled.
In the coming decades, it is expected that the development and use of the coastal zone
will increase manifold times and that there will be a growing demand for coastal space.
This will place unprecedented pressures on coastal areas and resources and encroach into
fragile coastal ecosystems. The question that emerges is how can law facilitate the
balance between conservation with infrastructural development?
To ensure that development proceeds in a more orderly fashion, and to maximize
and obtain optimal benefits from scarce resources and prevent haphazard development,
careful planning is pivotal. In this, it is essential that all development projects located in
coastal areas as part of their environmental impact assessments mandatorily incorporate
future scenarios regarding climate change and SLR into their planning, decision-making
and design, and that new development should as far as possible not accentuate existing
and future vulnerabilities.44 Planning should ensure that coastal areas and resources are
used intelligently and are made available not only for the present but also for future
generations. It also seeks to curb the establishment of sporadic patterns of settlement and
haphazard growth, which often leads to sprawling and slums that pose a strain on coastal
resources and degradation of the coastal environment. In the absence of planning, the
natural character, landscape values, heritage sites, scenic areas, areas of high biodiversity,
etc. may get lost.
44

For instance, see New Zealand, Dep’t of Conservation, New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010
(Wellington: Dep’t of Conservation, 2010) policy 24 (calling upon authorities to consider SLR and
other climate change impacts for over at least 100 years in assessing coastal hazard risk).
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Among the range of tools available, land use planning and zoning are the most
valuable, as they help to implement careful planning for the shoreline by seeking to
balance conflicting demands for coastal land and encouraging the development of
sustainable settlements.45 Once the boundaries of the coastal zone are determined
according to factors such as sensitivity to SLR impacts and the geographical, cultural,
historic, ecological and biodiversity uniqueness of a particular area, coastal areas would
have to be classified (e.g., appropriate for development, for nature preservation, for
protection, etc.). The zoning of the coastal zone involves the earmarking and
categorization of the coastal areas into areas for preservation, conservation buffer zones,
utilization and development zones. Zoning helps to curb inappropriate growth by
categorizing coastal lands into those fit for commercial, residential and industrial
development, but it is an arduous task and may not be practical in countries confronted by
coastal squeeze. In parceling out and earmarking coastal land, it may be necessary to
balance competing interests over these parcels, with the priority given to ensure that any
change in land use will not adversely impact coastal communities that are dependent on
that land for their livelihood and economic sustenance. Moreover, given that SLR and
extensive coastal erosion are major problems for most coastal states, zoning emerges as
the best way to ensure that people and valuable infrastructure are not in harm’s way. 46
Existing SLR may prompt nations to create buffer zones to preserve the shore, protect
coastal communities, and facilitate the implementation of retreat. In extreme
circumstances, development may have to be banned in these zones. Determination of the
mean high and low water line and subsequent setback lines will also be necessary. A
setback line is a unique, powerful, and practical concept in coastal zone management that
essentially demarcates the border between development and environmental protection47
and is extremely useful in adapting to SLR.

45
46

47

SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, ss 62, 17.
India’s Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 2011 and its predecessor coastal law, the Coastal
Regulation Zone Notification, 1991 are primarily zoning laws. However, there are flaws in India’s
approach as the several exemptions practically water down the zoning scheme and more importantly
people with very poor adaptive capacities are placed in harm’s way. For more details, see Ch 3,
Parts 3.2.1.4 & 3.2.1.5.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, s 25.
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Beyond zoning and related tools, the emphasis should be to ensure “smart growth
development,” a concept that emphasizes development in areas with existing
infrastructure and de-emphasizes development in areas less suitable for development.”48
Smart growth development in coastal zones would imply the need to situate development
in coastal areas most suited for the same, enhancing amenities available to coastal
communities by preserving existing natural resources, and saving the cost for new
infrastructure (which, if improperly situated, will have to subsequently be dismantled or
re-engineered). Again as the sea level rises, it may become necessary to relocate coastal
communities out of harm’s way through the acquisition of coastal land. Apart from the
state, private owners of coastal land may choose to adopt their own measures to protect
their property, like placing sand bags and constructing seawalls, which may not be
scientific and can endanger nearby properties. As well, it may become necessary to
prohibit rebuilding structures that are damaged by storms and other extreme weather
events.49 Haphazard land development in coastal areas may have to be re-worked;
depending on their vulnerability to SLR, and this implies that the government/agency has
the power to acquire private property subject to payment of reasonable compensation.50
The government may also have to acquire private property to ensure public access and
enjoyment of coastal resources.51 This is definitely an expensive option, which the states
in coastal South Asia may be unable to afford. Again as seen in Chapter seven, as the sea
level rises to inundate private coastal property, the question is whether owners can claim
compensation from the state in the event of the state refusing to adopt measures to protect
the private property or prohibiting the private property owners from raising fortifications
to protect other properties. The countries concerned will have to take an individual call

48
49
50

51

Stephanie Ramia, “Smart Growth: The Toolbox for Addressing Sprawling Development in Coastal
South Carolina” (2010) 9 Se Envtl LJ 173 at 186 (HeinOnline).
For more details on rolling easements, see Ch 7, Part 7.3.1.3.
See Coastal Development Authority Act, 1990, (Kenya), No 20 of 1990, s 16; SA, Integrated Coastal
Management Act, supra note 12, s 9; Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 12, s 20(2). Parties may
adopt mechanisms for acquisition, cession, donation or transfer of land to the public domain and
institute easements on properties. ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, art 20(2); Balochistan Coastal
Development Authority Act 1998 (No 1 of 1998, Balochistan), s 15.
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, ibid (empowering the minister to acquire private land for
the purpose of declaring it as coastal public property); ICZM Protocol, ibid, art 20 (public access to
the sea); see also UK MCAA, supra note 23, part 9 (dealing with coastal access).
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on such matters and its coastal law will have to provide for definite rules, lest confusion
arise to jeopardize the coastal management regime.52

10.2.7 Recognition of Decentralized Community-based Approaches, Comanagement, Providing for Conflict Management and Protecting the
Rights of Autochthonous Peoples
Successful implementation of ICZM models depends largely on matured governance
systems, clear demarcation of powers between the national, provincial and in certain
cases the presence of democratic institutions even at the local government level. These
factors are largely absent in most of the South Asian coastal countries, which are often
characterized by weak governance and institutional mechanisms and where the trend is
towards

greater

centralization,53

even

though

decentralized

community-based

management has widespread recognition in South Asia as a successful paradigm for
managing natural resources.54 Decentralized community-based management reverses
management from a being an almost exclusive ‘top-down’ approach to a more ‘bottomup’ approach, incorporating local knowledge and experience. It also encompasses the
idea is that the community, in its capacity as resource user, becomes involved in
developing and implementing the management programme geared towards the
sustainable use of the resource, instilling in them a sense of accountability. Such an
approach is more in sync with the principle of subsidiarity.55 Decentralized communitybased management is an essential cog in the ICZM process and therefore institutions and
plans to guide ICZM will have to be developed and implemented at the local level as
52

53

54

55

See SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, ibid, s 14(5)(a). It provides that if the high water mark
(HWM) moves inland of a land unit due to coastal erosion, sea level rise, etc. and remains so for
three years, the owner of that land looses ownership of any portion of the land situated below the
HWM, and is not entitled to compensation from the state. However, if the movement of the HWM is
a reasonable foreseeable consequence caused by an intentional or negligent act or omission by a
state organ, then this no-liability rule will not apply. Ibid, s 14(5)(b).
For instance, despite having enacted a coastal legislation that has prompted the creation of ICZM
plans, greater centralization has reduced the efficacy of the coastal management programme in Sri
Lanka. For more details, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.4.
Developing countries should always adopt a community based approach; in contrast, developed
countries should adopt a community based approach where local stakeholders attach direct values to
coastal quality, and adopt a top down approach where the general population attaches indirect values
to coastal quality. Fabio Zagonari, Fabio. “Integrated Coastal Management: Top–Down vs.
Community-Based Approaches” (2008) 88:4 J Envtl Mgmt 796 (ScienceDirect).
Marcus B Lane, “Towards Integrated Coastal Management in Solomon Islands: Identifying
Strategic Issues for Governance Reform” (2006) 49 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 421 at 436
(ScienceDirect).
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well.56 The success of a coastal zone management programme depends considerably on
the level of continuous participation it provides for and secures at the grass-roots level for
indigenous and other local communities in decision-making and benefit-sharing.57 In
other words, ICZM has to be reflective of local sentiment. Even though in many
developing countries, particularly those in South Asia, traditional informal governance
systems exist side-by-side with the formal mechanisms, these rarely have legal
recognition and this is where a major challenge lies (i.e., providing legal sanctity to these
informal bodies and as far as possible harmonize the informal with formal structures).
Indigenous communities (in South Asia and beyond) have a wealth of coastal zone
knowledge about coastal resources, marine habitats, fishing practices, etc., and through
these informal community-based management systems have developed their own codes
of conduct and resource management rules (e.g., land tenure systems and fishing
harvesting practices).58 This wisdom, which could be especially useful in devising
adaptation measures to deal with climate change impacts and SLR, is more or less dying
due to the lack of recognition by formal legal systems.59 Accordingly, it is essential that a
programme on coastal management, supported by a legal framework, recognize and
incorporate these informal mechanisms into the broader scheme for ICZM management if
it is to garner greater public support and legitimacy and provide avenues to tap
indigenous knowledge, using it in the best possible means for the management of the
coastal zone.60 Enlisting local communities helps to energize management initiatives, as
56
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60

See Ch 6, text accompanying notes 134-39.
In developing and implementing plans for the integrated management of all activities or measures
that affect estuaries, coastal waters and marine waters the minister has to collaborate with affected
aboriginal organizations, coastal communities as well. Oceans Act, supra note 12, s 31.
One of the traditional fishing practices followed by fishing communities in the state of Tamil Nadu
in India, is the construction of the Kattu Maram (two trees tied together) or the Catamaran. In the
Ramnad region catamaran are made from coral tree wood (kalyana murungai). The tree is cut during
the crescent moon period and it is kept for 15 days and is treated in fire to remove the outer bark.
The woods are arranged and tied with rope horizontally. T Rathakrishnan et al, “Traditional Fishing
Practices Followed by Fisher Folks of Tamil Nadu” (2009) 8:4 Indian J Traditional Knowledge 543
at 545. Traditional knowledge plays an important role in sustaining fishing communities elsewhere
as well. For instance, in the Solomon islands, it is believed that people who abuse fishing rights will
be eaten by guardian sharks. JCK Huang, “Climate Change and Integrated Coastal Management: A
Challenge for Small Island Nations” (1997) 37:1 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 95 at 97 (ScienceDirect).
Traditional knowledge saved ancient tribes on India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands from the worst
of the tsunami. Subir Bhaumik, “Tsunami folklore ‘saved islanders’”, BBC News (20 January 2005)
online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4181855.stm>.
Huang, supra note 58.
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they are more cognizant of the day-to-day real-life challenges that the coastlines face and
can make contributions in myriad ways.
Nonetheless, this does not dispense the involvement of the state in such initiatives,
especially with regards to disaster management. In South Asia, patriarchy and hierarchy
(as embodied by the caste system) still continue to play important roles in organizing
these societies, particularly in rural landscapes.61 There is a long history of exclusion of
women from coastal decision-making processes, even though women play indelible roles
in supporting the subsistence economy through the marketing, preserving and selling of
fish.62 They are also gatherers of natural products like water, firewood, corals, and shells.
Despite their central role in supporting coastal economies, women are sidelined to the
periphery in the decision-making process. Equity is at the heart of legal regulation of the
coastal environment and of its resources. Accordingly, it is imperative that a coastal law
recognizes the important role played by women and secures clearer roles to them in the
ICZM process.63 Similarly, the caste system though normatively proscribed, still
continues to raise its ugly head in these coastal areas, with the consequence that
traditional artisanal and other autochthonous fishing communities may sometimes be
excluded from the decision-making process.64 The law, while affording recognition to
informal coastal governance systems and dovetailing them into the ICZM process, will
also have to play an important role in securing rights for marginalized communities.65
Such affirmative measures can, in practice, strengthen the adaptive capacities of
women and marginalized communities. At its core, a coastal law should provide for the
empowerment, participation and active engagement of local inhabitants through local
61
62
63

64
65

For more on the effects of social dynamics on coastal management, see Ch 8, Part 8.2.
Ibid.
See “Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development” in UN, Report of
the World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September
2002, A/CONF.199/20* (New York: UN, 2002) ¶67(b).
See Ch 8, Part 8.2.
Oceans Act, supra note 12, s 2(1) (saving existing aboriginal or treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples guaranteed under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982), s 29 & s 31 (involving affected
aboriginal organizations in the development of the Oceans Management Strategy and Integrated
Management Plans); NZRMA, supra note 23, s 8 (emphasizing the need to take into account the
principles established by the Treaty of Waitangi). In achieving the purpose of the NZRMA, the
relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi
tapu, and other taonga must be taken into account. Ibid, ss 6(e), 8 (emphasizing the need to take into
account the principles established by the Treaty of Waitangi).
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government institutions in decision-making and benefit-sharing.66 Furthermore, it should
adopt measures to provide for the widest opportunity for public participation67 and must
implement community-based coastal resources management by devolving management
powers over coastal areas, resources and environment to local communities. While
providing for decentralized and community-based coastal management, local-level ICZM
plans are to be referred to the national-level umbrella agency, which has to ensure that the
local plan is in consonance with the national plan and other rules and laws relating to
coastal management.68 In sum, the importance and recognition of community as the key
stakeholder in the coastal management process has to be recognized in absolutely clear
terms, as a healthy coast is pivotal to the well-being of coastal communities that depend
on coastal resources for their livelihood and security. Without the active support and
participation of coastal communities, an ICZM programme is doomed to fail. Here the
legal instrument should, without discounting the merits of a top-down approach, foster a
bottom-up movement rooted in local community planning actions, the use of traditional
knowledge and local expertise, and the steady hand of local government institutions.

10.2.8 Ensuring Public Access to Coastal Resources by Implementing the
Doctrine of Public Trust and Rolling Easements
As more and more people, industries and developmental activities gravitate towards the
coastal areas of South Asia to capitalize on the economic opportunities that are not
available in the hinterland regions, conflicts arise between the different users. For
instance, coastal tourism projects tend to move traditional fishing communities away
from beachheads. This can have disastrous consequences for these communities, as they
may use the beachheads for their fishing operations as well as for cultural and recreation
purposes.69 Accordingly, one of the more controversial issues that a coastal law may have
to grapple with is the need to protect rights hitherto enjoyed by traditional coastal
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Cal CA, 2013, supra note 42, §30006.
Public participation can begin right from the time of the development of the ICZM plan right down
to its implementation. ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, art 14.
For instance, see SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, s 47(c)(i) (requiring
provincial coastal management programme to be consistent with the national coastal management
programme).
For more details, see India's and Sri Lanka's experience on coastal management, Ch 2, Part 2.2.1,
2.2.4.
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communities, especially the right of public access (the right of ingress and egress for
work, recreation and living), while at the same time allowing for modern development. 70
Lawmakers and coastal managers often grapple with the issue of how best to regulate and
manage the coastal zone by reducing conflicts amongst the various players, while at the
same allowing development and the sustainable management of critical resources and
habitats. In certain situations, the state, in exercising its sovereign powers, has displaced
coastal communities and transferred coastal resources to private players to facilitate
economic development. Such moves have been strongly opposed by coastal communities.
Establishing the doctrine of public trust as a central tenet in the management of the
coastal zone can be an effective and simple solution to conflicts over coastal resources,
including land. As seen, public trust obliges governments to manage certain natural
resources in the best interests of their citizens as a fiduciary, without sacrificing the needs
of future generations. The public trust doctrine acts a bulwark against discretionary
government action: “The state’s fiduciary obligations under the doctrine require not only
a respect for the rights of coastal owners but also a focus on protecting the public’s right
to access beaches in the future.”71 Thus, if a coastal law is to promote sustainability, it
must be anchored in the concept of public trust.72 There is yet another dimension to the
issue of increasing privatization of coastal zones. Since private entities generally have
superior financial and technological resources, they may implement hard armouring
measures to protect their coastal properties and frontage. This can lead to coastal squeeze
(preventing the inland migration of coastal ecosystems like wetlands) and other harmful
environmental consequences. Therefore, it may become necessary for coastal laws in
South Asia to implement a version of the concept of rolling easements, as were
developed in U.S. coastal jurisprudence.73

10.2.9 Providing for the Conservation of Coastal Resources and Controlling
Coastal Pollution
70
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Israeli Coastal Law, supra note 17, s 5 (securing a public right of way); SA, Integrated Coastal
Management Act, supra note 12, ss 20, 29.
F Patrick Hubbard, “The Impact of Lucas on Coastal Development: Background Principles, the
Public Trust Doctrine, and Global Warming” (2008) 16 Se Envtl LJ 65 at 82.
The state is the public trustee of coastal public property. SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act,
supra note 12, s 12; see also ibid, s 11 (affirming that the ownership of coastal public properly vests
in the citizens which is held in trust by the state on their behalf).
See supra note 49.
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The conservation and restoration of degraded coastal resources should be high on the
agenda of a coastal law. As a first step, it is necessary that the coastal law provide for the
identification of coastal resources, their current state, and the degree of dependence of
coastal communities on the resources.74 Once this task is complete, it becomes easier to
draft an appropriate conservation strategy for the resources. In this, ICZM plans assume
great importance, as the conservation strategy can be worked through an ICZM plan. In
particular, measures should be adopted to protect corals, restrictions (and, where
necessary, prohibitions) should be imposed on the extraction of beach sand and other
inert materials,75 and protection should be afforded to coastal wetlands and mangroves.76
Likewise, coastal forests, dunes, other coastal landscapes, islands, coastal antiquities and
historical artifacts should be protected.77 Here, a coastal law could provide for an
assortment of conservation and management tools, such as the creation of protected areas
(including networks)78 and no-take zones, special management areas, and so on.79
Restrictions (or, where necessary, prohibitions) may have to be imposed on fishing and
other resource extractive activities, particularly in cases where the extraction practice is
unscientific, exceeds the carrying capacity, and is destructive of the resource.80 Rules can
be also prescribed to prevent or regulate development situated in wetlands, beaches, dune
systems, mangroves, coral reefs, etc., so that their natural functions (e.g., storm buffering,
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Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 16, s 11 (providing for a survey of the coastal zone prior to the
preparation of the coastal zone management plan); see also EC, ICZM Recommendation, supra note
27, ch III (calling upon member states to conduct or update a stocktaking of major actors, laws and
institutions that influence coastal zone management).
Prior authorization is required before excavation and extraction of minerals, including the use of
seawater in desalination plants and regulating the extraction of sand. ICZM Protocol, supra note 16,
art 9(2)(e)(i)-(ii).
For instance, see CRZN, 2011, supra note 12, ¶7(i) (classifying mangroves as CRZ-I, which
envisages a heightened degree of protection to this ecosystem).
See ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, arts 10 (protection of specific coastal ecosystems like wetlands,
marine habitats, dunes, coastal forests and woods), 11 (protection of coastal landscapes), 12
(protection of islands) & 13 (protection of archeological, historical including underwater cultural
heritage).
UKMCAA, supra note 23, ss 116-17 (provides for the creation of marine conservation zones for
conserving marine flora or fauna, marine habitats and geological and geomorphological interest) &
123 (provides for the creation of a network of conservation sites).
Oceans Act, supra note 12, ss 35-36 (dealing with marine protected areas and interim marine
protected areas in emergency situations).
Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 12, s 22 (prohibiting the harvesting of corals in the territorial
waters and in the exclusive economic zone). Similarly, any person who uses explosives, poison or
noxious substances for the purpose of harvesting coral or catching fish is guilty of an offence. Ibid, s
27.
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support functions, carbon sequestration functions) are preserved.81
As described earlier, there is close relationship between water management and
coastal health, and therefore provisions may have to be crafted to ensure protection to
estuaries and deltas.82 As seen in the previous chapters, groundwater management in
coastal areas is a critical issue, as groundwater can be affected by rising sea levels. 83
Therefore, in tandem with water laws and regulations, groundwater management areas
may have to be declared and permissible consumptive volumes decided upon when water
extraction licenses are granted.84 Moreover, as there could be areas where permissible
consumptive volume has been reached or exceeded, no new licenses should be granted in
such areas. As well, a coastal law should contain provisions to protect cultural and
historical heritage sites, including underwater cultural heritage areas found within the
coastal zone.85
Without a doubt, and as delineated in the preceding chapters, land-based sources of
pollution are the primary cause for poor and declining coastal and marine water quality.
This not only affects aquatic life and leads to loss of marine habitat, but it adversely
impacts human health and the economic well-being of coastal populations. Since
legislations at the domestic level on coastal and marine pollution are limited in South
Asia,86 a coastal law will have to provide for measures that can help to identify, regulate,
and mitigate coastal and marine pollution.87 However, while it may be next to impossible
to identify and conceive of every kind of pollution source and provide measures to
manage and regulate them, this can be best achieved by the ICZM plan. In line with the
81
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Ibid, s 28 (beach protection); Israeli Coastal Law, supra note 17, s 4 (prohibiting damage to the
coastal environment)
SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, ss 33-34 (providing for the creation of
national estuarine management protocol and estuarine management plans); see also Oceans Act,
supra note 12, s 31.
For more details regarding the impact of SLR on coastal aquifers, see Ch 2, Part 2.5.1.
For instance, see ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, art 9(2)(e)(iii) (emphasizing on the need to monitor
coastal aquifers and the interface between fresh and saltwater, which may be affected by extraction
of the groundwater).
Ibid, art 13.
See generally Ch 3, Part 3.2.
Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 16, s 25; SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12,
ch 8 (entitled “Marine and Coastal Pollution Control”); Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 12, s 29
(prohibiting the fouling of foreshore); see NZRMA, supra note 23, s 15A-C (dealing with dumping,
storage, incineration of harmful substances, radioactive wastes, etc.) & s 16 (duty to avoid
unreasonable noise).
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‘polluter pays’ principle, those responsible for harmful polluting activities in the coastal
zone, must be asked to remedy the damage and by internalizing the costs of their negative
actions on the coastal zone.88 Such an approach is extremely important, given the fact that
oceans are warming and fish species are migrating in search of cooler environs. States
must take measures to minimize the adverse effects of water discharges (industrial,
thermal and nuclear reactor) and ensure that water temperatures and quality is
maintained. It may also be necessary that the law impose obligations on the part of the
state and its instrumentalities to provide for the establishment of plants for the treatment
of domestic sewage, industrial wastes, etc.89

10.2.10 Strengthening and Harmonizing Sectoral Legal Management There may
already be a myriad of laws, regulations, and policies applicable to the coastal zone. In
fact, sectoral management may be a deeply entrenched phenomenon in several coastal
countries and this may not help to promote sustainable coastal development. Sectoral
management definitely has its benefits and cannot simply be done away with. Therefore,
it is necessary for the coastal law to harmonize its relationship with other laws and
policies that have a bearing on the coastal zone,90 and this may require amendments to
existing laws. Such an approach can help secure better enforcement of the coastal law as
well.

10.2.11

Establishing

Adequate

Financial

Arrangements

and

Ensuring

Accountability to the Concerned Legislative Body Successful implementation of the
ICZM plan is an expensive undertaking and requires significant and committed fiscal
resources adequate to support the magnitude and complexity of the task. Generally, most
ICZM projects are implemented via funding from international donor agencies. However,
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SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, ibid, s 58; Cal CA, 2013, supra note 42, §30231.
See CRZN, 2011, supra note 12 at 12, ¶(IV)(a).
See SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra note 12, s 5. It is a “specific environmental
management act” brought out under the overarching umbrella legislation - the National
Environmental Management Act, 1998. Accordingly, this coastal law has to be “read, interpreted and
applied” in conjunction with the National Environmental Management Act 1998. Furthermore, in
case of any conflicts relating to the implementation of the coastal law, the same has to be
determined as per the terms in the National Environmental Management Act 1998. Ibid. See Israeli
Coastal Law, supra note 17, s 15 (stating that the coastal law is a supplement to other laws).
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it may happen that once external funding dries up, the project runs into trouble,91 and so it
would be prudent for the law to establish an ICZM fund to provide financial support for
the implementation of ICZM plans and for the preservation, conservation, restoration and
development of coastal resources and biodiversity.92 Apart from sustained government
financing, the authority can augment its financial resources by imposing environmental
management charges, fees, levies and fines on those who seek to use certain coastal
spaces and resources.93 As well, since the government funds the implementation of the
ICZM plan, the umbrella agency implementing the ICZM plan should be held
accountable to the legislature. Annual reports detailing activities will have to be placed
before the legislative body to ensure accountability.94 To further regional cooperation,
copies of these reports should also be submitted to the SAARC Coastal Zone
Management Centre, which will enable sharing of experiences.

10.2.12 Developing Capacity and Enhancing Public Awareness Designing and
implementing an ICZM programme requires the use of knowledge and skills from a wide
range of disciplines. Different sections of this thesis posit that climate change and SLR
are laced in uncertainty and that coastal zone management and adaptations decisions need
to be backed up by good and accurate science. While there is overwhelming evidence to
affirm that the coastal regions of South Asia will be badly hit by the phenomenon, the
exact nature of the impacts are still unclear and most countries continue to grapple with
outdated or insufficient data.95 In fact a primary impediment that has stalled the advance
of most coastal zone management programmes is the lack of knowledge regarding coastal
processes and the effects of human activity on them. Generally, there are wide gaps in the
available data, particularly on the nature of coastal and marine resources, the extent of
91
92
93

94

95

The experience of Bangladesh is illustrative of this aspect. See Ch 3, Part 3.2.3.
Sindh CDA 1994, supra note 72, ss 17-18.
Belize CZMA, supra note 18, ss 27 (fees to be levied for using natural resources within the coastal
zone), 28 (dealing with sports fishing license fee); NZRMA, supra note 23, 64A(4A) (imposing
coastal occupation charges).
Belize CZMA, ibid, s 33; Sindh CDA 1994, supra note 72, s 19; see also Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972, 16 USC §1458 (review of performance, section 312) & §1459 (records and audit,
section 313); see also EC, ICZM Recommendation, supra note 27, ch VI (calling upon member
states to report to the commission regarding implementation of the recommendation).
One major factor that has hampered the development of appropriate responses is the lack of
adequate science on the subject. See generally Ch 3.
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economic dependence of coastal populations on coastal resources, the rising sea levels,
ocean temperature, etc., inhibiting the development of informed decision-making in
respect of ICZM planning and management. This situation does not bode well for this
region and if this can be rectified this can contribute significantly to the development and
stability of environmental regimes.96 Therefore, capacity-building, building up profiles of
the coastal environment, developing baseline data including SLR planning benchmarks,
skills-training, pooling of resources, sharing of data and lessons learned and increasing
public awareness emerge as critical issues in coastal management.97 Here, the coastal law
can provide for the creation of specialized institutions charged with the duty of
conducting research, which can inform policy and legal development and
implementation.98 In developing capacity, all attempts should be made to harness
traditional knowledge and blend it with modern science to inculcate a new kind of
progressive thinking and develop a cadre of coastal management professionals. The
ultimate objective of capacity building efforts is to create a situation where ICZM
programmes can be designed, implemented and monitored without any external
support.99 Public involvement in the ICZM process is extremely important, but this, in
large measure, depends upon the public’s level of awareness and participation in the
programme. To facilitate awareness, local media should be used to spread the message of
coastal conservation and public education programmes and efforts to alert coastal
communities to the dynamic and the changing natural of the coast should also be
instituted. Web-enabled systems should be utilized to publish documents relating to
coastal zone management (clearances related to the coastal zone, the ICZM plans,
environmental impact assessments, scientific studies, etc.), as this would ensure greater
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Ibid.
See generally Xiamen Huasheng Hong & Xiongzhi Xue, “Building up a Training Base for
Integrated Coastal Management through Partnerships in Xiamen” (2006) 49 Ocean & Coast Mgmt
685 (ScienceDirect) (discussing the establishment of the International Training Center for Coastal
Sustainable Development).
Belize CZMA, supra note 18, ss 8-10 (providing for the constitution of the Coastal Zone
Management Institute, its objects and functions); see also Oceans Act, supra note 12, s 42 (dealing
with the development of marine sciences); see also EC, ICZM Recommendation, supra note 27, ch
IV(3)(h).
Biliana Cicin-Sain et al, “Education and Training in Integrated Coastal Management: Lessons from
the International Arena” (2000) 43 Ocean & Coast Mgmt 291 at 294 (ScienceDirect).
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reach and easy access.100 There must also be provision for outreach programmes and
activities, and people must be educated about the need to maintain healthy coasts and the
role that they, as communities, groups and individuals, can play in this regard.101 If public
involvement is to be an essential element in the preparation and implementation of the
ICZM plans, all relevant documents should be placed in the public domain. ICZM is a
dynamic process and therefore is predicated on the efficacious flow of information.102

10.2.13 Building Linkages with Disaster Management Policies and Protecting the
Health of Coastal Communities The coastal regions of South Asia are disaster prone,
and disasters like cyclones have already claimed a very heavy toll in terms of life and
property. In the coming years, it is expected that water-borne disasters will be more
intense. Accordingly, it is extremely important that measures be adopted to augment
critical coastal infrastructure to respond to disasters.103 Measures could include the setting
up of coastal shelters and dispensaries and the strengthening of all-weather-condition
roads and communication lines. In this regard, coastal management should be viewed as a
continuum, where coastal management represents the start-point and ends in disaster
management. In such situations, coastal management has to be more anticipatory in
nature, while disaster management should be viewed as reactive when dealing with postoccurrence impacts. Other measures also need to be adopted, as, for instance, increasing
temperatures have led to increased mosquito borne diseases like malaria and dengue
fever. In this regard, water stagnation is a major problem that contributes to the health
crisis; existing marine and other water regulatory structures, which are in dilapidated
conditions, have been found to accentuate the crisis. Hence, governments have to play a
more active role in involving local communities to ensure that water stagnation and
vectors are eliminated.
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CRZN, 2011, supra note 12 at 19, ¶IV(c); see also SA, Integrated Coastal Management Act, supra
note 12, s 93(1) (preparation of reports by the minister, so as to enable the public to make an
informed decision as to what extent the state has fulfilled its trusteeship duties). Even though
illiteracy is a major problem in South Asia, placing these documents on the web, facilitates easy
access by NGOs and other players in the coastal zones who in turn can disseminate relevant
information to coastal communities that exist even in far-flung areas.
ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, art 15 (awareness raising, training, education and research).
Cullinan, supra note 33 at 151.
See ICZM Protocol, supra note 16, arts 22 (dealing with natural disasters) & 24 (responding to
natural disasters); CRZN, 2011, supra note 12 at 11, ¶(iii)(j).
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10.2.14 Ensuring Compliance and Enforcement of the Law
A coastal law has to be an instrument that eliminates confrontation and competition and
favors cohabitation. Environmental pollution and natural resource degradation are
potentially violations of a human right, namely, the right to live in a clean and healthy
environment. Since one of the primary objectives of a coastal law is to regulate human
behaviour and secure human rights, fines and punitive sanctions should be prescribed for
violations of the law.104 And in certain cases incentives must also be offered to promote
good behaviour for in terms of costal environmental protection and conservation.
Moreover, there is a general perception that good policies and laws for coastal resource
management fail due to poor enforcement of these laws. As the issue of enforcement is
central to coastal management, it is imperative that coastal laws be implemented both in
letter and in spirit. One of the most potent ways to secure the implementation of law and
to increase its legitimacy is to ensure community involvement in law enforcement, as
‘feet-on-the-ground’ observers are more cognizant of violations. As well, reliance may
also have to be placed on satellite-based monitoring and data to determine the exact
nature of the violations.105
While it is possible for these coastal countries to carry out amendments to their
existing coastal laws in order to give effect to the identified principles/elements, this does
not necessarily guarantee coherence to the legal frame, as the approach is still piecemeal
and can potentially contribute to wasteful activity. In fact, up-scaling of ICZM efforts to
make a substantive impact requires a concerted approach in the form of a dedicated
coastal law to predicate ICZM practice. The list identified here to support ICZM lawmaking is by no means exhaustive, as our attempt is only to identify some of the major
principles/elements to inform coastal law-making, not to restrict them. A broader fleet of
initiatives will surely be needed to promote ICZM. In fact, for optimal results, the ICZM
process may have to be linked with other tools like marine spatial planning and integrated
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See Barbados CZMA 1998, supra note 12, ss 40-41; Sri Lanka CCA 1981, supra note 16, ss 29-30.
For information regarding the utility of satellite technology to identify violations of the coastal law,
see Ch 3, note 135.
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river basin management.106
While these principles/elements on coastal law-making (to be pegged onto the
SASAP) will guide coastal South Asia, there are certain particular aspects that these
countries should take into account in implementing the coastal law reform agenda. Some
of these are elucidated next.
As pointed out in chapter three, India enacted its first coastal law, the Coastal
Regulation Zone Notification, in 1991.107 Subsequently, 25 amendments were carried out
to this law rendering it practically nugatory.108 Recently, a new costal law, the Coastal
Regulation Zone Notification, 2011, was introduced.109 However, this law is replete with
inconsistencies,110 and India represents a classical case where adaptation measures and
SCD have been sidelined in favor of short-term economic goals. Accordingly, for India,
which has the longest coastline in South Asia, a dedicated statute on ICZM should be
enacted to put an end to adhocism that still characterizes the national legal regime on
coastal management (amending a statute requires legislative assent, unlike a piece of
subordinate legislation that can amended easily by the executive every now and then).
Moreover, if India has to implement a coastal law on the basis of these identified
principles, a subordinate legislation may not be the appropriate medium, given the limited
remit that this form of lawmaking enjoys.111
One of the fundamental tenets in Administrative law is that the Legislature is
supposed to discharge essential legislative functions, which are non-delegable. While it
can entrust to the executive, the power to make subsidiary legislation, it cannot abdicate
essential legislative functions.112 And, before delegating, the Legislature has to enunciate
expressly or by implication, the policy and the principles to guide the delegate. The
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For a discussion on the utility of linking ICZM with marine spatial planning, see Ch 9, Part 9.3.2.2.
Declaration of Coastal Stretches as Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) and Regulating Activities in the
CRZ (SO 114(E)/1991 India), online: Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India
<http://www.envfor.nic.in/legis/crz/crznew.pdf>.
Goa Foundation, Goa v Diksha Holdings Private Limited, (2000), [2000] 2 SCC 97 (India SC).
Coastal Zone Management Notification 2008 (S0 1761(E)/2008 India), online: Ministry of
Environment & Forests, Government of India <http://www.envfor.nic.in/legis/crz/so-1070(e).pdf>.
Tony George Puthucherril, “Operationalising Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Adapting to
Sea Level Rise through Coastal Law: Where Does India Stand?” (2011) 26 Int’l J Mar & Coast L
569 at 596-604 (SwetsWise).
For more details on the weaknesses in managing the coastal zone, through subordinate legislations,
see Ch 3, Part 3.2.1.5.
Avinder Singh v Punjab, (1979), [1979] AIR SC 321 (India SC).
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Legislature has to retain the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated, is
basically the power to implement the legislative intendment, the legislative policy, and
the purposes and objects of the legislation.113 The above identified principles for a coastal
legislation, has wide legal and policy connotations, and it is doubtful whether the
development of the coastal law can be left to the exclusive wisdom of the executive, lest,
the subordinate legislation be tantamount to excessive delegation and be struck down on
the ground of ultra vires the powers of the executive. As the Supreme Court of India
observes, “[t]he Legislature is the master of policy and if the delegate is free to switch
policy it may be usurpation of legislative power itself.”114
There are also other aspects that need particular consideration in the Indian context.
Given the fact that there are unprecedented pressures for more coastal land to promote
economic development, and that coastal fishing communities are finding themselves
dispossessed of their lands and livelihood, it is necessary that India’s coastal law be
imbued in the doctrine of public trust (since the doctrine can normatively restrict the
sovereign power of the state). As of now, coastal communities are reluctant to move
away from harm’s way (even in the face of SLR), as they feel that coastal lands once
cleared will be handed over to private players. Accordingly, India’s coastal law should
contain express measures that seek to secure the rights of coastal communities over their
resources. This is extremely vital, as such recognition will, in the long run, help build and
promote adaptive capacities.115
It is anticipated that both Bangladesh and the Maldives will be devastated by
climate change and SLR impacts. Yet, despite grim projections, these nations have not
enacted any specific coastal laws. Rather, their approach towards coastal zone
management is fragmented and is based on several general environmental laws. As far as
Bangladesh is concerned through a non-legislative approach it has been able to cover
considerable distances in developing ICZM. However, the absence of a dedicated
legislation has hampered the country’s efforts and non-clarity over the precise nature of
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ITC v Assam, (2007) [2007] 9 VST 250 (Gauhati HC).
Ibid.
See Ch 3, Part 3.2.1 (discussing this aspect in the context of India).
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entitlements has led to conflicts between users.116 To counter this, Bangladesh has to
enact a dedicated coastal law based on these identified principles, provide a practical
definition to the term ‘coast’ (a unit which they can realistically manage) and move in the
direction of enhancing the adaptive capacities of coastal communities through ICZM and
related legislation.117
For the Maldives, the question is one of base survival, and since the ratio of the
land area to the coastal zone is less, the focus here should be more on island management
and utilization of the general environmental and resources management laws to manage
these coral atolls. The Maldives is currently in the process of developing an ICZM plan;
therefore, it would be advisable for this country to peg ICZM practice onto a dedicated
coastal law,118 one that gives prominence to conserving the cultural heritage of the
islanders along with their local knowledge, customs and traditions. The coastal law
should also seek to strike a balance between the robust tourism and fishing industries, the
primary economic mainstay with the needs of conservation and environmental protection
and preservation of the unique cultural heritage and traditional ways of life.
As far as Sri Lanka is concerned, as was explained, Sri Lanka was one of the first
countries in Asia to enact a coastal law, namely, the Coast Conservation Act, 1981. While
this legal framework is designed to support ICZM programmes,119 it was insufficient to
meet the challenges posed by climate change and SLR. This law received a complete
overhaul in 2011; however several inconsistencies still continue to haunt it.120 Thus, even
though Sri Lanka’s coastal law stands on sound legal ground, centralized coastal
management and a single ICZM plan to manage all the coastal regions, ecosystems and
resources will not in the long-run contribute to sustainable development objectives. There
is a growing decentralization deficit that provides little opportunities for public
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See Ch 3, Part 3.2.3 (discussing this aspect in the context of Bangladesh's experience on coastal
management).
Ibid.
The Marshall Islands, which is also facing an existential crisis, has a dedicated coastal law, namely,
Coast Conservation Act, 1988. See (Marshall Islands), No PL 1988-13 of 1988. SIDS like Barbados
and Cuba have coastal management laws to support ICZM implementation and facilitate coastal
climate change adaptation.
Ibid at 608.
See Coast Conservation Act (No 57 of 1981, Sri Lanka), as amended by Coast Conservation
Amendment Act, No 49 of 2011.
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involvement in decision-making and accountability at the lowest levels. Thus, it is
necessary that Sri Lanka decentralize its coastal management if it is to truly promote
ICZM.121
As mentioned previously, in Pakistan, coastal zone management is essentially
legislated by the provinces, with the federal government playing a lesser role.122
Meanwhile, the coastal provinces of both Sindh and Balochistan in Pakistan will have to
revamp their coastal laws to incorporate specific measures to control land-based sources
of pollution. Since the health of the Indus delta and related ecosystems is in sharp
decline, coastal management may have to be linked with integrated river basin
management, necessitating a greater role for the national government.123

10.3 CONCLUSION
As seen from the above, a regional approach is particularly important and useful, given
the divergence in capacity available to the different coastal countries in South Asia to
operationalize and respond to the problems posed by SLR and climate change and the
increased possibility that countries will not be able to respond to the challenges
singularly. And here, the emphasis of these broad normative principles/elements
identified via this exercise is not to secure force-based compliance; rather, the intention is
that these principles/elements will enable the South Asian coastal countries to enact/reengineer coastal laws to underpin their ICZM plans and processes. As well, a legal spine
can produce a cascading effect to emerge as a starting reference point for the development
of a composite regional regime on ICZM that is sufficiently inter-linked with national
efforts to scale them up and propel the agenda of SCD forward.
A long drawn-out negotiation process generally precedes the development of a
legal text that has multilateral overtones. Each provision that finds its way into the
document is the outcome of a series of compromises and trade-offs, to finally epitomize a
unified vision. While it is clear that a radical re-structuring of the coastal laws,
121
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See Ch 3, Part 3.2.4 (for a discussion on Sri Lanka's coastal law experience).
See Puthucherril, “Adapting to Climate Change”, supra note 120 at 576-79.
See Ch 3, Part 3.2.2, for a discussion on Pakistan's coastal law experience.
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management systems and processes is in order in South Asia, this region may not
presently be ready to welcome an exclusive regional instrument on ICZM that imposes
hard-law binding obligations. For the present, a soft-law instrument will have much
greater acceptance and any concerns regarding erosion of state sovereignty can be
assuaged. Soft law also provides ample scope and freedom to apply and work these
principles/elements to their unique national context (different legal systems). In due
course, as coastal South Asia begin to appreciate the importance and utility of a regional
co-operative approach to implementing ICZM and CCCA, and as the problems wrought
by climate change and SLR intensify and as climate change refugees begin to cross
international borders in large numbers and as intense weather events hit the South Asian
landmass, and as more and more coastal regions continue to disappear under the raging
waves, it is possible that a more ambitious regime may evolve ostensibly to sustain and
promote regional stability and welfare. In this regard, the soft-law principles can
eventually metamorphose into a hard-law regional instrument, with stronger
commitments replete with regional institutional frameworks and mechanisms.124
Despite weaknesses, there is considerable potential in the SAARC to facilitate the
development of these principles/elements into a more effective regional regime on ICZM
and coastal climate change adaptation. Specifically, it can essay a catalytic role in
assisting coastal countries in reforming their coastal laws. To increase the relevancy of
these principles and to ensure that they secure widespread support, it is necessary that
countries contextualize these broad principles in their respective national laws to ensure
that they retain relevance with regard to the issues that they face. It is imperative that
nations, while indulging in coastal law reform by giving effect to these
principles/elements, take into account their own specific institutional frameworks, socioeconomic, political and cultural contexts, and developmental needs and aspirations.
Enacting a coastal law is practically a subtle exercise in tightrope walking, which
most coastal nations are unable to carry out due to capacity constraints. Hence, a regional
instrument to guide national efforts in each of the coastal states to formulate/re-engineer
124

See generally Aldo Chircop, David VanderZwaag & Peter Mushkat, “The Gulf of Maine Agreement
and Action Plan: A Novel but Nascent Approach to Transboundary Marine Environmental
Protection” (1995) 19:4 Mar Pol'y 317 (ScienceDirect) (identifying an incremental approach as one
of three main options for regional regime development).
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coastal laws at their respective national levels and to develop ICZM plans to work the
principle of integration would be especially useful. In particular, the regional instrument
must respond to recurrent coastal environmental protection challenges and, more
importantly, reduce the risks posed by SLR and climate change through coastal climate
change adaptation. The framework must also create the necessary institutional structures,
adequately reflecting integration between relevant administrative structures sectorally
organized and promoting requisite capabilities, all of which must be geared towards
achieving the central objective of sustainable coastal development. Even though there are
disputes between the coastal South Asian countries that appear as stumbling blocks to
cooperation, the bleak ecological scenario for the region, climate change, and SLR
provide the motivation for greater cooperation. It is necessary for coastal South Asia to
look beyond the differences engendered by sovereignty, territorial, maritime boundary
and other disputes to develop the political will to act on the marine and coastal
conservation imperative.
In sum, there exists sufficient rationale for a regional regime on ICZM in South
Asia as a probable adaptive strategy to respond to the problems of SLR and climate
change impacts. The three primary reasons are: 1) that the international community
continues to drag its feet over the issue and has yet to develop a coherent regime on
coastal climate change adaptation;125 2) that coastal nations in the South Asian region are
unilaterally attempting to deal with these problems (and cannot possibly do so
successfully on their own);126 and 3) that such a regime will help facilitate the sharing of
information and resources to stimulate greater efficiency and effectiveness in coastal
governance.127 Even though integration has emerged as the buzzword in almost all of the
discourses on coastal zone management, is ICZM the ultimate panacea to all the
problems that confront our degraded coasts? The answer is an obvious ‘No’. Integrated
decision-making emerges only as the starting point for a series of other measures that will
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For a discussion on International Environmental Law and ICZM development, see Ch 7, Part 7.2.
See generally Ch 3, Part 3.2.
For a discussion on the utility of a regional regime for ICM development, see generally Ch 9.
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need to be worked simultaneously to ensure sustainable coastal and ocean
development.128
This also brings us to a related question as to whether a coastal law will resolve all
problems and provide sufficient calibration to our eroding coastlines. Again, the clear
answer here is ‘No’. As is often said, “a law is as good as it is enforced.” Merely enacting
a coastal law and adding more rules to the statute book is not a solution and will not
resolve all problems.129 However, carved-in-stone statutes as coastal management and
adaptation tools would provide good anchorage, greater stability and consistency, and a
degree of mandatoriness that could help moderate the perils associated with climate
change and SLR. A legal framework would serve as the bedrock upon which the
management superstructure could be built.
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See EC, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Framework for Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal Management [2013] 0074 (COD)
at 8. Linkages may have to be established with river and watershed management. See generally
UNEP, MAP & PAP, Conceptual Framework and Planning Guidelines for Integrated Coastal Area
and River Basin Management (Split, Priority Actions Programme, 1999). The NZRMA supports a
catchment based approach. Robert A Makgill & Hamish G Rennie, “A Model for Integrated Coastal
Management Legislation: A Principled Analysis of New Zealand’s Resource Management Act
1991” (2012) 27 Int'l J Mar & Coast L 135 at 148.
For the SWOT analysis, which articulates the need for a coastal law, see Ch 8, Part 8.3.
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CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

11.1 MOVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE COASTAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA
“This is the worst pain a man can have: to know much and have no power to act.”1
These sagacious words of Herodotus resonate now more than ever, particularly in South
Asia in relation to the need to balance the seemingly conflicting interests of coastal
environment protection and economic development. As seen in the preceding chapters,
coastal zones represent transitory areas where the oceans, which cover two-thirds of the
earth’s surface, meet the remaining one-third land to produce several unique, diverse and
productive ecosystems. Consequently, coastal areas, ecosystems and resources are of
critical importance to a wide variety of terrestrial and aquatic life forms that includes, at
the top, the human species. As coastal populations continue to grow, there is a
concomitant rise in associated development activities to cater to the needs of the
expanding populace. Often these development activities are not sustainable and some can
even lead to increasing pollution and declining coastal resources.2
Countless reports, recommendations, guidelines, plans of action, etc., bemoan the
continued

desecration

of our coastal

zones

even

while offering numerous

recommendations to improve the situation.3 Meanwhile, as the experts’ debate and the
governments make concessions to developers, the coastal environment continues to
deteriorate. It is against this backdrop of coastal degradation that the interrelated issues of
climate change and sea level rise (SLR) must be probed, as they are probably the most
serious environmental issues confronting the planet today. In fact, SLR and climate
change now emerge as the primary drivers for improved coastal management.
While current efforts are to cap temperature rises at two degree Celsius above preindustrial levels, in all probability we will reach this figure by 2050. 4 Beyond this
temperature rise and timeframe, the climate change phenomenon will become disruptive
1
2
3
4

John Marincola, ed, Herodotus: The Histories, Rev ed (London: Penguin Group, 2003) at 506.
For an overview on the state of coastal environmental degradation in South Asia, see generally Ch 2;
see also Ch 3, Part 3.2.
See ibid.
See
generally
The
World
Bank,
Turn
Down
the
Heat:
Why
a
4oC
Warmer World Must be Avoided: A Report for the World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research and Climate Analytics (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2012).
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and highly dangerous.5 To prevent such rises in temperature, deep cuts in emissions will
have to be implemented. The truth of the matter is that we have been unable to control
anthropogenic emissions, and because of the emissions already spewed into the
atmosphere, we have consigned ourselves to a certain degree of warming and consequent
impacts from which there is no escape. As stated earlier in this study, anthropogenic
emissions, past and present, have profoundly impacted the climate system and have set
into motion chaotic changes that will be played out for a very long time. Even if we are
able to stabilize the temperatures, the negative consequences of climate change and SLR
will persist. And since most countries in the coastal South Asian region are unable to
respond to these challenges singularly, greater cooperation and coordination between
nations is urgently needed.6
Yet, despite the urgency of the situation, the international community continues to
drag its feet in its efforts to create binding mitigation targets. 7 This increases the
importance of climate change adaptation, and since developing countries are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse consequences of climate change, adaptation is an abstruse task.8
Within this less than ideal framework, one has to look for ways to protect our coastal
zones and approach the concept of integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) and
coastal climate change adaptation (CCCA) which, when put into practice, offer certain
viable pathways to contain and manage at least some of the harm posed by SLR and
climate change.9 Indeed, in regions like South Asia, where millions of people are
clumped onto the coastal areas and littoral environments, the situation is even more
desperate.10 Coastal South Asia cannot turn a blind eye to climate change and SLR
simply by wishing it away through legislative fiat. 11 The challenge before us is to halt or
5
6
7

8
9
10
11

Ibid.
For a discussion on the need for regional co-operation in marine and coastal management in South
Asia, see Ch 9.
Greenpeace, “What happened in Doha?: Analysis of the conduct and outcome of the COP 18
climate negotiations” (8 December 2012) online: Greenpeace <http://www.greenpeace.org/Intern
ational/Global/international/briefings/climate/Doha2012/QandAoutcomeDoha.pdf>.
For more discussion on the complexities of climate change adaptation, see Ch 5.
For more details on linking ICZM with coastal climate change adaptation, see Ch 6, Part 6.5.
For an overview on the state of coastal management and the challenges in implementing ICZM in
South Asia, see Ch 3, Part 3.2.
North Carolina, initially contemplated a Bill that sought to determine SLR based on historical data
(limited to the time period following the year 1900), the rates which could be extrapolated linearly
to estimate future rates of rise not to “include scenarios of accelerated rates of sea-level rise.” See
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reverse this process of continual degradation while at the same time ensuring coastal
development, environmental protection and CCCA– this, in essence, is the problématique
of this thesis.12

11.2 WHAT DOES THIS THESIS TELL US?
The spirit of hope pervading this thesis rises above the gloomy backdrop of profound and
seemingly hopeless coastal environmental degradation and water-borne disaster. This
hopeful spirit suggests that, through careful planning and management, it is possible to
moderate at least some of the major impacts and help reduce the costs of SLR and natural
hazards in terms of human life and property. As pointed out, in the face of growing
economic, social and environmental pressures, sector-by-sector decision-making may
prove disastrous.13 Moreover, silo management approaches do not consider the unique
features of the coastal zone and cannot reverse the destructive trends. It is in this context
that ICZM provides a new enlightened paradigm to coastal management.14
As well, the usual method adopted to moderate climate change impacts on coastal
zones is to build hard shoreline armouring, such as sea walls, or to haphazardly install
large boulders and rocks along the coastline to halt the ingress of the sea.15 In fact, in
most countries, CCCA measures are viewed as part of land-use planning and thus landuse regulations are utilized to implement these measures. The responsibility to do so then
falls on local governments. However, left to their own devices, local governments are
generally ill-equipped to meet the challenges posed by such daunting tasks.16
This thesis argues that while CCCA is crucial to all countries, it is particularly
important to those in the developing world (in the present case, the coastal South Asian

12
13
14
15
16

US, HB 819, An Act to Study and Modify Certain Coastal Management Policies, 2011, GA Sess,
NC, 2011, online: NCCF <http://www.nccoast.org/uploads/documents/CRO/2012-5/SLR-bill.pdf>.
This was subsequently modified following protest from the scientific community and general public.
See Scott Huler, “NC Considers Making Sea Level Rise Illegal” (30 May 2012), online: SA Blogs
<http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/>.
For a discussion on the problématique and the context, see Chs 1, 2 & 3.
For a discussion on sectoral decision-making in respect of coastal zone management in Bangladesh
and Maldives, see Ch 3, Parts 3.2.3 & 3.2.5.
For a discussion on the concept of ICZM, see Ch 6, Part 6.2.
For further information on improperly constructed sea walls in some of the coastal countries of
South Asia, see Ch 3, text accompanying note 197; see also Ch 9, text accompanying note 279.
See National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act, (S Afr), No 24 of
2008, s 49(2)(c)(v) (municipal coastal management programmes have to address coastal erosion).
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region), since large sections of the population already live below the poverty line and
hence the adaptive capacities of their communities are very low. 17 CCCA is an integral
pillar of the climate change regime as it rebuilds confidence in communities by reducing
the negative impacts of climate change and draws advantage from possible
opportunities.18 It also represents the only possible way to cope with impacts of climate
change over the next few decades. The coastal countries of South Asia will have to
expend aggressive efforts to combat climate change by investing resources in adaptation
and placing CCCA within the broader narrative of ICZM.19 Additionally, this thesis
posits the importance of law and legal frameworks in operationalising ICZM. It seeks to
override skepticism and champion the role of law and legal statutes in supporting and
facilitating good coastal governance through ICZM. However, this is not to suggest that
ICZM cannot be implemented in the absence of legal support. The thesis emphasizes that
a coastal law can help eschew unsustainable development practices and bring order to
fragmented and incongruent schemes for coastal management. Accordingly, it is
emphasized that there is the need for a legislative burst of energy to operationalize ICZM
on grander scales rather than as pilots or at localized levels. It is therefore incumbent
upon national governments in the South Asian region to swing into legislative action to
anchor their coastal management regimes in socio-economic, environmental and political
realities.
The primary argument here is that dedicated legal statutes at national levels are
needed to galvanize ICZM implementation and CCCA to address the root causes of both
coastal environmental degradation and social injustice.20 While several general laws and
policies can be brought to bear on the problem, sectoral-based legal management may not
produce optimal results in the coastal zone.21 The findings also prove that dysfunctional
laws can lead to gridlock in the governance process.22 More and more countries,
17
18
19
20
21
22

For an overview on poor adaptive capacities in South Asia, see Ch 2, Part 2.4; see also Ch 3, Part
3.2.
For more details on coastal climate change adaptation, see generally Chs 5 & 6.
For further discussion on the utility of linking coastal climate change adaptation with ICZM, see Ch
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particularly those in the developed world, are increasingly becoming aware of the need to
protect the coastal environment through the instrumentality of law. Of late, there has been
a flurry of legislative activity to overhaul the coastal legal landscape to attune it to new
realities, primarily SLR. However, in coastal South Asia and in most developing nations,
a patchwork of disjointed laws continues to support coastal management, as these
countries lack the legislative capacity to develop and implement coastal laws that are
truly geared towards sustainable coastal development.23 As well, these nations also find
that the scale of coastal degradation, climate change and SLR increasingly exceeds their
currently available resources, tool and methods to carry out coastal management. This is
where regional regimes can play a supportive role.
Meanwhile, the key role of coastal law must be underscored, as it serves to identify
principles/elements that support a regional roadmap to help coastal countries in South
Asia to implement ICZM through the legal route. Although this study offers no illusions
that complex management issues confronting the coastal zones can be resolved once and
for all by adding more legislation onto the statute book, it nevertheless holds optimism
that legislation that implements the predominantly new paradigm of linking ICZM and
CCCA enhances our ability and offers us a practical and effective means to resolve and
harmonise conflicting interests. In fact, this study calls upon countries to act with
foresight to adopt coastal laws to put into practice the enlightened approach to coastal
zone management i.e., one that creates linkages between CCCA and ICZM, which lies at
the heart of sustainable coastal development.24 An ICZM process that incorporates within
its ambit CCCA through the untapped potential of law can strengthen coastal governance.
In short, this thesis addresses the central research questions in terms of five concluding
statements, namely:
1) CCCA is not solely about zoning, building codes, hard armouring, floodplain
regulations, setback lines, etc. Rather, it is a twin-pronged process where implementation
of the above-mentioned items is only one part of the equation. The second part consists of
actions and measures to improve the adaptive capacity of coastal communities and to
23
24

For more details, see Ch 3.
For an articulation on the need to create linkages between coastal climate change adaptation and
ICZM, see Ch 6, Part 6.5.
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build the resilience of coastal ecosystems. Therefore, any programme that aims to
implement CCCA should address both these aspects if there has to be an effective holistic
response to the problem.25
2) The objective of all of our actions in the coastal zone should be geared towards
attaining the overarching aspiration of sustainable coastal development (SCD) which, as
seen, is a balance between economic development, environmental protection, social and
distributive justice and CCCA and mitigation.26
3) ICZM has tantalizing potential to place coastal developmental processes on the
trajectory of SCD. It seeks to address a vast array of environmental and resources use
issues in relation to the coastal zone, such as the causes and effects of coastal and marine
pollution, resource depletion, climate change and protection to ecologically significant
areas, livelihood opportunities and enhancing existing ones, and alleviating poverty – all
to be secured through a participatory process. In a nutshell, the “enlightened forwardthinking coastal zone management” represented by ICZM offers the best possible
solution to our degraded and constantly eroding coastlines, enabling us to deal more
effectively with the advancing sea. In the context of SLR and climate change and in
achieving this objective, it is necessary to link CCCA actions within ICZM efforts to
produce more enlightened and prudent responses to manage the diverse problems that
affect our coasts.27
4) Law and dedicated legal instruments can play a central role in supporting and reengineering coastal zone management to secure sustainable development goals. It is
necessary that countries invest resources now to strengthen their coastal legal framework
in order to produce optimal results in terms of management. Law is at the heart of any
ICZM process, as law lays out rules for ensuring long-term commitment to protect and
preserve the coastal environment and its resources in terms of sustainable exploitation,
for conflict management. Law also imposes duties, provides prescriptive rules,
strengthens good coastal governance and helps sustain the management process, which,
25
26
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See generally Chs 5 & 6.
For a discussion on the concept of sustainable coastal development, see Ch 4.
For a discussion on the need to link ICZM with coastal climate change adaptation, see Ch 6, Part
6.5.
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in its turn, maintains coastal processes and ecological values to the maximum extent
possible. As well, it helps build congruence between ICZM and coastal climate change
adaptation, and implement ecosystem-based, adaptive management and other principles
central to an ICZM process like the precautionary approach, the “polluter pays” principle,
environmental impact assessment, and protection to community rights in terms of the
doctrine of public trust.28
5) The depth of investigation in this study clearly reveals that, in general, the South Asian
coastline is more vulnerable today than at any time in the past and is experiencing rapid
changes such as intense cyclonic storms, salinity ingress, sea surges, rising sea surface
temperatures and SLR. Moreover, issues relating to coastal management are placed in the
backseat and the primary drivers are short-term economic objectives. The impact of all of
this on fishing and other traditional coastal communities is enormous, yet these problems
are not specific to South Asia alone; however South Asia in several ways represent a
microcosm of coastal problems that confront coastlines elsewhere. As it stands, efficient
coastal management systems are conspicuous by their absence in most of the South Asian
coastal countries. As this study points out the national-level legal frameworks on ICZM
are patchy and unable to provide direction.29 Moreover, the institutional capabilities in
most of the South Asian countries to implement ICZM are seriously deficient, with
existing approaches unable to respond to the scale of the problems posed by climate
change. Clearly, ICZM remains at the periphery of coastal management efforts in South
Asia, and this is where the challenge lies. Laws, policies and systems for ICZM and
CCCA should be put in place to reduce conflict and provide for effective management,
with the ultimate aim of sustainable development. In view of this situation, a regional
regime on ICZM can go a long way to removing logjams and fostering coastal climate
change adaptation.30 As of now, the realpolitik in coastal South Asia prevents the forging
of a hard-law, regional-level instrument and associated institutional mechanisms.
Presently, a soft-law regional instrument that identifies essential legal principles/elements
that can facilitate the enactment of coastal legislations at the respective national level is
28
29
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For a discussion on the pivotal role of law in implementing ICZM, see Ch 7, Part 7.3 & Ch 8.
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555

the need of the hour.31
However, it must be emphasized that the intention here is not to campaign for
standardization of ICZM law. As noted, there is no specific template on ICZM
implementation at the international level. Being highly dynamic and contextual, a model
ICZM legal code would be well-nigh impossible to carve into stone and apply to various
countries and diverse milieus. In fact any attempt to impose a uniform template will be a
futile exercise, given the differences between countries with regards to political and
administrative systems, the degree of economic development, the diversity of coastlines
and resources, and the nature of environmental problems, including SLR, that manifest
differently along coastal zones and environments. Nevertheless, the common challenge of
climate change and SLR, which has considerable potential to overwhelm these coastal
regions, resources and communities, highlights the need for cooperation and the need for
a strategic approach to coastal zone planning and management through the
instrumentality of law. Accordingly, even while advocating for a regional instrument on
ICZM that prescribes essential principles/elements to assist the development of national
level legal frameworks that embody integrated and sustainable development qualities,
since the national settings are varied, in developing a regional regime, pre-eminence must
be afforded to national interest, and national-level coastal laws must reflect the
environmental, economic, political and social realities of the particular country.
Accordingly, the idea here is to afford sufficient flexibility and discretion to the different
countries that comprise coastal South Asia to determine the structure of their own coastal
laws, which nevertheless has to be consistent with the basic principles identified in the
regional level instrument.32

11.3 EPILOGUE
While climate change and tempestuous seas may not result in the total annihilation of life
on earth, it is certain that the planet our succeeding generations will inherit will be vastly
different from the one we inherited from our forefathers. Sandy beaches, by then, will
31
32
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more or less have completely been replaced by concrete sea walls; most marine species,
corals, sea-grass beds, mangroves and other organisms will be specimens for public
viewing in museums and aquariums; traditional fisheries will have collapsed; and several
island nations will be completely wiped off the map. Drawing from the preceding
chapters, it is amply clear that coastal countries in the South Asian region cannot, on their
own, effectively or adequately respond to the challenges posed by climate change and
SLR. And while the associated rises in air and water temperature, changes in
precipitation patters, SLR, increased storminess, winds, surges in CO2 concentration,
disruptions in ocean circulation are presently taking a toll in South Asia and will only
intensify in the near future (depending on the nature and extent of human interference in
the coastal ecosystems), the ensuing consequences can be overwhelming if the warning
signals are misunderstood and action not initiated. Bold steps are needed to purge
systemic weaknesses that impair ICZM implementation in South Asia. Presently, the best
bet for these coastal nations is to regulate human activity in the coastal environment
through the instrumentality of coastal law. A coastal law offers consistency and helps to
bind the shifting sands, enabling fine-tuning of coastal management practices and
implementation of coastal climate change adaptation.
In short, there has to be a reorientation towards sustainable coastal development. As
this study points out, this can be accomplished in three ways, namely, 1) developing a
regional regime on ICZM (to further CCCA and to balance coastal environmental
protection and development) and thereby utilize some of the principles/elements
identified in this study to strengthen the existing SASAP vis-à-vis ICZM implementation;
2) enact/re-engineer national coastal legislations based on the identified principles and
develop ICZM plans and programmes; and 3) implement specific CCCA actions and
initiate measures to improve the adaptive capacities of coastal communities via the ICZM
methodology. It is imperative that coastal nations adopt a proactive approach to coastal
management as soon as possible, as the question is not whether the seas will rise but
when, which means that preparedness is essential. Acting now rather than later gives
countries time to re-model the principles/elements identified in this thesis to their
particular circumstances in designing their coastal laws.

557

At the national level, an omnibus coastal law emerges as the cornerstone of the
mosaic that is being suggested. Action is urgently required and any apathy by coastal
South Asian states in this regard is tantamount to placing oneself on the path of selfdestruction. SCD is no longer an aspiration but an attainable objective, and ICZM, due to
its holistic nature that strives to balance CCCA with coastal environmental protection and
development, provides the means. In the end, the clarion call for change has been
sounded and the movement towards SCD has been initiated. The lessons and schematic
map for coastal law reform that this thesis offers are not intended in any way to be
iconoclastic; rather, the emphasis is on identifying pragmatic solutions that utilize the
legal instrumentality for results. While grounded in a South Asian context, these solutions
are applicable to other coastal countries and regions as well. Climate change, SLR,
coastal degradation, and coastal urbanisation are themes that cut across national and
regional boundaries and will fundamentally reconfigure coastal zones. The costs of
inaction can be huge in terms of lives and property. Coastal South Asia has reached a cul
de sac, and the only way out of this seeming dead end is to work cooperatively to forge
regional-level ICZM and coastal climate change adaptation, thereby to strengthen
national-level coastal laws, management systems, capacity and implementation.
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ILM 161 (entered into force 16 November 1999).
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc
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164/37, 8 September 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (entered into force 11 December 2001)
[Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement], art 6(3).
Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 1985, online: SAARC
Disaster Management Centre <http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/charter.pdf>.
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24
October 1945).
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16
November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151, 11 ILM 1358 (entered into force 17 December 1975),
[World Heritage Convention].
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16
November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151, 11 ILM 1358 (entered into force 17 December 1975).
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the
Mediterranean, online: European Environment Agency <http://www.eea.europa.e u/>
[Amended Barcelona Convention].
Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, 16 February
1976, 15 ILM 290 (entered into force 12 February 1978, revised in Barcelona, Spain, on
10 June 1995 as the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, entered into force on 9 July 2004).
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Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 25
February 1991, 30 ILM 802 (entered into force 10 September 1997) [Espoo Convention].
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn), 23 June
1979, 19 ILM 15 (entered into force 1 November 1983).
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 2
February 1971, 996 UNTS 245, 11 ILM 963 (entered into force 21 December 1975)
[Ramsar Convention].
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into
force 22 April 1954).
Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Annex II:
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1.2.1.3
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[2000] OJ, L 327/1.
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1.2.1.8.1 Statute
Guyana, Environmental Protection Agency, Integrated Coastal Zone Management Action
Plan (Guyana: EPA, 2000).
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1.2.1.9.2 Delegated Legislation and Miscellaneous Government Documents
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(N, SO 329(E), 2001, India), online: MoEF <http://www.moef.nic.in/legis/crz/so329(e).
pdf>.
Andaman and Nicobar Coastal Zone Management Authority Order (O SO 2058 (E) 2008,
India).
Coastal Management Zone Notification 2008 (SO 1761 (E)/ 2008, India).
Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO19(E), 2011, India).
Coastal Regulation Zone Notification for National Coastal Zone Management Authority
(N SO991 (E) 1998, India).
Coastal Regulation Zone Notification of 2011 (N SO470 (E) 2002, India).
Coastal Zone Management Notification 2008 (S0 1761(E)/2008 India), online: Ministry
of Environment & Forests, Government of India <http://www.envfor.nic.in/legis /crz/so1070(e).pdf>.
Declaration of Coastal Stretches as Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) and Regulating
Activities in the CRZ (SO 114(E)/1991 India), online: Ministry of Environment &
Forests, Government of India <http://www.envfor.nic.in/legis/crz/crznew.pdf>.
Department of Environment, Forests and Wildlife, Ministry of Environment and Forests,
Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (SO19(E), India).
Draft Coastal Management Zone Notification, (SO No1070(E), of 2008 (India).
Island Protection Zone Notification (N, SO20(E), 2011, India).
Natural Calamities - Tsunami 2004 - Housing Reconstruction Policy 2005 (GO Ms No
172, Tamil Nadu) online: Revenue (NC III) Department <http://www.tn.gov.in/go
rders/rev/rev-e-172-2005.htm>.
Orissa Coastal Zone Management Authority Order (O SO 1759(E) 2008, India).
Reconstituting the National Coastal Zone Management Authority (N SO302 (E) 2011).
The Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (N, SO114(E) 1991, India).

1.2.1.10

Israel

1.2.1.10.1 Statute
Law for the Protection of the Coastal Environment Law 2004 (No 5764 of 2004, Israel).

1.2.1.11

Kenya

1.2.1.11.1 Statutes
Environmental Management and Co-Ordination Act, 1999, (Kenya), No 8 of 1999.

1.2.1.11.2 ICZM Plans
Kenya, National Environment Management Authority, Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Action Plan for Kenya, 2011-2015 (Nairobi: NEMA, [nd]).
Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources & NEMA, Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) Action Plan for Kenya, 2010-2014: Towards Integrated
Management of Kenya’s Coastal and Marine Resources [nd].
1.2.1.2
Maldives
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1.2.1.2.1 Constitution and Statutes
Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 2008, translated by Dheena Hussain, online:
Ministry of Tourism Arts and Culture <http://www.maldivesinfo.gov.mv/home/upl
oad/downloads/Compilation.pdf>.
Environment Protection and Preservation Act of Maldives (Law No 4/93).
Environmental Protection and Preservation Act of Maldives, 1993 (Act No 4/1993,
Maldives).
Maldives Tourism Act (Law No 2/99).
Maldives, Act on Decentralization of the Administrative Divisions of the Maldives, 2010
(Draft),
online:
shareefweb
<http://www.shareefweb.com/documents/LocalGov
Reforms/MaldivesDraftlaw&regulations/Draft%20Translation%20of%20decentra
lisation%20ActMaldives.pdf>.
Maldivian Land Act (Law No 1/2002, Maldives).
The Fisheries Law of the Maldives the Fisheries Law (Law No 5/87, 1987 Maldives).

1.2.1.12.2 Regulations
Maldives, Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water, Environmental Impact
Assessment Regulations, 2007 (Maldives, [nd]).

1.2.1.12.3 Policy and Miscellaneous Documents
Maldives, GEF, UNDP & Ministry of Environment, Energy & Water, National
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) [nd], online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc
.int/resource/docs/napa/mdv01.pdf>.
The Government of Maldives, “Aneh Dhivehi Raajje”: The Strategic Action Plan,
National Framework for Development 2009-2013, online: The President’s Office,
Republic of Maldives <http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv/>.

1.2.1.13 Marshall Islands
1.2.1.13.1 Statute
Coast Conservation Act 1988 (PL 1988-13, Marshall Islands).

1.2.1.14 New Zealand
1.2.1.14.1 Statutes
Building Act 2004 (NZ), 2004/72.
Foreshore and Seabed Act, 2004.
Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ), 2011/3.
Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ), 1991/69.

1.2.1.14.2 Policy and Other Documents
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New Zealand, Dep’t of Conservation, New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010
(Wellington: Dep’t of Conservation, 2010) policy 24.
New Zealand, Ministry for the Envt, Coastal Hazards and Climate Change: A Guidance
Manual for Local Government in New Zealand, 2d ed (Wellington: Ministry for the Envt,
2008).

1.2.1.15 Pakistan
1.2.1.15.1 Statutes
Balochistan Coastal Development Authority (Amendment) Act 2003 (No VII of 2003,
Balochistan).
Balochistan Coastal Development Authority (Amendment) Ordinance 2001 (No XVII of
2001, Balochistan).
Balochistan Coastal Development Authority Act 1998 (No 1 of 1998, Balochistan).
Coastal Development Authority (Amendment) Act 2006 (No VIII of 2006, Sindh).
Coastal Development Authority Act 1994 (No XXVIII of 1994, Sindh).
Coastal Development Authority Act, 1990, (Kenya), No 20 of 1990.
Easements Act, 1882 (No V of 1882, Pakistan).
Fisheries Act, 1897 (IV of 1897, Pakistan).
Forest Act, 1927 (XVI of 1927, Pakistan).
Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act 1976 (22 December 1976, Pakistan).

1.2.1.15.2 Policy and Miscellaneous Documents
IUCN Pakistan & Gov’t of Balochistan, Balochistan Conservation Strategy (Karachi:
Strategy (Karachi: IUCN Pakistan & Gov't of Balochistan, 2000).
Pakistan, Ministry of Climate Change, National Climate Change Policy (Islamabad:
Ministry of Climate Change, 2012).

1.2.1.16

South Africa

1.2.1.16.1 Constitution, Statutes and Bills
Climate Change and Greenhouse Emissions Reduction Act 2007 (SA).
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (S Afr), No 108 of 1996.
National Environmental Management Act, (S Afr), No 1540 of 1998.
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004, (S Afr), No 10 of 2004.
National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Amendment Bill, 2013, Notice
1046 of 2012, online: South Africa Gov’t Online <http://www.info.gov.za/view/D
ownloadFileAction?id =180951>.
National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act, (S Afr), No
24 of 2008.
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National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act, 2003, (S Afr), No 57 of
2003.
National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008, (S Afr), No 59 of 2008.
Sea-Shore Act, 1935, (S Afr), No 21 of 1935.

1.2.1.16.2 Policy, Papers and Miscellaneous Documents
Coastal Management Policy Programme, White Paper for Sustainable Coastal
Development in South Africa: Our Coast, Our Future (Department of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism, April 2000).
South Africa, Dep’t of Environmental Affairs, National Climate Change Response Green
Paper (2010).
South Africa, National Climate Change Response White Paper (np, 2011).
South Africa, White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa (np:
Dep't of Environmental Affairs & Tourism, 2000).

1.2.1.17

Sri Lanka

1.2.1.17.1 Statutes
Coast Conservation (Amendment) Act 1988 (No 64 of 1988, Sri Lanka).
Coast Conservation (Amendment) Act 2011 (No 49 of 2011, Sri Lanka).
Coast Conservation (Amendment) Act, No 64 of 1988.
Coast Conservation Act (No 57 of 1981 Sri Lanka).
Coast Conservation Act (No 57 of 1981, Sri Lanka), as amended by Coast Conservation
Amendment Act, No 49 of 2011.
Coast Conservation Act 1981 (No 57 of 1981, Sri Lanka), as amended by Coast
Conservation (Amendment) Act 1988 (No 64 of 1988, Sri Lanka).
Fauna and Flora Protection Ordinance, 1937 (No 2 of 1937, Sri Lanka), as amended by
Fauna and Flora Protection (Amendment) Act, No 49 of 1993.
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act (No 2 of 1996, Sri Lanka).
Marine Pollution Prevention Act, 1981 (No 59 of 1981, Sri Lanka).
Soil Conservation Act (Nos 25 of 1951 & 29 of 1953, Sri Lanka).
The Marine Pollution Prevention Act (No 59 of 1981, Sri Lanka).

1.2.1.17.2 ICZM Plans, Policy Documents and Miscellaneous Documents
Coast Conservation Department, Revised Coastal Zone Management Plan, Sri Lanka
1997, Rev ed (Colombo: Coast Conservation Department of the Ministry of Fisheries &
Aquatic Resources Development, 1997).
National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Sri Lanka 2011 to 2016: Final Draft
(2010), online: Climate Change Secretariat <http://www.climatechange.lk/adaptati
on/Files/Strategy_Booklet-Final_for_Print_Low_res(1).pdf>.
National Oil Spill Contingency Plan, online: Marine Environment Protection Authority
<http://www.mepa.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Ite
mid=50&lang=en >
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Sri Lanka, Coast Conservation Department, Coastal Zone Management Plan, Sri Lanka
2006 (Colombo: Coast Conservation Department of the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources Development, 2006), online: Coast Conservation Department
<http://www.coastal.gov.lk/czmp%20english.pdf>.
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Environment, National Policy on Sand as a Resource for the
Construction Industry – 2005 (Draft), online: ELAW <http://www.elaw.org/node
/1584>.
Sri Lanka, Ministry of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources, Ten Year Development Policy
Framework of the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Sector 2007-2016 (March
2007).

1.2.1.18

United Kingdom

1.2.1.18.1 Statutes and Bills
Climate Change Act 2008 (UK).
Flood and Water Management Act, 2010 (UK), c 29.
Localism Act 2011 (UK), c 20.
Marine (Scotland) Act, ASP 2010, c 5.
Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (UK), 2009.
UK, Dep’t of the Envt, Northern Ireland, Marine Bill, online: DOENI, As Introduced, <
http://www.doeni.gov.uk/>.

1.2.1.18.2 Policy and Miscellaneous Documents
Environment Agency, Prepare your property for flooding, online: Environment Agency,
Home and Leisure, Floods <http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk>.
National Adaptation Programme, online: GOV.UK, Climate Change, Adapting to
Climate Change, Detail: National Adaptation Programme <https://www.gov.uk/
government/policies>.
Shoreline Management Plans - the second generation (SMPs), online: Environment
Agency, Research, Planning <http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/>.
UK, DEFRA & EA, “Understanding the Risks, Empowering Communities, Building
Resilience: The National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy for
England Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 7 of the Flood and Water
Management Act 2010” (np, 2011).
UK, DEFRA, A Strategy for Promoting An Integrated Approach to the Management of
Coastal Areas in England (London: Dep't for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2008).
UK, DEFRA, Adapting to Coastal Change: Developing a Policy Framework (London:
Dep't for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2010).
Welsh Gov’t, Making the Most of Wales’ Coast: The Integrated Coastal Zone
Management Strategy for Wales (2007), online: Welsh Government <http://wale
s.gov.uk/?lang=en>.

1.2.1.19

United States
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1.2.1.19.1 Statutes (Federal and States)
California Coastal Act of 1976, 20 PRC §30235.
Coastal Public Lands Management Act, 1973 (NRC §§33.003-33.176 (1973)).
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub L No 109-58 (codified as amended at 16
USC §1451- 1465 (2005)).
Federal Coastal Zone Management Act, Pub L No 92-583, 86 Stat 1280 (codified as
amended at 16 USC §1451-1464 (West 1985 & Supp 1999)).
Open Beaches Act, 61 NRC §61 (1959).
Shoreline Management Act, 1971, Wash RC §90.58 (1971).
South Carolina Beachfront Management Act, 1988, SCC tit 48-39 §§250-360.
Submerged Lands Act, 1953, 43 USC §§1301-15 (1952).
Texas Coastal Coordination Act, 1991, 31 TAC §§501.
US, HB 819, An Act to Study and Modify Certain Coastal Management Policies, 2011,
GA Sess, NC, 2011, online: NCCF <http://www.nccoast.org/uploads/documen
ts/CRO/2012-5/SLR-bill.pdf>.
US, Living Shoreline Protection Act, Md C Ann Envir §16-201 (2008).

1.2.1.19.2 Executive Order
US, Office of the Governor of the State of California, Executive Order S-13-08 (14
November 2008).

1.2.1.19.3 Policy and Miscellaneous Documents
California Ocean Protection Council, Resolution of the California Ocean Protection
Council on Sea‐Level Rise (11 March 2011), online: California State Lands Commission
<http://www.slc.ca.gov/>.
Texas General Land Office, The Coastal Erosion Planning and Response Act, online:
Texas General Land Office, What We Do, Caring for the Coast, Grants & Funding
<http://www.glo.texas.gov/>.
US Dep’t of Commerce, Coastal Zone Management Program Strategic Plan: Improving
Management of the Nation’s Coastal Areas FY 2007–2012, online: US Dep’t of
Commerce, Ocean & Coastal Resource Management <http://coastalmanagement.n
oaa.gov/>.
US, California Emergency Management Agency & California Natural Resources
Agency, California Adaptation Planning Guide: Planning for Adaptive Communities (np:
2012).
US, California Natural Resources Agency, 2009 California Climate Adaptation Strategy:
A Report to the Governor of the State of California in Response to Executive Order S-132008 (California Natural Resources Agency, [nd]).
US, NOAA Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, Adapting to Climate
Change: A Planning Guide for State Coastal Managers (Silver Spring, MD: National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2010).
US, Office of Ocean & Coastal Resource Management, Dep’t of Commerce & State of
Texas, Combined Coastal Management Program and Final Environmental Impact
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Statement for the State of Texas (Office of Ocean & Coastal Resource Management, State
of Texas, 1996).
US, Senate, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, and the
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, with Annex: Message from the President of the United States, 103d
Cong, 2d Sess, Treaty Doc 103-39 (1994), online: US Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Treaties, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
<http://www.foreign.senate.gov/>.
US, State of California Sea-Level Rise Guidance Document (March 2013), online: State
of California: Ocean Protection Council <http://www.opc.ca.gov/>.
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Jurisprudence (National Cases)
Australia

Alanvale Pty Ltd & Anor v Southern Rural Water, (2010), VCAT 480 (Austl, VCAT).
Byron Shire Council v Vaughan, Vaughan v Byron Shire Council, (2009), [2009]
NSWLEC 88 and (No 2) [2009] NSWLEC 110.
Cadzow Enterprises Pty Ltd v Port Phillip CC, (2010), VCAT 634 (Austl, VCAT) online:
AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/634.html>.
Cooke v. Greater Geelong CC, (2010), VCAT 60 (Austl, VCAT).
Mabo v Queensland (No 2), [1992] HCA 23, 175 CLR 1 (HC).
Myers v South Gippsland SC (includes Summary) (Red Dot), (2009), VCAT 1022 (Austl,
VCAT) online: AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2009/1022.
html>.
Myers v South Gippsland SC (No 2) (includes Summary) (Red Dot), (2009), VCAT 2414
(Austl, VCAT) online: AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/200
9/2414.html>.
Owen v Casey CC (includes Summary) (Red Dot), (2009), VCAT 1946 (Austl, VCAT)
online: AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2009/1946.html>.
Paul v Goulburn Murray Water Corporation, (2010), VCAT 1755 (Austl, VCAT),
online: AustLII <http://ww w.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/1755.html>.
Pearce v Florenca, [1976] HCA 26, 135 CLR 507 (HC).
Printz v Glenelg SC, (2010), VCAT 1975 (Austl, VCAT), online: AustLII <http://ww
w.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/1975.html>.
Seas and Submerged Lands Act case [1975] HCA 58, 135 CLR 337 (HC).
Seifert v Coloc-Otway SC, (2009), VCAT 1453, (Austl, VCAT) online: AustLII <http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2009/1453.html>.
Suburban Blue Print Pty Ltd v Hobsons Bay CC, (2010), VCAT 1272 (Austl, VCAT)
online: AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/1272.html>.
Taip v East Gippsland SC (includes Summary) (Red Dot), (2010), VCAT 1222 (Austl,
VCAT) online: AustLII <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/1222.
html> .
Wade v Warrnambool CC, (2009), VCAT 2177 (Austl, VCAT) online: AustLII <http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2009/2177.html>.
West Gippsland Catchment Management Authority v East Gippsland SC, (2010), VCAT
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1334 (Austl,
1334.html>.
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VCAT)

online:

<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2010/

Bangladesh

Farooque v Bangladesh, [1996] WP 998 of 1994, CA 24 of 1995 (Bangladesh SC),
online: Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide <http://www.elaw.org/node/130 0>.

1.2.2.3

Canada

Barima v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994) 1 FC 30 (TD).
Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] SCJ 74.
Cheung v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1993) 2 FC 314 (CA).
Fosu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 90 FTR 182, [1994]
FCJ 1813.
Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1296, 68 Imm LR
(3d) 131.
TZU (Re), (2002) RPDD 174.
Yang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCJ 1463 (TD).
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Ajit D Padiwal v India, (1998), [1998] AIR 147 (Gujarat HC).
Andolan v India, (2000) [2000] (10) SCC 664 (India SC).
AP Pollution Control Board v MV Nayudu II, (2000) [2001] 2 SCC 62 (India SC).
AP Pollution Control Board v MV Nayudu, (1999) [1999] AIR 812 (India SC).
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BK Srinivasan v Karnataka, (1987) [1987] AIR 1059 (SC India).
Bombay Environmental Action Group v Maharashtra, (1991) [1991] AIR 301 (Bombay
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Forum for Sustainable Development, Hyderabad v India, (2010) [2010] 5 ALT 189
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G Sundarrajan v India (6 May 2013) CA No 4440 of 2013 (SC India).
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